Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAranyosi, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:00:06Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:00:06Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.issn0967-2559
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/22439
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical (understood as broadly logical) possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleInternational Journal of Philosophical Studiesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550903493544en_US
dc.subjectCausal essentialismen_US
dc.subjectConceivabilityen_US
dc.subjectModal argumentsen_US
dc.subjectPhysicalismen_US
dc.subjectZombiesen_US
dc.titlePowers and the mind-body problemen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage57en_US
dc.citation.epage72en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber18en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09672550903493544en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record