Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-11T19:57:58Z
dc.date.available2019-02-11T19:57:58Z
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.issn0734-306X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49277
dc.description.abstractEmployment relationships are governed by short‐term incomplete contracts and typically involve on‐the-job screening and firm‐specific training. This article studies a dynamic employment relationship with these features and identifies a potential conflict between the employer's twin objectives to screen and train the worker: when the training technology is quite productive, the employer may have to sacrifice from worker performance during the screening process. The article thus offers an explanation for why firms may invest suboptimally on training, which complements the standard “inappropriable rents” explanation based on ex post mobility of young employees.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Labor Economicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1086/209973en_US
dc.subjectEmploymenten_US
dc.subjectWorker performanceen_US
dc.subjectEmployeren_US
dc.subjectDynamic employment relationshipen_US
dc.titleOn‐the-job specific training and efficient screeningen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage681en_US
dc.citation.epage701en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber18en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/209973en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1537-5307


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record