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dc.contributor.authorVatansever, Saniyeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:03:29Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:03:29Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.issn2152-5188
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/50110
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a critical analysis of two influential readings of Kant’s Second Analogy, namely, Gerd Buchdahl’s “modest reading” and Michael Friedman’s “strong reading.” After pointing out the textual and philosophical problems with each, I advance an alternative reading of the Second Analogy argument. On my reading, the Second Analogy argument proves the existence of necessary and strictly universal causal laws. This, however, does not guarantee that Kant has a solution for the problem of induction. After I explain why the empirical lawfulness of nature does not guarantee the empirical uniformity of nature, I examine the modal status of empirical laws in Kant and argue contra Buchdahl and Friedman that empirical laws express two different kinds of necessity that are not reducible to each other.
dc.description.sponsorshipI am deeply indebted to Daniel Sutherland, Sally Sedgwick, Michael Friedman, Samuel Fleischacker, Kenneth Westphal, Lucas Thorpe, Reza Hadisi, Nicholas Garcia-Mills, Keziban Der, Berk Ozcangiller, and Jack Woods, as well as audiences at the Institute for the Humanities at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Bilkent University, and Koc University, for their feedback and discussions on the earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank Michael Friedman and Graciela De Pierris for their hospitality and generosity with their time during my tenure as a visiting researcher at Stanford University. Finally, I would like to thank the editor and the anonymous referees of the journal for their extremely helpful comments.
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.source.titleHOPOS (The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1086/698658
dc.titleKant’s response to hume in the second analogy: a critique of gerd Buchdahl’s andmichael friedman’s accountsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage310en_US
dc.citation.epage346en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber8en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.relation.projectBilkent Üniversitesi - University of Illinois at Chicago, UIC - Stanford University, SU
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/698658
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorVatansever, Saniyeen_US


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