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dc.contributor.authorWringe, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:38:17Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:38:17Z
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.issn2161-2234
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36388
dc.description.abstractAmbivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's response.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleThoughten_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.243en_US
dc.subjectAmbivalenceen_US
dc.subjectCognitivismen_US
dc.subjectEmotionen_US
dc.subjectNeo-stoicismen_US
dc.subjectPhenomenologyen_US
dc.titleAmbivalence for cognitivists: a lesson from chrysippus?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage147en_US
dc.citation.epage156en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber6en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/tht3.243en_US
dc.publisherJohn Wiley and Sons Ltden_US
dc.embargo.release2019-09-07en_US


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