We study the emergence of reference points in a bilateral, infinite horizon, alternating offers bargaining game. Players’ preferences exhibit reference dependence, and their current offers have the potential to influence ...

We study product development in a firm, utilizing a multistage contest model (i.e., race) with an endogenous length (with one stage or two stages) between two workers. We model the payments to workers using the normatively ...

We model costly preparations in negotiations and study their effect on agreements in a bilateral bargaining game. In our model, players bargain over a unit pie, where each player needs to pay a fixed cost in the beginning ...

We study the emergence of reference points in a bilateral, infinite horizon, alternating offers bargaining game. Players’ preferences exhibit reference dependence, and their current offers have the potential to influence ...

We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered ...

We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, ...