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dc.contributor.authorDavenport D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T13:54:19Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T13:54:19Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.issn21926255en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/38375
dc.description.abstractThere is no doubt that AI research has made significant progress, both in helping us understand how the human mind works and in constructing ever more sophisticated machines. But, for all this, its conceptual foundations remain remarkably unclear and even unsound. In this paper, I take a fresh look, first at the context in which agents must function and so how they must act, and second, at how it is possible for agents to communicate, store and recognise (sensory) messages. This analysis allows a principled distinction to be drawn between the symbolic and connectionist paradigms, showing them to be genuine design alternatives. Further consideration of the connectionist approach seems to offer a number of interesting clues as to how the human brain—apparently of the connectionist ilk—might actually work its incredible magic. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleStudies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31674-6_4en_US
dc.titleThe two (computational) faces of AIen_US
dc.typeBook Chapteren_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.citation.spage43en_US
dc.citation.epage58en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber5en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-31674-6_4en_US
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishingen_US


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