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dc.contributor.advisorSağlam, H. Çağrı
dc.contributor.authorTuran, Agah Reha
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T20:06:52Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T20:06:52Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/17113
dc.descriptionAnkara : The Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Univ., 2013.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.) -- Bilkent University, 2013.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical refences.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis includes three self contained essays on the existence and qualitative properties of equilibrium dynamics under endogenous time preference. In the Örst essay, we reconsider the optimal growth model proposed by Stern (2006). We prove the almost everywhere di§erentiability of the value function and uniqueness of the optimal path, which were left as open questions and show how a small perturbation to the price of future oriented capital qualitatively changes the equilibrium dynamics. Almost none of the studies on endogenous time preference consider the strategic interaction among the agents. In the second essay, by considering a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference, we provide the su¢ cient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. We numerically show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself. Lastly, in the third essay, we consider the socially determined time preference which depends on the level of Ösh stock and characterize the basic Öshery model under this setup. We provide existence of collusive and open-loop Nash equilibria and compare the e¢ ciency and qualitative properties of them.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityTuran, Agah Rehaen_US
dc.format.extentxii, 94 leaves, graphicsen_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous Time Preferenceen_US
dc.subjectSupermodular Gamesen_US
dc.subjectLattice Programmingen_US
dc.subjectDynamic Resource Gamesen_US
dc.subject.lccHD75.5 .T87 2013en_US
dc.subject.lcshEconomic development--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshMathematical optimization.en_US
dc.subject.lcshValues.en_US
dc.subject.lcshEquilibrium (Economics)en_US
dc.subject.lcshStrategic planning.en_US
dc.subject.lcshGame theory.en_US
dc.titleEssays on endogenous time preference and strategic interactionen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US


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