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dc.contributor.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorTeoman, Ece
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-14T12:50:19Z
dc.date.available2017-09-14T12:50:19Z
dc.date.copyright2017-07
dc.date.issued2017-07
dc.date.submitted2017-09-13
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/33606
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2017.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 25).en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we explore monotonicities and implementability of di erent matching rules. We nd a self-monotonicity of the stable rule and an h-monotonicity for the men-optimal rule, which does not satisfy Maskin-monotonicity. We then o er a sequential matching mechanism that implements the men-optimal rule in subgame perfect equilibrium, when there is no other matching that weakly Pareto-dominates the men-optimal matching for men. In our mechanism, women propose to men in an arbitrary hierarchy order, and each man either accepts or rejects the proposals he receives, where accepting means permanent matching with the proposing woman.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Ece Teoman.en_US
dc.format.extentvii, 25 leaves ; 29 cmen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectImplementationen_US
dc.subjectMen-Optimal Stable Matchingen_US
dc.subjectMatching Theoryen_US
dc.subjectSelf-Monotonicityen_US
dc.subjectSubgame Perfect Equilibriumen_US
dc.titleSubgame perfect implementation of men-optimal matchingsen_US
dc.title.alternativeErkek-optimal eşleşmelerin alt-oyun-yetkin uygulanmasıen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB156251


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