Junior managers' learning decisions and career expectations, promotion criteria, and parent firms' growth strategies are interdependent. We study this interdependence in a two-stage game where a junior manager invests in ...

We present a model of tariff disputes and concessions consisting of an infinitely repeated game under bilateral incomplete information. Given potential agreements to be reached through unilateral or reciprocal concessions, ...

This article studies the relation between the structure of monitoring hierarchies and corruption, that is, the expected number of bribed members. The model allows for internal corruption, a form of collusion eliminating ...

We consider a model of voluntary contributions for a public project with random number of potential contributors. The fundraiser, who observes this number, has to decide whether to reveal or suppress the information ...

We study private provision of a continuous public good in an incomplete information repeated game. The analysis generates the following predictions in the form of Perfect Bayesian equilibria. When the discount factor is ...

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the creditor in a ...

This paper explores implications of interactions between noncontractibility of quality, multidimensional hidden information, switching costs and the frequency of trade on the terms of contracts in a buyer-seller setup. ...

This paper provides an analysis of the corruption problem in public organizations. It distinguishes between two types of corruption (individual/organized) and crime (bribe for a legal/illegal application), and between two ...

We study the role of switching costs in a dynamic buyer-seller relationship where quality is not contractible and the sellers retain private information about their quality-relevant abilities. In this environment buyer ...

I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining ...