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dc.contributor.authorDemir, H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:06:32Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:06:32Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/22922
dc.description.abstractCohen and Meskin 2006 recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, I show that none of these is really an advantage. Moreover, the counterfactual theory fails to satisfy one of the basic properties of information flow, namely the Conjunction principle. Thus, I conclude, there is no reason to give up the standard probabilistic theory for the counterfactual theory of information.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleAustralasian Journal of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400701846541en_US
dc.titleCounterfactuals vs. conditional probabilities: a critical analysis of the counterfactual theory of informationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage45en_US
dc.citation.epage60en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber86en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00048400701846541en_US


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