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dc.contributor.advisorÖzgüler, Arif Bülent
dc.contributor.authorNiazi, Muhammad Umar B.
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-25T12:41:07Z
dc.date.available2017-08-25T12:41:07Z
dc.date.copyright2017-08
dc.date.issued2017-08
dc.date.submitted2017-08-22
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/33558
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2017en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 53-58).en_US
dc.description.abstractHow do people living in a society form their opinions on daily or prevalent topics? A noncooperative di erential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics, where the agents' motives are shaped by how susceptible they are to others' in uence, how stubborn they are, and how quick they are willing to change their opinions on socially prevalent issues is considered here. The agents connected through a multilayer network interact with each other on a set of issues (layers) for a nite time duration. They express their opinions, listen to others' and, hence, mutually in uence each other. The tendency of agents to interact with people of similar traits, known as homophily, restricts them in their own localities, which may correspond to ethnicity but may as well be the ideological ones. This governs their interpersonal in uences and is the cause of clustering in the network. As the agents build their biases, they also create conceptions about the correlation between the issues. As a result, antagonistic interactions arise if the agents see each other as holding inconsistent opinions on the issues according to their individual conceptions. This way the interpersonal in uence becomes ine ective leading to con ict and disagreement between the agents. The dynamic game formulated here takes these subtle issues into account. The game is proved to admit a unique Nash equilibrium under a mild necessary and su cient condition. This condition is argued to be ful lled if there is some harmony of views among the agents in the network. The harmony may be in the form of similarity in pairwise conceptions about the issues but may also be a collective agreement on the status of a leader in the network. Since the agents do not seek any social motive in the game but their own individual motives, the existence of a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as an emergent collective behavior out of the noncooperative actions of the agents.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Muhammad Umar B. Niazi.en_US
dc.format.extentxii, 58 leaves : charts ; 29 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial networksen_US
dc.subjectDynamic game theoryen_US
dc.subjectOpinion dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectOptimal controlen_US
dc.titleA noncooperative dynamic game model of opinion dynamics in multilayer social networksen_US
dc.title.alternativeÇok katmanlı sosyal ağlarda oluşan görüşlerin bir işbirliksiz dinamik oyun olarak modellenmesien_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB156110


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