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dc.contributor.authorAkman, V.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T13:50:20Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T13:50:20Z
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.issn0929-0907
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/38185
dc.description.abstractP.F. Strawson proposed in the early seventies a threefold distinction regarding how context bears on the meaning of 'what is said' when a sentence is uttered. The proposal was somewhat tentative and, being aware of this aspect, Strawson himself raised various questions to make it more adequate. In this paper, we review Strawson's scheme, note his concerns, and add some of our own. We also defend its essence and recommend it as an insightful entry point re the interplay of intended meaning and context.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titlePragmatics and Cognitionen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.13.2.06akmen_US
dc.subjectWhat is said'en_US
dc.subjectContexten_US
dc.subjectDisambiguationen_US
dc.subjectIllocutionary forceen_US
dc.subjectIndexicalen_US
dc.subjectLiterary theoryen_US
dc.subjectMeaningen_US
dc.subjectReferenceen_US
dc.subjectTranslationen_US
dc.titleOn Strawsonian contextsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage363en_US
dc.citation.epage382en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber13en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1075/pc.13.2.06akmen_US
dc.publisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Companyen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1569-9943


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