A territorial conflict: trade-offs and strategies

Date
2018
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Source Title
Defence and Peace Economics
Print ISSN
1024-2694
Electronic ISSN
1476-8267
Publisher
Routledge
Volume
29
Issue
6
Pages
1 - 10
Language
English
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Abstract

We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of winning). This paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict. © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

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