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dc.contributor.authorKörpeoǧlu, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorŞen, A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGüler, K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:40:56Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:40:56Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.issn3772217en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21085
dc.description.abstractWe consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm's type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEuropean Journal of Operational Researchen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.004en_US
dc.subjectEconomic Order Quantity modelen_US
dc.subjectInformation asymmetryen_US
dc.subjectInventoryen_US
dc.subjectJoint replenishmenten_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative game theoryen_US
dc.subjectEconomic order quantity modelsen_US
dc.subjectInformation asymmetryen_US
dc.subjectInventoryen_US
dc.subjectJoint replenishmenten_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative game theoryen_US
dc.subjectEconomic analysisen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectIndustryen_US
dc.subjectAggregatesen_US
dc.titleNon-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineering
dc.citation.spage434en_US
dc.citation.epage443en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber227en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.004en_US


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