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dc.contributor.authorBochet, O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorİlkılıç, R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMoulin, H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSethuraman, J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:04:39Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:04:39Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13117
dc.description.abstractIn a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked. The links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another. Our egalitarian transfer solution generalizes Sprumont's (1991) and Klaus et al.'s (1998) uniform allocation rules. It rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE893en_US
dc.subjectBipartite graphen_US
dc.subjectBilateral tradeen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-proofnessen_US
dc.subjectEqual treatment of equalsen_US
dc.subjectSingle-peaked preferencesen_US
dc.titleBalancing supply and demand under bilateral constraintsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage395en_US
dc.citation.epage423en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber7en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE893en_US
dc.publisherEconometric Societyen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1555-7561


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