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dc.contributor.authorMichaelian, K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:46:26Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:46:26Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn0268-1064
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21443
dc.description.abstractReal agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the 'endorsement problem': how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this article argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the endorsement problem.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleMind and Languageen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01445.xen_US
dc.titleMetacognition and endorsementen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage284en_US
dc.citation.epage307en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber27en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01445.xen_US


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