Now showing items 1-11 of 11

    • Bribing in team contests 

      Doğan, Serhat; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Elsevier, 2021-04-21)
      We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered ...
    • Contests over joint production on networks 

      Doğan, Serhat; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Wiley, 2020)
      We consider a network of heterogeneous agents where each edge represents a two‐player contest between the respective nodes. In these bilateral contests, agents compete over an endogenous prize jointly produced using their ...
    • A direct proof of the Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma using Sperner’s lemma 

      Le, T.; Le Van, C.; Pham, N.-S.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Springer, 2022-09)
      The Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma plays an important role in establishing the existence of competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we use Sperner’s lemma and basic elements of topology to prove the Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma.
    • Fatigue accumulation in dynamic contests 

      Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Elsevier BV, 2022-02-28)
      We study a dynamic contest model where efforts exerted in previous periods accumulate as fatigue. As an individual's fatigue level increases, it becomes more costly to exert one unit of effort in the future. This creates ...
    • (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Springer, 2022-11-21)
      We construct a parametric family of (modified) divide-the-dollar games: when there is excess demand, some portion of the dollar may disappear and the remaining portion is distributed in a bankruptcy problem. In two extremes, ...
    • Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium 

      Kamihigashi, T.; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Springer, 2021-10)
      Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions ...
    • Race meets bargaining in product development 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Wiley, 2020)
      We study product development in a firm, utilizing a multistage contest model (i.e., race) with an endogenous length (with one stage or two stages) between two workers. We model the payments to workers using the normatively ...
    • Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games 

      Camacho, C.; Kamihigashi, T.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Academic Press, 2018)
      A policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial, affecting some people positively but others negatively. In this paper we extend the “robust comparative statics” result for ...
    • Sabotage in team contests 

      Doğan, Serhat; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Springer, 2019)
      In the contest literature, sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent’s likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that, anticipating a possible sabotage, ...
    • Social status pursuit, distribution of bequests and inequality 

      Camacho, C.; Harmankaya, Fatih; Sağlam, Çağrı (Elsevier, 2020)
      The quest for social status modifies lifetime decisions and as a consequence, the trajectory of the overall economy. Focusing on the relative wealth dimension of social status, we build a two-period overlapping generations ...
    • A territorial conflict: trade-offs and strategies 

      Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Routledge, 2018)
      We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of ...