Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types 

      Bayrak, H. I.; Pınar, M. Ç. (Elsevier, 2016)
      We prove that a variant of the second price auction for the sale of a single good through a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes expected revenue of the seller is optimal when the type space is discrete. ...
    • Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming 

      Koçyiğit, Ç.; Bayrak, H. İ.; Pınar, M. Ç. (Springer New York LLC, 2018)
      It is commonly assumed in the optimal auction design literature that valuations of buyers are independently drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study auctions under ambiguity, that is, in an environment where ...