A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
Mathematical Social Sciences
Ashlagi, I., Karagözoğlu, E., & Klaus, B. (2012). A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems. Mathematical Social Sciences, 63(3), 228-233.
Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13115
We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored. (c) 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.
- Department of Economics