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dc.contributor.advisorKoray, Semihen_US
dc.contributor.authorİdem, Mehmet Hamdi Berken_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-22T06:59:30Z
dc.date.available2016-08-22T06:59:30Z
dc.date.copyright2016-07
dc.date.issued2016-07
dc.date.submitted2016-08-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/32152
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2016.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 38-39).en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we study the networks that arise in the equilibrium when risk averse investors play a network formation game for making joint investments with each other. The outcomes of these projects are stochastic and hence, depending on the shock realizations, investors may choose to default. However, counterparty defaults are damaging and investors have the option to buy default insurances against this damage. We show that in this model, equilibrium networks consist of complete components of a certain size, which maximize the expected utility of investors in that component. For a wide variety of parameters, it turns out that investors choose not to buy any insurance at the equilibrium.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityMehmet Hamdi Berk İdem.en_US
dc.format.extentvii, 39 leaves.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectDefault Insuranceen_US
dc.subjectNetwork Formationen_US
dc.subjectRisk Aversionen_US
dc.subjectStrong-Stabilityen_US
dc.subjectSystemic Risken_US
dc.titleNetwork formation with systemic risk and default insuranceen_US
dc.title.alternativeSistemik risk ve iflas sigortası ile ağ oluşumuen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB153722


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