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dc.contributor.authorPastine, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015/07/28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:06:32Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:06:32Z
dc.date.issued2002-06en_US
dc.identifier.citationPastine, I. (2002). Speculation and the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime. Journal of International Economics, 57(1), 197-229.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13472
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper demonstrates that the implications of first-generation speculative attack models do not hold if there is a rational, forward-looking policy maker. The policy maker will be able to avoid predictable speculative attacks by introducing uncertainty into the decisions of speculators. This changes the sudden attack into a prolonged period of increasing speculation and uncertainty. In addition, the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical foundation for a useful empirical methodology. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of International Economicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00134-9en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V.en_US
dc.subjectSpeculative Attacksen_US
dc.subjectNominal Anchoren_US
dc.subjectOptimizing Bop Crisesen_US
dc.titleSpeculation and the Decision to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate Regimeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage197en_US
dc.citation.epage229en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber57en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00134-9en_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US


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