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dc.contributor.authorWringe, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:38:18Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:38:18Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.identifier.issn0966-8373
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36389
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of (moral) obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not simply reducible to individual obligations; and that collective obligations supervene on individual obligations, without being reducible to them. The sort of supervenience I have in mind here is what is sometimes called ‘global supervenience’. In other words, there cannot be two worlds which differ in respect of the collective obligations which exist in them without also differing in respect of the individual obligations which exist in them. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltden_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEuropean Journal of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12076en_US
dc.titleCollective obligations: their existence, their explanatory power, and their supervenience on the obligations of individualsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage472en_US
dc.citation.epage497en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber24en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ejop.12076en_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US


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