A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities

Date
1998
Authors
Alemdar, N. M.
Özyıldırım, S.
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Source Title
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Print ISSN
0165-1889
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Publisher
Elsevier BV
Volume
22
Issue
6
Pages
811 - 832
Language
English
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Abstract

A genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Non-cooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Short of a joint maximization of the global welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

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