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dc.contributor.authorSarıtaş, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYüksel S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGezici, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T11:03:09Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T11:03:09Z
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/37112
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleIEEE Transactions on Automatic Controlen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2016.2578843en_US
dc.subjectCheap talken_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectInformation theoryen_US
dc.subjectQuantizationen_US
dc.subjectSignaling gamesen_US
dc.titleQuadratic multi-dimensional signaling games and affine equilibriaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.citation.spage605en_US
dc.citation.epage619en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber62en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TAC.2016.2578843en_US
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.en_US


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