An analysis of strategic behavior in eBAY auctions
Author
Gonzalez, R.
Hasker, K.
Sickles, R. C.
Date
2009Source Title
Singapore Economic Review
Print ISSN
0217-5908
Electronic ISSN
1793-6837
Publisher
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Volume
54
Issue
3
Pages
441 - 472
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
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Abstract
A relatively new type of panel data analysis is becoming more and more topical in the applied econometrics literature as auction mechanisms are being explored in more depth. The typical data utilized in such studies involves repeated measures of auction outcomes, where the variable of interest involves order statistics from the sample of bids from many bids on completed auctions for a particular commodity. This article presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. We exploit characteristics of such repeated measures to analyze the efficiency of private value auctions for a relatively homogeneous good, computer monitors sold on eBay. We discuss how outcomes of the auction mechanism can be analyzed and their equilibrium outcomes assessed and evaluate the consumer surplus that is generated from such auctions. Particular attention is given to the collection of the eBay data from data recovery protocols that monitor in real time and in relative detail, characteristics of a particular auction with heterogeneity controls for different types of monitors and for different reputation effects of the auctioneer. Among other findings, our results point to a rejection of the use of Jump Bidding (Avery, 1998) or "Snipe or War" bidding (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002). We also find that longer auctions only have a small effect on price and experienced auctioneers respond to this incentive. © 2009 World Scientific Publishing Company.
Keywords
English auctionsInternet auctions
Simulated nonlinear least squares
Structural econometrics
Commodity market
Econometrics
Estimation method
Incentive
Internet
Least squares method
Panel data