A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
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Alemdar, N. M., & Özyildirim, S. (1998). A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 22(6), 811-832.
Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/10936
A genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Noncooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Short of a joint maximization of the global welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.