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dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBag, P. K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015/07/28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:06:30Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:06:30Z
dc.date.issued2001-12en_US
dc.identifier.citationBac, M., & Bag, P. K. (2001). Law enforcement and legal presumptions. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(4), 722-748.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13469
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.description.abstractWe compare two alternative legal presumptions, one more pro-defendant than the other, with the objective of reducing bureaucratic corruption to any target level at minimum social costs, broadly defined to include law enforcement costs, trial costs, and verdict error costs. In the absence of collusion possibilities between law enforcers and offenders, presumption of innocence involves lower social costs for low corruption targets while presumption of guilt has a cost advantage for high corruption targets, Allowing for collusion enlarges the corruption range over which the presumed innocence rule will dominate. However, there are two possible exceptions to this outcome, namely, if the government's law enforcement budget is limited and if the offenders can be penalized only up to a maximum permissible limit. In each of these cases, presumption of guilt may become the cost-effective rule. J. Comp. Econ, December 2001, 29(4), pp. 722-748. Bilkent University, Bilkent 06533, Ankara, Turkey; and Department of Economics and Finance, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse Street, London WIT ILL, United Kingdom. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Comparative Economicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2001.1743en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).en_US
dc.subjectReasonable Doubten_US
dc.subjectCivil Litigationen_US
dc.subjectProofen_US
dc.subjectBurdenen_US
dc.subjectStandardsen_US
dc.titleLaw Enforcement and Legal Presumptionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage722en_US
dc.citation.epage748en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jcec.2001.1743en_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US


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