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dc.contributor.authorBerkovski, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:52:15Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:52:15Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21869
dc.description.abstractI examine Reichenbach's theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman's interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach's view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach's account from Kant's apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl's theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSyntheseen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9591-zen_US
dc.subjectConventionen_US
dc.subjectFriedmanen_US
dc.subjectReichenbachen_US
dc.subjectRelative a priorien_US
dc.subjectWeylen_US
dc.titleReichenbach and weyl on apriority and mathematical applicabilityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage63en_US
dc.citation.epage77en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber181en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-009-9591-zen_US


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