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dc.contributor.authorSarigil, Z.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:57:02Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:57:02Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.issn1354-0661
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/22216
dc.description.abstractBy analyzing the case of a bargaining situation in an institutionalized setting, which derives from Turkey's reform process in a sensitive issue area (civil-military relations), this study assesses the explanatory power of competing models of bargaining: rational, normative, and discursive/argumentative. The bargaining outcome in this case was puzzling because despite the existence of a strongly pro-status quo veto player (i.e. the military), the bargaining processes led to a new status quo.This study shows that the veto player simply failed to prevent a shift to a new status quo because such an action would do substantial damage to the military's ideational concerns (normative entrapment). The rational model remains under-socialized, while the discursive model is over-socialized in analyzing this bargaining situation. Although the normative model sheds more light on this puzzling outcome, a synthesis between normative and rational models would provide us with much better insight. © The Author(s) 2010.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEuropean Journal of International Relationsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066109344009en_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectCivil-military relationsen_US
dc.subjectNormative entrapmenten_US
dc.subjectVeto playeren_US
dc.titleBargaining in institutionalized settings: the case of Turkish reformsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Political Science and Public Administrationen_US
dc.citation.spage463en_US
dc.citation.epage483en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber16en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1354066109344009en_US
dc.publisherSage Publications Ltd.en_US


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