How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency
University of Chicago Press
391 - 424
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Baker, D., & Woods, J. (2015). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency*. Ethics, 125(2), 391-424.
Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/12526
We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizingfar wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.