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dc.contributor.authorBochet O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorIlkiliç, R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMoulin H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:40:23Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:40:23Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.issn220531en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21058
dc.description.abstractAgents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers.Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Economic Theoryen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016en_US
dc.subjectBipartite graphen_US
dc.subjectEgalitarianismen_US
dc.subjectLorenz dominanceen_US
dc.subjectSingle-peaked preferencesen_US
dc.subjectStrategyproofnessen_US
dc.titleEgalitarianism under earmark constraintsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.citation.spage535en_US
dc.citation.epage562en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber148en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016en_US


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