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dc.contributor.advisorPınar, Mustafa Ç.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBayrak, Halil İbrahimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-01T11:11:32Z
dc.date.available2016-07-01T11:11:32Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/30061
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.description.abstractFor the sale of a single object through an auction, we assume discrete type space for agents and make use of linear programming to find optimal mechanism design for a risk-neutral seller. First, we show that the celebrated incentive compatible mechanism, second price auction, is not optimal. We find a slightly different optimal mechanism referred to as “discrete second price auction”. Second we consider the problem of allocation with costly inspection. We obtain the optimal solution in the form of a favored-agent mechanism by the Greedy Algorithm. Moreover, we relax the common prior assumption and maximize the worst-case utility of an ambiguity averse seller for the two problems mentioned above. While the problem does not yield a useful optimal mechanism in general, optimal solutions for some special cases are obtained.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityBayrak, Halil İbrahimen_US
dc.format.extentviii, 58 leavesen_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectLinear programmingen_US
dc.subjectAuction designen_US
dc.subjectCostly verificationen_US
dc.subjectAmbiguity aversionen_US
dc.subject.lccB151126en_US
dc.titleAuction design and optimal allocation by linear programmingen_US
dc.title.alternativeDoğrusal programlama ile ihale tasarımı ve en iyi atamaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineeringen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB151126


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