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dc.contributor.authorSorrell, K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T13:43:18Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T13:43:18Zen_US
dc.date.issued2015en_US
dc.identifier.issn0891-625X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/38031en_US
dc.description.abstractThis article defends Charles Peirce's "doctrine of immediate perception." This realistic view holds that conscious agents, due to the work of unconscious mind, directly perceive the world and often know objects, events, and persons as they truly are, independently of how we might prefer to think of them (what is known as our realist intuition). The doctrine provides a promising alternative to more recent views insisting that all experience of the world and other persons is ineluctably mediated by language, along with the categories and biases language inevitably imposes. Peirce's view is further explicated in terms of what neuroscientists now call the "new" unconscious (but to which Peirce contributed to earlier) and supported by recent work in both neuroscience and empirical psychology, especially experiments involving infants. The article supports the conclusion that, while much experience is mediated by language (often helpfully so), direct (and desirable) access to a world that informs and often surprises us persists throughout conscious experience. Copyright © 2015 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Speculative Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.29.4.0457en_US
dc.subjectNew unconsciousen_US
dc.subjectEvolutionen_US
dc.subjectImmediate perceptionen_US
dc.subjectLanguageen_US
dc.subjectPeirceen_US
dc.titlePeirce, immediate perception, and the "New" unconscious: neuroscience and empirical psychology in support of a "Well-Known Doctrine"en_US
dc.typeReviewen_US
dc.departmentProgram in Cultures, Civilizations, and Ideasen_US
dc.citation.spage457en_US
dc.citation.epage473en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.5325/jspecphil.29.4.0457en_US
dc.publisherPenn State University Pressen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1527-9383


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