Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorOzguler, A. B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYildiz, A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T12:11:24Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T12:11:24Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn1474-6670
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/28111
dc.description.abstractThe question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleIFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.3182/20120914-2-US-4030.00046en_US
dc.subjectDynamic gameen_US
dc.subjectForagingen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectSwarmen_US
dc.subjectSwarming behavioren_US
dc.titleSwarming behavior as Nash equilibriumen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.citation.spage151en_US
dc.citation.epage155en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber45en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber26en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3182/20120914-2-US-4030.00046en_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record