Counterfactuals vs. conditional probabilities: a critical analysis of the counterfactual theory of information
Author
Demir, H.
Date
2008Source Title
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Print ISSN
0004-8402
Volume
86
Issue
1
Pages
45 - 60
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
117
views
views
115
downloads
downloads
Abstract
Cohen and Meskin 2006 recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, I show that none of these is really an advantage. Moreover, the counterfactual theory fails to satisfy one of the basic properties of information flow, namely the Conjunction principle. Thus, I conclude, there is no reason to give up the standard probabilistic theory for the counterfactual theory of information.