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      Incomplete information and incentives to free ride 

      Bac, M. (1996)
      We study private provision of a continuous public good in an incomplete information repeated game. The analysis generates the following predictions in the form of Perfect Bayesian equilibria. When the discount factor is ...
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      Incomplete information and incentives to free ride on international environmental resources 

      Bac, M. (Academic Press, 1996)
      This paper studies free-riding incentives on common environmental resources in an incomplete information repeated game where abatements are perishable and perfect substitutes. Two contrasting types of perfect Bayesian ...
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      Strategic information revelation in fundraising 

      Bac, M.; Bag, P. K. (Elsevier BV, 2003)
      We consider a model of voluntary contributions for a public project with random number of potential contributors. The fundraiser, who observes this number, has to decide whether to reveal or suppress the information before ...
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      Managerial defections, promotion criteria and firm growth 

      Bac, M.; Saglam, I. (Elsevier BV, 1999)
      Junior managers' learning decisions and career expectations, promotion criteria, and parent firms' growth strategies are interdependent. We study this interdependence in a two-stage game where a junior manager invests in ...
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      Switching costs and screening efficiency of incomplete contracts 

      Bac, M. (Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2000)
      We study the role of switching costs in a dynamic buyer-seller relationship where quality is not contractible and the sellers retain private information about their quality-relevant abilities. In this environment buyer ...
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      Signaling bargaining power: strategic delay versus restricted offers 

      Bac, M. (Springer, 2000)
      I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining ...
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      A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power 

      Bac, M. (Springer, 2000)
      Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" ...
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      On creating and claiming value in negotiations 

      Bac, M. (Springer Netherlands, 2001)
      This paper presents a negotiation model that includes value creation. It shows that creative negotiation efforts tend to intensify toward the deadline, and that the deadline is determined endogenously by the tension between ...
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      Law enforcement and legal presumptions 

      Bac, M.; Bag, P. K. (Academic Press, 2001)
      We compare two alternative legal presumptions, one more pro-defendant than the other, with the objective of reducing bureaucratic corruption to any target level at minimum social costs, broadly defined to include law ...
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      Corruption, connections and transparency: does a better screen imply a better scene? 

      Bac, M. (Springer New York LLC, 2001)
      A higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders' information about the identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance ...
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      Author
      Bac, M. (22)
      Bag, P. K. (2)Raff, H. (2)Saglam, I. (1)KeywordsBayesian equilibrium (3)Delay (3)Incomplete information (3)Sequential equilibrium (2)Ability acquisition (1)Alternating offers bargaining (1)Bargaining (1)Bargaining Model (1)Contributive efforts (1)Debt (1)... View MoreDate Issued1996 (5)2000 (4)2001 (4)1997 (2)1998 (2)1999 (2)1993 (1)2002 (1)2003 (1)TypeArticle (22)Has File(s)Yes (22)

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