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dc.contributor.authorNeyapti, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T11:59:08Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T11:59:08Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-2680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/11872
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates macroeconomic effects of fiscal decentralization, which has been a neglected area of research. Panel evidence for 16 countries over 1980-1998 indicates that expenditure and revenue decentralization reduce budget deficits. A principal finding is that the fiscal disciplining effect of fiscal decentralization increases with population size. Interestingly, absence of local elections is associated with greater effectiveness of fiscal decentralization. The benefits of expenditure decentralization decrease with ethnolinguistic fractionalization and quality of governance. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEuropean Journal of Political Economyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.01.001en_US
dc.subjectFiscal decentralizationen_US
dc.subjectBudget deficitsen_US
dc.titleFiscal decentralization and deficits: international evidenceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage155en_US
dc.citation.epage166en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber26en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.01.001en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.identifier.eissn0176-2680


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