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dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T11:56:04Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T11:56:04Z
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/10842
dc.description.abstractThis article studies the relation between the structure of monitoring hierarchies and corruption, that is, the expected number of bribed members. The model allows for internal corruption, a form of collusion eliminating accountability (monitoring) in the hierarchy. It is shown that the number of subordinates in a corruption-minimizing hierarchy is constrained by the prospect or internal corruption and/or monitoring costs. This constraint may generate structurally independent segments. When its members are provided with the same incentive system, the middle rank of a supervision chain displays the lowest external corruption, but there is more scope for internal corruption in the upper part than in the lower part.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Comparative Economicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jcec.1996.0013en_US
dc.subjectFirmen_US
dc.titleCorruption and supervision costs in hierarchiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage99en_US
dc.citation.epage118en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber22en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jcec.1996.0013en_US
dc.publisherAcademic Pressen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1095-7227


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