Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKoray, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorUnel, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:29:55Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:29:55Z
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/24473
dc.description.abstractSelf-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550200195en_US
dc.subjectSocial choiceen_US
dc.subjectChoice functionen_US
dc.subjectChoice ruleen_US
dc.subjectSocial choice functionen_US
dc.subjectSocial choice ruleen_US
dc.titleCharacterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domainen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage495en_US
dc.citation.epage507en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber20en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s003550200195en_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.identifier.eissn1432-217X


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record