

**TRIBES AND STATE: OTTOMAN CENTRALIZATION IN EASTERN  
ANATOLIA, 1876-1914**

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
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

The nineteenth century was an era when the centralization efforts of Ottoman government gained momentum as the new concepts of modern state, like uniform provincial administration and centralized government, were embraced by the Ottoman ruling elite. Eastern Anatolia, which had enjoyed an autonomous position because of its geographical characteristics and remoteness from the capital, was also subjected to a vigorous effort of centralization and administrative reform. Tribal structures and religion always played prominent roles in socio-political structure of eastern Anatolia. As Ottoman government tried to strengthen the central authority in its eastern provinces, tribal leaders and shaikhs became the key elements in the relations between the state and tribal populations.

The object of the present study is to examine the relation of tribe and state in eastern Anatolia during the Hamidian and the Young Turk periods. Throughout this work main emphasis will be given to the strategies of the central government for securing control and integration of the tribal element within the Ottoman Empire.

## ÖZET

Ondokuzuncu yüzyıl, tebaları ve ülkenin bütünü üzerinde etkin bir güce ve kontrole sahip modern devlet kavramının Osmanlı yönetici sınıfı tarafından benimsenmesi sonucu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda merkezileştirme çabalarının ivme kazandığı bir dönem oldu. Bu döneme kadar bölgenin coğrafi özellikleri ve merkeze olan uzaklığı nedeniyle merkezi otoriteye tam olarak tabi olmamış Doğu Anadoludaki aşiretler de ondokuzuncu yüzyılın sonu ve yirminci yüzyılın başlarındaki merkezileştirme çabalarının hedefi haline geldiler.

Bu çalışma Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Abdülhamid ve II. Meşrutiyet dönemlerindeki Doğu Anadoludaki merkezileştirme politikalarını ve bu politikaların aşiretler üzerindeki etkilerini araştırmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu temel nokta etrafında merkezileştirme süreci ve 'aşiret sorunu' merkezi otoritenin doğudaki aşiretleri kontrol ve entegrasyon politikalarıyla paralel olarak incelenecektir.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I cannot indicate my debt to Selçuk Akşin Somel who devoted his precious time to supervising me and making valuable comments which saved me many mistakes. This work would not have been possible without his criticisms and guidance. I owe a great deal to his moral support and inexhaustible patience without which this work would not come to an end. I would also like to thank my professors at Bilkent University, History Department, Mehmet Kalpaklı and Oktay Özel who were kind to read the draft and to make comments and criticisms which have vastly improved the work. I am also grateful to Necdet Gök and Yılmaz Kurt who spent much time improving my knowledge in Ottoman Turkish.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DH. MUI	Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi Kalem-i
DH. KMS	Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti
DH. SYS	Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi Siyasi Evrakı
EI <sup>2</sup>	Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition.
FO	Foreign Office papers at Public Record Office, London.
Y. MTV	Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat
Y. A. RES	Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı
WO	War Office papers at Public Record Office, London.



## **Introduction**

The nineteenth century was a time when the centralization efforts of the Ottoman Empire gained momentum as the new concepts of modern state, like uniform provincial administration and effective control of territories were embraced by the Ottoman ruling elite. Eastern Anatolia, which had always enjoyed an autonomous position because of its geographical characteristics and its remoteness from the capital, also became subjected to a vigorous effort of centralization and administrative reform. Tribal structures and religion always played prominent roles in socio-political structure of eastern Anatolia. As Ottoman government tried to strengthen the central authority in its eastern provinces, tribal leaders and shaikhs became the key elements in the relations between the state and tribal populations.

The object of the present study is to examine the centralization efforts of the Ottoman State along with their effects on the tribes of eastern Anatolia during the Hamidian and the Young Turk periods. The centralization and tribal problem will be dealt with by giving emphasis on how the central authority tried to use and control the tribal element in the region. Around this framework social and economic relations between Muslims and non-Muslims as well as tribal structures and institutions which deeply influenced these relations will be studied. Yet with its concentration on the relations of state and tribes, this study does not pretend to give a comprehensive view of socio-economic structures of eastern Anatolia in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.

The role of states in forming, changing and destroying tribal institutions and structures is undeniable, yet tribes and tribal structures, in return, affect administrative

and centralist policies of states. Approaching tribe and state in terms of power relations requires an analysis of the reactions from both sides. Unfortunately, the sources, which are available for an examination of the relation of state and tribes, were mostly written by the state officials or travelers viewing the tribes with a particular point of view. The reactions and viewpoints of tribal populations, which are indicated in these sources, are often sparse and misleading. The general view of tribal society among the contemporary writers and bureaucrats of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries opposed it to settled urban society. The nomads were regarded as ignorant of royal authority and lawful government which were unquestionably among the characteristics of sedentary civilization.

One should accept that an analysis of political history of state-tribe relations depending on these sources could not escape from the possibility of one-sidedness. Still a closer historical study of the state policies concerning the tribes of eastern Anatolia will serve to a better understanding the relation of tribe and state as well as present tribal structures.

A few remarks on the terminology used in this work would be useful. The definition of the term 'tribe' is extremely vague. Yet this study does not intend a long discussion on the terminological and conceptual issues on the term 'tribe.' The definition, which is given by Gellner for the Middle East context, seems appropriate for this study. Gellner describes tribes as political units whose members jointly help maintain order internally and defend the unit externally.<sup>1</sup> In fact, this is a typical

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<sup>1</sup> Ernest Gellner, "The Tribal Society and its Enemies," in *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, ed. Richard Tapper. London: Croom Helm, 1983, p. 438.

territorial behavior in which particular groups could claim a specific territory for its own and use and defend it against incursions by other groups. These groups could form larger units without any structural change. Clans, tribes and tribal confederations could resemble each other without any structural distinction except their size. The terminology of the Ottoman administration also does not make any strict distinction among these groups, the terms *‘aṣṣiret*, *ḵabile* or *ta’ife* could be used interchangeably for describing tribal groups at different levels of size. In the late Ottoman period, a common term ‘*aṣṣiret*’ seems to be used for both smaller tribes and tribal confederations.

There is also vagueness in the usage of terms, transhumance, semi-nomadism, pastoral nomadism. Moreover, it is difficult to put a sharp distinction between nomads and semi-nomads in eastern Anatolia. On the other hand, the term transhumance which is a restricted form of pastoral nomadism does not seem relevant for the tribes of the region, which usually covered long distances between their summer and winter pastures. Instead, a broader term, pastoral nomadism, which is defined as an adaptation of economy as a means of exploiting the terrain unsuitable for intensive cultivation,<sup>2</sup> will be used to define the tribes of eastern Anatolia in this study.

Throughout this study I have made extensive use of primary sources. The Yıldız Collection of Prime Ministerial Archives in İstanbul is an essential source for the Hamidian Era, containing valuable information on the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, religious orders as well as tribe-state relations in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. For the Young Turk Period, I have mainly used the Ministry of

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<sup>2</sup> Roy Ellen, *Environment, Subsistence and System: The Ecology of Small-Scale Social Formations*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp. 13-15.

Interior papers, which provide valuable data for the Young Turk policies in eastern Anatolia. I have also used Foreign Office papers in Public Record Office, London. The correspondence between the British Embassy in İstanbul and the Foreign Office only give accounts of the Ottoman provincial policies in eastern Anatolia, but also provide detailed reports on the reactions of tribal population towards the new régime during the Constitutional Era. On the other hand, the travel accounts of Europeans who visited the region during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries are also valuable primary sources containing information on the socio-political structures of tribes.

The first chapter will sketch a general outline of tribe-state relations from the classical period to the nineteenth century. Administrative policies and applications concerning taxation, military contingents and disturbances will be analyzed in relation to the historical context. The demographic changes in eastern Anatolia throughout the Ottoman-Safavid struggle will constitute one of the main issues in this chapter. Finally, the launching of settlement policies concerning nomadic populations and the launching of centralization process from the time of Mahmud II to the Hamidian Era will be summarized.

The following chapter will deal with the application of the Hamidian policies among the tribal populations of eastern Anatolia. Along with the designs of the Great Powers on the region, the objectives of the Hamidian régime will be studied in length. The Pan-Islamist policies of the Hamidian Era, which seem to have scored their most conspicuous success among the Kurdish population, will be studied. The discussion of the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, which became crucial elements in the Hamidian strategy concerning eastern Anatolia, will constitute the last part of the chapter.

In the final chapter, the re-emergence of tribal problem in the face of strict centralist program of the Committee of Union and Progress will be discussed. An analysis of the reactions by tribal structures and institutions to the loss of privileges as a result of the growing centralist tendencies in the Young Turk period constitute the main problematic of the chapter.

## CHAPTER I:

### Tribes and State from the Classical Period to the Tanzimat

#### *1-Tribes, Nomads and the State in the Ottoman Empire*

The Ottoman central bureaucracy often referred to nomadism as *bedeviiyyet* (a primitive form of human society) and to settlement as *medeniyyet* (civilisation). Ibn Khaldun, whose works were quite effective among the Ottoman intelligentsia, argues that *medeniyyet* was essentially a sedentary quality whereas *bedeviiyyet* represented a primitive stage in the natural adaptation of human society in contrast to agriculture.<sup>1</sup>

Although under the Ottoman administration nomads constituted a distinct category subject to certain laws and regulations, the bureaucrats of the Ottoman central administration often had a negative view regarding the nomadic population.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not this prejudice against nomadism entailed an Islamic influence is open to debate. However, this attitude becomes more understandable when one considers that the Ottoman bureaucrats were the instruments of an agrarian and centralist power. As the representatives of an agrarian state whose main source of revenue was agricultural production, Ottoman bureaucrats as a rule supported the peasantry and agriculture against the nomadic tribes.<sup>3</sup> Nomadic tribes were generally regarded as one of the most

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<sup>1</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *Kitab al-'Ibar; The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, vol. I, New York, 1967, pp. 252-253.

<sup>2</sup> Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600," in *A Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Halil İnalcık and D. Quataert, (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 32

important factors causing instability and disorder in Anatolia by the Ottoman administration.<sup>4</sup>

However it would be misleading to get an inductive conclusion about the everlasting struggle between the central administration and nomads. In historical records nomads were generally mentioned when they caused a trouble or problem to the Ottoman central administration. One should be careful when evaluating the judgements of the bureaucracy regarding the nomads. Otherwise a picture of continual struggle between nomads, sedentary population and local authorities could be drawn from the Ottoman archives. Instead a more complex framework which includes a gradual symbiosis between the sedentary population and nomads<sup>5</sup>, though not without conflicts, should be considered. The whole process can be seen as a struggle for power at local level among notables, Ottoman administrators and nomads.

The Ottoman administration recognized the importance of nomads for the functioning of its imperial system and tried to accommodate them in its administrative framework.<sup>6</sup> Under the Ottoman administration nomads were categorized among the *reʿāyā* as opposed to privileged *ʿaskeri* class. Although many nomadic groups were defined as *reʿāyā* in Ottoman *Ḳānūnāmes*, in many cases the Ottoman state granted them exemption from certain *raʿiyyet* taxes in return for service. Nomads performed certain military functions as auxiliary troops or defenders for mountain passes, roads and

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<sup>4</sup> M. Cağatay Uluçay, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Saruhanda Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*, (İstanbul: Berksoy, 1955), pp. 80-85.

<sup>5</sup> Halil İnalçık, "The Yürüks, Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role" in *Oriental Carpet and Textile Studies I*, eds. R. Pinner and W. Denny, (London: Hali OCTS Ltd., 1986), p. 40; A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, trans. Julia Croobenden, (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> İnalçık, *A Social and Economic*, p. 37.

borders in various parts of the empire. The Ottoman administration also utilized them in a wide range of services from mining to transportation.<sup>7</sup>

The Ottoman administration used a special terminology to define nomadic population. Large nomadic groups were called as *‘aṣīret*, *ḳabile* or *ta‘īfe* with their sub-groups, *oymaḳs*, *obas* or *cem‘aāts*.<sup>8</sup> Yet these terms could be used interchangeably for describing tribal groups at different levels of size. The Ottomans also organized nomadic tribal groups into confederations, which was called as *ulus* in the Ottoman terminology. Under this category the Ottoman administration divided the tribes of eastern Anatolia into two main groups. The first one was the Boz-Ulus, a remnant of Akkoyunlu confederacy, consisted of Turcoman tribes. The other group was called Kara-Ulus that mainly consisted of Kurdish tribes.<sup>9</sup> The Ottoman government also tried to define their winter and pasture areas, *yurts*, to prevent any kind of conflicts between various nomadic groups as well as between nomads and sedentary population. However it cannot be argued that the central administration was successful in this task when one considers that the Ottoman documents were full of disputes between nomads and peasants.

Whatever the exemptions they enjoyed in certain cases, nomads were still regarded as *re‘āyā* and were subject to certain *ra‘iyyet* taxes, such as *resm-i aḡnām*, and *bād-i havā*.<sup>10</sup> The limits of their summer and winter pastures were also defined in imperial registers. They were liable to pay taxes on animal husbandry and these taxes were also registered in provincial *ḳānūnnāmes*. These provincial compilations contained

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-41.

<sup>8</sup> İnalçık, *The Yürüks*, p. 49.

<sup>9</sup> İnalçık, *A Social and Economic*, p. 34.



regulations for a particular province, especially regarding taxation. They were usually a combination of previous provincial customs and the Ottoman taxation practices. An analysis of regulations regarding animal husbandry in provincial *kānūnnāmes* of the sixteenth century reveals that *resm-i aḡnām*, a tax levied on sheep, remained more or less the same in Anatolian provinces throughout the century.<sup>11</sup> *Resm-i aḡnām* that was the basic tax for animal husbandry was calculated as one piastre for every two sheep in a herd. If a nomad had a herd less than twenty-four animals he was termed as *ḡara*, the same term used for peasants who did not have any land for cultivation. He was liable to pay a special tax, *resm-i ḡara*, twelve piastres or thirteen as in eastern provinces each year.<sup>12</sup>

In the fourteenth century when the Ottoman principality was at the fringes of expansion to Rumeli, the Ottomans led or diverted the Turcoman ghazis and nomadic population into the Balkans. These groups were utilized for colonization and military functions. In return for these services they enjoyed lower rates in taxation along with exemptions from certain taxes. These groups were defined as *müsellem* or *yürüks* and they were not included in proper military class. Each group of 25 or 30 men constituted a unit, called *ocaḡ*, and five of them were classified as “campaigners” (*eḡkinci*), with each man taking turns to go campaign every year. The campaigners collected necessary

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<sup>10</sup> Faruk Sümer, “XVI. Asır Anadolu, Suriye ve Irakta Yaşıyan Türk Aşiretlere Umumi Bir Bakış,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XI (1952), p. 518.

<sup>11</sup> *Resm-i aḡnam* or *resm-i ganem* amounted one piastre for every two sheep in a herd. It remained more or less the same throughout Anatolia during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See; “Kanun-ı Liva-i Aydın, H.935/1528,” in Ö.L.Barkan, *XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Mali Esasları, v.I, Kanunlar*, (İstanbul, 1943), p. 12; “Yeni İl Kanunu, H. 991/1583,” *ibid.*, p. 77; “Diyarbakir Vilayeti Kanunu, H.947/1540,” *ibid.*, p. 133; “Erzurum Vilayeti Kanunu, H.947/1540,” *ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>12</sup> “Hüdavendigâr Livası Kanunnamesi, H. 892/1487,” *ibid.*, p. 3; “Kütahya Livası Kanunnamesi, H.935/1528,” *ibid.*, p. 24.

amount for their expenses from those campaigners who did not go on campaign in that year.<sup>13</sup>

It was argued that the Ottoman tax regulations regarding nomads were deliberately determined to force them to settle and abandon nomadic way of life.<sup>14</sup> However this argument includes a wrong assumption about the classification of nomads within the Ottoman society. It assumes that nomads were included in proper “military” class in the beginning of the Ottoman State. According to this argument the Ottomans started to treat the nomads as subject, almost peasants after the establishment of centralized administration.<sup>15</sup> However it is difficult to argue that nomads were included within *‘askerī* class during the early phase of the Ottoman state since it is open to debate whether we can speak about a clear distinction between military and non-military classes during the foundation of the Ottoman state.

On the other hand it would be misleading to argue that the Ottoman administration developed a deliberate policy of settlement for nomads before the seventeenth century. The Ottoman taxation system was regular and permanent in order to meet the needs of the government. Fiscal policies of the empire were designed to meet the expenditures of the army and the central bureaucracy. Thus in such a fiscalist state where the main concern of the central bureaucracy was to ensure maximization of its revenues. The policies of the central administration were naturally designed to control movements of nomadic groups while extracting maximum revenue and service from their productive capabilities. Yet, at the same time, the central authority did not wish

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<sup>13</sup> İnalçık, *A Social and Economic*, p. 91. See also, “Kanunname-i Eşkinçiyân-ı Müselleman, H.938/1531,” in Barkan, *Kanunlar*, p. 259; “Kocacık Yörükleri Kanunu, H. 992/1584,” *ibid.*, p. 262.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Linder, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 55-59.

instability in rural areas and tried to prevent excessive abuse of rural population, including nomads, by its officials.<sup>16</sup>

The accommodation of tribes within the Ottoman administration also constituted a problem for the central bureaucracy. Since the tribal chiefs were the only authority which tribesmen respected and obeyed, the central administration also recognized them as an intermediary between tribal population and the state. Provincial governors had no authority over the tribesmen since the tribal chiefs were alone responsible for the acts of the members of their tribes. If a tribesman commits a crime and after a *kāḍī* found him guilty, he leaves punishment to the tribal chief not the provincial authorities.<sup>17</sup> Thus the tribal chiefs or *kethüdas* as the Ottoman bureaucracy called them, were the mediator between the Ottoman government and nomadic tribesmen. The tribal leaders had to have the approval of the central government when they acquired their posts and the Ottoman administration paid utmost attention to the choice of tribal leaders for guaranteeing the leadership of the most loyal candidate. Although the tribesmen had no desire to abandon their proverbial freedom and anarchy for the taxes and central administration the Ottomans tried to control tribal population by manipulating the rivalry between the candidates for the leadership of the tribe. This policy was utilized to the great extent in the eastern provinces where the power of the central government was much feeble than it was in the center.

On the other hand after their conquest of eastern Anatolia the Ottomans abolished some previous tax applications in the region. Although the Akkoyunlu

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>16</sup> Ahmet Refik, *Anadoluda Türk Aşiretleri, 900-1200*, reprint, (Istanbul: Enderun, 1989), pp. 7-9; 201; 210-214; see also; "Kanunname-i Boz Ulus, H. 947/1540," in Barkan, *Kanunlar*, p. 140-144.

<sup>17</sup> Lindner, p. 55.

taxation system was widely applied until 1540 under the Ottoman domination, after this date the Ottoman taxation system gradually replaced the Akkoyunlu practices upon the request of the local population.<sup>18</sup> In fact many local tax applications that were mainly levied on animal husbandry was replaced by the standard Ottoman taxes within time.<sup>19</sup> This was a deliberate policy on the part of the Ottomans since the Ottoman administration was trying to gain the support of the local population against the Safavids.

In their struggle to dominate eastern Anatolia the Ottomans also established a formalized quasi-feudal system in the region. The Ottoman government set up locally independent units, *hükümet*s, along with hereditary *sancağ*s, which was also known as *yurtluğ* and *ocağlık*. There were also directly controlled *sancağ*s under centrally appointed officials in the region. *Hükümet*s were left outside of the Ottoman land surveys and taxation. There were no *timārs* in the *hükümet*s, and whatever the taxes their rulers collected from their subjects were entirely left to them. In return for these privileges the *hükümet*s' rulers had to participate in military campaigns. In *yurtluğ* and *ocağlık*, however, there were timars like the ordinary Ottoman *sancağ*s, they were included in the fiscal surveys and had to deliver some of their revenue to the state.<sup>20</sup> In theory both *ocağlık*s and *hükümet*s were ruled by the hereditary families and the ruler could not be deposed by the central government. However inheritance of the leadership in *hükümet*s and *ocağlık*s depended upon the approval of the central administration. The

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<sup>18</sup> Barkan, *Türkiyede Toprak Meselesi; Toplu Eserler*, v. II, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), p. 547.

<sup>19</sup> Many of the local tax applications were termed as innovations and abolished throughout eastern Anatolia. These were mainly taxes which levied on pastoral nomads during their seasonal transhumance. Among them were *der-amed*, *çubuk akçesi*, *selamlık*, *resm-i güde* levied on nomads by the local administration. See; "Kanunname-i Boz Ulus," in Barkan, *Kanunlar*, pp. 140-143.

central government always tried to utilize the rivalry between the members of the ruling family to prevent extreme decentralization in the region. The degree of autonomy that the local rulers enjoyed in these administrative units was directly related to the balance of power between the center and the periphery. The government control over the *hükümete*s and hereditary *sancağ*s as well as their numbers and sizes varied from one time to another. This reflected the balance between the powers, political skills and ambitions of local rulers, central government and government officials.

The numbers of *hükümete*s and hereditary *sancağ*s varied from one time to another. In 1609 ‘Aynī ‘Ali gives the number of *hükümete*s as eight, Hazro, Cizre, Eğil, Palu, Genc in Diyarbekir, Bitlis in Van, Mihrivan in Şehrizer and ‘Amadiye in Baghdad,<sup>21</sup> whereas the number of *hükümete*s appeared as eleven in 1631/1632.<sup>22</sup> Two decades later an Ottoman *ḳānūnnāme* gives the number of *hükümete*s as nine.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover the degree of autonomy and obligations of the hereditary families considerably differed over time. It would be wrong therefore to assume that the terms in *ḳānūnnāme*s always reflected the actual practices. For example during Sultan Murad IV’s Baghdad campaign of 1637-1638 certain *hükümete*s were subject to *sürsat*, an obligatory sale of provisions for the army, although they were exempt from taxation. The provincial governors could also interfere the internal politics of hereditary *sandjağ*s and *hükümete*s and extorted huge sums of money from tribal chiefs in order to strengthen

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<sup>20</sup> *Eyliya Celebi In Diyarbekir*, ed. Martin Van Bruinessen and Hendrik Boeschoten, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), p. 21.

<sup>21</sup> Aynī Ali Efendi, *Kavanin-i Al-i Osman der Hulasa-i Mezamin-i Defter-i Divan*, ed. M. Tayyib Gokbilgin, (İstanbul: Enderun, 1979), pp. 30-31.

<sup>22</sup> Şerafettin Turan, “XVII. yy. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İdari Taksimati,” in *Atatürk Üniversitesi 1961 Yılığ*, (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1961), p. 205.

their positions.<sup>24</sup> Evliya Çelebi who traveled in Diyarbekir and Van provinces between 1655 and 1656 notices the existence of *timārs* along with *alaybegs* and *çeribaşıs* in Eğil and Hazro which were classified as *hükümet*s at that time.<sup>25</sup>

The constant rivalry and struggle among the tribes could also change the existing political structure in the region. The more powerful tribal groups could eliminate or subjugate weak ones in order to gain access to pasturelands and water resources. Then the central authority, rather than reviving *status quo*, may choose to approve existing situation on the lines of its interests. Around 1630's a certain Bajlan tribe, for example, was able to capture Zohab and its neighboring territories. Sultan Murad IV, then, ceded this territory to the Bajlan tribe with the obligation of raising 2,000 horse when required and a yearly revenue of 300,000 piastres.<sup>26</sup> A more typical example was the Baban dynasty that replaced the waning Soran clan at the end of the seventeenth century. They succeeded to get approval of Istanbul through their service and assistance to the Ottomans in the wars with Safavids during the 1670's.<sup>27</sup>

The policies of the Ottoman Empire were designed to accommodate and control nomadic groups and tribal confederations within its imperial system. The Ottoman government aimed to protect political *status quo* in central and eastern Anatolia while pressing for centralization whenever it had enough power to do so. A deliberate policy of settlement was only launched during the seventeenth century in the face of an emergency. It is misleading to speak about an endless struggle between nomads,

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<sup>23</sup> Sofyalı Ali Çavuş Kanunnamesi, ed. Midhat Sertoğlu, (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1992), p. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Evliya Celebi In Diyarbekir, pp. 22-24.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>26</sup> F.O. 371/3406, *Notes on the Tribes of Southern Kurdistan*, Baghdad, 1918.

<sup>27</sup> David McDowell, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 31.

sedentary population and the state. Yet the relations between Istanbul and nomadic populations was far from perfect. While Istanbul pushed for an increasing control, nomadic tribes tried to avoid the restrictions of the central administration. In fact, nomadic groups were quite successful in repelling the pressure of Istanbul and her representatives until the nineteenth century.

## ***2-Demographic Changes in the Eastern Provinces during the Ottoman-Safavid Struggle:***

The expansion of Ottoman power into central and eastern Anatolia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries required the subjugation of nomadic Turcoman power in the region. Since the nomadic Turcomans had always had a deep resentment against any kind of centralized authority, Ottoman expansion into Anatolia proved to be more painstaking and troublesome than it had been in the Balkans.

Moreover the emergence of the shi'ite Safavi State in Iran as an alternative political power on the eastern frontier of the Ottomans complicated the situation. The frustration of Turcomans with the Ottoman central authority made them ready to accept Safavi propaganda easily. Only after the elimination of *kızılbaş* threat at home and the defeat of Safavi power at Çaldıran, did the Ottoman rule solidify in Anatolia more firmly.<sup>28</sup> Ottoman policies against the Turcomans throughout the period brought a mass migration of nomadic population into Azarbaijan, thus a decrease in Turcoman population in eastern and central Anatolia. In fact, starting from the Turcoman incursions into Anatolia before the battle of Manzikert, the Turcoman population of eastern and central Anatolia were rapidly increasing until the emergence of the Saljuq

State. The Saljuq State tried to control and even prevent nomadic migrations into its territory since it attempted to subordinate nomadic populations in the interests of a sedentary society. Yet the Mongol invasions destroyed the whole balance both by demolishing Saljuqid power in Anatolia and by opening the way to further Turcoman migrations. Thus Turcomans were already in majority throughout Anatolia when the Mongol power came into an end by the first half of the fourteenth century. After the collapse of Mongol domination various tribal confederations gained upper hand in the region. During the domination of Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu confederations in eastern Anatolia one can clearly see the expansion of Turcoman power and population in the region. Christian population in urban centers and the Kurdish tribes in rural areas one by one came under the domination of Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu Turcoman confederations.<sup>29</sup>

However during the sixteenth century the conflict between the Ottomans and the Turcoman tribes resulted in the mass migration of *kızılbaş* Turcomans into Azerbaijan. This resulted in the decline of Turcoman population and power in the region.

On the other hand the mountainous region from Erzurum to Diyarbakir gradually came under the rule of the Ottomans after the victory at Çaldıran in 1514. This region has always had more nomadic population than other areas in Anatolia since the mountains and plateau regions were more suitable to husbandry and nomadism than large-scale cultivation and settlement. After the penetration of Ottoman power into the region the local tribal chieftains and dynasties recognized Ottoman suzerainty one by

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<sup>28</sup> Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü*, (Ankara: TTK, 1982), p. 36.



one.<sup>30</sup> Along with Ottoman military strength the sympathy towards the Sunni Ottomans played an important role in recognition of Ottoman suzerainty by the Sunni Kurdish tribes in the region.<sup>31</sup> Moreover Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) encouraged the Kurdish chiefs to eliminate all *kızılbaş* from eastern Anatolia since *kızılbaş* tribes were considered as an internal threat to the Ottoman State.<sup>32</sup>

Following his victory at Çaldıran Sultan Selim I appointed a former Akkoyunlu official, İdris-i Bitlisi, for the administrative organization of newly conquered territories. There was still a danger of Safavid subversion or invasion in the region. It was also difficult to apply a direct taxation and centralist administration in such a region with high mountains and a nomadic population. As a result, under the guidance of İdris-i Bitlisi who knew the region and the local politics well, the Ottomans granted certain privileges and semi-autonomous status to the local tribes in return for various services and yearly revenue.<sup>33</sup> These tribes had to provide armed and mounted men to serve the Ottomans during the campaigns. Throughout the wars with Iran, Kurdish tribal forces played a role which was very similar to the role of the Crimean cavalry in Hungary. They also had other obligations like providing horses and provisions for the Ottoman army during the eastern campaigns.

In fact it can be argued that the Ottoman administration granted the Kurdish tribal chiefs greater autonomy and security than they had ever enjoyed during the Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu confederations. This policy mainly aimed to ensure the

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<sup>29</sup> Faruk Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular; Başlangıçtan Cihan Şah'a Kadar*, v. I, (Ankara: TTK, 1967), p. 32; John E. Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire*, (Minneapolis/Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1976), pp 104-114.

<sup>30</sup> Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire; The Classical Age 1300-1600*, (London: Phoenix, 1973), p. 33.

<sup>31</sup> McDowell, p. 26.

<sup>32</sup> *Evliya Celebi In Diyarbekir*, pp. 14-16.

<sup>33</sup> Halil İnalcık, "Selim I," *ET*, vol. IX, pp. 127-131.

submission of the local population as well as to prevent a danger of a Safavid subversion in eastern Anatolia and Iraq. Yet some Kurdish chieftains, usually the ones in Safavid-Ottoman border zone, preferred an opportunist policy of changing sides according to the political circumstances. Emirs of Hakkari represent a good example of tribal leaders who continuously changed sides for the privileges and benefits they can get from the Safavids or the Ottomans.<sup>34</sup>

### ***3-Nomads and the Launching of Settlement Policy***

It was only during the time of crisis between the defeat at Vienna in 1683 and long period of war that ended with the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 that the Ottoman central administration started to take seriously the settlement of nomadic groups. Forcible settlement of nomadic groups was one of the solutions to meet the need for new sources of revenue and manpower for the Ottoman administration. In order to protect the sedentary population and to increase revenues from agriculture the administration aimed to take nomadic groups under control either by forcible settlement or by exiling them to the frontiers.<sup>35</sup>

In fact this was a traditional policy of a state depending upon agrarian economy and peasant society. However starting from the last decade of the seventeenth century efforts or rather projects to control nomadic groups gained momentum in the face of military and financial crisis. It cannot be argued that the Ottoman administration was very successful in pursuing this policy since nomadic groups usually opposed the centralizing tendency and returned their former life styles and territories after forcibly

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<sup>34</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State; The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), pp. 148-149.

being settled into vacant lands or exiled to the remote regions of the empire. One of the reasons of this failure was that the central authority did not have the necessary means to cope with such a centralist policy in a state of crisis. Secondly the territories chosen for the settlement of nomadic groups were usually unfertile sites for settlement and agriculture. When all these factors came together with the opposition of nomads who had psychological and economic difficulties of adjusting to sedentary life the first serious settlement program was met with little success.

On the other hand the main reason behind the settlement of central and eastern Anatolian nomads in an unsuitable territory, i.e. in northern Syrian desert, was to check the pressure of Bedouin tribal confederations which were penetrating into the region in search of better pastures and water sources. The first waves of the ʿAnazah and the Shammar tribal confederations began to appear in Syria towards the end of the seventeenth century. But the northward movement of the ʿAnazah and the Shammar tribes strengthened in the eighteenth century. The absence of defensive capability on the part of the Ottoman central administration probably lured the Bedouin tribes to move into northern Syria in search of raid and better pastures.<sup>36</sup> While the ʿAnazah tribes moved to northern Syria, the tribes of the Shammar confederation generally migrated northeastward towards Cezire and Mardin.<sup>37</sup> The migration of these Bedouin tribes resulted in a mass migration of the local nomadic populations. Many of the Turcoman and Kurdish tribes started a westward movement causing plenty of trouble for the central administration.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı*, (İstanbul: Eren, 1987), pp. 39-45.

<sup>36</sup> Norman N. Lewis, *Nomads and settler in Syria and Jordan 1800-1980*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), p. 8.

<sup>37</sup> Anne Blunt, *Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates*, New York, 1879, pp. 372-375.

<sup>38</sup> İnalcık, *A Social and Economic*, p. 32.

Apparently, the Ottoman administration aimed to achieve two objectives at the same time. First objective was to get rid of nomadic tribes in central and eastern Anatolia which were now regarded as an obstacle to the development of sedentary life and trade, and the second was to prevent Bedouin incursions into northern Syria with the settlement of Anatolian nomadic population in the region.<sup>39</sup>

Northern Syria maintained its importance as an exile region for nomadic groups during the eighteenth century. The Ottoman central government insistently continued forcible settlement of Anatolian nomads in Rakka, Haleb, Hama and Hums.<sup>40</sup> The quickening of Bedouin pressure in the eighteenth century also compelled the central government to continue its unsuccessful settlement policy.

Yet all these efforts of the Ottoman administration before the nineteenth century were proved to be ineffective. Nomadic groups usually opposed to the centralizing tendency and returned to their former life styles and territories.<sup>41</sup> The Porte lacked the force to keep them settled and nomadic settlement in many regions resulted in serious disorder. Once they became outlaws and probably losing many of their herds during the forcible settlement, many of them did not hesitate to resume brigandage in the mountains and highways of Anatolia.<sup>42</sup> Thus the settlement policy of the Ottomans gave birth to more problems and troubles rather than providing safety and improved conditions for trade and agriculture in the empire.

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<sup>39</sup> Orhonlu, pp. 37-45.

<sup>40</sup> Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, (Ankara: TTK, 1988), pp. 136-139.

<sup>41</sup> Ahmet Refik, pp. 100-102; 201.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 191-192.

#### **4-Nomads and Tribes in the Eastern Provinces during the Centralization Policy of Mahmud II**

By the end of the eighteen-century the Ottoman Empire faced a severe crisis. The empire had to deal with increasing ambitions of its northern neighbor, Russia, as well as with increasing decentralization in her provinces. In 1808 the Sultan was obliged to recognize the growing power of the local potentates, *a'yāns*. Yet the new Sultan and the Ottoman central bureaucracy were quick enough to perceive the new opportunities laid by the nineteenth century before them. As usual, the Ottomans hastily adapted the new improvements in the technology of communications and firearms. Mahmud II began his reform and centralization policy with the elimination of provincial notables in western and central Anatolia. By 1820 almost all the *derebeys* of these regions were suppressed and newly confirmed government officials were installed to restore central authority.<sup>43</sup> Along with the wholesale removal of local hereditary rulers in the western provinces a new policy of centralization was launched in the eastern parts of the empire. In 1826 the governor of Sivas, Reşit Mehmet Pasha, also known as Gözlüklü Reşit Pasha was given the task of removing local rulers and installing government officials in the eastern provinces. However this scheme could not be effectively put into practice because of the crisis and war with Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Governor of Egypt. In 1831-32 Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, seized Syria and proceeded as far as Kütahya after he inflicted a humiliating defeat to the Ottoman army. Ibrahim's army was only persuaded to withdraw to Syria by the involvement of European Powers.

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<sup>43</sup> Mithat Sertoğlu, "Tanzimat'a Doğru," in *Sultan II. Mahmud ve Reformları Semineri* (28-29 Haziran 1989), (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1990), pp. 3-4.

It has been argued that the hereditary Kurdish rulers in the eastern provinces provided provisions to Egyptian forces during the struggle between the Ottomans and Muhammad Ali. There were also rumors about an Egyptian provocation among the local rulers.<sup>44</sup> Whether or not these claims represent reality, it can be assumed that the local rulers should have showed hesitation in supporting the Ottomans. They probably adapted a policy of wait and see rather than loyally fulfilling their obligations to the Ottoman government.

Despite the failure against the Egyptian forces, the Porte now expanded centralization policy to the eastern provinces. The removal of the prevailing local dynasties in the region was a logical objective regarded as a continuation to the destruction of *aʿyāns* throughout the empire. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Bahdinan in ʿAmadiya, Soran in Rawanduz, Baban in Süleymaniye, Botan in Cezire, were the leading local Kurdish dynasties in the eastern provinces of the empire. Among these Rawanduz and Süleymaniye were relatively newcomers whose formation can be traced back into the second half of the seventeenth century.<sup>45</sup> Other local dynasties were able to preserve their existence from the time of Sultan Selim I. The constant rivalry and struggle among the tribes and local dynasties had been the main reason behind the decrease in the number of the *hükümet*s in the region.<sup>46</sup>

The crisis and war with Muhammad Ali undeniably delayed the implementation of centralization policy in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Yet it was not

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<sup>44</sup> Celile Celil, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Kürtler*, tr. Mehmet Demir, (Ankara: Özge, 1992), p. 98.

<sup>45</sup> McDowell, p. 33; Celil, p. 72.

<sup>46</sup> An interesting example is the dynasty of Hasankeyf that well preserved its existence until the sixteenth century when a struggle between claimants to the seat of Hasankeyf prepared ground for the abolishment of the dynasty by the Ottomans. Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p. 146.

the central authority but the ambitious ruler of Rawanduz who made much contribution to the elimination of remaining dynasties in the region between 1820 and 1830. The ruler of Rawanduz, Mir Muhammad, promptly tried to take advantage of weakness in the central authority. Probably, the empire's troubles with Egypt also provided further advantages to him to carry out his ambitious expansionist policy. He also received support by the Persian Government.<sup>47</sup> Between 1823 and 1833 Mir Muhammad was able to eliminate or subjugate the local dynasties of Süleymaniye, ʿAmadiye. He also fiercely eliminated Yazidis in Shaykan on the ground of vengeance and attacked the *hükümet* of Cezire.<sup>48</sup> The Ottoman authorities were aware of the threat in their eastern borders but they were unable to react because of the Muhammad Ali affair.

However as soon as the crisis with Egypt was over the governor of Sivas, Reşit Mehmet Pasha, was ordered to move against Mir Muhammad with a substantial army. In 1836 Mir Muhammad was finally persuaded to submit to Istanbul without any confrontation with Reşit Mehmet Pasha's army.<sup>49</sup> In fact Mir Muhammad rendered a critical service to the Porte without being aware of it. He ensured the fall of Süleymaniye, ʿAmadiya, and Rawanduz dynasties in a single move by the Ottoman central administration. Otherwise subjugation and elimination of these dynasties could be more time consuming and arduous for Reşit Mehmet Pasha's army. The Kurdish tribal chiefs who surrendered to Reşit Pasha during this campaign were sent to exile to

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<sup>47</sup> Mark Sykes, *Dar-ul-Islam; A Record of a Journey Through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey*, reprint, (London: Darf Publishers Ltd, 1988), p. 220.

<sup>48</sup> *The Early Correspondence of Richard Wood 1831-1841*, ed. A.B. Cunningham, (London: The Royal Historical Society, 1966), p. 94. Nelida Fuccaro, *The Other Kurds; Yazidis in Colonial Iraq*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 37.

<sup>49</sup> McDowell, pp. 43-44, V.Minorsky, "Kurds," *EP*, p. 462.

Another factor was the difficulties of geography and climate that made transportation and provisioning nearly impossible in military campaigns except spring and summer. Epidemics and transportation of cannons were also two main obstacles for an army even during the campaign season.<sup>55</sup>

Pacification of the eastern provinces vigorously continued between 1834 and 1839. After the death of Reşit Mehmet Pasha from typhus in 1836, the new governor of Diyarbakır, Hafız Pasha, carried on centralization policy of the Porte. However the outbreak of war with Muhammad Ali in 1839 and the following Ottoman defeat at Nizib considerably delayed the implementation of centralist policies in the eastern provinces of the empire. Yet by 1839 only a few Kurdish dynasties which agreed to integrate the Ottoman administrative system, either becoming *mütesellims* or *voyvodas*, were left in their places.

After the Ottoman defeat at Nizib the tribes and local rulers, taking the advantage of confusion and weakness of central authority, started brigandage and widening their spheres of influence on all sides.<sup>56</sup> Some Kurdish dynasties that were left intact during the Reşit and Hafız Pashas' campaigns also saw the opportunity to expand their area of influence as well as hindering the application of centralist Tanzimat policies. An obvious example of a such case is Bedirhan Bey of Cezire. Since Bedirhan's revolt was closely related to application of the Tanzimat policies, it would be more convenient to analyze the case of Bedirhan Bey together with the application of Tanzimat policies in Eastern Anatolia.

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<sup>54</sup> Lütfi, *Tarih*, vol. V, p. 142.

<sup>55</sup> Moltke, p. 243.

<sup>56</sup> Henry Austen Layard, *Nineveh and its Remains*, ed. H.W.F. Saggs, (London: 1970), p. 66. Moltke, p. 364.



## **5-Application of the Tanzimat in Eastern Anatolia and the Case of Bedirhan Bey**

After the announcement of Tanzimat policies by an imperial edict in *Gülhane* in 1839, the Ottoman government sent a *fermān*, concerning the execution of all articles of *Gülhane Hatt-i Humāyūnu*, to the governors and deputy-governors of provincial administration.<sup>57</sup> With this edict the government made known that the Tanzimat reforms aimed at improving administrative and financial conditions by application of a more centralized system in tax collection and conscription. In fact, one of the main concerns of the Tanzimat policies was to provide a sizeable increase in state revenues by the implementation of a more centralized revenue system. The tax-farming system as well as existing *timars* were declared to be abolished and *muhassıls*, officials appointed by the central administration, would henceforth collect taxes throughout the provinces. Moreover the taking of fees and remuneration by state officials were altogether annulled on the ground that these applications resulted with many abuses of the Ottoman subjects by the state officials.<sup>58</sup>

The full application of the Tanzimat reforms apparently meant the deprivation of benefits which local notables and state officials were freely extracting from the local populations. Another negative factor was the principle of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims within the empire. The equality between Muslims and non-Muslims could not be easily accepted by Muslim population, especially by the ones living in relatively

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<sup>57</sup> Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, (Ankara: TTK, 1954), pp. 180-184.

<sup>58</sup> Halil İnalcık, "Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, V(1973), p.103.

undeveloped parts of the Empire. On the other hand there were various dues and taxes levied upon the Christian population by the local tribal leaders and aghas, if the Tanzimat would mean the loss of these rights they would never accept its application. It was obvious that such radical reforms would meet with resistance from the local power groups throughout the empire. Eastern Anatolia was no exception to this case. Various reactionary groups opposed the application of Tanzimat policies. Since they were assisted by the state officials who also faced with the danger of losing their benefits the expansion of Tanzimat policies became a difficult task for the Ottoman administration. A provincial report to the Porte on the uprising of Bedirhan reveals that various discontent groups came together around Bedirhan Bey. The local notables and timar holders of Van as well as the state officials in Erzurum and *kaymakam* of Muş were mentioned among the reactionary groups.<sup>59</sup>

After the defeat of Ottomans at Nizib Bedirhan Bey carefully began to widen his sphere of influence. In fact, the elimination of Mir Muhammad and other powerful local rulers by the Ottoman central authority offered an opportunity for expansion of his domination. Yet he was careful not to provoke and rouse the Ottoman central authority with which he had always been in close cooperation since his accession to the seat of Cezire in 1820.<sup>60</sup> He was able to expand his influence on Hakkari region as a result of a struggle between two rival claimants for the leadership. He supported Nurullah Bey against his rival, Suleyman Bey, and his Nestorian allies. The accession of Nurullah Bey

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<sup>59</sup> "... şu ihtilâfât Erzurum eyâletiniñ dâ'ire-i Tanzîmâtâ idhâlinden nâşi aşhâb-i timârât ve ümerâ-yı Van menâfi' ve serbestiyyet-i kâdimе ve zâtiyyelerinden dür olmak mü'tâlâ'asına şaparak ve uşûl-i tanzîmiyyeden murâd-i aşli olan ma'delet ve şefkat-i saltanat-i seniyyeyi aňlamayıp ol vaqt Erzurumda bulunan me'mûrîn dađi yolunda davranmayarak zühûra gelmiş olmasıyla beraber..." in Lütfi, *Tarih*, vol. V, pp. 474-475.

<sup>60</sup> McDowell, p.45.

to the seat of Hakkari ensured Bedirhan's control over this neighboring region. Moreover, Bedirhan set about to punish the Nestorian tribes that supported Süleyman Bey against his candidate to the seat of Hakkari. The Nestorian community had also been subject to missionary activities of American and English Protestants during this period.<sup>61</sup> This was also a dangerous and destabilizing factor that gravely complicated the situation of the Nestorians. In 1843 the Nestorians at Dez were attacked by the Kurds under the command of Bedirhan Bey, and they suffered great loss of life and property.<sup>62</sup> As a result of British governments intervention and the Porte's effort Bedirhan Bey agreed to release some of the captive Nestorians and to stop attacks against their villages.<sup>63</sup> Yet in 1846 Bedirhan and his ally Nurullah resumed their aggression towards the Nestorians in Hakkari against the orders of the governor of Mosul.<sup>64</sup>

The Porte did not go into action against Bedirhan Bey until the pressure of the Great Powers provoked the Ottoman government to stop Bedirhan's attacks against Nestorians. Although the apparent reason of the Porte's action against Bedirhan was his persecution of the Nestorians and the pressure of the Great Powers, the real motive on the other hand seem to have been Bedirhan's support to the reactionaries who opposed the carrying out of Tanzimat policies in Van. In fact, this group consisted of the local notables and *timār* holders who would loose their privileges as a result of the application of Tanzimat policies.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 45-46.

<sup>62</sup> *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, eds. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, Part I, Series B, vol. 6, (London, 1985), p. 271.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., pp. 278-279.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., pp. 283-287. Lütfi, *Tarih*, vol. V, p. 491.

<sup>65</sup> Lütfi, *Tarih*, vol. V, pp. 474-475.

In 1847 an expedition was sent against Bedirhan Bey under the command of Osman Pasha, the commander of the Anatolian army. Bedirhan Bey was unable to resist Osman Pasha's forces and took refuge to his fortress at Uruk where he surrendered to the Ottoman forces after an eight-month siege.<sup>66</sup> He and his family were first sent to İstanbul then exiled to Crete where he lived for ten years until Sultan Abdulmecid gave permission to his residence in İstanbul. Nurullah Bey of Hakkari was also captured and sent into exile after the elimination of Bedirhan Bey. Thus the Ottoman government was able to eliminate the regional loci of power in her eastern provinces by the second half of the nineteenth century.

Officially, all the parts of Eastern Anatolia were brought under the direct control of the Porte. In practice, however, the Ottoman governors had little control apart from urban centers since lack of financial and military resources along with difficulties of geography were preventing an effective rule in the area. On the other hand small tribal chiefs and religious leaders, *shaikhs*, gained upper hand among the tribal society after the destruction of Kurdish dynasties. *Şeyhs* especially distinguished themselves as mediators in settling blood feuds and inter-tribal conflicts among the tribal society. By settling inter-tribal conflicts they eventually gained more charisma and influence over the tribes and their members.<sup>67</sup>

There are several reasons contributing to the rise of shaikhs in eastern Anatolia after the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the reasons why shaikhs played a crucial role in ending conflicts is their religious influence and prestige both among the tribal leaders and the tribal population. *Şîfîs* and *tarîkats* had always a role of cardinal

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 142-144.

importance in the religious and social life of the region since the medieval ages. The *Ḳadīrī* order was the predominant *ṭarīqat* in the region by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Yet a new *ṭarīqat*, *Muceddidī*, that originated from *Naḳṣhibendī* order became dominant and surpassed *Ḳadīrīs* in the nineteenth century. *Naḳṣhibendī-Muceddidī* shaikhs expanded their influence and followers, *mürīds*, among the Kurdish population.<sup>68</sup> Government policies also contributed to the rise of *şeyhs* in power and wealth during the nineteenth century. Apart from ending tribal conflicts and blood feuds Ottoman government was aware of their role as mediators between tribal society and the state. Thus the central government tried to win over shaikhs usually by giving them *vakıf* lands with a certain amount of revenue for keeping their pious foundations. As we will see later this policy reached its paramount during the time of Sultan Abdülhamid II.

During the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman government initiated a radical and comprehensive reform program for the settlement of nomadic populations. In 1858 the government issued a Land Code that was apparently designed to break the power of urban notables and tribal chiefs with a normalization of land regime. The Land Code originally intended to distribute lands to small farmers as well as to transform the actual tillers of soil to legal possessors of the land. Another objective of the Land Code was to provide favorable conditions for the settlement of nomadic groups. This is not the place to discuss whether the central government reached its objectives with the Land Code or not, but it can be argued that in many places local notables and aghas were able to keep their power and wealth under the new regulations.

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<sup>67</sup> Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), p. 4.

<sup>68</sup> McDowell, p. 51.

The issue of the Land Code was accompanied by a comprehensive settlement program throughout the Empire. The famous expedition to Clician plain by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, for example, was a part of this comprehensive program.<sup>69</sup> The settlement policies were put into practice throughout Anatolia and other parts of the empire. An interesting example is the settlement policies that the Ottoman officials was trying to implement among Bedouin tribes in Syria with a little success in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>70</sup> It was also argued that many settlements in Inner Anatolia dated to the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>71</sup> Yet for the settlement policies in Eastern Anatolia during this period, there is limited data available due to the lack of research on the subject. But still, the accounts of European travelers and the official documents of later periods, i.e. Hamidian Era, give a general view about the failure of the settlement policies in Eastern Anatolia.

Sultan Mahmud II's and Tanzimat reforms aimed at furthering the loyalty of specific socio-economic and religious groups living in the area. The Ottoman reformers tried to assure the viability of Ottoman rule, especially with the efficient implementation of tax collection and conscription in the region. It can be argued that they were successful to some degree in the former task. Yet the central government always faced with difficulties in the application of conscription and regular taxation until the Hamidian regime which partially solved the problem in a different way. The second

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<sup>69</sup> For a detailed information on the expedition to Clician plain see ; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Fırka-i Islaiyye ve Yapmış Olduğu İskan," *İ.Ü.E.F. Tarih Dergisi*, vol. XXVII(1973), pp. 1-20; Paul Dumont, "La Pacification du Sud-est Anatolien en 1865," *Turcica*, V(1975), pp. 108-130; Andrew Gordon Gould, *Pashas and Brigands: Ottoman Provincial Reform and its Impacts on the Nomadic Tribes of Southern Anatolia 1840-1885*, Los Angeles, University of California, 1972 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

<sup>70</sup> Norman N. Lewis, *Nomads and Settler in Syria and Jordan 1800-1980*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), pp. 42-46.

<sup>71</sup> Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, "Land Division and Settlement in Inner Anatolia," in *Turkey; Geographic and Social Perspectives*, eds. P.Benedict, E. Tümerterkin, F. Mansur, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 21-23.

chapter will deal with the strategies of the Hamidian régime for control and integration of the tribal elements within the Ottoman system.

## Chapter II:

### The Hamidian Era: Conciliation and Integration

#### *1-Last Efforts of Survival*

The late nineteenth century was an era when the Ottoman Empire seemed to come onto the brink of collapse after a series of domestic and international troubles. In the international arena, all the conditions seemed to turn sharply against the Porte. The empire neither was able to pay its debts nor could find new financial sources in the period following the economic crisis of the 1870's in Europe. The public opinion in Europe, especially in Britain where a considerable number of shareholders of the Ottoman debts existed, was not in favour of the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarian insurrection of 1876 and its suppression by the Ottomans further worsened the situation and resulted with the "Bulgarian atrocities" agitation in Britain. Some politicians, especially Gladstone, utilized the theme of "Bulgarian atrocities" to use public opinion for achieving their political aims.<sup>1</sup> The result was a strong anti-Ottoman feeling that also contributed to the drastic diversion of British Eastern Policy.

On the other hand, the Tsarist Russia, the deadly enemy of the empire, regarded the decline of British support to the Ottomans as an opportunity and triggered a crisis that would end in the Turco-Russian War of 1877-78. At the same time the empire faced with a series of crisis after the deposition of ʿAbdulaziz in the domestic scene. The period between the succession of Murad V and his replacement by ʿAbdulhamid II with

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed account of the "Bulgarian atrocities" agitation see; R.T. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876*, (London: Thomas and Sons Ltd, 1963).



the proclamation of a new constitution further deepened the political chaos and vacuum in the decision-making mechanisms of the empire.

Although the result of the 1877-78 Turco-Russian war was a catastrophe for the Empire, the “Sick man of Europe” was again saved from the total collapse thanks to the rivalry among the Great Powers. The treaty of San Stefano raised a number of threatening possibilities in eastern Mediterranean for Britain. A likelihood of Russian control over Bulgaria and Constantinople once again aroused Russophobia in Britain.<sup>2</sup> As a result of the support given by other Great Powers, Britain finally succeeded to revise the articles of San Stefano at the Congress of Berlin.

Yet the Congress of Berlin did not change the devastating results of the 1877-78 war for the Ottoman Empire. The empire eventually lost most of its Balkan provinces as well as Cyprus that it desperately leased to Britain in return for a guarantee of its Asian lands and support in the Congress of Berlin.<sup>3</sup> Besides the empire faced with a new and challenging domestic problem, the “Armenian Question”, during the late nineteenth century. To sum up, the empire had to handle external challenges as well as internal troubles throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century. The governing elite of Hamidian regime repeatedly resorted traditional policies along with new inventions that were borrowed from European adversaries, or even from Russia, to guarantee the existence of the empire among the covetous imperialists of Europe.

Broadly speaking, the Hamidian Era emerges as a period of conciliation with the tribal elements in eastern Anatolia. The Hamidian régime chose to find a way of

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<sup>2</sup> Keith Nelson, *Britain and the Last Tsar; British Policy and Russia 1894-1917*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 112.

<sup>3</sup> Muriel E. Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy 1789-1914*, (London: Longman, 1988), p. 141.

conciliation with the leaders of tribal structures, i.e. tribal chiefs and shaikhs, rather than forcing a sudden integration of the region into the central authority.

The present chapter will first draw a general outline of the policies of Great Powers, mainly those of Russia and Britain, on eastern Anatolia. The implementation of Pan-Islamist policies in eastern Anatolia and the establishment of the Hamidian Cavalry Regiments, which was, in fact, an imitation of Russia's Cossack Regiments, will constitute the second part of the chapter.

### ***1-Designs of the Great Powers on Eastern Anatolia***

The Hamidian policies concerning Eastern Anatolia cannot be thoroughly conceived without a survey of the strategic interests of the Great Powers on the region in the late nineteenth century. In an age when rivalry and struggle for acquiring new territories engaged all the imperial powers, eastern Anatolia enjoyed a significant place in the designs of Russia and Great Britain. It is not natural sources or economic potential of the region but its strategic importance that mainly allured the interest of these imperialist powers. Although Russia had serious drawbacks and vulnerabilities as an imperialist power, it nonetheless kept following an expansionist policy throughout the nineteenth century and its interests were often in clash with those of Britain in Central Asia and Eastern Mediterranean.

Britain's strategic interest in Eastern Anatolia in the nineteenth century was a consequence of its proximity to Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia, especially the Euphrates Valley, was regarded as a vital passageway to Britain's Indian Empire. British policy makers regarded this area as a crucial strategic position for the defense and

communication with India.<sup>4</sup> A probability of Russian domination over Eastern Anatolia was certainly seen a serious challenge to British interests in the region. This region was also considered to be the passage for approaching the Persian Gulf and Britain's interests in Persia as well.<sup>5</sup> Thus British efforts were chiefly directed to prevent Russian expansion and intervention in Eastern Anatolia while extending its influence further in the Near East. Britain's traditional policy in the region had been to guarantee the integrity of the weak Ottoman Empire, yet the 1877-78 Turco-Russian War proved that its survival was no longer possible. It can be argued that after this date British policy-makers seriously started to plan a direct penetration into Mesopotamia while preparing grounds for the foundation of a new buffer state, Armenia, in Eastern Anatolia against the Tsarist Russia.

The period following the Congress of Berlin witnessed Britain's intensifying attention on Armenian subjects of the Porte and the "Armenian Question." The main concern of Britain was to force the Ottoman government to follow a reform policy on behalf of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. So Britain's role as a protector of Armenians would give it an opportunity of extending its influence in Eastern Anatolia. Thanks to the British influence, the treaty of Berlin put the Porte under a pledge of reforms in the region. Interestingly enough, it was Russia that put the "Armenian Question" on the agenda yet Great Britain was able to turn back the Russian tide with the Congress of Berlin and it became the champion of the Armenian cause.<sup>6</sup> Thus, from 1878 onwards, Britain constantly tried to intervene in domestic politics of the Ottoman Empire on

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<sup>4</sup> Marian Kent, "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900-1923," in *The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Ram Lakhani Shukla, *Britain, India, and the Turkish Empire 1853-1882*, (New Delhi: New Age Printing, 1973), pp. 39-40.

<sup>6</sup> Robert F. Zeidner, "Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 7(1976), p. 470.

behalf of Armenian subjects. The British government utilized every means from missionary activity to the “gunboat policy” to play the role of the champion of the Armenian cause during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The British Bible societies along with French and Russian missionaries increased their activities on Armenians as well as Nestorians to spread their influence in the region.<sup>7</sup> In 1879 the British government even resorted to the “gunboat policy” to ensure the implementation of reforms in Eastern Anatolia. The British fleet at Malta was ordered to proceed to Ottoman waters. The British ambassador in İstanbul warned the Grand Vizier that the Sultan’s throne and the Empire would be in immediate danger if the reform program in eastern Anatolia would not be put into practice.<sup>8</sup> The Porte once again devised the traditional policy of playing one power to another and implied that the Ottoman government then would appeal to Russia if Britain did not draw back its fleet. At the same time the Porte promised to reach a satisfactory agreement upon the reforms in Eastern Anatolia.

In fact, the Ottoman government was in an extremely fragile position. The implementation of the reforms would eventually lead to the foundation of an autonomous Armenia in eastern provinces of the Empire. On the other hand it would also mean the alienation of Muslim subjects towards the government that allowed the implementation of reforms on behalf of Christians. The Empire once more extricated itself from this delicate situation thanks to the rivalry between the Great Powers. The Porte intentionally hindered the application of reforms arguing that lack of funds in treasury severely impeded the reform program in Eastern Anatolia.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 471.

<sup>8</sup> FO 424/89, Musurus Pasha to the Marquis of Salisbury, 1 November 1879, in *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, vol. I (1856-1880), ed. Bilal N. Şimşir, (Ankara:TTK), 1989, p. 582.

Yet the main support for the Ottoman resistance to reform program and British pressure was the change in Russia's foreign policy after the succession of Alexander III. The new regime following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 was characterized by more strict and centralist policies towards its subjects. The policy of Russification of minority groups along with the confiscation of the church properties resulted in a growing reaction among the Armenian revolutionary groups. As a result, the Russian bureaucracy became the main target of Armenian terrorist activities from 1880's onwards.<sup>9</sup> Hence, Russia showed little sympathy to the idea of Armenian independence in the Ottoman lands that, in turn, would cause serious troubles at home. As it was stated above, Russia had already had problems with its Armenian subjects and it could not support any movement in the Ottoman lands that might eventually affect its Caucasian possessions.<sup>10</sup>

After the Congress of Berlin British influence on Armenians also caused suspicion among the Russian policy makers who opposed any scheme proposing the establishment of an autonomous Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. Growing British influence on Armenians was another factor in determining the policy of Russia towards the "Armenian Question." These factors radically changed the foreign policy of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, though its traditional designs on the Ottoman lands remained unchanged for the long term. Russian policy after 1878 was maintaining the existence of a weak Ottoman Empire while attempting to prevent other powers from gaining influence at the Porte.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Richard G. Hovvannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, reprint, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 17-18.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914*, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 229.

<sup>11</sup> Alan Bodger, "Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire*, p. 77.

During the Armenian crisis of 1896, for example, Russia insistently refused to join an international intervention on behalf of Armenians. It was also very reluctant to support any coercive measures to enforce the application of reforms in eastern Anatolia.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the rivalry between Russia and Britain provided a breathing space for the Ottoman Empire for the time being. Yet the Porte urgently had to devise new policies to guarantee the integrity of its realm. After the loss of territories in the Balkans, the majority of the population in the empire consisted of Muslims along with Christian minorities and the prospective policies of the Porte could not be designed without considering this fact. The Ottoman central government started intensively to utilize universal motifs of Islam, like the Caliphate, in dealing with its Muslim population that included diverse ethnic groups from Albanians to Kurds.

### ***2-Shaikhs and the Application of the Pan-Islamist Policy in Eastern Anatolia***

As it was stated in the first chapter, the elimination of local dynasties in the 1830's led to a kind of power vacuum in eastern Anatolia. The major objective behind the elimination of local powers, as in other parts of the empire, was to establish the central authority more firmly throughout the region. Yet during the period following the elimination of local dynasties, the Ottoman government did not have the resources and the consistent policy to get eastern Anatolia under its direct control. Thus, this power vacuum was gradually filled by religious orders and shaikhs. It was argued that the religious prestige as well as their role as mediators in conflicts and blood feuds among Kurdish tribes contributed the rise of shaikhs in eastern Anatolia.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Nelson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 163.

<sup>13</sup> McDowell, pp. 50-52. Bruinessen, pp. 232-234.

On the other hand the Ottoman central government had no objection to growing influence and power of shaikhs whom it considered being always respectful and obedient to the central authority and easy to deal with. Thus the central government intentionally helped the rise of shaikhs with grants of lands as well as tax revenues of villages in the vicinity of *vakıfs* (pious endowments). In fact, granting land to shaikhs and tribal chiefs was extensively utilized by the Ottoman authorities for gaining their loyalty to the central state from 1840's onwards.<sup>14</sup> The Ottoman government also winked at the acquisition of land and villages by the shaikhs and the tribal chiefs who particularly benefited from the Land Code of 1858. Since ties of mutual benefit and interests existed between the local officials, tribal chiefs and shaikhs, they easily managed to acquire lands and to have these lands registered in their own names. Soon the shaikh families emerged as rich landowners in eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq.

Under the reign of Abdulaziz, for example, the family of Suleymaniye shaikhs acquired considerable amount of lands and villages around the city, mainly by purchase. Apparently, the shaikhs of Suleymaniye established mutual relationships with the local government officials and the central authority.<sup>15</sup> During the time of Abdulhamid II, the leader of the same family, Shaikh Said, made a journey to Istanbul and gained Imperial favor.<sup>16</sup> It was also argued that Sultan Abdulhamid II used him as an instrument of Pan-Islamist propaganda among the Kurdish tribes of Iran.<sup>17</sup>

Not suprisingly, the Porte had been utilizing Islamic propaganda and symbols among the local population since the beginning of its centralization efforts in eastern

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<sup>14</sup> Olson, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> E. B. Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise*, reprint, (Amsterdam: Apa-Philo Press, 1979), pp. 187-190.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 187.

provinces. The defeat of Mir Muhammad of Rawanduz in 1836 (see chap. I) was facilitated by the government propaganda claiming that raising arms against the Sultan-Caliph would mean *küfr*, and would result in becoming an unbeliever.<sup>18</sup> The Porte was also aware of the importance of *ṭarīkāt*s and shaikhs in eastern Anatolia from the very beginning of the centralization process. In 1842 Sultan Abdulmecid ordered the building of a large *zāviye* over the tomb of Shaikh Ḥālid, the founder of the *Naqṣibendiyye-Ḥālidiyye* order that was very influential and widespread among Kurdish population.<sup>19</sup>

After the subjugation of Bedirhan Bey in 1847, his companion Nurullah Bey, the mir of Hakkari, was also persuaded to surrender to the Ottoman government with the influence of Shaikh Sayyid Taha of Nehri.<sup>20</sup> Sayyid Taha later established his shaikhly family in Şemdinan and became the only power in the vicinity by eliminating petty mir of the district. The shaikhs of Şemdinan acquired considerable power and lands during the time of Abdulhamid II. Thus, the manipulation of Islamic propaganda by the government among the local population was nothing new.

Nevertheless, it was Abdulhamid II who adapted this traditional policy to a concrete strategy of modern propaganda for guaranteeing the obedience of Kurdish population in eastern Anatolia. Pan-Islamist propaganda was one of the vital elements in Hamidian policies concerning Kurdish population in the region. As for the other parts of the Ottoman Empire or for non-Ottoman regions, like India, Java, China, shaikhs and sufi orders were the essential means for conducting propaganda on behalf of the Sultan-Caliph in eastern Anatolia. Since shaikhs and sufi orders had always an effective and

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<sup>17</sup> B. Nikitine, *Les Kurdes, Étude Sociologique et Historique*, (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1956), p. 215

<sup>18</sup> Bruinessen, p. 209.

<sup>19</sup> Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19<sup>th</sup> Century," *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. XXII (1982), p. 35.



extensive network all over eastern Anatolia, Abdulhamid only needed to influence and gain their loyalty as the Sultan-Caliph of all Muslims.

There is ample evidence in the Ottoman archives on how the Sultan deals with the shaikhs and *tarîkats* in eastern Anatolia. The Sultan and the central bureaucracy paid utmost attention for gaining loyalty of shaikhs and sufi orders with granting them privileges and pensions. The requests of sufi shaikhs for financial help and pensions were never turned down despite the financial difficulties that the Empire suffered throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century.<sup>21</sup>

An interesting example on how the central bureaucracy and the Sultan even gave heed to the request from a shaikh of small district is the assessment of Imperial ADC Derviş Paşa on the request of financial support by the shaikh of Palu, a district of Diyarbekir. After receiving no response to his petition to the Porte, the shaikh of Palu felt no hesitation to apply to the Yıldız Palace. Eventually, Abdulhamid II as the Caliph and the protector of Islam did not turn down this request by granting a monthly pension to the shaikh.<sup>22</sup>

The immediate result of this intricate policy was the loyalty, partly religious and partly because of benefits received which the shaikhs and sufi orders felt for Abdulhamid. The Sultan was quite successful in gaining the obedience and respect of shaikhs to his person as the Caliph and the champion of Islam. Just as Abdulhamid centralized the decision making of state policies in his person, he also made various ethnic groups of the Empire focus their loyalty and obedience to the sultan himself. By

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<sup>20</sup> Nazmi Sevgen, "Kürtler," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. XXIV (1969), p. 41.

<sup>21</sup> For some examples of the Hamidian policy concerning shaikhs see Y.MTV 112/22 Shaikh Abdülhalim of Hakkari to Imperial ADC Derviş Paşa, 2 Receb 1312/30 December 1894. Y.MTV 138/127 Governor of Bitlis to Yıldız Palace, 17 Şevval 1313/1 April 1895. Y.MTV 222/30, 7 Receb 1319/20 October 1901. Assessment by Imperial ADC Derviş Paşa on the request of Shaikh Abdullah Efendi.

achieving this, he used the bureaucracy and officials in the provinces as the 'scapegoats'. The bureaucracy was intentionally presented as the supporter of reform on behalf of Armenians. In fact, there was a great fear and despise among Kurdish population for a foreign intervention that would result in the foundation of an autonomous Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. Abdulhamid was able to present himself as the only barrier in the way of an European reform in eastern Anatolia which further deepened the loyalty of local Muslim population to his person. Although Abdulhamid succeeded to gain the loyalty of shaikhs and local population with this strategy in the short term, after his deposition, the policy of gaining their loyalty to his person gave birth to serious troubles for the Young Turk Government.

The Hamidian government also made use of shaikhs as mediators among tribal population as well as propagandists for the Pan-Islamic zeal. As mentioned before, shaikhs emerged as mediators in blood feuds and tribal conflicts after the elimination of the local foci of power. The Ottoman officials in the eastern provinces had no objection to their role as mediators and even encouraged them to take active role in ending inter-tribal conflicts. An interesting example is the prevention of inter-tribal conflict between the Tiyari and Pervari tribes in 'Amadiye district in 1888. The Ottoman government resorted to help of Shaikh Mehmed Efendi, a *Naqşibendî* shaikh in 'Amadiye, to put an end to conflict between these two tribes. Both Pervari and Tiyari tribes gave consent to the mediation of the shaikh for prevention of the conflict. It is especially noteworthy that Tiyaris accepted the mediation of Shaikh Mehmed Efendi since they were Nestorian Christians by faith. Upon the request of Government and the tribes the shaikh accepted to act as mediator between two tribes and accompanied the Governor of Van to the

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<sup>22</sup> Y.MTV 77/29, 9 Şevval 1310/26 April 1892. Assessment by Imperial ADC Derviş Paşa on the request

negotiations between Tiyaris and Pervaris. Derviş Pasha especially indicates that Shaikh Mehmed Efendi was remarkably influential in ending the conflict for the time being.<sup>23</sup> Derviş Pasha also recommended that rewarding the shaikh would be appropriate for his services and loyalty to Government.<sup>24</sup> Yet the peace between two tribes seems to be short lived, since one year later Government once again sought the mediation of Shaikh Mehmed Efendi which was accompanied by some military measures.<sup>25</sup>

In the very beginning of Abdulhamid II's reign, the sultan observed the power of shaikhs over local Kurdish population. One particular event, the rise of Shaikh 'Ubeydullāh of Nehri, probably became very effective in forming the Hamidian policies in eastern Anatolia after 1880. Shaikh 'Ubeydullāh was the head of shaikhly family of Şemdinan. After accessing to the seat of Sadāt-i Nehri (i.e. the seyyids-descendants of the Prophet- of Nehri), 'Ubeydullāh started to consolidate his power through marriages between his family and the families of tribal chiefs.<sup>26</sup> As mentioned before, during the time of Shaikh Seyyid Taha, the shaikhs of Şemdinan gradually acquired lands and power by eliminating the mīr of Şemdinan in Hakkari district. In 1870's their power and followers grew rapidly so that in the Turco-Russian war of 1877 Shaikh 'Ubeydullāh joined the Ottoman army with a considerable number of armed men.<sup>27</sup> Shaikh 'Ubeydullah's reputation and charisma continued to grew among Kurdish population. Economic hardships and famine severely hit the population of eastern Anatolia during

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of Shaikh of Palu. For the full text of the document see, Appendix I.

<sup>23</sup> Y. MTV 35/141, 29 Safer 1306/ 4 November 1888. Assessment by Imperial ADC Derviş Paşa on the conflict between Tiyari and Pervari tribes.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Y.MTV 41/105 Governor of Van, Halil Paşa, to Yıldız Palace, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1307/26 December 1889.

<sup>26</sup> Olson, p.3.

<sup>27</sup> Halfin, *XIX. Yüzyılda Kürdistan Üzerine Mücadeleler*, 2. ed., (İstanbul: Komal Yayınları, 1992), pp. 77-78.

the late 1870's. This also contributed to the rise of ʿUbeydullah's religious charisma since illiterate and pious population of the region started to wait a savior, *mehdi*, who would bring miracles and a better life.

Thus, between 1880 and 1881 when ʿUbeydullah invaded Iran and provoked Kurdish tribes in Iran to join his movement, he could command 30,000 men.<sup>28</sup> He led these in a revolt against Persian Government and endeavored to carve out an independent principality for himself, probably under Ottoman and, if possible, British protection. From the very beginning Ottoman government gave support to ʿUbeydullah's movement, either by sending Bahri Bey of Bedirhan family to unite various tribes in Hakkari around ʿUbeydullah or assigning ex-army officers to train Kurdish tribesmen.<sup>29</sup> But ʿUbeydullah soon placed the Ottoman Government in a difficult position by penetrating some distance towards Tebriz before finally driven back over the frontier. Upon the protests of Russia and Iran, the Porte had to withdraw its support from a movement which it had first regarded as a useful counterpoise to Armenian nationalism.<sup>30</sup> Upon the foreign pressure, ʿUbeydullah was captured and first send to Istanbul. He was later exiled to Mecca where he died in 1883.<sup>31</sup>

Shaikh ʿUbeydullah's movement delineated some major characteristics of eastern Anatolia and Kurdish tribal population. These were probably effective in shaping of the Hamidian policies concerning Kurdish tribes and the region after 1880's. In the first place, as it has been explicitly argued above, shaikhs had enormous power over Kurdish tribal population and they could easily control and influence them through

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<sup>28</sup> WO 106/920, Personalities in Kurdistan, June 1919, Published by Civil Commissioner's Office, Baghdad. Also see, WO 106/63 J.R. Maunsell to Gibbon, London, 1 Dec 1918.

<sup>29</sup> Halfin, pp. 87, 95.

widespread networks of sufi orders. Thus, if the central government wished to rule and control Kurdish tribes without much disturbance, it had to gain loyalty of shaikhs in eastern Anatolia. Abdulhamid II, in order to achieve this objective, resorted to pre-existing methods of statecraft. He utilized Islamic propaganda through emphasizing his position as the Caliph of Muslims. He also granted privileges and revenues as *vakıfs* to shaikhs and their sufi orders.

On the other hand, the Porte regarded the Kurds as the Muslim subjects of the Empire who still live in a state of nomadism and savagery under tribal customs. In the beginning, they had to be civilized and educated through Islam and the laws of *şeriat*.<sup>32</sup> Since shaikhs and their *halifes* undertook essential functions in instructing local population which had usually no or little information about the world outside their villages and tribes, the central government also considered *tarikats* as important instruments for instructing the local population as well as conducting Pan-Islamist propaganda in the region.

Moreover, Shaikh ‘Ubeydullah’s movement represented military potential of the tribes of eastern Anatolia. By arming and controlling these tribes, it was possible to employ them to police eastern Anatolia in peacetime. The Hamidian regime, in its present financial state of affairs, preferred to utilize military potential of tribes rather than keeping numerous regular army forces in its eastern provinces.

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<sup>30</sup> FO 373/5, Armenia and Kurdistan : Handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office, London, 1919.

<sup>31</sup> Olson, p. 7.

<sup>32</sup> Y.MTV 77/29, 9 Şevval 1310/26 April 1892. Report by Imperial ADC Derviş Paşa.

### ***3-The Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments***

The Hamidian policies concerning eastern Anatolia was not only directed to shaikhs. Tribal leaders were also one of the foci attracting interest of Yıldız Palace. If the Ottoman government would held the control of its eastern possessions, one way or another, it had to hold the reins of tribal leaders who had little respect to central authority. In achieving this painful task, Abdülhamid II chose to resort to a traditional policy of the Ottoman empire rather than a direct centralization as Mahmud II did in 1830's. The Ottoman government generally succeeded to be flexible enough to accommodate local men in its imperial system without much loss of control. That is why the central government never hesitated to give ranks and official functions to persons whom it once regarded as outlaws and rebels. This characteristic of central administration would be regarded as a source of strength and a capacity to endure which prolonged the life of the Empire. Thus, viewed from this angle, the formation of cavalry units from local tribes in eastern Anatolia was an adaptation of a traditional policy in a time of great need.

On the other hand, the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiment was also a borrowing from the Empire's deadly enemy, Tsarist Russia. The Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments was formed on the pattern of the Russian army's Cossack units. Ottoman army officers were sent to St. Petersburg to study organization and training methods of the Cossack units.<sup>33</sup> The positive shift in Russia's foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire in 1880's probably made such an attempt possible.

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<sup>33</sup> Y. MTV 57/38, Commander-in-chief Rıza Paşa to Yıldız Palace, 15 Cemaziye'l-evvel 1309/ 17 December 1891. On the assignment of these officers to the 4<sup>th</sup> Army Corps, see Y. MTV 138/92, Rıza Paşa to Yıldız Palace, 13 Şevval 1313/ 31 March 1895. For the full text see, Appendix II.

General Zeki Paşa was the man behind the project of Hamidiye Regiments. It was Zeki Paşa who proposed the formation of irregular cavalry units from the tribes of eastern Anatolia in 1890. Although the project was met some objections in military circles, Abdülhamid supported Zeki Paşa's proposal and the first regulation of the Hamidiye Regiments was prepared in 1890.<sup>34</sup> The formation of the regiments that started in the same year became quite successful since the tribes of eastern Anatolia showed great concern in joining the ranks of the Hamidiye. While the leaders of tribes were visiting Istanbul to show their allegiance to the Sultan, the number of the regiments were rapidly growing and their number reached twenty-two at the end of 1891.<sup>35</sup> The tribal leaders who were persuaded to visit Istanbul recognized the Sultan's nominal authority and each accepted at his hands the titles and honours. During their visit to İstanbul, many of the tribal chiefs were given the rank of Pasha along with decorations and impressive gifts. The Sultan apparently tried to influence tribal leaders to gain their loyalty to his person as the Sultan-Caliph of Muslims.

Since one of the major aims of the Hamidian régime in eastern Anatolia was the accommodation of the Kurdish Muslims within the Ottoman system on the basis of Muslim unity, the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments was mainly formed from Sunni Kurdish tribes.<sup>36</sup> There were also Turkish tribes, Karapapaks and Turcomans, among the ranks of the Hamidiye, even though they constituted a small portion of the regiments.<sup>37</sup> As it was mentioned above, the tribes of eastern Anatolia were quite willing to join to the

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<sup>34</sup> Bayram Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası*, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1987), pp. 33-34.

<sup>35</sup> Y. MTV 48/83, Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army Corps, Zeki Paşa. to Imperial ADC Şakir Paşa, 25 Receb 1308/ 6 March 1891. For the table showing the number and names of already formed regiments in 1891 see, Y.MTV 55/29, 14 Teşrin-i Evvel 1891/ 14 October 1891. For the full table see Appendix III.

<sup>36</sup> Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 9 (1973), p. 141.

Hamidiye units. The main reason behind this willingness was, in fact, the privileges and advantages given to the tribes that constituted the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments. The families of the Hamidiye members were exempted from most taxes including the annual tax on livestock, *resm-i aġnām*. The central government had always difficulties in collecting this tax, what the Hamidian government did, in fact, was the legalization of a *de facto* situation. Moreover, the members of the Hamidiye were immune to conscription, which also made the Hamidiye more appealing for the tribes.

There is no doubt that the Hamidiye tribes used their status to gain advantage over other tribes which were left outside of the system. It was argued that the central government purposefully overlooked the actions of the Hamidiye tribes against the tribes which were always hostile to the Ottoman central government and were intentionally left outside of the Hamidiye regiments.<sup>38</sup> In fact, the Hamidian régime gave attention to not allowing non-Sunni tribes to form the Hamidiye regiments. The requests of Yezidi tribes and *Alevî* tribes of Dersim, which saw their disadvantageous position against the Hamidiye tribes, for joining the Hamidiye Cavalry regiments were rejected by the Ottoman central administration.<sup>39</sup>

The regiments were to be consisted of at least 512 men and not more than 1,152.<sup>40</sup> Yet it seems that the real number of regiments, in practice, varied between 500 and 700 men.<sup>41</sup> While larger tribes could form more than one regiment, like Haydaranlı which constitute seven regiments, smaller tribes could supply companies for

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<sup>37</sup> Bayram Kodaman, "Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alayları, II. Abdülhamid ve Doġu Anadolu Aşiretleri," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyet Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, vol. 32 (1979), p. 445.

<sup>38</sup> M.Şerif Fırat, *Doġu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Saka Matbaası, 1948), pp. 125-126.

<sup>39</sup> "...Hamidiyye Alayları şâfi'îyyü'l-mezheb ve şelâbet-i islâmiyyeleri ma'ûm ve mücerred olan âhâlden teşekkül etmekle tâ'ife-i mezkûruñ daħi müsâvî mu'âmeleye mazhar edilmesi lâıık olamayacağından.."Y.MTV 61/18, Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army Corps, Mehmet Zeki Paşa to Yıldız Palace, 8 Ramazan 1309/ 7 April 1891. For the full text see Appendix IV.



regiments.<sup>42</sup> The commanding officers of the regiments were their tribal chiefs, but they were to be assisted by a regular army officer who would supervise and control the actions of the regiments. Each of the Hamidiye chiefs were also required to send one of their sons to the military school in Istanbul to be trained as cavalry officer, who were to be assigned to their tribal regiments after completion of their training.<sup>43</sup> Some of the tribal chiefs, like the ones of Cibranlı, were quite willing to send their children to the military school, and even they sent petitions for acceptance of their sons.<sup>44</sup> The tribal school, *‘Aşîret Mektebi*, which primarily aimed to the training of children from Arab tribes, also received demands from the Kurdish tribal chiefs for admission of their sons.<sup>45</sup> Probably, the Kurdish tribal leaders had the idea that Arab tribes were gaining an advantageous position by sending their children to the tribal school and they did not want to be deprived of the same advantages.

The Hamidiye regiments would only gather in times of need and upon the order of the commanding general. The regiments were to be given weapons, equipment, special standards and uniforms, which were actually imitations of the uniforms used by Cossacks in the Russian army.<sup>46</sup> Since the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments were regarded as military units, their members could only be tried by court martial and they were held to be outside of ordinary law and the jurisdiction of provincial administration. This was one of the vulnerabilities of the Hamidiye organization. Some of the Kurdish tribal leaders considered the privileges and immunities given by the central government as a

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<sup>40</sup> Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid*, p. 34.

<sup>41</sup> Y.MTV 55/29, 14 Teşrin-i Evvel 1891/14 October 1891.

<sup>42</sup> Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid*, p. 53.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 35-36.

<sup>44</sup> Y.MTV 46/16, Governor of Bitlis to Yıldız Palace, 8 Rebiyyü'l-evvel 1308/22 October 1890. For the full text see Appendix V.

<sup>45</sup> Bayram Kodaman, "II. Abdülhamid ve Aşîret Mektebi," *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XV(1976), p. 263.

further incentive for their act of lawlessness.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, the Hamidiye tribes started to act more freely against the provincial administration. The Hamidiye commanders were under the direct control of Zeki Paşa, the commander of the Fourth Army, who always acted as the protector of tribes against the provincial administration. The allegiance of the tribal leaders, thus, was directed only to Zeki Paşa and the Sultan whom they called as “the father of the Kurds.”

The provincial bureaucracy was helpless against the violence of the Hamidiye tribes. The main concern of the Yıldız Palace was to maintain and strengthen the loyalty of the tribes to the Empire and Abdülhamid avoided any action which would have resulted in alienation of the Kurdish tribes. To take an obvious example, in the face of numerous complaints and requests of trial for İbrahim Paşa, the leader of Milli tribal confederation which situated in Urfa and Raqqa, the Yıldız Palace kept its silence and İbrahim Paşa’s power continued to grow unchecked in the region.<sup>48</sup>

It was only during the Armenian incidents of 1894-96 that the Hamidian régime reluctantly attempted to take measures against the Kurdish tribes upon the international pressure. When the European powers once again started to press for reforms in eastern Anatolia, Abdülhamid had to accept a new program of reforms and a commission was sent to eastern Anatolia under the supervision of Şakir Paşa in 1895.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, the Ottoman government was able to manipulate the public opinion of Muslims in eastern Anatolia that it had no choice other than accepting the reform demands of the

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<sup>46</sup> McDowell, p. 59.

<sup>47</sup> Duguid, p. 147.

<sup>48</sup> There is ample evidence in the Ottoman archives that the recurring complaints and requests of trial by the provincial administration for İbrahim Paşa could not receive a positive response from the Sultan. To cite a few examples, Y.MTV 165/98, 22 Rebiyyü'l-evvel 1315/ 21 August 1897. Y.MTV 241/6, 1 Zilhicce 1320/ 1 March 1902. Y.MTV 281/38, 8 Muharrem 1323/ 15 March 1905.

<sup>49</sup> Ali Karaca, *Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmet Şakir Paşa (1838-1899)*, (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), p. 55.

European Powers.<sup>50</sup> The reform commission eventually prepared a report on the possible regulations and measures for putting the Hamidiye regiments under firmer control of the government.<sup>51</sup> The report could be taken as a valuable evidence indicating some of the shortcomings in the Hamidiye organization. First of all, it was argued that the Hamidiye regiments lacked a military discipline. The regular army officers who were assigned to the regiments for supervising them, were naturally unable to assert their influence on tribal chiefs, since the officers received their wages from these tribal chiefs. Secondly, the Hamidiye commanders had no respect to the provincial administration and the laws because they were only liable to the commander of the Fourth Army, Zeki Paşa. Finally, the main proposal of the report was to bring the Hamidiye members under the jurisdiction of the civil courts and the provincial administration once again. By this regulation the provincial government would be able to maintain a control over the activities of the Hamidiye tribes.

Yet the Sultan had little incentive for alienating the very group that he had been struggling to gain its loyalty. The cooperation of the local population, at least the Muslim population, was essential for the defense and unity of the region. All of the reform efforts were, in fact, a showpiece to ward off the international pressure. Thus, it is not very surprising that the new regulations were never applied to the Hamidiye Regiments.

Apart from gaining the loyalty of the local population, another function of the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments was to serve as a police force in eastern Anatolia. In the present financial state of the Ottoman Empire, the central government had limited financial sources to support a large army and police force in eastern Anatolia. This

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<sup>50</sup> Duguid, p. 150.

situation presented a serious trouble for the Ottoman authorities, especially in a period when the Armenian revolutionary activity gained momentum. This is not to underestimate the deep hatred between Armenians and Kurds. Since the main concern of the Ottoman government was the unity of its realm, the formation of a militia from the Kurdish tribes would, in a way, mean preferring the Muslim Kurds to the rebellious Armenian subjects.

The Hamidiye Regiments were also utilized for securing the borders of the Empire against Armenian revolutionaries as well as the Kurdish tribes of Iran.<sup>52</sup> Especially, the Turco-Iranian border was always subject to raids by the Kurdish tribes of both sides. The border agreements between the two states did not mean anything for the nomadic tribes that had the summer pastures on one side and the winter pastures on the other side of the border. The Kurdish tribes on both sides of the border were at feud with each other for many years. In 1821, for example, as a result of a frontier raid by Haydaranlı tribe against Iranian territory Iranian army crossed the border and invaded Ottoman territory as far as Van. The peace treaty of Erzurum in 1823 once again restored the frontiers decided in 1639 with the Kasr-i Şirin treaty.<sup>53</sup> Frontier disputes between the two states were repeated in 1848 when a commission was set up under surveillance of Russia and Britain to settle the Turco-Iranian frontier issue.<sup>54</sup> Yet even after these efforts both states were unable to curb actions of the tribes on the frontier. As a contemporary observer stated in 1903:

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<sup>51</sup> Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid*, p. 51.

<sup>52</sup> Y.MTV 143/67, Commander-in-chief, Rıza Paşa to Yıldız Palace, 20 Muharrem 1314/ 1 July 1896. Also see, Y. MTV 161/69, Rıza Paşa to Yıldız Palace, 26 Muharrem 1315/ 27 June 1897.

<sup>53</sup> Hassan Arfa, *The Kurds, An Historical and Political Study*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 22.

<sup>54</sup> Mehmed Hurşid Paşa, *Seyahatname-i Hudud*, ed. Alâattin Eser, (İstanbul: Simurg, 1997), p. 13. The travel account of Hurşid Paşa, who was a member of the commission, contains valuable data on the tribes and demography of eastern Anatolia in 1840's.

Why do the Turks permit the frontier aşirets to remain armed with breechloaders, martinis, etc. when by a little exertion they might pacify the country by collecting these weapons? If the Turkish frontier tribes were disarmed they would be at the mercy of the Persian Kurds, with whom they have been at feud many years. This would entail maintaining a frontier force to protect them, which in the present financial state of affairs would be an impossibility.<sup>55</sup>

Such an action was likely to be met fierce resistance by the tribes. The Porte insistently resisted the requests of the foreign ambassadors for collecting weapons of the tribes in eastern Anatolia arguing that this would definitely result in resistance and disorder among the tribes.<sup>56</sup> Yet after the Armenian incidents of 1894-1896, the depots of arms were established in convenient centers to keep the weapons of the Hamidiye Regiments under lock except when they were required for training and campaigns.<sup>57</sup> This does not necessarily mean that the Hamidiye tribes were unable to possess weapons other than the ones given to them by the government. It was quite easy to get a rifle in eastern provinces of the Empire either through smuggling or local production of famous brands like old-styled martinis.

It is often argued that utilizing the tribes of eastern Anatolia in a prospective war against Russia was one of the main aims in formation of the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments. When the lack of military training and non-existent discipline in the Hamidiye Regiments is considered, however, it becomes clear that these units had little value in the modern warfare. Along with guaranteeing the loyalty of the tribes, the Ottoman central government was probably hoping to get them accustomed to conscription and service in the regular army. In 1892, with a new regulation, the government decided that each Hamidiye regiment in turn were to stay in İstanbul for a

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<sup>55</sup> Mark Sykes, *Dar-ul-Islam, A Record of a Journey through Ten of Asiatic Provinces of Turkey*, reprint, (London: Darf Publishers Limited, 1988), p. 160.

<sup>56</sup> Y.MTV 120/2, the Foreign Ministry to Yıldız Palace, 15 Zilkade 1312/ 10 May 1894.

<sup>57</sup> H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies*, vol. II, reprint, (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), p. 5.

one year period during which they were regarded as regular army units. They were to be stationed in the military barracks and were liable to military regulations.<sup>58</sup> Mark Sykes, who watched a *Selâmlık* parade in 1903, states that along with Albanian riflemen, Syrians and the Ertuğrul Lancers, there were two Hamidiye Regiments in the ceremony.<sup>59</sup> The Sultan primarily aimed to integrate the Kurds into the Ottoman régime and the military value of the Hamidiye would not be an important matter in this first stage. In some of the Hamidiye villages the government also established schools and mosques for achieving the integration of the tribal population into the Empire.<sup>60</sup>

Yet, the flexibility of the central government in dealing with the tribes of eastern Anatolia during the Hamidian era was always resented by many of the provincial bureaucrats who were usually educated in modern lines and had a “Young Turk” mentality. A contemporary Young Turk observer who served in various provincial posts in eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia during the Hamidian era remembered the conciliatory policies of the Yıldız Palace towards shaikhs and tribal leaders with a dislike.<sup>61</sup> The generation of the Young Turks had completely different ideas on how to threat various elements in the Empire which they regarded incompatible with an ideal modern state. The triumph of the Young Turks and the deposition of Abdülhamid, thus, mean a shift and discontinuity in the policies of the Ottoman government in dealing with the Kurdish tribes. The next chapter will discuss this new attitude in the state policies under the Committee of Union and Progress régime.

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<sup>58</sup> Y.MTV 73/46, 5 Cemaziyye'l-evvel 1310/ 25 November 1892. Draft by Imperial ADC Şakir Paşa.

<sup>59</sup> Sykes, p. 251.

<sup>60</sup> Y. MTV 87/133, Commander-in-chief Rıza Paşa to Yıldız Palace, 14 Cemaziyye'l-evvel 1311/23 November 1893. Lynch's evidence who travelled in eastern Anatolia during the same period also verify this policy: “In the principal village of Patnos, the principal seat of Haydaranlı tribe, a solid store structure was built by the order of Government to serve several purposes of a mosque, a school, a residence for the chief.” Lynch, vol. II, p. 422

<sup>61</sup> Ebubekir Hazım Tepeyran, *Canlı Tarihler*, vol. I, (İstanbul, 1944), pp. 268-270.

## **Chapter III**

### **Tribes and state in Eastern Anatolia from 1908 to 1914**

#### ***1-The Young Turk Period: Re-emergence of Tribal Problem***

The period after the declaration of the Constitution and the re-opening of Parliament with an imperial decree by Abdulhamid II in 1908 witnessed the shift of political power from the Yıldız palace to the Sublime Porte. In other words Abdulhamid II was the last Ottoman sultan who held the political power and administration in his hands. Whereas Abdülhamid II transferred the decision making center of the Empire from the Porte to the Yıldız Palace, after 1908 the Sultanate became a symbolic post which nearly had no power upon administration of the Empire except approbation power. A weak sultan such as Mehmed V would have no role except affirming the decisions of governments. Thus the struggle for the political power changed ground since the control of the Parliament and government now meant the control on the administration.

Parallel to this development the Committee of Union and Progress (hence CUP) emerged as the only power that could fill the political vacuum with the fall of the Hamidian régime. Except for a short period between 1912 and 1913, the Committee was the main power that shaped the domestic and the foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire. Many of the bureaucrats of the ancient régime were gradually removed from the office while the Unionists filled the ranks of the bureaucracy and the army. The natural result of this cleansing was a definitive shift in the state policies both in foreign and domestic domains.

The Unionists, who were mainly educated in Western-styled modern schools, had completely different ideas on the administration of the Empire. They desired to transform the Empire to a modern European state with efficient administrative mechanisms. One could argue that this was also the aim of the Hamidian régime, which laboriously continued the Tanzimat reforms. Yet the Unionists lacked the flexibility of the Hamidian régime in dealing with the local elements which strongly hated any direct attempt of centralization. For many of the Unionists, the ideal modern state was the one, which was able to implement regular conscription and taxation all over the Empire through its uniform provincial administration. Conciliation with the local elements was out of question, which was remembered as one of the vices of the Hamidian era. The traditional Ottoman policy of integration by dealing with rebellious local elements, in which the authorities preferred assigning them to official posts rather than announcing them as rebels<sup>1</sup>, was unacceptable to the Young Turk bureaucrats.

Thus, it is not surprising to observe a sharp change in the state policies concerning the tribes of eastern Anatolia during the Second Constitutional Era. The new régime continually struggled to bring the tribes under closer central control by the elimination of local power centers. In this process shaikhs and tribal leaders naturally became the main targets of the central authority. One can even speak about an attempt of 'detrribalisation' in the Unionist period, even though its success is open to debate.

The traditional policy of governors in eastern Anatolia was usually to allow the various small chiefs and agas more or less free to manage their own affairs, and to fight among themselves as they please during the Hamidian régime. Yet the provincial

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Schölch, "The Decline of Local Power in Palestine After 1856; The Case of 'Aqîl Ağâ," *Die Welt Des Islams*, vol. 13-14 (1984), p. 467.



administration under the CUP had little sympathy for lawlessness and banditry. Many of the provincial governors, who were primarily loyal Unionists, tend to suppress such acts with harsh measures.

In fact, the Unionists had rightful reasons to resent the authority of shaikhs and tribal chieftains over the population of the eastern Anatolia. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, uprisings, which were led by influential shaikhs and tribal chiefs, took place for supporting Sultan Abdülhamid in various parts of Anatolia and northern Iraq. The famous as well as notorious chief of Milli confederation, İbrahim Paşa, immediately rose against the new régime. He tried to instigate a revolt in all over Syria against the Young Turk government in favor of Sultan-Caliph Abdülhamid.<sup>2</sup> As it was mentioned in previous chapter, the chief of the Milli confederation was always protected by the Sultan against the provincial administration. During the uprising İbrahim Paşa occupied Damascus with the support of 1,500 tribesmen on behalf of the Sultan. Yet the new government quickly reacted by inciting the deadly enemy of Milli confederation, the Arab Shammar tribes, to attack İbrahim Paşa. Milli forces was defeated and İbrahim Paşa was killed during his withdrawal.<sup>3</sup>

Another uprising took place in the Süleymaniye district this time led by a shaikh. Shaikh Said, who was an important actor of the Sultan's pan-islamist propaganda in the region, revolted against the new Constitutional government. Since the shaikhs of Süleymaniye had close ties with the surrounding tribes of Süleymaniye, mainly with the tribes of Hamawand confederation, the uprising caused a great deal of trouble for the central government. The rising was only suppressed for the time being when Shaikh Said

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<sup>2</sup> Bruinessen, p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> Arfa, p. 25.

was killed in Mosul, probably by a government agent.<sup>4</sup> However, after this event the shaikhs of Süleymaniye always resented the CUP government and continued to be trouble-makers for the central authority with the help of adherent Hamawand tribes.<sup>5</sup>

Consequently, the CUP government always look upon shaikhs and tribal leaders with distrust and resentment from the very beginning. They were regarded as the reactionary elements, which were trying to bring back the Hamidian régime. Shaikhs and religious orders especially attracted much suspicion of the new government. On the other hand, shaikhs also had every reason to hate the Unionist government. The non-Orthodox policies of the Unionists also alarmed and alienated the traditional religious elements in the region. A guiding principle for many of the Unionists was the transformation of the society into a state that religion has a limited role over the society.<sup>6</sup> The Young Turks were aware about the difficulty of implementing non-traditional policies and tried to reconcile Islam and their 'secularist' reforms . But these arguments were far from persuading Orthodox ulema and traditional Islamists. The *softas* joined the rebellious forces and took an active part in the 31 March Incident and the restoration of the *şerîat* became the slogan of mutineers. But the religion and the term *şerîat* were the normal vehicles for political struggle in the Ottoman Empire for centuries and the same slogans were utilized in 31 March for providing legitimacy to the rebellion in the eyes of the public.

However, the effects of the 31 March incident in eastern Anatolia was probably more profane than in western parts of the Empire. The institution of Caliphate played a

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<sup>4</sup> FO 371/1003, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, 8 March 1910. See also, WO 106/920, *Personalities in Kurdistan*, (Baghdad: Civil Commissioner's Office), 1919.

<sup>5</sup> Soane, p. 195.

<sup>6</sup> Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, New York, 1995, p. 214.

vital role in prompting political loyalties among the tribal society of eastern Anatolia. The demand of the *şeriat* in the 31 March uprising and the following response of the CUP which resulted in the deposition of the most venerated Sultan-Caliph, Abdülhamid II, resulted in deep resentment by religious elements in eastern Anatolia against the new 'gavur' régime. Some shaikhs and their *halifes* even initiated a propaganda campaign against the new Young Turk government throughout eastern Anatolia.<sup>7</sup>

Another group, which was severely hit by the new government's policies, was the tribal chiefs of eastern Anatolia. After the rebellion led by famous Hamidiye chieftain İbrahim Paşa of Milli, the CUP government seriously started to consider the removal of the Hamidiye regiments and the breaking the power of tribal chiefs in eastern Anatolia. The nomadic tribes were seen as the source of banditry and chaos in the region. The provincial administration no more tolerated inter-tribal fighting and raids, and the tribes which joined such conflicts and raids were severely punished. The central government even issued orders for the removal of some chieftain families, which were notorious for banditry and raiding.<sup>8</sup> The reaction of the provincial administration to banditry in the Second Constitutional Era totally differed from the one in the Hamidian period. While the dull procedure followed in such cases throughout the Hamidian period was, if possible, to return the stolen goods and cattle to their actual owners without

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DH. MUİ 54-1/20, Mutasarrıf of Muş. Rauf, to the Ministry of Interior, 20 Kanun-i Evvel 1325/2 January 1910. For the full text see, Appendix VI.

DH. MUİ 23-2/13, Grand Vizier Hüseyin Hilmi to the Ministry of Interior, 9 Zilhicce 1327/22 December 1909.

punishing the guilty parties and to restore peace between conflicting tribes<sup>9</sup>, the CUP government insisted upon the severe punishment for the guilty parties.

Inter-tribal conflicts for pasture and cattle among the nomadic tribes as well as raids upon villages, both Christian and Muslim, constituted a normal way of life. Banditry, which represented a major economic source for the tribes, was very common throughout the region. The typical tribal man was likely to be some kind of bandit who looked upon the opportunities for pillage and profit through non-economical means. These usually included raids against caravans, villages of neighboring tribes and provided 'means of reinforcing' the loyalty of tribal members felt against the tribal chief.<sup>10</sup> The Hamidian régime, which had little concern for a rapid change in socio-economic and tribal structures in eastern Anatolia, had acted with a great flexibility in dealing with banditry and inter-tribal fighting. The Young Turk régime, on the other hand, initiated a crusade against all the decentralizing elements in the Empire in its first years. Yet the Kurdish tribal leaders had no desire to abandon their proverbial freedom and power for the taxes and military system of a well-ordered government. Eastern Anatolia continued to be a place of unrest, like Albania where the centralist policies of the CUP resulted in a general uprising.

The CUP government also took steps for the removal of the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, which were regarded as the remainings of the Hamidian administration. Many of the Hamidian commanders were suspected as the reactionaries who labored for the restoration of ancient régime. On the other hand, the Hamidiye Regiments were seen

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<sup>9</sup> See Y.MTV 46/36, Governor of Van, Halil Paşa, to Sublime Porte, 22 Rebiyyülevvel 1308/ 5 November 1890. Y. MTV 67/122, 30 Safer 1310/24 September 1892, telegram by Mustafa Paşa, chief of Miran tribes, to Yıldız Palace Imperial Secretariat. See also, Y.A. RES 2/19, 21 Safer 1296/18 February 1878.

as totally useless from the military point of view because of their inadequate discipline and training.<sup>11</sup> They were probably unable to grasp the main function of the regiments; to assure the viability of Ottoman rule by guaranteeing the loyalty of the tribes living in the area.

Yet the Unionists were aware that there was no possibility of a complete removal of the Hamidiye Regiments without causing widespread disturbances in the region. The central government, thus, began to reduce the number of regiments while curtailing their privileges given in the Hamidian Era. Under the name of reorganization, their name, which reminded the Sultan Abdülhamid, was changed to *‘Aşîret Alayları*, or the Tribal Regiments and their numbers were gradually reduced from 66 to 24.<sup>12</sup> In 1909 the central government even sent order for the collection of *resm-i aġnām* for previous three years from the Hamidiye tribes, which was opposed by the Fourth Army Commandership, pointing that the Hamidiye tribes were immune to *resm-i aġnām* and many of the regular taxes.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, the collection of this tax continued to be a source of unrest among the tribes. In 1914 an increase in *resm-i aġnām* to 6 piastres per head of sheep resulted in a serious unrest among the tribes and was one of the reasons of the Hizan rebellion which will be later discussed in length in this chapter. In the Ottoman Parliament an opposition to the government policies towards the Hamidiye Regiments also existed among the deputies of the region. To give an example, in a

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<sup>10</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko’s Revolt,” in *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, ed. Richard Tapper, (London: Croom Helm), 1983, p. 374.

<sup>11</sup> Fahrettin Altay, *10 Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası; 1912-1922*, İstanbul, 1970, p. 55.

<sup>12</sup> FO 371/1484, Ian M. Smith to Sir L. Mallet, Van, 14 February 1914.

<sup>13</sup> DH. MUİ. 16-3/12, Grand Vizier Hüseyin Hilmi to the Ministry of Interior, 30 Rebiyyülahir 1327/10 May 1909. For the response of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army Commandership see, DH. MUİ 61-1/7, Grand Vizier Hakkı Paşa to the Ministry of Interior, 17 Muharrem 1328/29 January 1910.

memorandum prepared by the deputies of Genç, Muş and Hakkari, the reorganization and the curtailment of the privileges given to the Hamidiye was severely protested and possible methods and regulations were proposed for taking the Hamidiye under firmer control of the government.<sup>14</sup>

Tribal chiefs and shaikhs were not the only targets of the Constitutional government. Local notables and provincial officers were also considered among the obstacles on the way of the new régime by the Unionists. In fact, the CUP government had rightful reasons for suspecting the provincial officers, many of whom were drawn from the local population. Tribal chiefs, shaikhs and the local representatives of the government were often connected to each other through ties of mutual benefit and interests. Even though conflicts between the individual members of these groups frequently took place, there was an overall symbiotic relationship between these interest groups.<sup>15</sup> In spite of all the determination of the new régime from the beginning, the implementation of centralist policies could not be carried out because of the resistance shown by the provincial administration including the local courts. To take an obvious example, after the troubles caused by İbrahim Paşa of Milli, three of his sons were arrested and put on a jail in Diyarbakır. But the court at Diyarbakır decided that the trial should take place in Viranşehir, the principal town of Milli tribe. But the local CUP protested of this declaring that the court was bribed to give this decision which would probably result in the acquittal of İbrahim Paşa's sons.<sup>16</sup> The central government

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<sup>14</sup> DH. MUI 60/28, 20 Muharrem 1328/2 February 1910.

<sup>15</sup> Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p. 249.

<sup>16</sup> FO 371/1003, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 4 September 1910.

interrupted the implementation of this decision, and finally the properties of İbrahim Paşa was confiscated by the state even though his sons were set free by the court.<sup>17</sup>

However the government could not successfully divert the decisions of the local courts all the time. In Bitlis, for example, the reactionary elements could still resist the punishment of the local chiefs and shaikhs in 1910. Shaikh Seyyid Ali of Hizan, who was a very influential figure in Bitlis was acquitted and set free after a month trial by the court of Appeal at Bitlis. Throughout the Constitutional Period Bitlis was to be the principal center of disaffection and unrest. After the 1908 Revolution a new governor was assigned to Bitlis but in the face of strong opposition and unrest the government had to dismiss the governor who tried to continue the work of reform and dismissed several local officials.<sup>18</sup>

These developments did not impede the centralizing efforts of the CUP government. In east Anatolian provinces most of the existing police force were removed while many of reactionary officials in administrative departments were displaced. Many high native officials were dismissed and replaced by others, including Armenians, who were loyal to the Unionist government.<sup>19</sup> In fact, as a result of the political alliance between the Unionists and Armenians after 1908, the CUP governments started to favor Armenian population to the Kurds in the region, whom they regarded as the supporters of Abdülhamid II. The word of reform was more frequently pronounced by the central government and its agents in the area. Yet, in the eyes of shaikhs and the tribal population the very word 'reform' meant the interference of the Great Powers and the establishment of an autonomous Armenia in the region. This further worsened the

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<sup>17</sup> DH. MTV 48/9, Governor of Diyarbakır to the Ministry of Interior, 20 Zilkade 1330/1 October 1912.

<sup>18</sup> FO 371/1003, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 30 May 1910.

dissatisfaction of the tribal population, being felt towards the new government, as well as the hatred and conflicts between the Armenians and the Kurds in eastern Anatolia. In this point, a short analysis of the relations between Armenians and Kurds from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries would be necessary before continuing further discussion of the relations between tribes and the CUP governments.

## ***2-Armenians and Kurds in Eastern Anatolia during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries***

It is often true to describe the Armenians as agricultural cultivators and traders of the plains but it seems rather an exaggeration to describe Kurds as entirely pastoral nomads of the mountains. The large pastoral tribes of the Van plateau and the nomads of Hakkari were prominent since they were usually associated with all kinds of troubles with the central authority and were usually taken as a typical example of the Kurdish tribes. Yet the sedentary population among Kurds also constituted a large portion of the tribal society.

It is also possible to describe the demographic distribution as Armenian and Turkish populations being concentrated mainly in urban centers whereas the Kurdish population settled in mountainous districts and rural areas. A considerable portion of the Armenian population, however, could be found in rural areas in eastern Anatolia in the late nineteenth century. As a result of several factors, like religion, literacy etc., Armenian population of eastern Anatolia easily adapted itself to the penetration of Western capitalism than the Muslim elements. Although the trade with Western countries did not constitute a large percentage, in urban centers a kind of petit bourgeoisie among Armenians gradually emerged in the area. Missionary activities also

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<sup>19</sup> FO 371/1003, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 7 February 1910.



played a crucial role in integration of Armenian community with Europe and the United States while disrupting the existing socio-economic and political relationships between Armenians and Muslims, both Turks and Kurds.

Contemporary observes, both European and Ottoman, points out the financial and commercial talents of the Armenians whereas depicting the Kurds mainly as pastoral nomads and seldom as agriculturalists.<sup>20</sup> Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, for example, who visited eastern provinces between 1848-1852, points out that Armenians constituted all the artisans and merchants in the province of Van as well as they made up the majority of cultivators.<sup>21</sup> As it was mentioned before, even though the sedentary portion among the Kurdish population was considerable, the pastoral Kurdish tribes were taken as typical because they were notorious for their banditry and violence and were much spoken of by European diplomats as well as the Ottoman provincial administration.

The nineteenth century was an era when the pledges of reform, the nationalist impulse as well as the Great Power interference and missionary activities severely disrupted the socio-political ties and allegiances between Armenians and their Kurdish overlords. In the nineteenth century there were still feudal connections between the Kurds and the Armenians in some districts of eastern Anatolia.<sup>22</sup> Armenian villages had to recognize a certain Kurdish chief and paid tribute in return for protection from the other Kurdish tribes. In fact, serfdom was a widespread institution among Armenian villagers throughout eastern Anatolia. In mentioning Armenian villagers of the region, Lynch points out that

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<sup>20</sup> Sir C. N. Edgcumbe Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, (London: Odysseus), 1900, p. 433.

<sup>21</sup> Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, *Seyahat-ı Hudud*, pp. 236-237.

<sup>22</sup> Eliot, p. 434.

The serfs who are Armenians, are known as, *zer kurri*, signifying bought with gold. In fact they are bought and sold in much the same manner as sheep and cattle by the Kurdish beys and aghas. They are transferred with the lands which they cultivate. In return for the protection against other Kurdish tribes, Armenians pay a tax from this earnings, capitals and goods.<sup>23</sup>

Although such practices were announced to be abolished with the Tanzimat reforms, which pledged equality for all the Ottoman subjects, in practice these reforms could not be easily applied in many parts of the Empire. The Armenian and Muslim peasantry were largely untouched and lived under the oppression of the tribal chiefs in eastern Anatolia. Even in 1911 the Kurdish chiefs were still claiming an ancient tax called, *kāfirlik*, from the Armenian peasantry in mountainous regions of eastern Anatolia.

The right of *kāfirlik* implied the obligation of each Armenian house to give annually to the Kurd chief of the village 180 kilograms of corn, one sheep, one *batman* of butter, two pairs of shoes, two pairs of socks, etc. Besides this the entire household was obliged to give 20 to 40 days' labor for cutting wood, etc. for winter. Whenever his agha has a child, the Armenians must offer him a lamb if it be a boy or some chickens if it be a girl.<sup>24</sup>

The *kāfirlik* was in fact nothing more than a sign of the serfdom of these Armenian peasants. Yet as the pledges of equality by the Ottoman government and nationalist ideas spread among Armenian population of eastern Anatolia, they became more and more assertive against the Kurdish tribes. Armenian villagers started to refuse the payment of such taxes as *kāfirlik* to the Kurdish chiefs. The result was increasing

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<sup>23</sup> Lynch, pp. 430-431.

<sup>24</sup> FO 371/1263, Vice-consul of Van, Molyneux-Seel to Lowther, Van, 9 October 1911.

violence against the Armenians by the tribal chiefs. The Sasun incident was a good example for the violence of Kurdish chieftains on the 'rebellious' Armenian villagers who did not want to pay archaic taxes anymore.<sup>25</sup>

Similar events were still taking place in the 1910's in eastern Anatolia. In 1911 the chiefs of Mutki tribes, Hacı Musa Ağa and Hacı Reşit Ağa, sent word to all of 20 Armenian villages in their district to prepare *kāfirlik* tax for the last three years, i.e. from the beginning of the Constitutional Era, left unpaid and send them with the usual amount. When the latter refused to do so, the Mutki tribes descended upon these villages and carried off sheep and cattle. There were also similar events in Varto, Muş and Mozug between the Armenian villagers and the Kurdish chieftains.<sup>26</sup>

Feudal relations was not the only problem which deepened the hatred between the Armenians and the Kurds. After the period following the Berlin Congress the Armenians attracted much interest of the Great Powers that tried to introduce new reforms on behalf of Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile there was a growing anxiety among the Kurdish shaikhs and population about the establishment of an autonomous Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. As the word 'reform' started to be frequently pronounced, the hostility of Kurds towards Armenians drastically grew and in many places this turned to acts of violence. As the Armenian revolutionary activity increased in 1890's, the Kurdish chiefs regarded this as an opportunity to teach a lesson to their insurgent vassals as well as to provide booty for their followers.

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<sup>25</sup> Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms 1812-1914," in *A Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Halil İnalcık and D. Quataert, (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), p. 880.

<sup>26</sup> FO 371/1263, Consul of Erzurum, McGregor to Lowther, Erzurum, 13 November 1911.

As many Armenians emigrated to Russia during these events, their lands and houses were taken by the Kurdish chiefs.<sup>27</sup> After the 1908 Revolution land question between Armenians and Kurds gained primary importance since the Armenians, who escaped to Russian territory during the Hamidian era, gradually started to return their towns and villages to reclaim their lands and properties. Unsettled land question became the source of bad relations and complaint between Armenians and Kurds. The CUP government, which made an alliance with the Armenian community in the elections, tried to solve the land question on behalf of the Armenians. Two years after the revolution, most of the lands taken by the Kurdish tribes was restored to the Armenian owners to the annoyance of the former in many provinces of eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman central government paid much attention to the restoration of usurped lands as well as the punishment of depredators who were unwilling to give them back.<sup>28</sup>

The result of the CUP's policy was, as expected, a feeling of great discontent among the Kurdish tribal chiefs and shaikhs who were much benefited from the seizing of these lands. The discontent of shaikhs and tribal chiefs in a tribal society consequently meant the discontent of the tribal population, and the growing feeling of resentment against the CUP government in the region.

There was an another factor that seriously complicated the situation in eastern Anatolia, which was the shift in Russian policy towards the eastern possessions of the Ottoman Empire. Following the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, the new régime

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<sup>27</sup> Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p. 107.

<sup>28</sup> DH. MUİ 70-1/5, Armenian Patriarchate to the Ministry of Interior, 19 Safer 1328/2 March 1910. See also, FO 371/1003, McGregor to Lowther, Erzurum, 31 July 1910; FO 371/2130, Ian M. Smith to Sir L.Mallet, Van, 14 February 1914. In some cases the claims of the Armenians could turn out to be ill-founded after a investigation in the registers since the lands which they reclaimed were empty ones without any owners. See, DH. MUİ 77-2/15, Governor of Mamuretü'l-aziz to the Ministry of Interior, 9 Cemaziyevvel 1328/18 June 1910.

started to follow a liberal policy to integrate the subject nations into the Empire. Russia, by posing itself as the protector of Armenians, aimed both gaining the loyalty of its Armenian population and the sympathy of the Ottoman Armenians.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, after concluding an 'Eastern Settlement' with Britain in 1907, Russia also felt free to deal with eastern province of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, by 1910's the Russian foreign policy regarding eastern Anatolia drastically changed after a period of silence.

Russia's attention in eastern Anatolia did not only display an inclination towards the Armenians, but also towards the Kurds who were dissatisfied with the present Ottoman government. While Russia was prompting hopes of autonomy among the Ottoman Armenian population, Russian agents were, on the other hand, busy to provoke the Kurds by claiming that the Ottoman government would allow Armenians to gain autonomy in the region.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, In the capital of the Empire there was a specific group of Kurds who were affected national ideologies of the time. They were mainly the members of notable Kurdish families like Bedirhans and shaikhly family of Şemdinan, who were in exile in İstanbul. One of them was Shaikh Abdülkadir, the son of the famous Shaikh Ubeydullah, who became the President of the Ottoman Council of State after the dethronment of Abdülhamid II. After the suppression of the counter-revolution attempt in 1909, he was sent to eastern Anatolia to calm down the growing opposition to the CUP since he was known as loyal to the Unionists and the new régime. Yet when he

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<sup>29</sup> Hovannisian, p. 31.

<sup>30</sup> "...Some alleged Russian propagandists were lately making a good bussiness among hundreds of discontented Hamidie officers at Malazgird and Bulanik in the way of paving road for "Russian ccupation" of the territory. There appears really exist striking proofs that the Russians cause among kurdish malcontents is making widespread progress..." FO 371/1263, McGregor to Lowther, Erzurum, 27 lovember 1911. Also see, FO 371/1773, Molyneux-Seel to Lowther, Van, 8 May 1913.

reached to Şemdinan, the seat of his shaikhly family, he started to arrange meetings with the chiefs of surrounding tribes both on the Ottoman and Persian sides, whose aims were unknown to the provincial administration since the local representatives of the central government in Şemdinan were the men of Abdülkadir's shaikhly family.<sup>31</sup>

Another figure was Abdürrezzak of Bedirhan family who became a chamberlain to the Sultan during the Hamidian era. One of his brothers, Ali Şamil Paşa, also occupied a high post in the army during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid. Yet as a result of a personal quarrel in 1907, Rıdvan Paşa, the Governor of Constantinople was murdered by Kurd retainers of Abdürrezzak and Ali Şamil, and by the Sultan's orders all the members of Bedirhan family were exiled to Tripoli and other distant parts of the Empire.<sup>32</sup> Following the 1908 Revolution Abdürrezzak became active in eastern Anatolia to propagate the idea of an autonomous Kurdish state with the help of Russia. Under the guidance of Russians Abdürrezzak's efforts escalated during the spring of 1913 when the rumors of a Kurdish revolt within the triangle of Van, Bitlis and Mosul under the assistance of Russia started to be spread in the region.<sup>33</sup> Although Abdürrezzak's attempt turned to be a complete failure, the CUP's efforts to win him back through the Ottoman ambassador in Tahrán continued until 1914.<sup>34</sup> Even though both Abdülkadir and Abdürrezzak were under the influence of nationalist ideologies, these had no effect on the tribal chiefs and shaikhs in eastern Anatolia. Consequently, they tried to utilize tribal and religious allegiances of their families to provoke a revolt without a success.

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<sup>31</sup> DH. MUI 71/68, Governor of Van, Bekir Sami, to the Ministry of Interior, 5 April 1326/18 April 1910.

<sup>32</sup> WO 106/920, *Personalities of Kurdistan*, Baghdad: Civil Commissioner's Office, 1919.

<sup>33</sup> FO 371/1003, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 12 May 1913.

<sup>34</sup> DH. KMS 8/20, The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Interior, 28 Safer 1332/27 January 1914.

### ***3-The Tribes of Eastern Anatolia on the eve of the First World War***

While the unrest among the Kurdish population was rapidly growing, the CUP government started to recognize the gravity of danger in its eastern provinces. The CUP attempted to re-endorse the denounced Hamidian policies in eastern Anatolia. From utilizing shaikhs of Naḳṣībendiyye-Hālidiyye order in pacification of Kurdish population to granting gifts and money to tribal chiefs and ağas, the CUP made a drastic return to the Hamidian practices.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, the new attitude of the CUP could not remove the bad impression of the new régime in the eyes of the shaikhs and tribal population. This general discontent eventually led to a rising in Bitlis in the spring of 1914, in which the religion and the shaikhs played a principal role.

In fact, the province of Bitlis had been a place of unrest and discontent from the beginning of the Constitutional Era. This was a consequence of the rumors of reform and the severity with which the central government dealt with the Kurdish chiefs and shaikhs in the area. In 1910, for example, the provincial administration had Shaikh Seyyid Ali of Hizan arrested for anti-government propaganda, but he was acquitted by the local court. The government began to regard some of the shaikhs, who had a very political as well as religious influence on the population, as a source of threat. The reason of the rising at Bitlis was, too, the arrest of a molla, Molla Selim, who was under the protection of Hizan Shaikh, Seyyid Ali. Molla Selim was said to be a propagandist against the CUP government and provoking the Kurds in Hizan to force the government to restore the

*şerîat* and to give back to the religious leaders the influence and privileges which they formerly possessed.<sup>36</sup>

The rising was harshly suppressed by the CUP, many of the Kurds were arrested while 20 of them, many of whom were mollahs, were condemned to death by court martial. Shaikh Seyyid Ali with some his followers took refuge in the Russian consulate. Russian consulate, which refused to hand him over, was surrounded by troops to prevent escape of shaikh.<sup>37</sup>

The way that the CUP dealt with the Bitlis rising sent a wave of shock among the Kurdish tribes in the region. One could argue that the severity of the punishment in Bitlis along with the CUP's attitude towards other shaikhs in the region, like Shaikh Taha of Şemdinan and shaikhly family of Barzan, deepened the hatred and alienation of the Kurds felt towards the CUP régime. The efforts of Abdülhamid II for Muslim unity was nearly spoiled in eastern Anatolia at the end of a six-year period of the Young Turk government. Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the CUP government was in no position to trust the support by all of the tribal population in eastern Anatolia. That is why the tribes of eastern Anatolia hesitated to join the Ottoman army despite the call for *cihād* by the Sultan-Caliph in the first year of the war. Yet, thanks to the conscription of Armenians to the Russian army and the revenge activities of Armenian troops on the Kurds, the Kurdish tribes definitely sided with the Ottoman army against the Russians throughout the war.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> DH. SYS 23/12, Governor of Erzurum, Reşid Paşa, to the Ministry of Interior, 28 Mayıs 1329/10 June 1913; DH. SYS 19/27, Governor of Van, Tahsin Paşa, to the Ministry of Interior, 8 Cemaziyelevvel 1332/4 April 1914.

<sup>36</sup> FO 371/1263, Ian M. Smith to Mallet, Van, 4 April 1914.

<sup>37</sup> FO 371/1263, Mallet to Grey, Constantinople, 13 April 1914.

<sup>38</sup> FO 373/4, *Turkey in Asia*, London, 1919.



## Conclusion

One could assume that the centralization process in eastern Anatolia, which started in the 1830's with the Sultan Mahmud II, was still unfinished in the early 1930's when Republican government was vigorously trying to pacify the region after the Shaikh Said Rebellion in 1925. In fact, the emergence of Shaikh Said Rebellion was closely linked to the factors that we have been discussing throughout this study. Tribal structures, influence of shaikhs and tribal chiefs on the local population were still important socio-political factors in the region in the 1920's.

Although the centralization process of the 1830's succeeded in the elimination of the local foci of power, which could pose a threat to the central authority, the full integration of the region into the Ottoman central system could not be achieved throughout the Tanzimat Era. External and domestic problems of the second half of the nineteenth century as well as remoteness of the region to the capital prevented the full introduction of reforms and settlement policies to eastern Anatolia. This period also witnessed the rise of shaikhs and petty tribal chiefs who became major elements affecting social and political life of the region. The New Land Code of 1858, which originally aimed at the protection of small farmers, contributed to the increasing wealth and power of shaikhs and agas since these elements were in mutual relations with the local representatives of the central government in eastern Anatolia. One could argue that the central government also supported the rise of shaikhs, who were crucial elements for the Porte in controlling the tribal population, by granting them revenues and lands.

Yet it was Abdülhamid II who integrated this traditional policy into a concrete strategy of Pan-Islamism for guaranteeing the obedience of tribal population in eastern

Anatolia. Pan-Islamism was a part of the Hamidian policies that aimed at survival of the Empire in the face of European aggression. The major objective of Sultan Abdülhamid II was that the whole Muslim world should acknowledge him as Caliph. He accordingly sent emissaries to distant countries as India, Java and China. Although within the Ottoman Empire his claim to be the head of Islam was much opposed by the Arabs, his Pan-Islamist policies gained most adherents among the shaikhs and tribal population of eastern Anatolia. Shaikhs and Sufi orders provided an extensive and effective network for conducting propaganda on behalf of the Sultan throughout eastern Anatolia.

On the other hand, Abdülhamid also succeeded in gaining the loyalty of most tribal leaders in the region. The establishment of the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments played a crucial role in securing this objective. By enticing the Kurdish chiefs to visit İstanbul, by granting them privileges and honors, or by dealing their acts of lawlessness with tolerance, the Sultan tried to make the Kurds of eastern Anatolia identify themselves with the Ottoman Empire. It can be argued that Abdülhamid was more successful than his predecessors in the integration of tribal population into the Ottoman system. With these characteristics the Hamidian Era can be considered as a period of conciliation and integration.

Since Abdülhamid tried to secure the survival of the Empire on the basis of Muslim unity, he had little incentive for a change in the socio-economic structures of eastern Anatolia that would alienate Muslim elements. Even in the face of growing pressure by Britain, the Yıldız successively impeded the implementation of reforms for the Ottoman Armenians, which was considered as a scheme for the establishment of an autonomous Armenia by the local Muslim population. As a result of Britain's protection and growing impulse of nationalist ideas, Armenian population of eastern Anatolia

became more assertive against their Kurdish overlords by trying to repudiate the ancient feudal bonds. Yet the Kurdish tribal chiefs had no desire to abandon their feudal rights and resorted to violence for collecting revenues from Armenian peasants. The result was the growing hatred and violence between these two communities throughout eastern Anatolia.

Whereas the Hamidian régime favored the Kurds in this conflict on the basis of a Muslim unity, the Young Turk government tried to solve the problem on behalf of Armenians. The reason behind this change was the political alliance between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Dashnakist party. Moreover, the CUP governments immediately attempted to implement a direct centralization in eastern Anatolia without considering socio-political structures and relations existed in the area. The decrease in the number of the Hamidiye Regiments and the abolishment of privileges which shaikhs and tribal chiefs had enjoyed during the Hamidian Era resulted in the alienation of the Kurdish population to the new régime. Several uprisings, which were mainly led by shaikhs, took place on the eve of the First World War. Yet the remaining Hamidiye Regiments which were renamed as the “Cavalry Regiments” as well as ex-Hamidiye tribes preferred to remain loyal to the Ottoman central authority in the First World War. Broadly speaking, the success of the Hamidian policies in the integration of the Kurdish tribal population into the Ottoman system as well as the activities of vengeance on the Kurds committed by Armenian troops of the Russian army secured the loyalty of the Kurds to the Ottoman Empire throughout the war.

ileyh dā'ileri hāqıķaten o havālīde neşr-i fuyūzāt-i 'ulūm-i 'aliyye ile şöhret-şie'ār olmuş ve küçük büyük āhālīniñ hūsn-i teveccüh hōrmetini kazanmış bir zāt olduğu Edirne vālisi 'İzzet ve teftiş-i 'askerī komisyonu re'is-i şānīsī İsmā'il Hāķķı Paşalar kullarınıñ iş'eār ve ifādeleriyle de mü'eyyed bulunmuş olmasına ve bu mişillü du'āyānıñ talīfi merahīm-i vefr-i şehinşāhilerinde mültezim bulunmasına binā'en kendisiniñ me'yūsen 'avdet etmemek üzere kayd-i hayāt şartıyla üç dört yüz gurus ma'āş talhışı ve ihsānı şūretiyle ta'aṭṭufāt-i hāzret-i velī-ni'met-i a'zamīlerine maḥhariyyeti istirhamına cūr'et kılındı ol bābda ve kaṭıbe-i āhvālde irāde ü fermān velīyyü'l-emr efendimiz hāzretleriniñdir fī 8 Şevvāl sene 1310 ve fī 14 Nisan sene 1309

Yaver-i Ekrem kulları

Derviş

Mucibince şeref-şādır olan irāde-i seniyye-i mülūkāne Bāb-i 'Ālīye tebliğ edilmiş ve Derviş Paşaya da cevāb yazılmışdır

fī 12 Şevvāl sene 1310

'abd-i mülūkāne

Şüreyyā



## Appendix II: List of the Hamidiye Regiments in October 1891

(Y.MTV 55/29)

Bu def'a teşkilât-i fi'iliyye ve esâsiyyeleri ikmâl edilen Hamidiyye Süvari Alaylarının aldıkları numero ile ʿaşıretlerini ve maḥall-i iḳāmetlerini müşʿir cedveldir

Aldıkları numara	ʿAşıretleri	Meskûn bulundukları vilâyet ve sancak ve kazâlar	Mevcûd-ı hâliyyeleri nefer hayvanat	Teşkil eden rû'esânın esâmisi	Meşrûhat
1	Sepili	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı ʿAntab ve Eleşkird kazâları	640 350	Hüseyn Ağa	
2	Sepili	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı ʿAntab ve Eleşkird kazâları	553 300	Hasan Bey	
3	Sepili	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı ʿAntab ve Eleşkird kazâları	540 300	Hâcî Yûsuf Paşa	
4	Zeylanlı	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı merkez kazâsı	567 350	Selîm Paşa	
5	Zeylanlı	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı merkez kazâsı	500 300	Eyüb Paşa	
6	Karapapak	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı Eleşkird kazâsı	500 300	ʿAli Ağa	
7	Karapapak	Erzurum vilâyeti Bayezîd sancakı ʿAntab kazâsı	500 300	Taşdan(?) Ağa	

8	Haydaranlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Antab ve Diyadin kazası	650	310	Hüseyin Ağa	
9	Haydaranlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Antab ve Diyadin kazası	522	300	Emîn Paşa	
10	Cemadanlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Eleşkird kazası	500	300	Hüseyin Bey	
11	Adamanlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Diyadin kazası	500	300	Mirza Ağa	
12	Adamanlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Diyadin kazası	500	300	Mirza Ağa	
13	Haydaranlı	Van vilāyeti merkez sancağı Bargiri kazası	672	330	Mehmed Şadık Ağa	
14	Haydaranlı	Van vilāyeti merkez sancağı Bargiri kazası	549	291	Mehmed Şadık Ağa	
15	Mukri	Van vilāyeti Hakkari sancağı Mahmûdî kazası	574	351	İbrâhîm Efendi	
16	Şuyuli (?)	Van vilāyeti Hakkari sancağı Mahmûdî kazası	549	305	Cafer Ağa	
17	Takuri	Van vilāyeti Hakkari sancağı Mahmûdî kazası	271	150	Hüseyin Ağa	İki bölük teşkil etmiştir
	Mevrad (?)	Van vilāyeti Hakkari sancağı Mahmûdî kazası	446	194	Mehmed Ağa	Üç bölük teşkil etmiştir

18	Ḥaydaranlı	Van vilāyeti merkez sancağı Erciş kazāsi	540	300	Emīn Paşa	
19	Ḥaydaranlı	Van vilāyeti merkez sancağı °Adi'l-cevāz kazāsi	630	300	Ḥācī Timur Paşa	
20	Ḥaydaranlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Diyadin kazāsi	547	300	Ḥüseyin Paşa	
21	Ḥaydaranlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Diyadin kazāsi	529	310	Ḥüseyin Paşa	
22	Ḥaydaranlı	Erzurum vilāyeti Bayezıd sancağı Diyadin kazāsi	540	330	Ḥüseyin Paşa	



[illegible][illegible]

مجلسه فیروزیه در روز شنبه هجری ۱۳۰۲

### **Appendix III: Report by the Commander-in-chief, Rıza Pasha on the assignment of the officers trained in St. Petersburg**

(Y.MTV 138/92)

“Aıufetlü Efendim Hâzretleri

Fı 5 Cemâziyye’l-aıır sene 1309 tarıhinde işâbet-efzâ-yı sunûh ve şudûr buyurulan irâde-i hikmet-ifâde-i hâzret-i hilâfet-penâhı mantuk-“âlisince Kazaı uşûlunde ta“lîm öğrenmek ve “avdetlerinde Hamidiyye Süvari Alaylarında istiıhdâm edilmek üzere Petersburga izâm edilmiş olan süvari yüzbaşı vekilleri Mehmed Şadıı ve Şıdıı ve Ahmed Feyzi efendiler ikmâl-i ma“lûmât etmiş olmalarına mebnî şâyân buyurulan müsâ“ade-i seniyye-i cenâb-i cihân-bânî üzerine bu kerre Der Sa“âdete “avdet etmiş olduklarından dâ’ireleri dâhilinde Hamidiyye Süvari Alayları müteşekkil olan dördüncü ve beşinci ordu-yı hümayûnlarıñ merkezlerinde bulunarak ara sıra mezkûr alayların mevâkı“ini devr ve teftiş etmek ve Kazaı uşûlünün iş bu alaylara şüret-i tatbikiyyesi hakkında mü“âla“atını me’mûr oldukları ordu-yı hümayûnlarıñ müşiriyyet ve kumandanlığına bâ-rapor bildirmek ve Hamidiyye Alaylarıñ ta“lîm için ictimâ“ı zamânlarında hazır bulunarak alacakları emre göre ta“lîmlere nezâret etmek üzere sâye-i “atıfet-vâye-i hâzret-i hilâfet-penâhıde yüzbaşılığa terf“leriyle mûmâ-ileyhümden Mehmed Şadıı ve Şıdıı efendilerin dördüncü ve Ahmed Feyzi efendiniñ de beşinci

ordu-yı hümāyūnlara ʿizāmları istizānına dāʿir sūvāri dāʿiresinden tanzīm olunan  
mazbaṭa leffen ʿarz ü taḳdīm kılınmış olmaḡla mūmā-ileyhümüñ ol vechle terfī-i rütbe  
ve icrā-yı meʿmūriyyetleri huşūsuna müsāʿade-i seniyye-i cenāb-i cihān-bānī şāyān  
buyurulduḡu ḡālde muʿāmelātı ifā ve buyurulduları taştīr olunacaḡı beyānıyla istizāna  
ibtidār olundu ol bābda emr ü fermān efendim ḡazretleriniñdir

Fi 13 Şevvāl sene 1313 ve fi 16 Mart sene 1312

Serʿasker Rızā



## AppendixIV: Assessment by Zeki Pasha on the request of Yezidi and Alevi tribes for joining the Hamidiye Regiments

(Y.MTV 61/18)

Yıldız Sarāy-i Hümāyūnu

Baş Kitābet Dā'iresi

Şūret

Dördüncü Ordu-yı hümāyūnları müşiri Zekī Paşa kıullarından vārid olan fī 19 Mart sene 1307 tarihli şifreli telğrafnāme-i cevābiyyeniñ şūret-i maḥlūlesidir

Fī 15 Mart sene 1307 Hakkari kıt'asında vāki' Elbak redif taburu dā'iresiniñ ba'zı maḥallerinde meskūn olan t̄ā'ife-i yezīdiyyeniñ Hamidiyye Süvari Alayları 'idādında bulunmak üzere kendilerinden daḥi bir alay süvari teşkiline müsā'ade buyurulmasını bir kaç def'alar istirḥām etmelerine mebnī bu bābdaki ma'rūzāt-i 'ācizānem mücerred beyān-i ḥālden 'ibāret idi Hamidiyye Alayları şāfi'yyü'l-mezheb ve şelābet-i islāmiyyeleri ma'lūm ve mücerred olan āhāliden teşekkül etmekle t̄ā'ife-i mezkūruñ daḥi müsāvī mu'āmeleye mazhar edilmesi lāyık olamayacağından bu bābdaki irādāt-i mülhemiyet-āyāt-i ḥazret-i pādīşāhī maḥz-i ḥikmet ve 'ayn-i kerāmetdir Elbak taburunuñ Bayezıd sancağından müretteb bölükden başka diğeri üç bölüğü dā'iresinde şimdiye kadar aḥz-i 'asker mu'āmelesi cārī olmadığından ve t̄ā'ife-i mezbūre daḥi bu bölükler dā'iresinde temekkūn etdiklerinden şu mu'āmele bi't-ṭabī' anlara da sirāyet etmiş idi lakin Bayezıdın 'Antāb kazāsında meskūn olan ve oldukça cem'iyetli bulunan Yezidiler mes'ele-i zā'ileden sonra Rusyaya hicret geri kıalanlarıñ cüz'iyeti ve hem

civārlarınıñ ʿumūmen Hāmidīyye Alaylarına mensūbiyyeti cihetiyle bunların ahz-i ʿasker muʿāmelesine taʿbiyyet etdirilmesi suhūletle mümkün olabilir Dersim kürdlerine gelince bunların başka bir nām ile bir kuvve-i cunūdiyye teşkili hakkındaki muṭālaʿa ekrād-i merkūmenin kızılbaş olmalarından münbaʿiṣ ise el-yevm efrād-i ʿaskeriyye meyānında ve bu mezhebden pek çok neferāt olub ehl-i sūnnet ile ihtilāṭ ve imtizācları şemeresiyle bi't-tedric kesb-i şalāḥ edegelmekdeler iken mücerred ihtilāṭ-i mezkūra müsteniden ʿakerlikleri ihtişāş etdirilir ise mādđi ve maʿnevī mucib-i maḥzūr olur binā'en-ʿaleyh Dersim kürdlerini siyāsī ve ʿaskerī iṣlāḥāt-i ʿādilāne ve müsāvatkārane ile te'līf ve te'nīs ederek ahz-i ʿasker muʿāmelātına alışdırmak tarīḳ-i eslem gibi teḥaṭṭur olunmaḳda ise de yine her ḥālde işābet irāde-i seniyye-i mülūkāne dā'iresinde olduđu maʿrūzdur

Aşlına muṭābıḳdır

Şākir

Muḳābele olunmuştur

ḳulları

ḳulları

Kāzım

Meḥmed Cevād

ʿAbd-i mülūkaneleri

Şüreyyā

در دینی اردوی همیونری میری محمد زکایات قورنده وار داری ۱۸ مارش ۱۹۱۰ تاریخ  
تقریر لودلف قنار جویانه صورت محموله سید

ع ۱۵ مارش ۱۹۱۰ حکامی قطعه سده واقع آباد در بقی طابوری داره سنک بعضی معدنیه مکتوبه اوله  
طایفه بزیه نیا حمید سوری لایبری عدارت برنجه اوزره کتد ورنده دفن برالای سوری تسکینه معده  
بویلن بر قایح دفعه استرهم ایندیز منی بوبایک که معرفتات عاجزانم مجرب و بیاب حاله عبارت ایدی حمید  
لایبری سا فنی المذهب و صلابت اسلایبری معلوم و مجرب اوله اهلجه نه قتل اینکله طایفه قورنده دفن  
مادی معامده نظر ایدلی لایبری اوله حیفه بوبایک ارادت طلبیت ایات حضرت یارکلی محف حکمت و عین  
گرامه آباد طابوریه بایزیه سنجینه مرتب بولکنه بقیه دیگر اوج بلوک داره سده سده یه قدر اخذ  
عکس معامده جاری اوله حیفه و طایفه مذکورده دفن بر بولکل و دارنه تکلمه اینه کلرینه ستم معامده باطلع  
اندر ده سزایت ایتله بزیه نیا عتاب قضایه مکتوبه اوله و اولدو جمیع بولنامه بزیه برسنده زالدور حله روسیه  
هجوت اینه کلرینه کرد قانوزن جنایتی و هم جوار لریزه عمرها حمید لایبری منسوبی جتله بونون اینه عکس معامده سبقت  
ایتدلی سولنده محکمه اوله بلور و رسم کرد لریزه کلن بونون بقیه برنم اید بر فوه جندویه تسکینه حقیقه که مطلع  
اکرار قورنده قتل باسه اولدورنه مبعث ابراهیم اوزار علیه بیات و بونده هبه به یل جود نقان اولوب اهل  
سنه اید اختلاط داشته ایدی ترمسید باله بریح کب صلاح اید کلکله لریکبه مجرد اختلاط مذکورده مستند  
عکس لکله اختصاص اید بر بولر ابراهیم مادی و معنوی موجب محذور اولور بنا علیه درسم کرد لریزه سیاسی و عکس اختلاط  
عمادده و رد تکلیف اید تالیف و تائیس اید اینه عکس معامده است بر لریزه طریقه اسلام کی تحفه و تقیه ابراهیم بهر حال  
اصابت اراده اینه ملوکانه داره سنه اولدورنه معامده

اصد طایفه  
شاکر

مقابل دلتنه

قورنده  
محمد حیدر  
عبد مکرر  
کرنا

## Appendix V: Assessment by Şakir Pasha on the request of Cibranlı chiefs

(Y.MTV 148/69)

Doğuzuncu Hamidiyye Hafif Süvari Alayı kâ'im-i makâmı Mehmed Bey kulları tarafından mahdûmunun ʿAşîret Mekteb-i feyz-mekîne kayd ve kabûlu istirhâmına dâ'ir ic'â olunan ʿariza meşmûl-nigâh-i hikmet-penâh-i hazret-i tâcdâr-i aʿzamîleri buyurulmak üzere ʿarz ü takdîm kılınmış ve efrâd-i ʿaşâyir arasında bu vechle intişâr-i ʿilm ü maʿrifete hâşıl olan mübâlât mücerred muvaffakiyât-ı meʿâlî-derecât-i hazret-i cihândâr-i aʿzamîleri aşâr-i mucibesinden bulunmuş olmağın her hâlde ve kâṭbe-i âhvalde emr ü fermân hazret-i veliyyü'l-emr efendimiziñdir fî 19 Teşrîn-i şânî sene 312

Maʿbeyn-i mülükâneleri erkân-i harbiyyesi müşîri

ʿAbd-i memlûkleri

Şakir



لمقوینی حمیدیه حضرت سواد اسیر، فائزهای محمدرضا فولادی لهرستانه محمد و نیک  
 عزیزت سبب فیض سبب فیه و قبولی شانه را از اعطاء اولیای عریفه مسئولان  
 همینه حضرت ناچار عظیمی بود و او را عرض رتبه هم نشسته و از عیار  
 اینه بود و به انتساب عدم معرفت عالی پدید میبرد و صفیات معالی را  
 حضرت جلایا عظیمی را سجده است بر همه اولیای اهل کمال و احوال را  
 و فرمای حضرت ولی اسرافیه فرمود: [۱۳] سرایه  
 مسدود است  
 مسدود است  
 مسدود است

میرزا احمد بیگانه ایله - ۱۳۱۴

## Appendix VI: Mutasarrıf of Muş on the propaganda against the Constitutional Régime

(DH. MUİ 54-1/20)

Muş Mutaşarrıflığından alınan şifredir

Ahmed Efendi nāmında ak şakallı ve hoca kılıklı bir şahsın hükümet-i meşrūtaya mütāvaʿat edenlerin Hicāza kabul edilmediği hakkında ve hükümet-i meşrūta-i hāzıramızın ʿaleyhinde baʿzı ifsādāt-i melʿanetkārānede bulunduğı ve Bulanık köylerini dolaşdıktan sonra bu günlerde Varçoya ʿazîmet edeceği şimdi istihbār kılınmağla biʿz-zāt ve ʿitimād olunacak vesāʿitle kemāl-i sürʿat ve chemiyyetle tahkikāt icrā edilerek bu hāl ve kıyāfetinde bir adam görüldüğü anda nezāret altına alınması ve maʿlūmāt ʿiṭāsı vucūbu icāb edenlere tebliğ edilmekle berā-yı maʿlūmāt maʿrūzdur fermān

20 Kānūn-i Evvel 1325

Mutaşarrıf Raʿuf

سوره سوره نوره النامه سوره



احمدیقه نامده امدتالی و خوام قیافتی برکت حکومت سوره و عت ایدنن مجازه قبول ایدلیدی حقه  
و حکمت سوره حاضره ترک علینزه بصد افسان سلطنت ایدره بولینن و بولننه کولینن طولانده صکره بکولنده  
و صوبه غریبه ایدلیدی سوره استیلا قلمه بالان و اعتماد قلمه و ساطلم کای سوره و اهلیمه تحقیقات اجرا ایدلیدی بومال و قیافه  
برای کور لیدی آنده نفعه نفعه النامه و سوره امدت و جوب ایدره بولنن ایدلیدی برای سوره امدت و سوره

سوره  
سوره

ا. ب. ک. ه. ج. د. ه. ا.

۱۱ و ۱۲

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