Fiscal Decentralization, Central Bank Independence and Inflation
Neyapti, S. B.
Neyapti, B. (2004). Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence and inflation: a panel investigation. Economics Letters, 82(2), 227-230.
Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/11306
We reinvestigate the relationship between revenue decentralization (RD), central bank independence (CBI) and inflation by modifying the paper by (ECO 72 (2001) 95). We show that, in contrast to the earlier findings, RD has a negative impact on inflation if accompanied by both CBI and local accountability. In low inflation countries, however, RD has a negative impact on inflation even without these additional factors, though CBI accentuates this effect. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
- Department of Economics