

CRITICAL MOMENTS OF SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD: AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE MAINSTREAM
GECEKONDU HISTORY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Ankara
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TO MY BELOVED MUM, DAD, NURHAN AND NİHAN

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GECEKONDU HISTORY

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

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BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

June 2007

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

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ABSTRACT

CRITICAL MOMENTS OF SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE MAINSTREAM *GECEKONDU* HISTORY

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This thesis aims to expose an alternative local historical reading of the formation of a *gecekondu* space as a response to modernist consideration of *gecekondu* development in Turkey. The social construction of neighborhood space, which occurs at the level of social imaginary and representations as well as at the level of real interventions in the form of social practices producing a built environment, is narrated by means of insider perspectives and using qualitative techniques. In this reading, it will be made explicit that the dynamics and patterns by which the modernist, strategic interventions in local space and tactical acts of the migrants in producing their locality are closely interconnected. This interconnectedness not only sheds light to the weaknesses of the strategical practice of imposing a modernist space but also the tactical acts of migrants utilizing the loopholes in the strategical realm. Spontaneity as the defining and intrinsic quality of *gecekondu* settlements is mainly embedded in the diverse local agencies that lead to spatial contingencies. The ethnic identities constitute the main means by which the migrants employ certain tactics with regard to strategical policy acts and to other groups in the neighborhood. Within the context of the intertwined nature of tactic

and strategy, *gecekondu* settlements will be discussed as a by-product of the sum of modernist strategical acts more than as unintended consequences of urban development.

Keywords: *Gecekondu*, Social Spatialization, Tactic-Strategy, Ethnic Identities, Spontaneity, Spatial Contingency.

ÖZET

MAHALLEDE TOPLUMSAL MEKANSALLAŞMANIN KRİTİK ANLARI: GELENEKSEL *GECEKONDU* TARİHİNİN ALTERNATİF OKUMASI

Demirtaş, Neslihan

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de *gecekondu* oluşumunun modernist ve seçkin bir bakış açısı ile değerlendirilmesine karşı alternatif bir yerel tarih okuması yapmaktadır. Söz konusu alternatif okuma, Mamak’a bağlı Boğaziçi mahallesindeki toplumsal mekansallaşmanın anlatımını temel almaktadır. Mahalle mekanının hem toplumsal düşün ve temsil hem de fiziksel mekana müdahaleler düzeyinde oluşumu, niteliksel yöntemlerle ve içeriden bakış açısı ile anlatılacaktır. Bu anlatım içinde, yerel mekanın modernist stratejik müdahalelerle dönüştürülmesi ve göçmenlerin kendi mekanlarını oluşturmak için ortaya koyduğu taktik eylemler arasındaki iç içe geçmiş ilişkinin dinamikleri ve örnekleri gösterilecektir. Bu ilişkinin doğası, hem stratejik alanın modernist mekan dayatma eylemlerinin zayıf yönlerine hem de gecekonduluların stratejik alanın açıklarından faydalanan taktiksel eylemlerine ışık tutmaktadır. Etnik kimlikler, göçmenin stratejik alanın politik eylemleri ile başa çıkmasında ve yerel düzlemde diğer gruplarla ilişkisinde en önemli araçlardan ve

belirleyicilerdendir. Araştırma alanındaki güç ilişkileri, değişik sosyal grupların stratejik alanın ajanları ile toplumsal mekansallaşmanın değişik anlarında kurdukları farklı ilişkiler ile belirlenmektedir. Gecekonduya geçirilen süreç içinde göçmenlerin taktik eylemleri direnme ve hatta yerel mekanı ciddi bir şekilde belirleme kapasitesi kazanır. Gecekondu mahallelerini betimleyen ve onlara içkin kendiliğindenlik özelliği, büyük ölçüde yerel eylemlerin bu kapasitesine dayanır. Aynı kapasite, stratejik alanın yukarıdan aşağı dayattığı modern mekan uygulamalarının, mekansal olumsuzluklar eşliğinde sapmasını getirir. Strateji ve taktik bağımlı ilişkisi içinde gecekondu mekanı, modernist planlamanın beklenmedik sonuçları olmaktan daha çok stratejik politikaların ürünü olarak değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gecekondu, Toplumsal Mekansallaşma, Taktik-Strateji, Etnik Kimlikler, Kendiliğindenlik, Mekansal Olumsuzluk.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xi
CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Conceptual framework of the thesis	1
1.1.1 Introduction.....	2
1.1.2 Research Objectives.....	15
1.1.3 Conceptual Framework	19
1.1.3.1 “Social Spatialization” as a Conceptual Alternative to “Production of Space”.....	21
1.1.3.2 Spatial Triad	29
1.1.3.3 Spatial Spontaneity.....	33
1.1.3.4. Strategy versus Tactic.....	40
1.2 Methodological framework of the thesis	51
1.2.1 Definition of the Research Setting.....	51
1.2.2 Methodological Framework	58

1.2.3 Research Methods	62
1.2.4 Sampling, Data Analysis and Some Weaknesses of the Research.....	65
1.2.5 An outline of the Thesis.....	72
CHAPTER 2: STRATEGICAL REALM'S DISCOURSE OF GECEKONDU SETTLEMENTS.....	
2.1 Introduction.....	75
2.2 1940-1966: The Period of First Encounters.....	78
2.2.1 Rural-to-Urban Migration and the Initial Emergence of Gecekond Settlements.....	78
2.2.2. Legal Strategies with Regard to Spontaneous Spaces: Un-Stat Gecekond	86
2.2.3 The Elitist Approaches to the Initial Formations of Gecekond Settlements.....	91
2.3 1966-1980: The Period of Settled Gecekond Neighborhoods.....	94
2.3.1 Rapidly Spreading and Socio-spatially Transforming Gecekond Settlements.....	94
2.3.2 Strategies of Planning: Dealing with an Immense Gecekond Problem.....	100
2.3.3 Public and Academic Approach to Gecekond Settlements Dominated by the Problem of Integration.....	104

2.4. 1980-Present Time: Further Commercialization of “Gecekondu” Space	110
2.4.1 Neoliberal Economic and Social Policies	110
2.4.2 Changing Physical and Social Space of “Gecekondu” and Identity Politics	117
2.4.3 “Varoş” Replacing “Gecekondu”: Representing Low-Income Settlements as “Illegal”	123
2.5 Conclusion	130
CHAPTER 3: THE EMERGENCE OF MAMAK GECEKONDU REGION IN ANKARA, THE HEART OF A WESTERNIZATION PROJECT	134
3.1 An Overview of Ankara’s Urban History	134
3.2 The Historical Reasons behind the Strategy of Constructing a “Modern” Space in Ankara	137
3.3 The Weaknesses of the Planning Strategy	143
3.4 Spontaneous Social Spatialization Altering the Course and Implementation of Planning	151
3.5 “Post-Planning” Planning Strategies in Ankara	157
3.6 The Remarkable Spontaneous Social Spatialization in the Periphery: The Development of Mamak Gecekondu Region	162
3.7 Municipal Experiences of Mamak Region	165
3.8 Conclusion	171

CHAPTER 4: INITIAL PHASES OF SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION

NATURAL SPACE	174
4.1 Introduction	174
4.2 Survival Tactics within the Space of Strategic Loopholes: Urban Agriculture, Railway and Highway.....	178
4.3 Gecekondü Construction: Tactic versus Strategy on the Vertical Level....	189
4.3.1 “GECE KONDU” Built Overnight by Community: Hemşehri Relations as Tactic Operating on the Vertical and Horizontal Level.....	194
4.3.2 Near-Strategical Acts Defining Community Settlement.....	202
4.4 The Story of the River: The Beginning of the Journey from Natural Space to Market Place.....	209
4.5 Conclusion.....	218

CHAPTER 5: THE 1970S: THE IMPACTS OF RADICAL POLITICS ON

SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION IN THE LOCALITY	221
5.1 Introduction	221
5.2 An Overview of the Political Context in the late 1960s and 1970s	223
5.3 The Story of the River: The Expansion of Market Place and Its Becoming as the Focal Point of Political Struggles in the 1970s.....	232
5.4 Struggles between Leftists and Rightists Dominating Social Spatialization.....	235

5.5 Tactics of the Ordinary Inhabitants: Insiders' Space, Protection within the Community	243
5.6 Living Spatially Close to Each Other: "Sacredness" of Being Neighbors?	251
5.7 Conclusion.....	259
CHAPTER 6: AFTER 1980: NEOLIBERAL STRATEGY, IDENTITY	
POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF SPACE	261
6.1 Introduction.....	261
6.2 Paranoid Space: The Isolation of Social Relations in the Neighborhood.....	264
6.3 The Effect of Neoliberal Policies on Neighborhood Space.....	268
6.4 Favoritism as the Side Effect of Neoliberal Strategy: The Increasing Importance of Alevism and Sünnism as Part of Politics of Space	274
6.5 The Near-Strategical Decisions of Shop Owners vis-à-vis the Paradoxes of Strategical Realm	283
6.6 Consumption Determinants: Prices or Alevi/Sünni identities?	294
6.7 Revitalization of Alevi and Sünni identities: The Politics of Religious Spaces	299
6.8 Conclusion	316
CHAPTER7: CONCLUSION	319
BIBLIOGRAPHY	340

APPENDICES

Appendix A SAMPLE QUESTIONS OF INTERVIEWS WITH RESIDENTS	
.....	352
Appendix B SAMPLE QUESTIONS OF INTERVIEWS WITH SHOP	
OWNERS.....	357

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Conceptual Framework of the Thesis

Gecekondu is one of enduring problems in Turkey having political, societal and economic repercussions. This chapter starts with a brief analysis of various representations of *gecekondu* settlements in public debate. In order to have a better understanding of these various representations the chapter provides a brief explanation of socio-spatial transformations in *gecekondu* settlements over time. Overall purpose of this chapter is to introduce conceptual tools in accordance with the research objectives of the thesis. The spatial conceptual and methodological framework that will be employed through the thesis will also be made explicit within the context of this chapter.

1.1.1 Introduction

Since the 1940s, with the initial emergence of *gecekondu* (squatter) settlements in the largest cities of Turkey, namely Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, there has been an extended public debate. *Gecekondu* literary means “built-overnight” and *gecekondu* refers to people living in gecekondu settlements. Initially, the concept of gecekondu referred to houses or settlements constructed on state or privately owned land without planning and/or construction permission through the efforts of migrants from the rural to urban areas and their fellow countrymen.

In time, the meaning, attributes and status of *gecekondu* have changed. The early “*gecekondu*” neighborhoods had been legalized over time. Therefore, classical definition of *gecekondu* does not apply to these settlements anymore. Especially since the early 1990s, gecekondu is no longer a concept signifying all the settlements of low-income people in the periphery of the cities. Besides, the newly emerging unlawful settlements in the 1990s, which occurred mostly as a consequence of forced migration¹, hardly reflect the socio-spatial qualities of classical “*gecekondu*” settlements.

Parallel to the socio-spatial transformations in low-income settlements, the general public approach that have been defined by social actors having different

¹ Forced migration is either the forced deportation of the villagers, being Kurd in ethnic origin by state security forces or their unprepared sudden decision of rural-to-urban migration as a consequence of the fights between state security forces and *PKK*, a separatist group seeking to establish an independent Kurdish State in the southeastern part of Turkey. Forced migration had dominated rural-to-urban migration starting from the early 1990s

agendas with regard to representation and definition of these low-income settlements have also been transformed over time. Representation of these settlements in public perception by diverse actors differently depending on the context constitutes an important part of *gecekondu* policy where the general strategical parameters of dealing with *gecekondu* issue have been defined. Diverse legal means to deal with the unlawful aspect of *gecekondu* settlements, the problem definitions in relation to *gecekondu* growth in political, academic and journalistic circles, planning policy orientations and all the attempts to represent *gecekondu* space and population are considered within the context of the strategical acts in dealing with *gecekondu* space in this thesis. As will be mentioned in the following pages, the main objective of the thesis is to exemplify the tactical acts of the migrants in dealing with these strategical acts and to show the intertwined nature of the tactical and strategical realms. Tactical acts of the migrants include all the critical decisions, acts and forms of resistance in order to survive both in relation to the hardships of the local context and to the strategical acts and interventions in *gecekondu* space. Consequently, the thesis will be an endeavor to come up with a local history of a *gecekondu* neighborhood by considering the intertwined nature of the strategical and tactical realms with an insider perspective. Before making the research questions explicit, though, it will be helpful to define the problematic nature of strategical realm in dealing with *gecekondu* spaces over time. So, the following operational questions will help to define the context of the strategical realm, which are:

- What kind of a public discourse² about low-income settlements has been constructed over time?
- Who have dominated the definition of public discourse in relation to these settlements?
- What kind of changes and continuities can be identified over time with regard to this public discourse?

Although these questions will be discussed at length in the following chapter, it is necessary to briefly address these questions in order to highlight the relevancy of the research objectives of this work. At the outset it is also important to note that, *gecekondu* and *gecekondulu* becomes an object in the eyes of various societal actors, who internalize different subject positions defining the role and status of *gecekondu*. The subjective concerns related to *gecekondu* settlements show variations for different actors who define the public agenda.

The interest of politicians in the *gecekondu* development is twofold. First, they perceive *gecekondus* as a potential source of votes. Second, politicians have a responsibility to solve the problems in these settlements as part of urban problems. There have also been numerous academic works on *gecekondu* settlements in different fields. Sociological studies dominate these academic works but *gecekondu* has become a topic of political science, economy, and urban planning as well. The journalists have often carried the problems related to *gecekondu* settlements into public attention by using all means of mass media.

² Public discourse here does not only refer to the representations and narratives on *gecekondu* issue in public debate but also to the legal or political practices in dealing with and defining *gecekondu* space.

Although there are variations in these different actors' reason of dealing with *gecekondu* settlements, a modernist-elitist perception has dominated their approaches to *gecekondu* settlements and *gecekondu* to a large extent. In other words, modernist-elitist perspective defines public perception that refers mostly to the credents of urban middle classes about *gecekondu* settlements. The groups that have constructed public discourse about *gecekondu* settlements and *gecekondu* are sometimes referred to as “urbanites” throughout the thesis in order to reflect the common position these groups have internalized vis-à-vis *gecekondu*. The term, urbanite, is borrowed from Özbek (1997: 228), to signify a loose group consisting of bourgeoisie, state bureaucrats, the urban middle classes, Kemalist intellectuals, and some radical intellectuals who define the parameters of the urbanity mainly with reference to *gecekondu*.

Public discourse to a large extent has been defined by the impositions of “urbanites” and thus has been shaped by a strong elitist perspective. Therefore *gecekondu* neighborhoods and their “way of life” have been conventionally portrayed in Turkish public understanding as the main problem and an impediment against modernization. The public discourse has taken different forms and been acknowledged by different urban groups over time depending on the macro political, social and economic context of the country and the socio-spatial transformations of *gecekondu* space(s) in this context.

In this study, the course of *gecekondu* settlements is divided into three main periods in accordance with their changing socio-spatial context. The first period in *gecekondu* history overlaps with the years of transition to multiparty politics in

Turkey. The initial encounters with *gecekondu* settlements in the periphery of cities and their spread in number occur as a result of the initial populist of experiences of multi-party politics. In the 1940s *gecekondu* settlements had first entered the public agenda with the initiation of migration from rural to urban areas, most of all to Ankara and İstanbul. During those years, the public agenda about these settlements had also started to take form. Republican Regime's strategy of creating a modernist urban space that took Western cities and lifestyle there as its main reference point in the late 1920s and early 1930s had determined the content of elitist perception. This elitist understanding had in turn defined public discourse with regard to *gecekondu* settlements in this period of early encounters with *gecekondu* settlements.

The act of imposing a Western way of life and existence on society supposes ideal templates of "urbanity". The main act of the Republican Regime in the service of this ideal was to reconstruct Ankara, capital city of Turkey as a planned and modernist city. The city was planned and constructed in a twofold fashion as the socio-spatial representation of that ideal. First of all, the physical space of the city was constructed and planned with a strong reference to Western European cities. Secondly, in congruence with this physical planning, the social space of the city was constructed and implemented by taking the "urban way of life" in Western European cities as its main model. The construction of modernist social space had been realized by making "urban lifestyle" visible to public. The modern lifestyle was modeled and acted out by the newly arrived elites of the city, namely the families of state bureaucrats, intellectuals and representatives of Western countries.

This process had defined the parameters to be an “urbanite” in the early years of the reconstruction of the city of Ankara.

In spite of all planning attempts under the rule of Single Party regime, namely the Republican People’s Party, *gecekondu* settlements in the periphery and slum-like residential areas inhabiting seasonal workers at the traditional centers of Ankara and İstanbul had initially become visible in the early 1940s. Yet, these settlements were few in number and constructed primarily for the purpose of sheltering. The intellectuals, journalists, bureaucrats, and academics of the early Republican Regime who had been socialized via the Republican ideals have shaped public discourse in those years and delineated the terms of “urbanity” by mainly pointing out its “other”, namely *gecekondu* spaces. Furthermore, the ideal templates of urbanity and urban space have been continuously defined by giving examples from the West. The “other” of these ideal templates has been continuously defined via depicting the spontaneous spaces (*gecekondu* neighborhoods) emerging within the system that are inconsistent with the ideals of the modernization. In that respect, public discourse usually neglects the embeddedness of socio-spatial transformations of these space(s) in the changing context of the country.

Modern life style as imposed by Republican Regime, from the beginning, had captured serious irreconcilabilities with the context of everyday life in large cities of the country. Public approach blames rural-to-urban migrants as the main reason behind the intensification of these irreconcilabilities. It attributes these irreconcilabilities to the intrinsic marginal qualities of *gecekondu* settlements rather

than the impediments embedded in the attempt to impose a context-free modern space from top to down. There had emerged a certain uneasiness and neglect on the part of the Republican elites and politicians about the emergence of these spaces. Alongside this uneasiness there had also been a wishful and optimistic public perception that was based on a belief on the transitory qualities of these settlements. Since these were the initial years of migration and these settlements were few in number, they were considered as transitory structures that would be integrated into cities in time. In addition, the rural-to-urban migration was also considered as reversible by means of macro economic and political strategies.

Contrary to the early estimates, the rate of rural-to-urban migration had increased with the populist concerns of political actors of multi-party period that was initiated by Democrat Party's (*DP*) coming to power in 1950. The politicians began to realize the increasing effect of *gecekondus* settlements in defining the fate of politics. *DP*'s approach in relation to the increasing potential vote of *gecekondus* settlements in determining the course of politics had been considered by the party through an integrative political discourse capturing urban and rural poor. The number of *gecekondus* in the periphery of the cities had increased during those years. Therefore the loose settlements of *gecekondus* houses in the periphery of the cities were met by a greater public attention, which had signified mainly the transitory character of these settlements like the approaches during Single Party regime. However, closer encounters between rural migrants and the "urbanites", who had deeply internalized Republican ideals and been educated in accordance with its doctrines, led to the emergence of a biased approach about *gecekondus* settlements in public discourse. The elitist bias fed by the modernization ideals of

Republican Regime took on a more concrete and conservative form during this period.

The urban elites who took critical posts were severely critical of these settlements and *gecekondu* lifestyle. *Gecekondu*s were considered as deviant and ugly spaces that ought to disappear from the face of beautiful cities. The definition of *gecekondu* settlements as the “other” of Turkish modernization has taken place within such a context that solidifies the framework of modernist space and lifestyle that have been unattainable to a large extent in reality. This representation of *gecekondu* settlements and *gecekondu* as the other of Turkish modernization in public discourse attribute a false homogeneity to *gecekondu* society and to settlements.

As mentioned above the academic works mostly in the disciplines of sociology, political science, urban planning and economy have considered the emergence of *gecekondu* settlements in the periphery of the large cities as an important subject matter during the 1950s and 1960s. The official history of *gecekondu* settlements offered in academic works presupposes a certain discontinuity between the formation of *gecekondu*s in the periphery of the cities and the development of city space in general. The presupposition resides in attributing a certain artificial autonomy to these settlements and the people living there. In some of the academic works, the emergence of settlements like *gecekondu* was not linked to the political and economic conditions but rather to the attributes of *gecekondu*s themselves. In this outlook, the causes leading to the emergence of *gecekondu* settlements are limited to *gecekondu* as if their existence is

autonomous from the rest of the society. This is the most important point that will be criticized in the context of the thesis. Academic works in this period capture a belief in the transitory and rural character of these settlements. Within this context, the everyday habits and tastes of *gecekondu* families are described in a discourse of degradation so as to solidify the “rural other” of the modernization process (Tok, 1999: 47).

The second period runs from 1966 to 1980. In 1966, *gecekondu* law no. 775 was promulgated as the earliest legal document denoting the first formal recognition of low-income settlements with its publicly known name, *gecekondu*. This period ends in 1980 when the political and economic structure was totally changed by the intervention of military in democracy. This period witnessed the extreme polarization of politics between right wing and left wing ideologies. *Gecekondu* space, like other places in the cities was dominated by violence and the struggle between these extreme political groups. This seems to be closely related to strengthening of the image of the *gecekondulular* as a “political target” during this period. The political parties intensified their dealings with *gecekondu* settlements that had triggered the emergence of radical politics in *gecekondu* settlements.

Another important characteristics of this period is the deconstruction of the homogenizing effect of *gecekondu* identity previously imposed on *gecekondu* dwellers as the “rural other” by public discourse. The struggles between radical militant groups and the extreme politicization of *gecekondu* settlements led to the development of awareness about the heterogeneity of *gecekondu* dwellers in hometown, sectarian and ethnic terms. In public approach, these differences had

been considered as triggering the emergence of serious conflicts particularly in these marginal spaces in comparison to the other neighborhoods in the city. In addition to the political cleavages, the religious cleavages became part of the political competition. The sectarian differences and close encounters between *Alevi* and *Sünni*³ communities in *gecekondu* settlements were articulated with the political struggles between left and right. The fights between the leftist and rightist militant groups had found support mainly amongst *Alevi* and *Sünni* communities in *gecekondu* settlements respectively. Public discourse, unlike its emphasis of the “rural other” as a homogenous group having “inferior” cultural qualities in previous decades, had overemphasized the sectarian and ethnic differences among *gecekondu* society in the 1970s to point out the threatening and conflict-ridden qualities of these settlements for national unity.

³ *Alevi* people living in Ankara *gecekondus* appear to be descendants of rebellious tribal groups that were religiously affiliated with the Sfauids (Bruinessen, 1996: 7). Their native language is Turkish and they have migrated from Central Anatolian provinces. The practices of *Alevism* greatly differ from the *Sünni* Islamic practices. Prayer (*namaz*), the fast in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca and zakat that are binding duties of *Sünni* Islam are either not practiced by *Alevi* groups or practiced in different ways and times. *Alevi*s have their own practices like ceremonial meeting namely *Cem*. The ceremony is conducted in the place called *Cemevi* meaning Cem House. *Alevi*s often built this place as to be used specifically for *Cem* ceremonies. However, there are cases in which big salon of a house or other suitable places may be used for *Cem* ceremonies. The *Alevi*s do not go to *Cemevi* in the way orthodox *Sünnis* go to the mosque. Unlike a mosque or church, *Cemevi* is not a place where one goes for prayer and in order to comfort her/himself through prayer. Contrary to that in order one to go to *Cemevi*, one need to have a peaceful conscience at first (Çamuroğlu, 2000: 83). Rather than performing the external (*zahir*) demands of Islam *Alevi*s claim to live according to the inner (*batin*) demands of religion (Bruinessen, 1996: 7). In that sense to be a good person and development of personal morality come before everything else in *Alevi* belief system and practices. The interpersonal relations within the community; their survival with mutual respect and appreciating good humane characteristics like, tolerance, equality and freedom constitute the backbone of *Alevi* ethical system. Approach to gender differences constitutes another important difference between *Alevi* and *Sünni* belief systems. *Alevi* approach to woman inhabits liberal and egalitarian elements; therefore among migrant communities in cities *Alevi* women are most of the time more educated, more occupied and expressive than *Sünni* women. Before the 1950s where *Alevi* and *Sünni* people mostly lived in villages of their own, these identities had not let to any conflict ridden situation between groups. However, after the 1950s with the intense rural-to-urban migration these identities came into close contact in *gecekondu* settlements constructed in the periphery of the cities.

The third feature of transforming public discourse about *gecekondu* settlements in second period is related to the commercialization of the *gecekondu*. In the early years of rural-to-urban migration, *gecekondu* settlements were mainly built to meet the immediate needs and for direct use of migrants. At that time, *gecekondu* had no or little market value. However, from the 1970s onwards, we can talk about the commercialization of *gecekondu* settlements due to the continuous migratory flow into these settlements and the transformation of *gecekondu* land and house into main sources of economic gain particularly for the early settled *gecekondu* dwellers. The perception of *gecekondu* settlements as shelters for the poor in the early periods of *gecekondu* formation was accompanied by a belief in the transitory qualities of these settlements. In public debate, this belief had also changed during the 1970s owing to the commercialization of these settlements. Besides that, in this period *gecekondus* had taken the form of extended neighborhoods constituting large *gecekondu* regions circulating the big cities.

The third period starts in 1980 and covers the years until now. At the beginning of the third period, *gecekondus* had been legalized to a large extent with the implementation of neoliberal policies by the early 1980s. The modernization ideal foreseeing the integration of *gecekondu* settlements with the “modern” urban space totally failed. The evidence of failed integration can be found in the permanency of these settlements and their continuous growth in various socio-spatial forms.

In this period, new academic efforts to redefine and understand the changes in *gecekondu* spaces became widespread. “*Gecekondu*” in its original meaning has

become insufficient to define all low-income settlements in the periphery of the cities. On the one hand, there are neighborhoods that were once *gecekondu* settlements but had been legalized to a large extent during that period. They still keep their traditional physical appearance composed of single-story *gecekondu* houses with gardens. On the other hand, there is another type of low-income settlement that has been illegally built after the 1980s with the intense rapid rural-to-urban migration to large industrial cities such as İstanbul, İzmir, Diyarbakır, and Mersin. These newly emerged low-income settlements reflect a scene of unorganized two or three story houses with amorphous and unfinished outlook.

In the cities mentioned above, the rural to urban migration has been intensified particularly after the 1980s as a result of forced migration. Therefore the newcomer migrants are mostly Kurds in ethnic origin. The ethnic cleavage seems to be added to the political and religious cleavages of low-income settlements from the perspective of public perception. The presence of Kurdish migrants in increasing numbers has triggered the anxiety in public perception about how urban life has been threatened in the 1990s. In fact, a new term “*varoş*” appeared within this context, and has gained an extensive usage after the first half of the 1990s (Etöz, 2000). In relation to that anxiety, the debates of *varoş* or its representation in public debates from middle class perspective seem to incorporate, in some cases, racist overtones employing even arbitrary classifications between “White Turks” and “Black Turks”, which will be explained in detail in the second chapter. *Varoş*, as used in place or with the concept *gecekondu*, is usually associated with the newly emerging illegal settlements. However, *varoş* also signifies the bad tastes, marginal and criminal life styles that are associated with all low-income

settlements, new or old, without exception. Public representation has defined all low-income settlements as the shelter for criminal acts relating that to the poor living conditions in these spaces, which was actually a consequence of neoliberal economic policies.

Moreover, the electoral success of the conservative Islamist parties in both local and national elections in the 1990s - mainly with the support of low-income settlements- has led to the emergence of a new cleavage; Islamist versus secular.⁴ The increasing power and influence of *Sünni* Islam on everyday life and the increasing intensity of tariqat membership in low-income neighborhoods had invoked anxiety among the secularists, mostly the Republican urban elites. Low-income settlements as sheltering these communities were perceived as a threat in accordance with this general perception. “Urbanites” who perceive secularism as their and nation’s defining identity, position themselves against “ethnically distinct” and “religiously fundamentalist” *gecekondu*s this time.

As briefly explained above, urban middle class perspective in Turkish public discourse had defined its “other” differently over time depending on the context but with strong reference to *gecekondu* spaces most of the time. This has been done mostly with certain neglect of the interconnectedness between the socio-spatial transformations in low-income settlements and macro political economic strategies by attributing an atomistic quality to the agency of “*gecekondu*” inhabitants. The

⁴ According to many students of Turkish politics, Islamist vs Secular division constitutes a significant explanatory factor in the political spectrum in Turkey. In general, Islamists have been seen as a threat to secular characteristics of the Turkish state. Islamist political parties are not radical movements trying to change the legal and political systems rather, they are arguing for a conservative society based on Sünni values. For a detailed analysis of the issue see Ergun Özbudun, 2000. In general, Islamists have been seen as a threat to secular characteristics of the Turkish state.

correlation between the acts of *gecekondu* and state policies was invisible in the public discourse about *gecekondu* just like the spaces and people who live in these neighborhoods. Given that, I would like to analyze in detail some moments through the historical narratives of *gecekondu* whereby, the acts in the strategic realm, - the realm of politicians, state bureaucrats, urban planners and intellectuals- in defining *gecekondu* space and the tactical everyday acts of *gecekondu* inhabitants, who have used the impediments and loopholes of strategic realm, are dialectically intertwined. In the following section, I will introduce the research questions that reflect the problems of the representation of *gecekondu* settlements in public debate over time via a critical local history of a typical *gecekondu* neighborhood.

1.1.2 Research Objectives

This thesis intends to discuss two main objectives. First of all, the study aims to show the dynamics and patterns by which the strategic interventions in local space and tactical acts of the migrants in producing their locality are closely interconnected. This interconnectedness between **strategic** and **tactical** realm will be analyzed mainly through the local spatial history of a typical *gecekondu* neighborhood. In order to analyze this relationship, I have conducted in-depth interviews and observations in Boğaziçi, a neighborhood of Mamak district of Ankara. Mamak is a typical “*gecekondu*” locality which comprises mainly one-story *gecekondu* houses with small gardens that had been legalized approximately 20 years ago, nevertheless have kept their traditional physical forms. Boğaziçi

neighborhood, the research setting, is an old *gecekondu* neighborhood having a 50 years history. My sample, in that sense, covers inhabitants who have witnessed each of the three periods of *gecekondu* development as was explained in the previous section.

Revealing the interconnectedness between strategic and tactical realm will also signify the parallel moments in the spatial transformation of the designated research setting and city space in general. This transformation indicates that the production of *gecekondu* space as a process can only be understood as an integrated part of the general political, social and economic context of Ankara. Therefore the transformation of the neighborhood space from predominantly a natural space⁵ in the 1950s to a radically political space in the late 1970s and to an economically and religiously dominated space beginning by the 1980s gives clues about this interconnectedness and continuity between the macro socio-political developments in Turkey and in the local history of *gecekondu* neighborhood.

The second main objective of this thesis is to expose an alternative local historical reading of the formation of a *gecekondu* space as a response to modernist consideration of *gecekondu* development in Turkey. This alternative historical reading will depend on a narration of the “social spatialization” in the neighborhood. Social spatialization as used by Shields (1991, 2006) refers to an ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of social imaginary and

⁵ With reference to the initial settlement period, the respondents mainly narrate the locality with reference to its natural qualities. Natural factors had determined the course of spatialization mostly during that period.

representations as well as real interventions in the form of social practices producing a built environment (Shields, 1991: 31). To put it differently, the concept signifies the process in which social and spatial have continuously defined each other in the locality in close interconnectedness with the general context of urbanization in the city. The analysis of social spatialization, so as to put an alternative history of the locality, has twofold implications for this thesis.

First of all, the **spontaneity** as the defining and intrinsic quality of *gecekondu* settlements as different from other “more planned” neighborhoods of the city will be made explicit. This spontaneity is not only closely related to the tactical acts of the migrants in relation to the strategical realm, but is also related to certain spatial contingencies emerging in the course of social spatialization. Understanding this spontaneity intrinsic to *gecekondu* settlements makes it possible to reveal the causes behind the biased estimates of strategical planning policies, which are developed in accordance with modernization principles.

Secondly, the examination of social spatialization considering the interconnectedness of tactic and strategy on the vertical level will also highlight the competition between different groups along hometown and sectarian identities on the horizontal level during the formation of neighborhood space. In other words, the power relations between different groups in the locality have a strong connection with these groups’ diverse ways of forming relations with the actors of the strategical realm. The ethnic identities through hometown and sectarian affiliations directly define the course of spatial production in the locality. Since, migrants use these identities as a means to perform certain tactics in dealing with

strategical realm depending on the nature of identity politics as defined by the strategical realm at that particular moment. Strategical acts have attributed certain values and meanings to these ethnic identities in conjunction with policy interests, which enable migrants to use these identities as tactics in dealing with the strategical realm and other ethnic identities in the locality. In that respect, the nature of competition between these groups in the course of social spatialization in the locality seems to depend strongly on general socio-political context of the city and the country at that particular moment. In that sense, the local historical reading of social spatialization following the route mentioned above will also exemplify the nature of encounters between different groups in the neighborhood at different moments of this process. As mentioned above, public representation had either under or overemphasized the heterogeneity of *gecekondu* society. The elite perception either defines *gecekondu* society as a homogenous one by attributing a socio-cultural otherness to the whole *gecekondu* society or exaggerates the threatening qualities of close encounters between conflict ridden identities in *gecekondu* setting to define it as an illegal or criminal space. The narration of the course of social spatialization in the research setting signifies the fact that the hometown, ethnic and sectarian differences have played important roles as variables that have defined the context of encounters between different groups at certain moments of spatial production. These encounters, however, may sometimes take a strong tone of conflict and struggle or, in other times, may necessitate compromises in the 50 years history of the research setting.

The secondary objective of this thesis, stemming from the main objectives, is to provide a spatial approach as a methodological and analytical tool to the study of

low-income settlements. As will be demonstrated with research data, low-income settlements have strong spontaneous quality based on spatial contingency. Spatial approach allows us to reveal characteristics of *gecekondu* settlements. I mainly benefit from the conceptual and theoretical framework as offered in debates on urban (socio)-spatial production in modern societies both at conceptual and methodological levels. In that sense, first of all, I will explain the conceptual framework of the thesis and define the concepts and the outlook that I am going to employ in the course of the thesis. Secondly, I will define the methodological approach of the thesis that attempts to reconcile the local historical reading in a neighborhood depending on the narratives of the respondents and the spatial analysis that accompany and constitute the core of this reading.

1.1.3 Conceptual Framework

The thesis seeks to bring a criticism to the exclusionary and blaming modernist discourse on *gecekondu* space and *gecekondu* on a number of points as mentioned above. In this process, *gecekondu* is defined by public representation either as the main culprit of the mal-urbanization within the “blaming the victim” tradition or as the idle, marginal and passive beneficiaries of Turkish urbanization. In either case, the formation of *gecekondu* space and city space seems to be thought apart, concealing or neglecting the paradoxes and impediments of modernist planning activity and the politics of urbanization in Turkey. In conjunction with the

research interests, the critical literature on the modernist planning of urban space and everyday life constitutes the main inspiration and conceptual framework of the thesis. The critique that Henri Lefebvre (1998) poses to the production of space in Western capitalist societies in his groundbreaking book, “The Production of Space” constitutes one of the main inspirations for the thesis. The recent debates in critical spatial theory that are enriched not only by the premises but also with the criticisms of Lefebvre’s theory construct the conceptual and theoretical skeleton of the thesis.

The core of the conceptual structure of the thesis consists of a critical synthesis of Henri Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space in modern capitalist societies, -the building stone of critical Marxist geography- supported with Michel De Certeau’s (1984) theory on the practice of everyday life that aims at bringing an alternative historical reading. The main objective of this section is to show the relevance of the literature with the research interests of the thesis and to make explicit the conceptual and methodological concerns that had played important roles in the research design. In order to accomplish this task, I will define certain concepts that I am going to use and refer to in the course of the thesis. The meaning of (social) space, production of space, social spatialization, spatial triad, strategy, tactic and spontaneity will be discussed at length in connection to their theoretical claims.

1.1.3.1 “Social Spatialization” as a Conceptual Alternative to “Production of Space”

Lefebvre’s main objective in his book “The Production of Space” is to show and criticize how state rationalism and power attempt to bring a unified and homogenous society into perfection by producing a peculiar space in accordance with its objectives in modern capitalist societies (Lefebvre, 1998: 281). While doing that he puts his novel definition of “space” at the center of modern geographical thought and points out the vitality of spatial analysis in any social scientific research. In his theory of space, Lefebvre (1998: 8) challenges previous definitions of “space”. He criticizes Cartesian dualist understanding, where space is defined as an object against subject dominating all senses and bodies. This criticism of Lefebvre seems to be mainly inspired by late Heidegger’s emerging interest in space besides time. Heidegger treats questions of spatiality as equally important to those of temporality. As Elden (2004: 92) mentions, Heidegger criticizes the understanding of space, like time in a narrow, calculative, mathematical sense, which is divorced from our experience of space in our everyday dealings with the world where we act and react to objects within it in a lived, experiential way, instead of abstracting them in a Cartesian grid of coordinates.

The second main definition of space to which Lefebvre channels criticism is Aristotelian space. This is an empiricist space whose reason of existence is reduced to the classification and naming the evidences of senses rather than having an absolute existence. Lefebvre opposes such a definition of space mainly with reference to the status of space in defining the context of everyday dealings with the world for people.

Thirdly, Lefebvre criticizes Kantian space where space is defined as the apriori realm of consciousness and separated along with time from the empirical sphere. The epistemologico-philosophical notion of space in general, fetishizes a mental realm that comes to envelop the social and physical ones, which is challenged by Lefebvre for their neglect of the practical and material qualities of space (Lefebvre, 1998: 5). According to Lefebvre, recognition of space mainly as a mental realm leads to a gap between the theoretical (mental and social space of philosophers) and practical (space of people dealing with material things). Therefore, theoretical unity should be considered between cosmos (physical nature), mental, logical and formal abstractions and social spaces (Lefebvre, 1998: 11). He attempts to integrate social practices, perceptions and representations within the definition of space rather than defining space only as an object or physical container of social practices. In that respect, he initiates a third position between positivistic geography dealing with space mainly with reference to its physical qualities and humanistic geography dealing with particular places and the cultural meaning and values attributed to these places lacking a systematic approach. He offers a combination of materialism, existentialism and

phenomenology⁶ to come up with a more effective and dynamic definition of space.

Hence Lefebvre's definition of space is found quite extensive and inclusive. His definition of space is considered by many so inclusive that the whole theory is thought to instigate a fetishization of space over time. In fact, *space* having an equal status with *time* can only be considered as having positional and contingent effects on the context of social relations for some (see Sayer, 1985). The reason behind the criticisms directed to Lefebvre is the importance he attributes to the transforming capacities of space in altering the course of social relations in any mode of production. He makes an extended criticism of modernist production of space as part, parcel and the most important determinant and transformer of capitalist relations of production. Particularly, when he contextualizes his analysis in relation to urban space, he signifies the dynamic and dialectic relation of space with the social, emphasizing the defining aspects of spatial contingencies on urban development. Lefebvre's analysis of space and its production in capitalist society point out space's intrinsic capacity to alter the whole context of social relations of production in the following manner:

Space has a sort of reality of its own, a reality clearly distinct from, yet much like, those assumed in the same global process by commodities, money and capital... space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and action... in addition to being a means of production, it is also a means of control, and of domination, of power... Is this space an abstract one? Yes, but it is also "real" in the sense in which concrete abstractions such as commodities and

⁶ "Implicated in this project was Lefebvre's own particular brand of Marxism which stressed the importance of everyday life, of alienation and of the writings of the early humanist Marx. Consequently, his project on space does not simply reduce the mental to the material in a "vulgar" Marxist fashion. For Lefebvre, the realms of perception, symbolism and imagination although distinguishable, are not separable from physical and social space." (Merrifield, 1993:523)

money are real. Is it then concrete? Yes, though not in the sense that an object or product is concrete. Is it instrumental? Undoubtedly, but, like knowledge, it extends beyond instrumentality (Lefebvre, 1998: 26, 27).

His theory on space reflects the power of the production of space as the explicit/implicit manifestation of multifaceted class interests. That is the reason why he uses space with the concept production as showing the “social” and “power” ingredients embedded in the spatial. He defines “(social) space as a (social) product” (Lefebvre, 1998: 26). Lefebvre’s using of “social” in brackets does not signify the fact that space has a detachable social component, on the contrary, points out as the first step in his theoretical premise that “space” and “social” in the modern world are impossible to tell apart. That is the reason why he uses the concept of space while dealing with modernity always with the complementary verb “production”⁷. First implication of his theory that space is a social product, supposes the disappearance of (physical) natural space with the growing effect of capitalist spatial production. In capitalist system nature comes close to its defeat and destruction more than ever. However, the disappearing natural space by creating certain spatial contingencies may, in some cases, alter the course of social relations of capitalist production and reproduction.

⁷ He makes a distinction between “production” and “work” where he defines production in the service of repetition mainly as part of capitalist system. He attributes work all the creativity. Therefore, pre-industrial cities and their spatial qualities are mainly identified within the sphere of work and creativity but the aspects of modern space are identified with the verb production in Lefebvre’s terminology (Lefebvre, 1998: 77). He makes a similar distinction between domination and appropriation of space. According to Lefebvre, domination of space is mainly a quality of capitalist production unlike the appropriation of space. “Domination by technology tends towards non-appropriation- i.e. towards destruction... There is a conflict between domination and appropriation. This conflict takes place in space”. (Lefebvre, 1998: 343) Appropriated space is a natural space in order to serve the needs and possibilities of a group that it has been appropriated by that group (Lefebvre, 1998: 166). Lefebvre sees the resistance capabilities of the powerless in modern societies in their capacity to appropriate space and challenge the abstract space as produced by capitalist power holders.

Second implication of the theory supposes that every mode of production produces a space of its own (Lefebvre, 1998: 32). To put differently, every power structure in order to impose its power in an efficient way should produce its own space. The space that is produced by capitalist production relations in modern times to sustain the continuity of the system is called an “abstract space”⁸ by Lefebvre. In order to prevent any kind of mass revolts, the “abstract space” of capitalism should conceal relations of exploitation and alienation in everyday life. Therefore the “abstract space” of capitalism is “buttressed by non-critical (positive) knowledge backed by a frightening capacity for violence and maintained by a bureaucracy which has laid hold of the gains of capitalism” as defined by Lefebvre (1998: 52). The Republican Regime’s attempt of creating a modernist space seem to include production of such an abstract space that serves the interest of Republican Regime to create a homogenous and modernist physical and social space in the course of nation building as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter.

If space is a product of our knowledge, then it must be expected to reproduce and expound the process of production (Lefebvre, 1998: 36). Third implication of the theory gives important clues about Lefebvre’s notion of space not only as a social product but also as having a reality of its own, particularly within the context

⁸ Abstract space “as a product of violence and war is political; instituted by a state, is institutional. On first inspection it appears homogenous; indeed it serves those forces, which make a tabula rasa of whatever stands in their way, of whatever threatens them- in short of differences (Lefebvre, 1998: 285). In order to understand Lefebvre’s definition of abstract space, there is a need to understand the difference he supposes between domination and appropriation. Abstract space of capitalism dominates rather than appropriates.

of its capacity to define the reproduction of social relations. Edwards Soja (1985), a leading interpreter of Lefebvre's theory develops the term socio-spatial dialectics particularly with reference to this precept of Lefebvre. The production of space refers and occupies what Soja calls socio-spatial dialectic in which space is conceptualized both as the medium and the outcome of social action, which according to him connect social and spatial structures in such away that the former appears in its concrete form in the latter (Soja, 1985: 94). Soja's basic premises upon which the "material interpretation of spatiality" is built, reformulate the understanding of the production of space in Lefebvrian sense. Soja lists the qualities of "concrete spatiality" in the following manner:

- 1) Spatiality is a substantiated social product, part of a "second nature" which incorporates as it socializes and transforms both physical and cognitive space;
- 2) As a social product, spatiality is *simultaneously the medium and the outcome* ... social action and relationship;
- 3) This spatio-temporal structuration of social life defines how social action and relationship are materially constituted, made concrete;
- 4) The constitution/concretization process is problematic, filled with contradiction, conflict, and struggle;
- 5) Conflict and contradiction arise primarily from the duality of produced space as both outcome-embodiment-product and medium-presupposition-producer;
- 6) Concrete spatiality is thus a competitive arena for both social production and reproduction, for social practices aimed either at maintenance and reinforcement of existing spatiality or at significant restructuring and possible transformation;
- 7) *The temporality of social life*, from the routines and events of day-to-day activity to the longer-run making of history, *is rooted in spatial contingency in much the same way that spatiality of social life is rooted in temporal/historical contingency*;
- 8) The materialist interpretation history and the interpretation of spatiality are inseparably intertwined and theoretically concomitant, with *no inherent prioritization of one over the other* (Soja, 1985: 98- 99, emphasis mine).

Soja's reformulation of Lefebvrian understanding of the production of space acknowledges the defining capacity of space in the reproduction of social relations and the effect of spatial contingencies in producing unintended effects. These

spatial contingences may alter development schemas in urban context just like the historical contingencies may alter the spatial relations of production in such a reformulation.

By introducing such a broad and dynamic definition of space, Lefebvre wants to transcend the Marxist dichotomies and binary oppositions between proletariat and bourgeoisie, wages and profit, or productive labor and parasitism. This is done by integrating a third element that is *land* with its determining capacities into two means of production or moments of capitalism, namely *labor* and *capital* by Lefebvre (1998: 228). He attempts to go beyond the weaknesses of Marxist formulation of capitalist relations of production by integrating the “production of space” into this formulation. However, the “production of space” in Lefebvrian reformulation emphasizes mainly the capitalists’ power and capacity in producing a totalizing space dominating all other space(s). This reformulation, however, leaves his argument hostage to misinterpretation and reduction back to established Marxist concepts of production according to Shields (2006: 154). In fact, Lefebvre’s broad definition of space and the capacity of spatial relations in altering the course of social relations should transcend such a homogenous and one-way formulation of power relations of “producing space”. Therefore, according to Shields, an important reviewer of Lefebvre’s contribution to spatial theory, there emerges a desperate need of a vocabulary to conceptualize the varied production and consumption of varied spaces, places and landscapes. He explains this need to reconceptualize Lefebvre’s term of “production of space” in the following manner:

Lefebvre is referring to not only the empirical disposition of things in the landscape as “space” (the physical aspect) but also attitudes and habitual practices. His metaphoric *l’espace* might be better understood as the

spatialization of social order. In this movement to space, abstract structures such as “culture” become concrete practices and arrangements in space. Social action involves not just a rhythm but also geometry and spacing. Spatialization also captures the processual nature of l’espace that Lefebvre insists is a matter of ongoing activities. *That is, it is not just an achieved order in the built environment, or an ideology, but also an order that is itself always undergoing change from within through actions and innovations of social agents* (Shields, 2006: 155, emphasis mine).

As mentioned by Shields, unlike the critics of Lefebvre who point out the weaknesses of his Marxist framework, Lefebvre appreciates the actions and innovations of social agents within the context of his critique to structuralism. Particularly when he refers to urban space and its modernist production and planning, he signifies the irreconcilability of the planning attempts of the center vis-à-vis the spatial practices of the “users” in everyday life. The power of the “users” is implicit in their ability to appropriate alternative spaces in congruence with their needs against modernist attempt of spatial production according to Lefebvre. This has close connection with the creativity and dynamism he attributes to the social agency and the capacity of the “users” in altering the course of spatial production. However, this aspect of his theory seems to remain open to misreading owing to his conceptualization of capitalist space as a totalizing space assimilating all “*other*” spatial experiences as defined via the term “production of space”. The main reason behind Shields’ attempt to put the term “social spatialization” in place of the “production of space” is to overcome such a misleading reading of Lefebvre’s theory. He wants to overcome the internal conceptual contradictions of Lefebvre’s terminology in order to strengthen Lefebvre’s critique of modernist, rationalist system of capitalist production via the novel understanding of dialectical relation of the social and spatial. Social spatialization in that respect not only

designates the physical environment but the process in which social practices, social imaginary and spatial constructions are in continuous interplay.

Shields (1991: 31) defines “social spatialization” as the ongoing and processual social construction of the spatial at the level of social imaginary (collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as interventions in landscape (for example, built environment). Social spatialization as a process also includes contingency and spontaneity as emerged from the spatial determination of the social relations, which constitutes the core of Lefebvre’s novel definition of space as will be detailed in the following pages. The term “social spatialization” will be preferred in place of “production of space” in most part of this thesis with reference to the discussion above. Lefebvre’s formulation of spatial production in interconnection with social signifies a variety of power positions and interests, rather than referring to a homogenous realm with a unilateral power structure. In relation to that, I will introduce Lefebvre’s spatial triad, which will be referred quite often throughout the thesis.

1.1.3.2 Spatial Triad

Lefebvre’s main criticism to modernist urban planning is made explicit through his formulation of a spatial triad. According to Lefebvre, every society has its peculiar spatial code and this spatial code can be defined with a spatial triad. In this triad, space is defined as an outcome of the dialectic interplay of the three moments of social spatialization or acts of social agency. First component of the triad is *spatial*

practice that is society's space. Society produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it in everyday life. That can be defined as an externalized material or built environment. This is the perceived space in which there is a close connection between "daily reality" (daily routine) and "urban reality" (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, private life and leisure (Lefebvre, 1998: 37, 50). The reproduction of social relations by means of real interruptions and activities in space happens to take place in this aspect of the spatial triad.

Second component of the triad is the *representations of space* (conceived space) that is the space of planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers. This is the part where a conceptual model used to direct practice is imposed by modernist or capitalist agency. "This space comprises the various arcane signs, jargons, codifications, objectified representations used and produced by these agents." (Merrifield, 1993: 523) The second part of the triad constitutes the core of Lefebvre's criticism that is posed to modernist planning strategy and its incompatibility with the lived space or the space of everyday life. The problem under capitalism is the primacy given to the determining capacity of the conceived part of spatial triad.

The third component of the triad is *representational space* (lived space) that is space directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of "inhabitants" and "users", but also some artists. It is the sphere where the lived social relations of users in relation to the environment are conceptualized (Lefebvre, 1998: 38, 39; Gottdiener, 1993: 131). This is the space of "users" or the

“inhabitants” and where Lefebvre sees the source of potential challenge to the existing rationalist system and also the potential to create difference.

Lefebvre offers such a spatial triad to explain the production of space in a capitalist society and the power relations between different agents in such a framework. This triplicate integrates a dynamism and expansion to the dialectics of social and spatial. It avoids, at the same time, a degeneration of the discussions of the dualistic socio-spatial dialectic into a reductionist and unproductive debate over the primacy of social over space or vice-versa (Shields, 1991: 56). According to Lefebvre, these three aspects –perceived, conceived and lived- go together and there are no antagonisms, oppositions and contrasts between these three moments of the triad, there are rather echoes, repercussions and mirror effects.

The reason why Lefebvre sees no antagonisms between these three aspects may depend on his overemphasis of the power of capitalist system creating a totalizing space where the “users” in the representational space have little maneuver area to affect the agency in the other two realms, representations of space and spatial practice. In that respect, Lefebvre defines the representational space as the dominated and hence passively experienced space, the space of the “users” rather than the “producers”, which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate (Lefebvre, 1998: 39). This is the most criticized and problematic part of Lefebvre’s theory in general but also for the objectives of the thesis. To exemplify the potential of *gecekondu* inhabitants to produce their own space through using the means and loopholes in the modernist planning and policies necessitates conceptually an opening in this part of Lefebvre’s theory. In order to

overcome this theoretical impediment, De Certeau's distinction between strategy and tactic will be synthesized with Lefebvre's triad with a critical rereading of both theories, which will constitute the subject matter of the following sections. Shields (2006) also directs his main criticism to Lefebvre at that point. As indicated by Lefebvre, capitalist system produces an abstract space that is imposed as a hegemonic and totalizing space as mentioned in the previous section. This leads to much tortuous writing and a tendency to reduce the contemporary social spatialization to a capitalist strategy. Yet, a close reading of Lefebvre's triad also signifies the potential he sees mainly in the realm of representational space as mentioned above. As stated by him, the producers of space have always acted in accordance with a representation -very difficult to challenge- and users, on the other hand, "passively experienced whatever was imposed upon them in as much as it was more or less thoroughly inserted into or justified by their representational space" (Lefebvre, 1998: 43, 44). In this statement, Lefebvre makes explicit the necessary condition behind users' acceptance of what was imposed upon them. If the space of the "producers" (representations of space) is in great disharmony with the representational space of the "users", then the users may act to create a maneuver space for themselves, which is again limited by the knowledge and power of the "producers" (Lefebvre, 1998: 50). Still the existence of a representational space having a certain capacity to create a *differential space* poses one of the most important challenges to capitalist system's producing a unified and homogenous space.

To sum up, Lefebvre's triad is important in his critique to structuralism in general and structural Marxism in particular. He opposes all dualities and

dichotomist reading of power relations and structures by exhibiting a triad of spatial production. The creativity of social agency is appreciated in his theory on space yet it is not easy to get this fact out of his way of stating the power of capitalist system in creating an abstract space that is overemphasized and portrayed as imposing its representations on the “users”. The reader may have a sense throughout the book about the impossibilities of “powerless” or “users” to resist or about their lack of potential to create a resistant space. As Shields mentions, despite this difficulty “The Production of Space” is “devoted to developing a radical phenomenology of space as a humanistic basis from which to launch a critique of the denial of individual and community’s “right to space” under the abstract spatialization embodied in capitalism and technocratic knowledge structures of the state” (Shields, 2006: 146). In that respect, the book with his theoretical elegance offers wide ranging conceptual and methodological tools for criticizing the modernist planning and the potential of representational spaces in creating a spontaneity and difference sometimes even by means of the structural weaknesses of rational and bureaucratic planning. This constitutes the main reason behind such a detailed reading of Lefebvre’s critique of modernist attempt of producing space in relation to the interests of the thesis.

1.1.3.3 Spatial Spontaneity

There is a strong possibility of spontaneity in every holistic urban planning attempt even in cases where the agency of the conceived realm is powerful enough to impose its space. The sources of spontaneity in Lefebvre’s triad lie in the

components of “representational space”. “Representational space” of Lefebvre’s triad is;

Fully “lived” space (*l’espace vécu*)... It is an essential terrain of struggle on the way to realizing ourselves as “total persons”... This sphere offers complex re-coded and even decoded versions of lived spatializations, veiled criticism of dominant social orders and of the categories of social thought often expressed in aesthetic terms as symbolic resistance... Also included in this aspect are clandestine and underground spatial practices, which suggest and prompt alternative (revolutionary) restructurings of institutionalized discourses of space and new modes of spatial praxis, such as squatters, illegal aliens, and third world slum dwellers, who fashion a spatial presence and practice outside the norms of prevailing (enforced) social spatialization (Shields, 2006: 164).

As mentioned in the above anecdote, the component of “space of representation” or “representational space” in Lefebvre’s triad unlike the criticisms posed, offers an opening for possible resistances and spontaneities within the represented and practiced space of the hegemonic power. This potential of spontaneity in the production of capitalist space is signified a number of times in his book, “The Production of Space”. In his wording, growth of the forces of production does not directly in a causal fashion lead to a particular space or time. Mediation and mediators, so as the action of groups, the factors within knowledge, within ideology, within the domain of representations, in short, the “human agency” has to be taken into consideration in order to understand this process (Lefebvre, 1998: 77). Soja’s interpretation and reformulation of socio-spatial dialectic as mainly inspired by Lefebvre foresee such a potential of spontaneity in the production of space. The spontaneity emerged outside the context of modernist’s representations of space is both due to the inherent qualities of space and its production and also the unintended consequences of the spatial acts of human agency. In that respect, Soja acknowledges space an equal status with time

in the emergence of contingencies as mentioned in previous sections. In order to emphasize it again, according to Soja (1985: 94), the temporality of social life, from the routines and events of day-to-day activity to the longer-run making of history, is rooted in spatial contingency in much the same way that spatiality of social life is rooted in temporal/historical contingency. This is mainly related to the peculiar qualities of space as produced in modern society. As maintained by Lefebvre, space as a social product is not only the outcome of the social action but it has a peculiarity differentiating it from other products of capitalism, which is its capacity to produce and reproduce social relations while being produced. This premise brings the contingency on the forefront of the theoretical debate that aims to articulate new geographical approaches with critical social theory. In that respect, Derek Gregory (1985) suggests that the centrality of space in human affairs could be translated into and/or articulated with the premises of structuration theory. In structuration theory, language of agency and the bounded contingency of practical life are reconceptualized through spatial structures.

Lefebvre's reference to the spatial spontaneity and contingency of everyday life in modernity owes to Nietzsche's conception of everyday life. Nietzschean definition of modern world as an "assertion of life and lived against political and economic processes" seemed to inspire Lefebvre's integration of the "lived" as the most important aspect of the spatial triad acknowledging potential of users' agency to create differential spaces as resistant spaces (Elden, 2004: 87). By accepting the importance of reversibility and instability in everyday life, Lefebvre provides an extended place in his theory to the spontaneity embedded in these appropriated spaces. Lefebvre gives references to shantytowns in explicating spatial spontaneity.

Yet, the emphasis of the hegemonic power of the center is made explicit vis-à-vis the resisting power of these spaces in his theory. As stated by him, the differences (squatters, shanty towns) endure on the margins of the homogenized realm (modern urban space) either in the form of resistances or in the form of externalities (lateral, heterotopical, heterological). However, for Lefebvre, sooner or later, the existing center and the forces of homogenization must seek to absorb all such differences and they will succeed if differential spaces keep a defensive posture rather than a counter action (Lefebvre, 1998: 373). As will be criticized in the following sections in a more explicit manner, the “center” or the sphere of “representations of space” is defined with an overall mission of homogenization and production of the “abstract space” of capitalism as defined by Lefebvre. However, it is important to note that, in some cases the system to define and legitimize its “space” may also be willing to keep its “other” as in the form of differential spaces.

Lefebvre’s perception about the irreconcilability between the space of producers and users defines the abstract space of capitalism almost as pseudo space. In that respect, spontaneous architecture and planning in shantytowns prove greatly superior to the organization of space by specialists according to Lefebvre (1998: 347). Lefebvre gives Oscar Niemeyer’s Brasilia as an example to such planned spaces into which a faithfully technocratic and state bureaucratic society had been projected and he states that there is an almost self consciously comic aspect to the process (Lefebvre, 1998: 313). Brasilia carries important similarities with rationality implicit in the construction of Ankara. The irreconcilability of the perceived and the lived in the course of the planning and construction of Ankara

will be discussed in detail in the third chapter by relying mainly on Lefebvrian conceptual framework.

The emergence of the *gecekondu* settlements in the heart of a rational implication of a westernization project, Ankara city, even in the early years of city's establishment can be considered as a good example to the potential of spatial spontaneity embedded in all modernist attempt of producing space. Such spontaneous spatial formations manifest a social life far more intense than the bourgeois districts of the cities and reflect an appropriation of a remarkably high order according to Lefebvre. This approach of Lefebvre is paraphrased by Shields in the following manner:

Slums, barrios and favelas are seen by Lefebvre as localized "reappropriations" of space that may furnish examples of such "representational spaces" or "spaces of representation" by which certain sites are removed or severed from the governing spatialization and returned to the realm of "communitas". These are prophetic, temporary autonomous zones. Lefebvre differentiates the popular appropriation of space from the dominated space of the nation state or of the capitalist city. The latter is the site of hegemonic forces of capital, the former site of possible emergent spatial revolutions (Shields, 2006: 165).

The attribution of Lefebvre to these spontaneous spaces the potential of spatial revolution against the abstract space of capitalism can also be acknowledged as his emotional appeal to Marx's conception of alienation. In his criticism to everyday life, he signifies the alienation by referring to the fragmented quality of individual life (Shields, 2006: 73). Similar approaches to the study of the spontaneous spaces in third world cities that have attributed these spaces a potential of resistance against the homogenizing power of the center are highly criticized as romanticizing the problems of squatter settlements neglecting the

systematic problems in political, economic and social terms. These approaches are also criticized for the fact that they attribute positive and transformative potential to the spontaneous settlements. However, from another way around, to understand and explain the socio-spatial dynamics behind the emergence of these spontaneous spaces in which the artificial aspects of modernist planning are also made explicit would greatly contribute to develop a more inclusive and democratic approach in urban governance. Since the agency of residents in squatter type of settlements seems to be quite effective in defining the construction of these spaces when compared to other districts in the city, one needs to have a track of local knowledge explicating the socio-spatial dynamics between groups.

Particularly by the 1980s, with the increasing effect of neoliberal policies in Turkey and in many countries, the spontaneity/contingency issue has centralized recent debates in geographical theory on urban space. Groth&Corjin (2005: 506), in a recent case study on the reappropriation of urban residual spaces⁹ in everyday life that pose an alternative local planning agenda by civil or informal actors coming from outside the official, institutionalized domain of urban planning and urban politics. According to the authors, the three cases from Helsinki, Berlin and Brussels constitute examples to spaces which do not speak the traditional language of planning, thus allowing a “spontaneous urbanity” to arise which has been open to constant change, flexible, almost personalized transformation of space (Groth&Corjin, 2005: 509). Such studies that emphasize the spontaneous appropriation of certain spaces as an alternative to the central planning attempts

⁹ “Urban residual spaces” refer to abandoned industrial areas- i.e. interstitial sites that are weak in spatial terms may, due to their indeterminate character provide opportunities for new, transitional reappropriations (Groth and Corjin, 2005: 506).

brings two closely related themes into the forefront of spatial theory: the peculiarities of space as capturing the potential of creating contingency more than the other commodities of capitalism and the agency of the “weak” or “users” in Lefebvrian sense in playing with such contingency. Particularly, the debates on the neoliberal reorganization of urban space recently rely on this aspect of spatialization.

The formation and transformation of urban space have been predominantly defined by free market mechanisms that have been coupled with neoliberal opening of urban space to national and international investment as mentioned by such debates. However, as a spatially embedded commodity, real estate embodies a crucial paradox (Weber, 2004: 174). Despite the fact that real estate has always attracted a range of investors-from the small-scale speculator to the largest insurance companies- the shifting values in urban space can easily make real estate in certain locations to acquire uneven negative and positive values. Such uneven shifts in market value of real estates stem from the inflexible nature of real estate as a commodity that resists frequent modifications. “These qualities make the commodity of real estate very sensitive to devolarization, especially in contrast to machinery and other forms of fixed capital.” (Weber, 2004: 174) Besides, the distinction between use and exchange value of real estate may cause a problem if one considers the inherent resistance of it to modification. The peculiar qualities of real estate seem to trigger struggles and competition between different interest groups on urban space. Those people with emotional attachment to place and those without such attachments may stand against each other in this competition (Weber, 2004: 172). As will be made explicit in the empirical chapters, the neoliberal

policies on *gecekondu* settlements have also led to such contingent results in local context in relation to the inherent qualities of space. With the legalization of most classical *gecekondu* settlements as a consequence of neoliberal policies, some *gecekondu* settlements that have been evaluated as favorable by large-scale investors were opened to competitive market mechanisms. Or else, some *gecekondu* settlements due to their low market value in congruence with their location vis-à-vis favorable spaces hardly experienced rapid apartmentalization process. Other than that, the clashing interest of local groups in these spontaneous spaces may also bring about unintended and contingent spatial developments in such a neoliberal context. The spatial practice of local actors and their attribution of use and exchange value to certain places in *gecekondu* neighborhoods when combined with the asymmetrical power relations in localities contribute to the spontaneity of these neighborhoods. In that sense, the spatial acts of the inhabitants of *gecekondu* settlements gain considerable importance when the potential of spontaneity embedded in these neighborhoods is taken into consideration.

1.1.3.4. Strategy versus Tactic

Understanding the creative and transformative agency of local actors regarding their potential to create spontaneity, De Certeau's critique of everyday life and the concepts that are developed by him are resourceful for this thesis. De Certeau has also built his arguments on Lefebvre's general critique to abstract space of capitalism. This will constitute the subject matter of this section.

Michel De Certeau, in his book “The Practice of Everyday Life” (1984) brings a similar criticism with Lefebvre (mentioning his inspiration from Lefebvre) to everyday life as organized by capitalism and the domination of modernist strategist acts in defining a totalizing space for the “consumers” with a different vocabulary than Lefebvre. The rationalization of the city, in a very similar fashion with Lefebvre’s critique, seems to be mystified by the strategist discourse according to De Certeau. As indicated by him (1984: 94), the city founded by utopian and urbanist discourse is defined by the possibility of a threefold operation.

First of all, the strategy should produce its own space in which rational organization must repress all the physical, mental and political pollutions that would comprise it. Secondly, univocal scientific strategies must replace the tactics of users who take advantage of “opportunities”. Finally, universal, anonymous subject which is the city itself should be created and thereby it gradually becomes possible to attribute to it all the functions and predicates that were previously scattered and assigned to many different real subjects.

However, as De Certeau indicated, modernization praxis and paradigm mainly bring the *cul-de-sac* (dead end) of the functionalist organization. Functionalist organization by “privileging progress, (i.e., time), causes the condition of its own possibility- space itself- to be forgotten; space thus becomes a blind spot in a scientific and political technology” (De Certeau, 1984: 95). This inherent inability of the modernization ideal to realize itself leads to a dualism and a distinction between “strategy” and “tactic” as defined by De Certeau.

The distinction between strategy and tactic is the near correspondence of the distinction as supposed by Lefebvre between the realm of “producers” and “users”. As stated by De Certeau, the possibility of any strategic act to realize itself, there needs to be a defined and planned space. Lefebvre also refers to the realm of strategy at some point of his discussions on the production of space where he signifies the close and necessary relation between strategy and occupying a certain space. The goal of any strategy, for him, is to occupy space by the varied means of politics and war (Lefebvre, 1998: 366). The agency of “representations of space” or its correspondence in De Certeau’s terminology, “strategic realm” is able to produce, tabulate, and impose spaces (De Certeau, 1984: 30). The actors who take part in the macro planning activity (urban planners, bureaucrats, technocrats, social engineers, academics) who have the ability to conceptualize space in Lefebvrian sense have the economic and political power to develop strategies. As in management, every strategic rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its own place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an environment or in other words from the context of actually existing social relations (De Certeau, 1984: 36).

On the other hand, the space of the tactic is the space of the other (weak), it does not, therefore, “have the options of planning a general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a district, visible, and objectifiable space.” (De Certeau, 1984: 37) Tactics of the weak can only use manipulate and divert these spaces of power. Tactics are procedures that gain validity and success mostly in relation to their efficient usage of time and their ability in turning an instant intervention into a favorable situation where the rapidity of the movements may change the organization of a space, which paves the way for the successful

application of a tactic (De Certeau, 1984: 38). De Certeau makes relatively a more noticeable emphasis when compared to Lefebvre on the autonomy or tactical power of the “weak” to alter the space of strategy by employing the very tools of the strategical realm. The common position as held by Lefebvre and De Certeau is that they have transformed the concept of space and “taken it beyond the formalistic axioms of geometry, transforming the ephemeral character of spatialization into a dynamic enigma” (Van Loon, 2002: 90).

The distinction between strategy and tactic by De Certeau is conceptually to be resourceful to define the acts of *gecekondu* in the process of diverting the modernist space of strategy, which is by its nature open to exploitation and diversion due to its irreconcilability with the actually existing social relations. Baydar (1997) has first used the conceptual framework of De Certeau in relation to *gecekondu* dwellers. As stated by Gülsüm Baydar (1997: 203), although *gecekondu* lack necessary power to “strategically” utilize and manipulate local political institutions in their service, they “display ingenious tactics” in which they “turn events into opportunities and make use of the strong”. In a sense, migrants “lend a political dimension to everyday practices” and they protect early *gecekondu* dwellings by using “tactical operations against the relentless strategies of city fathers.” (Baydar, 1997: 203)

De Certeau also gives examples from the squatter type of formations while mentioning about the tactical realm. He signifies the potential of political agency with a stronger emphasis than Lefebvre by giving references to the maneuver capacity of the users within the strategical space and their potential of diverting the

space. Still he defines tactical acts mainly within the realm of consumption rather than production. De Certeau, in a number of points throughout his discussion give examples from the migrant dwellings in France referring to these people's consuming and diverting city's space in accordance with their cultural prerequisites similar to his following anecdote:

Thus a North African living in Paris of Roubaix (France) insinuates into the system imposed on him by the construction of a low-income housing development or of the French language the ways of "dwelling" (in a house or in a language) peculiar to his native Kabylia. He superimposes them, by that combination, creates for himself a space in which he can find ways of using the constraining order of the place or of the language. Without leaving the place where he has no chance but to live and which lays down its law for him, he establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity. By an art of being in between, he draws unexpected results from his situation (De Certeau, 1984: 30).

He gives the above example to the tactic of the powerless and their potential of creating certain spaces of their own. However, De Certeau defines these dwellings mainly in the context of time-sensitive tactical acts of consuming the dominant space rather than defining these dwellings as more permanent socio-spatial forms that have some potential to influence the strategical realm. If we are to take and employ De Certeauan theoretical framework to understand and conceptualize social spatialization in *gecekondu* settlements, his distinction between strategy and tactic can be criticized on a number of points with an iterative consideration of empirical feedbacks. In that respect the critical and merged reading of Lefebvre's theory on production of space and De Certeau's distinction between strategy and tactic will be employed throughout the thesis regarding the empirical findings by critically analyzing these two theories.

However, even before going into the evaluation of empirical data, certain criticisms can be brought to both De Certeau and Lefebvre in terms of their conception of power relations and the dualism they cannot avoid with a supposition of a clear distinction between strategical and tactical realm with such a power conception.

The supposition of dualism between tactical and strategical realm has been defined with a quiet static understanding of power relations. Although one of De Certeau's main objective is to point out the potential moments in alternative reading of history when the tactics of the "weak" divert the dominating space in various ways, his overemphasis of the power of the strategical realm to impose its hegemony over the "users" or "consumers" seems to sabotage this objective to a certain extent. The limits of the tactical realm are so often emphasized by De Certeau that even the ways in which strategical and tactical realm interact in the practical context seem to be neglected. Lacking a place of its own, lacking a view of the whole, limited by the blindness, limited by the possibilities of the moment, a tactic is determined by the absence of power just as a strategy is organized by the postulation of power according to De Certeau (1984, 38).

The reciprocal relation between the formation of strategy and employment of tactics seems to be neglected in such an attribution of perfection and homogeneity to the power structure of the strategical realm. Different definitions of power make it possible to understand the dynamism and reciprocity between strategical and tactical realm. Ewick and Silbey (2003) conduct a qualitative research that depends on respondents' stories about their dealings and encounters with law. Individuals

employ the opportunities of the strategical realm to develop resistant acts. Their aim is to analyze the individual narratives of resistances. Ewick and Silbey (2003) give direct references to the terminology of De Certeau in their study with these narratives. Depending on a case, they try to transcend the limitations of De Certeau's theory and offer new ways of looking the relation between tactical and strategical realms, which seem also very beneficial to mention here for the objectives of this thesis. According to the authors, acknowledgment of power not as a thing to possess, but as a probabilistic social relationship will help one to see the interconnections between the strategical and tactical realm. Power is a series of transactions whose consequences are contingent upon the contribution of all the parties, those who turn out to be more powerful (superordinate) and those who turn out to be less powerful (subordinate) according to the authors. This is a relational and processive understanding of power. In that respect, there needs to be reciprocity and close alliance between the institutional structures of the strategical realm and resistance. Resistance, as much as power, is contingent upon the structural resources available to the relational participants (Ewick and Silbey, 2003: 1335). Within such a framework they define certain patterns of acts of resistance as individuals deal with law. They name these patterns as the "typical reversals of conventional features" of structural relations. As mentioned above, the tactical realm is mainly operationalized by the efficient usage of time. However, Ewick and Silbey (2003: 1350, 1351) go beyond the possible patterns of resistant acts by introducing tactics that depend on different sources, like "masquerade" that is playing with social roles; "rule literalness" that is playing with rules; "foot dragging" that is playing with time and "colonizing space".

The intentional change of social roles in order to deal with law is called as “masquerade”. The tactic of “rule literalness” depends on two sources as stated by the authors. First possibility of resistance may emerge from the incompleteness and opening in any rule system that provide opportunities for the “weak” to exploit. This incompleteness may emerge from a lacuna in the system of rules, by virtue of not being governed or defined (Ewick and Silbey, 2003: 1353). Second source might involve subverting the purpose of rule by rigidly observing it. “Foot dragging” is the resister’s playing with the rationalized time of the modernist strategy that defines and controls behavior in terms of time (Ewick and Silbey, 2003: 1359). Fourthly “colonizing space” is to produce spaces of resistance.

With such a novel typology of tactical acts, the limitations of tactic as defined by De Certeau seem to be transcended. Burkitt (2004) brings a similar criticism to De Certeau’s conception of everyday life. According to Burkitt, De Certeau’s definition of tactics as temporary, dispersed and lacking a colonized space should be rethought. The practices tactical in nature (unofficial) do have their spaces and, moreover, the way time and space is combined in such practices differentiate them from official practices (Burkitt, 2004: 216). In this understanding, (2004: 224) independent from the official or unofficial nature of some practices, within everyday life, some practices are fixed more in geographical space and relatively frozen in time, while other more fleeting experiences are quick to pass and do not have such a materialization in geographical space.

To conclude, both Lefebvre and De Certeau seem to accept an asymmetrical power relation in advantage to the agency of the conceived realm or strategic

realm. Lefebvre acknowledges the repercussions between the three components of the triad. According to Lefebvre, the study of space must account for both “representational spaces” (lived) and “representations of space” (conceived) but above all for their interrelationships and their links with “spatial practice.” (Lefebvre, 1998: 116) However, he also overemphasizes the power of social engineering projects to create a totalizing and homogenizing space. De Certeau leaves a relatively more extended and flexible place to tactical act’s capacity to divert space from within the system, but still the potential and ability of users to create their own space are to a large extent neglected by an identification of the act of consumption with the “weak”.

As will be pointed out by the findings of the research in the following chapters, a critical reconsideration of the strategical and tactical realm is necessary. First of all, there is a need to reconsider the theoretical dualism between strategy and tactic because evidence from the research implies their interconnected nature. Within the context of this interconnectedness, it will be argued that not only the acts in tactical realm need to take into consideration the strategical realm, but also the strategy defines itself and its “other” by taking into account the nature of the incidents in tactical realm.

Secondly, the diversity and dynamism of power positions should be taken into account within each realm. The diverse and reciprocal ways of actors’ dealing or relating with the actors in their or other realms of the spatial triad should be considered. This examination on the empirical level would also bring up the need for new concepts to define acts of *gecekondulus* vis-à-vis the actors in the realm of

strategy on the vertical level or the “other” groups in the realm of tactic on the horizontal level. Since the main motivation behind the research is to understand the nature of social spatialization in the neighborhood rather than the power relations between different groups based on *hemşehri*, sectarian or ethnic lines, this examination will be made by showing certain examples to the shifting nature of the relations between the groups with reference to the critical moments in the course of spatial history. Such a dynamic model of social spatialization would be helpful to bring a dynamic approach to shifting group identities and changing boundaries between groups depending on the context of relationship at different moments of social spatialization.

Within the context of the reconsideration of the theoretical frameworks offered by Lefebvre and De Certeau, certain empirical cases will play a vital contributory role. Therefore in empirical cases, I will draw attention to the local groups who had been positioned within the tactical realm at certain moments of social spatialization as totally lacking relations with the actors in the strategical realm. Their developed socio-political relations with the actors in the strategical realm on the vertical level had brought about these groups’ gaining power in time. This had turned their actions into near-strategical nature as a consequence of this shift in power relations.

It will also be exemplified by empirical cases that tactical acts of the powerless in their attempt to create a space for themselves may influence the planning acts of the strategical realm in the coming decades in spite of the strong definition of *gecekonu* settlements as the “other” of the modernist space. The

empirical cases will also pose examples by which the homogenous definition of each realm is challenged. The changing relations of power in the tactical realm between *hemşehri*, sectarian and ethnic groups depending on strategical context and spontaneous and contingent nature of social spatialization will also be discussed within the context of such theoretical reconsideration.

The study of tactical forms of resistance is generally criticized by some scholars in two main respects as defined by Ewick and Sibley (2003: 1330). First, the purpose of these resistant acts can never be clearly defined; therefore it is not always clear how the practitioners of such acts interpret what they are doing. In that respect, there is a danger to attribute a greater agency and an over developed oppositional consciousness to these acts by the researcher.

Second critique supposes that focus on everyday resistance abandons a vision of transformative politics by a preoccupation with what appear to be individual, often momentary trivial acts (Ewick&Silbey, 2003: 1330). In conjunction with these criticisms the authors point out the significance to tackle the traces of the reciprocal relations between resistance and the realm of power where the resistance does not seize upon lapses of power so much as it relies on the persistence of and familiarity with a particular social organization. While keeping such a conceptual framework in mind, the reading of the local historical dynamics of social spatialization in a *gecekond* neighborhood will be done mainly by analyzing tactical acts as an embedded and connected part and parcel of the system rather than a marginal and ineffective part of the city. The acts of migrants in appropriation of *gecekond* lands, construction of their *gecekond*s, claiming

certain services like water, electricity, transportation, their construction of religious spaces and associations that affect the course of spatial development, are all considered within the context of analysis. Rather than romanticizing such acts, also pointed out by Baydar (1997: 208), it is important to understand the intertwined nature of tactic and strategy in compliance with the research interests.

1.2 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

1.2.1 Definition of the Research Setting

The large segment of the designated research setting is included within the official boundaries of Boğaziçi neighborhood that is located on the edge of Samsun Highway, -the main highway that connects Ankara with other central Anatolian towns and cities from which the rural-to-urban migration to Ankara had mainly taken place- and extends towards Nato Highway. The research had been chiefly conducted in Boğaziçi neighborhood including the places just on the boundary between Boğaziçi and adjacent neighborhoods. Some cases are also used from the places that are close to Boğaziçi in these adjacent neighborhoods namely Akşemsettin, Duralıalç and Fahri Korutürk. Since the main objective of the thesis is to write a spatial history of the locality rather than a specific neighborhood, the research is not restricted to Boğaziçi only.

The locality is considered officially as a part of Nato Highway region constituting an important component of Mamak municipal district. The reasons

behind selecting Mamak *gecekondu* region in congruence with the research interests are diverse closely related to the certain peculiarities and commonalities of Mamak vis-à-vis other *gecekondu* districts. Mamak is one of the largest squatter districts in Ankara and has been recognized as the oldest and typical squatter district by public knowledge in Turkey. It is composed of fifty-six neighborhoods and six villages each of with an approximate population of ten thousand people and positioned in the east side of Ankara Metropolitan area (see, Mamak Belediyesi, 2001). Mamak as one of the most famous and large *gecekondu* districts in the periphery of Ankara, the heart of Westernization project, had long been a symbolic space of the “traditional” life styles, radical political resistance and poverty. As such it challenges the modernist image of the city in the fifty years of *gecekondu* history. This constitutes one of the main reasons behind the identification of the district with *gecekondu* phenomenon in public perception more readily than the other *gecekondu* districts of Ankara city. The region has been considered as a typical *gecekondu* district for the fact that the growth of the region exemplifies well the peripheral pattern of *gecekondu* expansion, which was the mostly encountered pattern in Turkey. *Gecekondu* districts that have been grown closer to the city center might not have witnessed all the processes in the growth and production of a typical peripheral *gecekondu* district capturing a certain autonomy and spontaneity. On the other hand, Mamak *gecekondu* region as a peculiar case constitutes one of the rare examples to the unintended growth of a *gecekondu* district as a challenge to and from within the radically modernist production of urban space. As a by product of the highly modernist interventions in space in the service of producing a modern western city, the growth of Mamak *gecekondu* region has witnessed, at the same time, the modernization history of Turkey. Locating on the gateway of many

central Anatolian cities and towns to Ankara, Mamak region started to take migration beginning by the early 1950s, whose history will be discussed at length in the third chapter.

There are also diverse reasons behind the selection of the specific neighborhood as suitable for research interests. First, the locality has hosted a large market place that is composed of nearly 150 shops and workshops. The market had long kept its status as the only market in a vast area including customers from the majority of the neighborhoods in Mamak. The unanticipated presence of the market place that is constituted by the striking co-existence of many shops, branches of national and international brands, alongside the very small shops of traditional craftsmen or the ones that sell goods particular to the needs of squatter life in a quite classical neighborhood of typical *gecekondu* houses inevitably attracts the interest of a researcher who wants to conduct a study on spatial history. The market place is situated on two edges of the main road that divides Boğaziçi and Fahri Korutürk neighborhoods into two all along a valley. The spatial history of the market place has witnessed a transformation from a river that had played a predominant role in the social spatialization of the neighborhood to a crowded market place that has constituted the focal point of social interaction for years. Market place and the social dynamics that had affected its development constitute the core of social spatialization in the locality. To understand these dynamics will hopefully highlight the interconnected nature of these peculiar or spontaneous developments in the locality and the context of urbanization in the city in general.

The second reason behind the selection of this particular locality is the socially heterogeneous quality of this setting in terms of mainly hometown and sectarian differences. As will be supported by the empirical findings, these differences in social terms play a crucial role in the spontaneous social spatialization in this locality. In qualitative type of research like this one, it seems crucial from the beginning to find out, if differences of gender, ethnicity or class matter also for those studied (Emerson, et al., 1995: 135). In that respect, particularly in the first phases of the research, I had paid close attention to any occasion upon which people explicitly talk about or describe their relationships in the history of social spatialization with reference to *hemşehri*, sectarian or ethnic differences. I encounter, almost in all cases, a clear awareness and perception about their and “other”s *hemşehri* and sectarian identities. In that respect, *hemşehri* and sectarian identities seem to come to the forefront of the narratives explicitly in most cases.

Third reason behind the selection of this particular setting is the 50 years history of the neighborhood that witnesses the three periods of *gecekondu* in Turkey. The emergence and development of this classical *gecekondu* setting from the 1950s to present is quite dissimilar to the newly emerging illegal settlements by the 1980s that are usually defined with the concept “*gecekondu*” but show important variations from classical *gecekondu* districts. Most of the *gecekondu* houses in Mamak have been legalized owing to their fifty years history by means of *gecekondu* amnesty laws. However, still in the designated research setting, as a consequence of inconvenient geographical landscape for construction of

apartments and other social reasons¹⁰, thousands of typical one-story *gecekondu* houses dominate the scene. Newly emerging illegal settlements in İstanbul, İzmir, Diyarbakır and Mersin have constituted a research interest for a number of studies in recent years. However, in order to do an alternative reading of official *gecekondu* history by posing challenges to it, there seems to be a need to choose a locality that has a long history and carries the traces of a classical *gecekondu* setting.

The *hemşehri* and sectarian identities are taken as important variables in this research constituting the main axis of competition and cooperation in the process of social spatialization. For that reason it is crucial to make explicit the common meanings attributed to being from certain hometowns that symbolize certain political and sectarian affiliations. The choice of migrants to live close to their *hemşehris* makes the social heterogeneity of the region spatially detectable. This squatter region similar with other *gecekondu* settlements of Ankara inhabits migrants mainly from the villages and towns of central Anatolian provinces namely, Kırşehir, Kırıkkale, Çankırı, Çorum, Yozgat, Sivas, and Ankara. There is also a large community of migrants from Tunceli who had settled in the region as a consequence of in-city migration in the early 1960s. At this point, it is worth to mention that some provinces are categorized in a particular way depending on the provinces' identification with certain political ideologies (leftist/rightist) and/or the dense presence of sectarian populations (*Sünni/Alevi*). Likewise migrants categorize each other in accordance with their hometowns.

¹⁰ The resistance of local actors and other socio-spatial factors may constitute a barrier against the application of construction plans properly in spite of the legalization of *gecekondu* lands and houses in these neighborhoods. This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter six.

The migrants from Kırşehir are the most densely represented migrant community in the region. Migrants from Kırşehir in the neighborhood are all *Sünni* in sectarian origin and they are also known for their support to Islamist political parties starting from the early 1990s. In their everyday lives, they exhibit a conservative and religious lifestyle. Besides that, as will be mentioned in detail in the empirical chapters, due to some socio-spatial factors, they are one of the most influential groups in defining the social space of the neighborhood. In spite of the fact that most of them have a center right approach in politics, they did not take active part in the political struggles of the 1970s on side of ultra nationalist militant groups.

Migrants from Kırıkkale are the second most densely represented group in the region. They are mostly *Sünni* in sectarian origin; however, there are also migrants from some *Alevi* villages of Kırıkkale in the region. Kırıkkale is still generally identified with nationalism in migrants' perception.

Third largest migrant groups are from Çankırı, Çorum, Sivas and Yozgat. These provinces are represented in the region by their heterogeneous sectarian structure. There are migrants both from the *Alevi* and *Sünni* villages of these provinces. As will be made explicit in the empirical chapters, the migrants of these provinces, regardless of their political inclinations, had suffered from the political struggles of the late 1970s relatively more in comparison to other *hemşehri* communities, which are homogenously represented in sectarian terms. *Sünni* migrants of Yozgat, both in their own or other migrants' narratives are identified

mainly with ultra-nationalist and extreme rightist politics as with the *Sünni* migrants of Çankırı. Sivas is mainly identified with leftist politics and *Alevism* due to the dense presence of *Alevi* villages within its boundaries. *Alevi* migrants of Sivas and Çorum seem to constitute communities that had taken part in or given support to the leftist militant groups of the 1970s. Particularly *Alevi*s of Sivas due to their extensive support to leftist political struggle are identified as the “other” of the neighborhood. This perception is not only accepted by the conservative *Sünni* communities but also by “acculturated”¹¹ *Alevi* communities of heterogeneously represented central Anatolian provinces.

The last large community analyzed in this study is composed of migrants from Tunceli. Migrants from Tunceli are distinguished from other migrants analyzed in this thesis because of their Kurdish identity. In addition, in terms of their sectarian affiliation they are *Alevi*s. They seem to be perceived as the most distant “other” by *Sünni* migrants. Depending on my observations in the region, the social relations between migrants of Tunceli with other migrants retain the most distant quality within the general context of the socio-spatial composition of the region. They also seem to be physically the most isolated community as they had settled on places close to the upper sides of the hills that are topographically most difficult to settle in the region.

As it is clear from the above description of migrant features in the region, there is a high level of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity, within the context of the third research interest of the thesis mentioned above will hopefully provide a

¹¹ Some *Alevi*s of Çorum, Yozgat and Sivas due to the social pressure of their *Sünni hemşehris* go to mosque and fast during the Ramadan, which are not *Alevi* ways of praying.

context to understand the nature of different encounters among the members of these communities at some critical moments of social spatialization in the locality.

1.2.2 Methodological Framework

As discussed within the framework of conceptual and theoretical structure of the thesis, the main objective of the research is to trace the course of social spatialization in the locality. This will be done by mainly relying on the migrants' narratives about individual and neighborhood histories. However, it is crucial to note that this will not be a detailed local history or report of all aspects of social spatialization and in that sense the historical account of all places that can be considered as the focal point of social interaction in the neighborhood. Rather, it will be an endeavor to signify some moments of social spatialization that seems worth to mention by the respondents as part of their individual history in the course of social spatialization. In that respect, these moments that may constitute examples to the research objectives of the thesis and in that respect some spaces, be it the components of market place, religious places, village associations, schools or spaces of transportation would be brought into discussion to the extent they had taken place in the stories of the migrants. Rather than making a sample of these particular places in the locality and tracing all instances of social spatialization in them from the beginning, this will be a research of social spatialization through the narratives of migrants. Therefore some particular spaces were given extended place when compared to others in the research due to their frequent citing in the stories.

Individual narratives will be employed on two different levels in analytical terms. At the first level, the peculiarity of individual stories or the perception or memory of the same incidents differently by each respondent is evaluated as crucial in understanding the nature of encounters between different groups in the course of social spatialization. This also gives clues about the dynamics of spontaneity embedded in this process. The respondents, in some cases, may manipulate history of the neighborhood and their place in it by having certain agendas in their minds. Narratives of the same incident differently by individual respondents may depend on personal histories of migration, class, gender, religious affiliation, age and so on (Ley and Mountz, 2001: 240). In the context of the thesis, these differences in interpretations will be analyzed to evaluate the way respondents situate themselves depending on their *hemşehri* and sectarian identities in the social spatialization of the locality.

At the second level, the totality of narratives in combination with my observations and interpretations constitute the building blocks of my reading of the actual course of social spatialization in the neighborhood. As mentioned above, researcher may encounter with different interpretations of the same incidents. “These different versions might be grounded in some of the details not present in the other, to order actions in slightly different ways and to offer different interpretations of cause and responsibility.” (Emerson, et al, 1995: 117) In that respect, the totality of the narratives may substantiate the author’s making up of a story of social spatialization.

De Certeau states that one must locate a scientific model to explain the relation between narration and tactics (spatial practice), in which the theory of practices takes precisely the form of a way of narrating them (De Certeau, 1984: 80). In that respect, rather than searching a secret or reality that exist behind all stories, for De Certeau, tales and stories should already be considered as practices. Ewick and Silbey (2003: 1345), in their research mentioned above, accept a similar position with De Certeau in which case, the stories speak for themselves. They search for the examples of how respondents manipulate the structural means and system of the strategical realm to develop resistant acts. The authors find certain instances in the stories as constituting examples to the way respondents deal with law. In this thesis too, the significance and meanings respondents attribute to certain moments of social spatialization are allowed to determine the course of story. In that respect, rather than attributing an important place to certain components of public space from the beginning, the signified spaces that had taken place in the stories of migrants were given predominance as mentioned above. However, beyond that, to appreciate the need for a second level of analysis that contains the interpretations and the conclusions of the researcher regarding the conceptual and theoretical framework s/he is dealing with seem to be necessary within the context of this research. This seems to be an important methodological concern shared by most researchers. As Emerson et al. (1995: 139) mention indigenous categories can only provide a starting point. More than identifying these member's categories there is a need to specify the conditions under which people actually invoke and apply such terms in interaction with others. Shields shares a similar position in his spatial research by mentioning that pure hermeneutic would be inadequate if one is striving for a more broadly based

sociological explanation (Shields, 1991: 26). In that respect, Giddens' double hermeneutic, which involves both the entering and grasping the frame of meaning adopted by the actors themselves in the production of social life, and reconstituting these within new frames of meaning according to the analyst's technical, conceptual schemas seems to be relevant with regard to the objectives of the thesis (Shields, 1991: 20). Insiders may ascribe to particular discourses about places as a mark of their insider status; however, there is a need for the researcher to understand the "real" dynamics underlying such discourses. As mentioned above, these dynamics can only be traced through interpreting the totality of narratives about the social spatialization, as will be the case in the thesis. It is quite difficult to sustain some balance between these two levels of analysis. An overemphasis of the scholarly framework would distort the narratives of the insiders; but to simply present member's categories exclusively would produce texts devoid of relevance and interest to scholarly audiences (Emerson, et al., 1995: 169, 170).

Considering these methodological difficulties, it is crucial to come up with a thematic analytical spatial story of the research setting where key patterns, processes and regularities of social spatialization in the locality would be searched mainly in relation with the first research objective of the thesis mentioned in the section of research problem above. It is also important to tackle certain critical instances and moments in the course of social spatialization that may constitute examples mainly to the second and third research interests of the thesis.

Besides considering "space" as an object of study in tracing some moments of social spatialization, "spatial approach" is accepted as a methodological and

analytical tool in the thesis. Spatial approach, both as a theoretical and methodological tool, seems to suit quite well to the study of a *gecekondu* locality due to peculiar qualities of *gecekondu* neighborhoods. The innate nature of the formation of *gecekondu* settlements necessarily incorporates a certain appropriation of and/or competition over space. The embedded spontaneity in these settlements is mainly related to this competition as will be elaborated with the findings of the research. Spontaneity in the locality is also related to migrants' active agency in the process social spatialization. In other words, the migrants behave simultaneously as planners, constructors and inhabitants of their space for a certain period. In that respect, the competition over and production of space constitute the primary concerns for the migrants in their everyday lives.

1.2.3 Research Methods

By applying qualitative research methods such as semi-structured long interviews, informal talks and observation as in the form of participating in some daily occasions of the respondents, the oral spatial history of the neighborhood and the way individuals situate themselves in this history had been elaborated in the course of the research. The priority that is given to the narratives of the individuals as mentioned above makes qualitative research techniques appropriate and relevant for the purposes of this study. The research started in the summer of 2002 and with certain intervals it had lasted until the summer of 2005. I had paid daily visits to the region and tried to spend with the respondents as much time as possible. In most cases, I try to arrange more than one meeting with each respondent. Because, in

many cases, the things people say may not coincide with the things they really think and certain time is needed to form a trust relation as an “outsider” researcher. In that respect, the participation in some daily occasions with the respondents or to have informal conversations with them seems to be vital for the purposes of the research. In order to get “member’s meanings”, rather than asking directly about their ideas on certain issues, to observe and record naturally occurring talk and interaction can be more resourceful (Emerson, et al., 1995: 140). Since some of the data concerns politically and religiously sensitive issues, informal talks and participatory observation have been more useful than formal interviews for the purposes of this research.

The “outsider” researcher role can also be acknowledged as an advantage for the fact that it sustains a certain comfort for the studied to express themselves in a more explicit manner. In some cases, as Mohammad (2001: 109) mentions, the positioning of the researcher as an “insider” may also have an effect of making the researcher appear too close for comfort, making people wary of sharing information. Due to the anxiety on part of the respondents in making their past experiences in the neighborhood and ideas about certain issues explicit particularly with regard to their relations with “other” groups, I, most of the time, avoid using tape recorder and try to comfort respondents by means of informal talks.

One of the main objectives of the interviews is to learn about the life histories of the individuals in connection with the spatial history in the region (see Appendix A and B). Therefore, as will be mentioned in the section on sampling issue, old people who have a track of history in the locality had been given priority while

conducting interviews or conversations. Mostly, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with one respondent at a time. However, I have not insisted on conducting individual interviews if there was a couple or a group of men or women who wished to express their experiences or opinions as a group. Particularly in attempts to reach historical accounts, the conversations and debates within the group lead to the surfacing of many memories, otherwise may remain tacit. Crang (2001: 217), in a similar research conducted by local history groups mentions the importance of group study in local history research. As stated by Crang, remembering the past is a social undertaking, about establishing and sharing senses of the past to produce “social memory”. The naturally occurring informal talks and disputes between the individuals might make explicit the real incidents and ideas implicit in the historical accounts of social spatialization. The intention behind the application of semi-structured interviews is not to cut the natural flow of the conversations. In order to manage the information with reference to the incidents and memories those seem to be emphasized more by the respondents, I have restructured the interviews in the course of the dialogue.

Considering the heterogeneity of the region in sectarian terms, it is important not to form closer relations with people from one of these sectarian groups when compared to the other. Forming an honest relation by making my identity as a researcher explicit makes all stages of the study easier. Besides these, official maps of the neighborhood and the municipal documents related to the planning of the designated settlement constitute another source of data.

1.2.4 Sampling, Data Analysis and Some Weaknesses of the Research

There are two main groups of respondents selected as convenient with the objectives of the research. First group comprises the migrants who can be accepted as either the active or more powerful agents who have the ability to act near-strategically as defined in the conceptual framework. Shop owners who seem to be the most effective group and behave as the main power holders both in conjunction with their economic assets and networks in local politics mainly constitute this group. Shop owners are also critical as a group in order to attain the information on the history of social spatialization in the market that constitutes the core of the research due to the importance and centrality of the place as the focal point of social interaction. In that respect, shop owners constitute the first group of population in accordance with the objectives of the research. In order to attain a representative sample by considering the different functions shops perform, the country of origin and sectarian affiliation of the owners and the years spent in the neighborhood, the purposeful sampling¹² method is used. Since the research mainly traces the spatial history, the shops and workshops that have a relatively longer history are given priority to be considered within the sample. 15 in depth

¹² “This is a strategy in which particular settings, persons or events are selected deliberately in order to provide important information that can’t be gotten as well from other choices.” (Maxwell, 1996: 70) As defined by Maxwell there are at least four possible goals for purposeful sampling. Firstly, by means of purposeful sampling, the representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals, or activities can be selected. Secondly, the heterogeneity of the population can be sustained through purposeful sampling. The third possible goal of purposeful sampling is to examine the cases that are essential for the theoretical and conceptual framework employed by the researcher. Fourthly, purposeful sampling can be critical to provide the possibility of comparison to exemplify the differences between different settings and individuals (Maxwell, 1996: 71, 72).

interviews were conducted with shop owners. In proportion with the dense representation of shop owners from Kırşehir in the market, five shop owners from Kırşehir were taken in the sample. Two shop owners from Yozgat, three shop owners from Ankara, two shop owners from Çorum, two shop owners from Çankırı and one shop owner from Kayseri were interviewed. Besides the interviews, I had spent a certain amount of time in each shop to witness the daily routine and the relationship between customers and shop owners. During my stays in the shop, informal talks with the shop owners provide crucial knowledge in understanding the dynamics of social spatialization.

The ordinary inhabitants of the region constitute the second population of informants. 33 in-depth interviews are conducted within this group. Similar to the concerns as in the first group of population, the period of stay in the locality, hometown and sectarian affiliations constitute the main concern during the sampling process. In order to attain the second group of respondents, a combination of random and purposive sampling method is used. Since the inhabitants from the same hometowns mainly choose to settle close to each other, it is possible to clearly demarcate spatial concentration of migrants from the same *hemşehri* groups. Considering the provincial distribution of the migrants in certain *hemşehri* regions, I select a random house in each region and take information about the families who may have suitable qualities from these randomly selected families. In a sense, these randomly selected houses constitute keys to other families of the same hometown who have considerably longer history in the region and are from certain sectarian identity. In each region a number of families were selected by using different key informants who were randomly selected. This is

done in order to avoid key informant bias. Qualitative researchers, as some cases show, may rely on a small number of informants either in the process of taking guidance as to make purposeful sampling or in the course of gathering the major part of their data (Maxwell, 1996: 73). Particularly, in *gecekond* research, the key informant bias may imprison the researcher in a closed and small *hemşehri*, kinship or sectarian group. The main concern while choosing families in each *hemşehri* locality is to reach houses those are spatially distant from each other. The main objective behind such a concern is to have a track of social spatialization in the broadest sense. A number of families are selected as cases for their spatial location near families from the opposite sect in order to constitute examples to the processes and meanings of being neighbors with the opposite sect in the course of social spatialization.

By employing such a method, 13 *Alevi* and 20 *Sünni* respondents were interviewed. 16 of the interviewees are women while 17 are men. There are seven migrants from Kırşehir, six from Yozgat, five from Kırıkkale, four from Çorum, four from Tunceli, three from Sivas one from Kastamonu, two from villages of Ankara present in the sample. Almost all of the respondents are above the age 40, who had spent considerable time in the neighborhood. In the composition of the sample interviewees, older people had been particularly looked for. In that respect, migrants interviewed are the early comers to the region rather than the latecomers and tenants. Therefore there seems to be a bias in the research from the beginning since almost all of the respondents in the sample are relatively powerful groups as the early comers accumulate wealth, experience and social and political network in the city. Besides these two important groups of respondents, with the orientation of

the narratives, a number of interviews with key people who have played important roles in the course of social spatialization had also been conducted.

Hometown and sectarian differences of being *Alevi* and *Sünni* are taken as important variables that affect the relationship between groups in the course of social spatialization and taken on different meanings and tones depending on the context of social spatialization. In this research, group identity or the definitions of “us” and “them” in the narratives of the respondents even in the beginning of the research had been considered as context dependent and showing variations depending on spatio-temporal factors. In the later stages of the research, the empirical data also support my theoretical acceptance of constructivist view of identity from the beginning of the research. In such a view, ethnic boundaries are the outcome of social interaction between groups. “The criteria that are used to categorize “Us” and “Them” are not objective differences, but features that the actors themselves regard as significant. Ethnic boundaries in this view are not given, but constructed, manipulated, subject to change and situational.” (Erdentuğ&Colombjin, 2002: 10) Even the simple definition of identity seeks this kind of reciprocity and construction rather than a consequence of given reality. Social identity includes our understanding of who we are as a group and definition of the other group for us, reciprocally; vice-versa is also true for the other group’s definition of their identity (Jenkins, 1996: 5). However, it is important to mention that these definitions by their nature depend on the context of the social interaction. In that respect, identity can only be taken as a process; as being; or becoming. There needs to be certain remembering and sharing in a group for the sake of the continuation of such collective identities. However, these rememberings and

sharings may have shifting meanings over time. Sometimes, one definition of “us” or “them” for a group may be contested by another definition of “us” and “them” that is substantiated from another identity source for the same group. In that respect, collective identities are generated in transaction and interaction and are, at least potentially, flexible, situational and negotiable (Jenkins, 1996: 102).

The identity issue and hometown and sectarian commonalities as the most often mentioned identity references in the narratives are regarded mainly in such a constructivist manner throughout the thesis. It is also important to note that the basic objective of the thesis is not to deal with the definitions or interpretations of identities. Rather I take identity definitions as variables or/and reasons behind the situational positioning of groups depending on the spatio-temporal context of the locality. Therefore, there will be no detailed references to the theoretical literature on identity and no closer interpretation of and narrative analysis related to identity definitions will be made throughout the thesis.

I initiated data analysis with a thorough reading of all the field notes and defined certain categories and themes through this reading. As mentioned by Maxwell (1996: 79), the key feature of most qualitative study is their relying initially and mostly on the data gathered in the process of defining codes for analysis in an inductive fashion. This inductive approach seems to be the dominant form in qualitative type of study in congruence with the nature of it as it is mainly grounded in the data. In a research having an important historical component like this, the initial categorization of the field-notes by putting the data into temporal units before a more specific and thematic coding helps a lot. This also contributes

to coming up with a thematic story at the last stage of the writing process. After the first and second revision of the field-notes, at the stage of initial thematic coding of the data, there emerged a need also to utilize existing literature and theory on which the research interest had been built. Coding process necessitates mainly a categorization of data, overall review of existing theory in interaction with research data and the consideration of conceptual structure of the people studied that is emic categories. As Crang mentions sometimes quantification of the qualitative data like content analysis can be resourceful in following the trace of repeated memories, emotions, processes and incidents in local historical research (Crang, 2001: 227). In the writing process, sometimes there emerges a need to reconsider the codes. In turn, the data analysis also necessitates a reconsideration of the conceptual framework in iterative fashion.

The main important difficulty in the field emerges from the perception of certain issues and certain moments as in a quite sensitive mood by the migrants. These sensitive memories and issues particularly related to the late 1970s where the struggle between leftist and rightist militant groups had radically politicized make the process of gathering data quite difficult in some cases. Particularly, related to this particular period, they behave and speak quite timid about sharing their sufferings. They also do not want to make explicit their perception and real ideas about other sectarian and *hemşehri* groups and their tactical acts that include informal moments in the course of social spatialization. In order not to take the risk of losing many instances of social spatialization by disturbing the natural flow of the conversation, I avoid using tape recorder in most cases. Rather I take instant notes in the course of the interviews and prepare field-notes for my each visit to the

region about the feelings I get from the conversations and also about the attitudes and emotions of the respondents. Therefore, I wrote my field-notes compiling the notes that I had taken during the conversation as immediately as possible, sometimes even in the bus on my way to home.

Second important difficulty is related to gathering information about religious spaces and practices particularly from the *Alevi* respondents. *Alevi*'s place for prayer *Cemevi*¹³ is still not considered as a legally recognized place for prayer due to the domination of *Sünni* interpretation of Islam in state policies about religion. There is only one *Cemevi* in the region that is not recognized officially but informally functions as a cultural foundation for *Alevi* people, but they conduct religious gatherings in it. The participation in such gatherings or to take detailed information about the construction of *Cemevi* has been a quiet difficult process for me. Moreover, to behave quite insistent in order to gather knowledge might have caused suspicion within both *Alevi* and *Sünni* communities. This might also have restricted the possibility of gathering knowledge from people about other, less sensitive issues.

The formal places of prayer for *Sünni* population are the two mosques in the settlement. Since men use the mosques mostly, the informal religious gatherings at home constitute an important part of the religious life for *Sünni* women. However, these informal gatherings at home have also been under close surveillance of

¹³ The *Alevi*s do not use *Cemevi* in the way orthodox *Sünnis* use mosque. Unlike a mosque or church, *Cemevi* is not a place where one conducts prayer in order to comfort her/his conscience. In order one to go to *Cemevi*, at first, one need to be peaceful. *Cemevi* is a multivocal place. In most of the *Alevi* villages, *Cemevi* is used for purposes other than religious ceremonies in normal times (see, Çamuroğlu, 2000: 83).

security forces. In that respect, I could only participate in two religious gatherings at home. Since it is difficult to define public and private realms in *gecekondul* settlements, such gatherings are also considered as public issues therefore considered as important parts of recent social spatialization in the neighborhood. However, *Sünni* women also behave timid to share information about these gatherings. Village associations of *Sünni* migrants, which are usually used as coffeehouses by men due to their status as manly spaces, had been very difficult for a woman researcher to sustain long hours of participation in the daily routines there. In spite of all these difficulties, not to be so insistent on attaining certain knowledge and entering in certain spaces had helped me to sustain a trust relationship and to gather in depth knowledge about other aspects of social spatialization, which in turn sustain important clues about these sensitive issues in the course of the research.

1.2.5 An outline of the thesis

The main contribution of this thesis is to reveal some instances about the interdependent nature of the formation of *gecekondul* settlements and planning of city space in general with a new framework appreciating the reciprocity between tactical acts of *gecekondulu* and the agency of strategical realm. *Gecekondulu* rather than being a marginal actor tactically employs the structural means of the strategical realm for the sake of constructing informal *gecekondul* space. Any planning practice that wants to attain success should consider local knowledge in these neighborhoods where spontaneity plays a crucial in social spatialization of

them. Spontaneous and contingent development in these settlements is very much an embedded part of local social dynamics between different groups in the locality. So hopefully, a sketch of social spatialization with a retrospective perspective in one of the oldest and typical *gecekondu* settlements will shed light on these local dynamics that have taken different forms over time. Local knowledge and the ways offered to attain it in this thesis would hopefully sustain a piece of information for the ones interested in new ways of urban planning and politics. This way of gathering local information will hopefully contribute to a new understanding that shifts the analytical focus from “government” to “governance”, and takes a critical stand with regard to holistic conceptions of urban planning (Groth&Corjin, 2005: 504). Democratic and more inclusive ways of local governance will be possible by gathering pieces of local knowledge together. This thesis will hopefully provide a piece of local knowledge in the service of urban policies and planning.

With such a conceptual and methodological agenda in mind, the second chapter is devoted to the critical historical sketch of how *gecekondu* neighborhoods have been represented in public discourse in parallel to the socio-spatial developments in them. While doing that the hesitant approach of politicians to *gecekondu* issue would be problematized within an overview of *gecekondu* laws and politics. The third chapter includes a critical and a detailed reading of planning and construction of Ankara city and the emergence of spontaneous spaces in the periphery of the city as a paradox and impediment of this planning activity. The initial settlement years in the designated research setting will be elaborated in chapter four. The settlement decisions of migrants, construction of *gecekondu* houses and the development of the basic socio-spatial schema of research setting

will be elaborated with reference to the dialectical interaction between migrants' tactical acts and natural factors as the most important spatial determinants of the time. Chapter five is devoted to an analysis of the political turmoil of the 1970s in the neighborhood. The effect of the open and harsh struggles between leftist and rightist groups will be portrayed by an examination of radically political social spatialization in the locality. The changing context of power relations due to tactical wars on the horizontal level will also be considered. The changing context of social spatialization due to neoliberal policies and identity politics beginning by the 1980s will be examined in the context of chapter six. It will be a showcase to explicate the transition from a "space of politics" to a "politics of space" in the course of social spatialization in the neighborhood. The spontaneity and contingency embedded in spatialization during that period will be extensively evaluated. The religiously dominated identity perceptions will be elaborated in relation to the socio-spatial context of the period.

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGICAL REALM'S DISCOURSE OF *GECEKONDU* SETTLEMENTS

2.1 Introduction

The sixty years history of *gecekondu* settlements in Turkey is considered as the most important side effect of the rapid urbanization process, which has been itself embedded in the political and economic context of the country sharing similar and in some cases, common instances with many of the developing countries' histories. During the long history of *gecekondu* in Turkey, however, different interpretations of this statement have delineated various ways of representing these settlements. As briefly mentioned in chapter one, the system related causes of *gecekondu* construction in Turkey have been underemphasized in most early academic research and also in public debate. This approach has attributed an overburdening

responsibility to the migrants as the main aggravators of the mal-urbanization in Turkish cities. On the other extreme, the modernist public approach had attributed a totally effective agency to the actors who have the authority to represent space in the strategical realm. In so doing, the acts of representing, producing, tabulating, planning and imposing spaces by a bundle of agents such as urban planners, politicians, state bureaucrats and scientists have been considered as to transform *gecekondu* settlements into modern districts overtime effectively. Such an approach neglects potential spontaneity embedded in the social spatialization of *gecekondu* space, which depends considerably on the capabilities of local agency.

Considering the weaknesses of these two approaches, the socio-spatial transformations in *gecekondu* settlements will be dealt with by taking the changing political and economic context of the country into account. The simultaneous analysis of the legal context in dealing with *gecekondu* spaces and the changing representations of *gecekondu* space will constitute the core of this chapter. I intend to accomplish this objective by dividing *gecekondu* history in Turkey into three main phases showing certain correspondences with the phases of social spatialization as signified by the respondents of the research.

The first period covers the years between 1940 and 1966. This period signifies the first encounters with *gecekondu* settlements. Though *gecekondu* settlements had become widespread through the end of this period and the concept of *gecekondu* had been used in public debates that criticize the policies about these settlements, the “*gecekondu*” had not been acknowledged formally until 1966, the

year when the first law about *gecekondu* settlements was issued. The period covers Republican Regime's policies of constructing a modern life style through urban planning and also the transition to multiparty politics, which had altered the policy of urbanization in a dramatic manner.

The second period includes the years between 1966 and 1980. This period covers the most dynamic years in the socio-spatial transformation and the rapid spread of *gecekondu* settlements in the periphery of the cities. This period witnessed the ossification of *gecekondu* settlements in the physical, political, economic, social context of large cities in spite of the fact that they had been represented as marginal spaces in public and academic debates. Political and economic instability in the 1970s had led to radical struggles going on between extreme leftist and rightist militant groups in all towns and cities of the country. *Gecekondu* spaces have also been subject to this struggle, even more than the other places, due to the close encounters between *Sünni* groups claiming extreme rightist and ultra-nationalist ideologies and *Alevi* groups appropriating extreme leftist ideologies in the neighborhoods. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, these were the years in which the homogenous identity imposed on *gecekondu* society as the "rural other" have been severely damaged as a consequence of the conflict-ridden encounters between different identity groups in *gecekondu* settlements.

Third period starts with 1980 the year denoting the military intervention. The intervention was carried out with the pronounced aim of restoring democracy in the politically unstable context of the country. It paved the way for a new phase in

Turkish history, which has been dominated by the neoliberal policies of the first civil government. This neoliberal approach to economy and politics transforms the whole estate system and *gecekondu* neighborhoods are also included in the context of this transformation. The socio-spatial transformations in these settlements had hardened the content and intensity of exclusionary representations about *gecekondu* neighborhoods in public debate. The intense proliferation of illegal settlements in the periphery of large cities after the 1980s that have shown great variations from the socio-spatial emergence and qualities of classical *gecekondu* settlements have made the analysis of representation of low-income settlements in public debate a more complicated issue.

2.2 1940-1966: The Period of First Encounters

2.2.1 Rural-to-Urban Migration and the Initial Emergence of *Gecekondu* Settlements

The period between 1940 and 1966 witnessed the implementation of important economic and structural reforms with the aim of integrating Turkey with the world economy. The single party regime that had lasted until the late 1940s sought statist economic and cultural policies, which aimed to construct a national industry depending on country's own resources and implemented a civilized life style modeling west. Republican People's Party's (*CHP*) statist, centralist and

protectionist economic policies of import substitution and intense control of agricultural production including the forced collection of farm produce had alienated mainly the landlords and peasants. This alienation had prepared the context for a warm welcome and popular support for Democrat Party (*DP*), the victor of the first elections of multi-party period held in 1950 (Ahmad, 1993:102). As an alternative to the statist policies of *CHP*, *DP* seemed to integrate a more liberal approach to economy and society. The first seeds of the process of integration with west through Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had already been sown during the single party era. *DP* carried on the integration, which constituted the core of its party program and the party played a major role in this integration process. However, in time, with its repressive, populist and hesitant policies it was accused of carrying similar policies with *CHP* in alienating masses. During the *DP* rule, the control of economy was to a large extent left to western powers. Economy was dependent on the export of raw materials and food to Europe [the demand for food was high during post war years in Europe, but declined in succeeding years] and on highly mechanized but not effective and productive agriculture.

The unproductiveness of agriculture depended on the continuing dominance of landlords at the local level and populist unstable economic policies at the national level. With the aim of avoiding landlord domination in the countryside, *CHP* put a land reform bill into effect in 1945. This bill foresaw a dramatic structural transformation in traditional means and relations of agricultural production. It aimed at preventing local and parochial loyalties mainly among rural population and breaking the political hold of the landlords in rural regions by

transforming Turkey into a republic of independent peasant proprietors (Ahmad, 1993: 103). However, due to the populist bias of *DP*, the conditions of this bill could not be properly implemented. The bill that foresaw the distribution of privately and state owned land to peasants and the improvement in the conditions of peasants worked in the opposite way as a result of the political pressure and the power of landlords.¹⁴ Another factor that further complicated and hardened the conditions of peasants and turned most of them into landless farm laborers was the intense mechanization of agriculture with the introduction of 42,000 tractors into Turkish agriculture by Marshall Plan. This further deteriorated the conditions of peasants vis-a-vis landlords by making them dependent also for technology on landlords. Change of the social balances in the countryside played an important role in the rural-to-urban migration. Another important factor contributing to the scale of rural-to-urban migration was the expansion of transportation facilities with the construction of road networks by US aid during *DP* era. This development increased the mobility of peasants and enabled them to encounter towns and cities that are close to them.

There had emerged two different spatial models of urbanization out of these developments that might take place simultaneously or follow each other sequentially through different migratory patterns. First model of urbanization emerged as a consequence of the increasing encounters of villagers with near towns. These encounters had enlivened the economic life in terms of trade based

¹⁴ “Between 1947 and 1962 only about 1.8 million hectares were distributed to 360,000 families with only 8,600 being taken from privately owned land. The peasants again lost. The state owned lands, which were distributed, had been essential to sustain the landless or near-landless peasants who had used them for communal grazing. These people were reduced to the status of farm laborers, or they migrated to cities in search for work” (Ahmad, 1993: 116).

on agricultural goods and led to the gradual settlement of the villagers in these towns temporarily or permanently. This brought the transition of these small towns into city status with the increase in their population. Tümerterkin considers Turkish urbanization, preeminently, as a consequence of this transformation. This trend brought a relatively balanced distribution of cities and population in the 1950s (1973: 120). The urbanization of the country particularly in the late 1940s and early 1950s was by means of the acquisition of small rural towns, city status. These small cities had been the first stop for the migrants on the way to large cities in the west that are İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Second spatial model of urbanization owes to intense rural-to-urban or urban-to-urban migration beginning by the late 1950s and continued through the 1960s. This led to the rapid growth of largest industrial cities that had paved the way to an uneven regional development.

The early phases of being present in cities for the migrants attributed an in-between position to them. Usually the male members of the households migrated to city while leaving the women and children back in the village. There were mainly two patterns of migration in the 1950s. First one is the “migration from village to a smaller town then to a city, namely indirect migration; and the second one is the “migration from village or small towns directly to a city” (Karpat, 1976: 26). Within the context of the indirect migration, there appears an extended space for the migrants to accumulate knowledge and experience about social networks and connections in the large cities during their stay in the towns. Indirect migration also brought about the first model of urbanization mentioned above contributing to the transformation of small towns into cities.

In both of these migratory trends, migrants protect their strong links with their villages and if they have a land in the village, it is possible to talk about a dual earning for the families. With the expanding knowledge of migrants in the city, the migration took a more permanent character. The migration process that was directed mainly by the “push factors”¹⁵ started to take more permanent form that was directed by the combination of push and pull factors. This transformation led to a chain kind of migration in which the forerunner migrants in the city share their knowledge and material sources with their *hemşehri* -fellow countrymen- in order to make them settled as their neighbors in city. As will be discussed in chapter four, the migration dynamics that contributed to the emergence of the designated research setting do not fit clearly to these defined migratory trends. Interestingly rather than an urban work, the urban agriculture in the periphery of Ankara had led to a seasonal form of migration in the 1940s that had constituted the basis of permanent migration of families in the late 1950s. As defined by İçduygu and Ünalın (1997: 41) there are multiple forms of internal migration in Turkey. These are interregional seasonal migration from rural to urban places; seasonal rural to rural migration; migration from urban to urban; migration from urban to rural and particularly after the late 1980s the forced migration from Eastern parts of the country (İçduygu&Ünalın, 1997: 41). The form of early migration in the designated research setting seems to be seasonal rural-to-“rural periphery” of Ankara.

¹⁵ Push factors can be defined as the insufficient living conditions in the rural context. Pull factors can be defined as the attractive opportunities of the urban environment. Pull factors were the facilities and services urban context provided for the migrants. These can be listed as the education and health facilities, the wide range of employment opportunities and entertainment facilities in cities.

In sum, the reasons behind rapid urbanization can be listed as the agricultural mechanization and the structural transformations following that, like the encouragement of cash crops production by state, the changing social relations in rural settlements working to peasants' disadvantage while making landlords more powerful socially and economically vis-a-vis peasants; better opportunities of health and other social service provision in cities; high chances of mobility due to both the governmental policies that were permissive rather than oppressive towards migrants and the construction of roads that made people more mobile (Danielson and Keleş, 1985: 33; Kıray, 1998). What makes Turkish *gecekondu* formation a peculiar and rapid experience was the distinct quality of land ownership patterns in Turkey. There are state lands in the periphery of Turkish cities much more than the privately owned land, which can be considered as a consequence of the land system, which has been inherited from Ottoman Empire (Friedrich Ebert, 1996:5). It is important to remember the fact that even in the early periods of rural-to-urban migration in Turkey, *gecekondu* population in three largest cities of the country namely Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir constituted respectively 59%, 45%, and 33% of total city populations¹⁶.

These developments led to the emergence of *gecekondu* settlements starting from the 1950s in the periphery of large cities. However, before that, even during the single party era, it was possible to encounter illegal shelters with very poor conditions in large cities. According to the journalistic interviews conducted in

¹⁶ See the reports on *gecekondus* in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir that were prepared by the Ministry of Reconstruction & Resettlement General Directorate of Housing in 1966.

Altındağ neighborhood of Ankara in 1947, 40,000 people were estimated to live in cave-like shelters there, tins covering their roofs getting light only through small holes dig on these tin roofs (Şenyapılı, 1998: 302). The emergence of these settlements was the consequence of the beginning of migration mainly as a result of push factors. In those years, *CHP* practiced statist and centralist policy of industrialization. Therefore, for the migrants there had been no or little vacancies in the sector of heavy industry that was rarely present in most of the cities. There were also no service sector jobs during that period in the largest cities of Turkey. Migrants whether seasonal or permanent had settled either in shelters mentioned above or rent rooms with desperate conditions in some low-income neighborhoods at the center of the cities.

There were three low-income groups in Ankara living in illegal settlements or under difficult conditions. The first group was the low-income state officials employed in Ankara's large bureaucratic sector. The second one was the rural migrants coming from near towns and cities to Ankara, from the cities of central Anatolia. The third group was the native Ankara dwellers or rural migrants resettled by state forces as a result of war, natural disaster or in the process of the construction planning of Ankara city (Şenyapılı, 1998: 304). These groups were the main actors of *gecekondu* construction in Ankara. As was the case in İstanbul, Ankara's *gecekondu* settlements have intensely grown towards the end of 1950s.

Considering the emergence of illegal shelters in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir as early as the late 1940s and early 1950s when the effects of Republican attempts to

produce modernist urban space in physical and social terms had been still fresh and strong, it is important to reemphasize the criticisms posed to Lefebvre's and De Certeau's attribution of perfection and homogeneity to the power of strategical realm. As mentioned above, the policies of governments to modernize and industrialize the country through a statist agenda during the Single Party era inevitably led to the transformation of the structure of agricultural production. In fact, these policies of modernization implemented by the *CHP* particularly towards the 1950s paradoxically had certain populist aspects and concerns to avoid the alienation of influential social classes. These populist concerns had gained impetus with the *DP*'s ascendance to power.

Even in the early years of Republican Regime, the populist concerns of political actors had fragmented the modernist and homogenizing discourse and practice of the strategical realm. This fragmentation had taken a more intense form during the *DP* era as a consequence of the increasing responsiveness of political actors to migrant masses in the city. The emergence of illegal shelters in big cities has various causes: rural-to-urban migration as a consequence of the agricultural reforms; the insufficiency of the industrial sector to provide jobs for the migrants; speculative nature of urban real estate system in big cities that had prevented the development of efficient social housing policies. The legal measures that were adopted in relation to urban problems particularly beginning by the *DP* period triggered the expansion of these illegal shelters. The initial fragmentation in the strategical realm mainly by means of political actors' populist bias had gone together with the strong and ardent modernist discourse on part of state bureaucrats and academics in relation to rural-to-urban migration.

2.2.2 Legal Strategies with Regard to Spontaneous Spaces: Un- Stating *Gecekondu*

DP came to power by taking the votes of masses and, in cities, the votes of *gecekondu* dwellers who had been alienated by the policies of *CHP* for long. Consequently, they could not stay irresponsible to the demands of *gecekondu* settlers, a condition that led to the utilization of populist policies by the party. Therefore *DP* era is to be considered as the breaking point in *gecekondu* history that had transformed the form of *gecekondu* settlements from houses or sheds scattered loosely in space as seen in the late 1940s to more permanent and established neighborhoods in the 1950s (Şenyapılı, 1998: 309). In an environment where the old “modernist” city inhabitants, the media and governors all were in strong opposition to the emergence of *gecekondu* settlements, Şenyapılı points out politicians’ overlook of these settlement’s rapid growth. As stated by her, this was not only related to the vote potential of these settlements, but also related to the economic functions they have performed from the 1950s onwards in large cities (Şenyapılı, 1998: 310).

Before *DP* era, during the single party regime, the illegal settlements were given references in construction laws but the political measures taken could not be effective. State tried to prevent constructions and social happenings taking place outside the framework of the planned urban space mainly in a formalistic manner.

The statist and regulatory policies had shown itself in the form of legal arrangements that dealt with eradicating the preliminary symptoms rather than the causes of mal-urbanization during those years (Heper, 1978: 12). Between 1930 and 1950, five major laws dealing with the land and housing issues and aiming at preventing the illegal house construction were implemented.

The first group of laws pursued the well functioning of real estate system by making some re-organizations in the ownership patterns of the state lands. In order to halt land speculation and to put the functioning of real estate market in order, the laws foresaw the transmission of the possession rights of these state owned lands to municipalities. In this way, the municipalities were obliged to buy the state lands on credit, develop it according to plans and resell it.

The two laws complementing this one came in 1948. The former foresaw the transition of the ownership of some treasury lands to Ankara Municipality on credit that would be paid in installments of ten years. In so doing, the law enabled Ankara Municipality to allocate and transfer part of its land under special circumstances for the ones who wanted to build their own houses (Heper, 1978: 18). Its complementary law came in the same year. The law encouraged house construction by municipalities and extended the jurisdiction of the previous law to all the municipalities in Turkey (Heper, 1978: 18). The first successful example of social housing, Yenimahalle district was constructed by means of these two laws. Second group of regulations foresaw the demolition of houses that had been built without construction permit. They were promulgated after the municipal laws, which

showed the inability of the previous laws to avoid the construction of illegal housing.

The law that supposes the demolition of buildings without construction permits came in 1949. It directly targeted *gecekondu* houses which became “highly visible” to the ones who believed in the transitory character of these settlements. Second law was established in 1953 and envisioned the provision of social housing to the ones who had built unhealthy houses without permits (Heper, 1978: 20).

However, due to the lack of resources and technical manpower, these laws could not be carried out properly as the succeeding laws in the following five decades would not be realized for similar reasons but with the addition of populist concerns. The ineffectiveness and inability of the strategical realm to handle these spontaneous spaces was not only related to the internal impediments and contradicting interests of the actors in this realm but also to the changing socio-political conditions of *gecekondu* settlements. The number of *gecekondu* houses had increased dramatically particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It became difficult for state officials to apply police measures in a context where the resistance of the migrants had taken a stronger form with high degree of solidarity among *hemşehri* groups. This was the period in which *gecekondu* settlers had also become aware of their political bargaining power in demand of electricity, water and other infrastructural services for their neighborhoods. More and more political actors had adopted populist approach towards *gecekondu* dwellers with the increasing bargaining power of *gecekondu*.

The internal impediments of the strategical realm in terms of lacking material resources had been compensated by other factors like the clashing interests of the actors in the strategical realm. At the local level, the civil servants, who were in charge of the implementation of legal rules in relation to illegal housing, may overlook some cases. This was an important phenomenon, which I also encountered in the course of the research. There were many reasons for this. First, since some of the civil servants themselves were *gecekondu* dwellers it was difficult for them to implement the demolition decisions. They did not want to give harm to other *gecekondu* dwellers sharing the same fate with them. Second, for many of the civil servants, the demolition activity turned into a means of obtaining economic benefit by taking bribe from the migrants. Third, in some rare cases a strong resistance in *hemşehri* or neighbor groups met the officials, which made the implementation of the demolition decisions difficult. In some cases, the demolition decisions were implemented partially, like destroying some part of the house, which would not lead physically to the demolition of the whole building.

During the *DP* era, three construction laws were promulgated and these laws provided official pardon to the already emerged illegal low-income settlements in the peripheries of the cities. These laws avoided using the label of *gecekondu* that had become widespread in public use during those years. There was a common condition in almost all of these urban planning laws.¹⁷ The amnesty was valid for

¹⁷ “During the period between 1948 and 1966 three construction laws have been issued. In 1953 law number 6188 encouraging apartment constructions was put into effect and forgave illegally constructed houses that have been built until that time. Following that law number 7367 issued in 1959 which foresaw the distribution of state owned lands out of the municipal boundaries to poor

the illegal houses that had been built before the law became effective. In spite of this condition, however, the laws by no means had any dissuasive effect. As a consequence of populist policies, migrants could easily make future estimations that governments would make new amnesty laws with almost every coming election. However, despite *DP*'s populist policies and their effective role in the increasing proliferation of *gecekondus* in the periphery of the cities, *DP*'s approach to urban planning had taken a "despotically modernist" turn particularly towards the end of their ruling period. Similar to Single Party regime's policies, they would like to erase traces of the past and poverty. Accordingly, *DP* implemented formalistic policies that make Ankara and İstanbul resemble to modern European metropolises (Şenol- Canteke, 2006: 51).

As this section reveals, the agency of the strategical realm has not represented a uniform attitude and intention with regard to low-income settlements. This inconsistency has two basic causes: Contradicting concerns of the political actors and state bureaucrats and the changing social and political context over time. In this initial period, the legal measures that were taken in relation to urban problems and planning were mainly formalistic in nature and contain a certain disregard of illegal shelters emerging at the center and periphery of the cities. Legal indifference had gone together with the strongly modernist approach on the part of state elites in their attempts to represent the modernist urban space by indicating the "other" of this space, namely *gecekondu* houses and *gecekondu*lular.

people. In 1963, another law that guarantees service provision to houses, which were officially lacking municipal permission for residing was issued" (Ekinci, 1998: 194).

2.2.3 The Elitist Approaches to the Initial Formations of *Gecekondu* Settlements

The emergence of *gecekondu* settlements in the periphery of the cities, particularly in Ankara that was planned as the core project of Republican Regime to impose a Western life style on society had been met by public and academic attention in the 1950s and 60s with a strong emphasis on uneasiness and degradation related to these settlements and rural lifestyle there. Such a strong reactionary representation of low-income settlements in the center and periphery of the cities and a neglect of the system related causes of their emergence had gone together with an optimistic belief in the transitory character of these settlements. Parallel to the policies dealing with the problems of urbanization in an insincere manner as mentioned above, the public approach had foreseen possible solutions to the problem by getting rid of the visible consequences of the problem that were *gecekondu* settlements, rather than the problem itself. In spite of its failures, formalist approach in urban planning and policies has been dominant from the 1940s until present. Particularly, between 1955 and 1960, under the name of construction movement, big boulevards have been built in Ankara and İstanbul (Şenyapılı, 1981: 8). This can be considered as part of the hesitant approach of *DP* squeezed between its early populist and late modernist policies. The elitist bias fed by the modernization ideals of Republican Regime had taken a more concrete and conservative form during those years. It may be considered as a result of the closer encounters between the “urbanite” part of the society who had highly internalized

the modernization principles and values and had been educated. As Şenyapılı (1981) mentions the ones who tried to point out the system related causes of migration and *gecekondu* construction had been held subject to legal investigation in the early periods of *gecekondu* construction within the framework of this elitist approach. The uneasiness on part of the elites about the presence of *gecekondu* settlers in the city had been first pronounced in the late 1940s as the forerunner of the degrading representation, which would continue its effect in the following years. Metin Toker, a journalist, in an article published on 28 September 1948, pointed out in a quite unpleasant manner the existence of *gecekondu* settlements side by side with İstanbul's most refined and beautiful middle class neighborhood Şişli. (Şenyapılı, 1998: 308). One year later, the same journalist, by referring to İstanbul city governor Fahrettin Kerim Gökay wrote in the following manner: "Governor Gökay seems to protect *gecekondu* constructors; we have no words to say. However, the *gecekondus* that have their own laws, order and cabinet today, if [they] create their own police forces or military tomorrow, this is nothing to be surprised about" (Şenyapılı, 1998: 308). The academic and public representation in the following years defined *gecekondu* development as a threat. These were the initial years of *gecekondu* construction, characterized by a wishful and optimistic discourse on the transitory and reversible character of these settlements and migration process. There were some propositions about forbidding the entrances to large cities or giving visa for entering İstanbul or Ankara.

The belief in the transitory and rural character of these settlements was given reference also in academic works. A research conducted by Yasa in 1964 captured certain stereotypical representations of migrants with reference to their rural life

styles in a degrading manner (Yasa, 1970, 1973). Migrant women working in middle class houses as domestic laborers were referred to as junk dealers because of the fact that they wore the leftovers of middle class families on their rural clothes, which was a very ugly outlook threatening the modernist perception of aesthetic (Yasa, 1970: 11). According to the premises of the study, *gecekond* family had to integrate with city life in order not to threaten the security in the urban environment. The inherent assumption was that *gecekond* families who were in the middle of their process of transition caused social unease and insecurity in the city. Eating, dressing and entertainment habits of *gecekond* family were described in a discourse of degradation in order to mark the “rural other” of the modernization process. The strongly elitist and modernist ingredient in academic studies have continued its existence in the following decades with an emphasis on the necessity of integration of these settlements with city space in physical and social sense. The academic and public approach dominated by the problem of integration neglects the dynamics behind the rapid growth of *gecekond* settlements in the 1960s and 1970s.

2.3 1966-1980: The Period of Settled *Gecekondu* Neighborhoods

2.3.1 Rapidly Spreading and Socio-spatially Transforming *Gecekondu* Settlements

The first formal acknowledgement of squatter settlements with the publicly known name “*gecekondu*” in 1966 with “*gecekondu* law” seems to reflect the collapse of the belief in the transitory character of these settlements in the periphery of the cities on the discursive level. This change of approach has a strong factual reason. The percentage of *gecekondu* population in total urban population increased rapidly during those years. In the year 1955, the share of *gecekondu* population in city population was 4.7%; in 1960 this percentage shifted to 16.4% and in the following five-year period the percentage changed from 16.4% to 22.9% (Keleş, 1993: 383). If we reflect these percentages only in large cities like Ankara, for example, we see that, in 1955, the percentage of *gecekondu* population in city’s total population was 21.8%. This percentage shifted to 56% in 1960, 57.4% in 1966, 60.6% in 1970, 64.9% in 1975, 68.4% in 1978 and 72.4 in 1980 (Keleş, 1993: 384). It is possible to argue that, during that period *gecekondu* settlements experienced an immense growth incomparable with other periods in *gecekondu* history. This period not only witnessed the growth and getting crowded of these neighborhoods but also the maturation of *gecekondu* dwellers’ experiences in the city environment.

Beginning from the deputy elections of 1969, in the national and municipal elections of 1973, 1975 and 1977 migrants played more effective roles with the population increases in these settlements. The effectiveness of right-wing politics in local governing had been replaced by the domination of left-wing politics with the support of *gecekondu* dwellers (Keleş, 1993: 389). Politicians could not remain irresponsible to the demands of *gecekondu* population for two reasons. First of all, the population of these settlements had shown serious increase during that period as mentioned above. Particularly in local elections, *gecekondu* dwellers had the power to determine the fate of elections alone. Secondly, *gecekondu* population gained enough experience in the city environment during those years in order to use their political power tactically for bargaining purposes in attaining infrastructural services. This was the period signifying the beginning of reciprocity between tactical and strategical realm that would gain certain intensity in the following decades as will be discussed in depth in chapter six by referring to research data.

This phase in *gecekondu* history also witnessed the deconstruction of homogenous identity imposed upon *gecekondu* dwellers as the “rural other” by the elitist discourse as mentioned in the introductory chapter of the thesis. The heterogeneity in terms of ethnic, sectarian and hometown identities became apparent due to a number of developments. The main reason behind this was the emergence of conflicts between different groups as a result of the radical politicization of *gecekondu* space. Radical politicization of *gecekondu* space

happened to take place by the operation of two factors. First of all, favoritism (*particilik*), which means the unequal municipal treatment of different regions in *gecekondu* neighborhoods according to their political affiliation in terms of providing services, emerged during that period in a strong form. The municipal services like constructing roads, parks, schools, water, electricity and sewer systems and providing transportation facilities constituted a bargaining power for both *gecekondu* dwellers and local politicians before the elections. We observed an intimate dialogue between political candidates and *gecekondu* inhabitants during those years.

Second important underlying reason behind the politicization of these settlements was the economic and political depression in the country. During the period between 1950 and 1970, Turkish economy experienced rapid growth. However, this growth was mainly financed by foreign debt. In 1970, for the sake of encouraging investments, the Turkish lira was devalued. However, after the military memorandum in 1971, the government ended the policy of encouraging investments, by showing budgetary deficit as a reason for that. The unsustainable economic policies, low productivity and inability to control inflation prepared the ground for the economic and political crises for the period between 1975 and 1980. The rate of people who work in marginal sectors and being unemployed increased considerably in 1978 when compared to the late 1960s. The poverty experienced during those years eased the manipulation of *gecekondu* population by radical political parties. In other words, class based politics had triggered the radical politicization of sectarian, ethnic and *hemşehri* differences in *gecekondu* society. Economic instability was accompanied with political instability in such a way that

this period witnessed the extreme polarization of politics between right wing and left wing ideologies. A number of extremist youth groups on the left, and the Grey Wolves and fundamentalists on the right did not experience any trouble recruiting youngsters who had few or no career prospects due to economic crisis (Zürcher, 1998: 276). The radical left considered the *Alevi*s as natural allies due to the affinity emerged from the egalitarian and humanist nature of *Alevi* belief system. *Alevism* substituted its religious content to political ideology of socialism during the 1970s and they mainly define themselves with the ethical framework of extreme-leftist politics (Çamuroğlu, 2000: 15). “The fascist and religious extreme right, on the other hand, oriented their recruiting efforts on *Sünni* Muslims of the mixed regions by fanning their fear and hatred of the *Alevi*s, thus, provoking violent incidents.” (Bruinessen, 1996: 8) The sectarian difference of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* took on a political character. *Gecekondu* space like other places in cities was dominated by violence and struggle going on between these two extreme groups. The main difference of *gecekondu* spaces from other neighborhoods in the city is the close encounters between different sectarian and *hemşehri* groups in the spontaneously developed space of these neighborhoods.

The politicization of the neighborhoods that began with favoritism gained impetus with the ongoing violent struggles between *Alevi* and *Sünni* groups. Two groups define their boundaries in neighborhoods and the entrance to each other’s regions was severely forbidden. In that sense, neighborhood inhabitants should take into consideration these regions in relation to their sectarian affinity when they determine their everyday routes in the neighborhood. These severe conflicts between two groups had taken new forms in the following years. In academic

literature of the period, it is hard to encounter this part of *gecekondu* history. However, the heterogeneous nature of *gecekondu* society in terms of ethnic, sectarian and hometown identities would constitute the main subject matter in *gecekondu* research after 1980 that would be dealt in the following pages. But for now, it is possible to claim that the deconstruction process of the representation of *gecekondu* spaces under the homogenous category of “rural other” in public discourse started during the 1970s.

There are reasons other than the politicization of *gecekondu* space, which contributes to this deconstruction. Starting from the early 1970s, when forerunner migrants had reached to a certain level of economic and social well being, we can talk about the commercialization of *gecekondu* settlements. This was due to the continuous migratory flow to these settlements and the perception of early *gecekondu* settlers, the land and house ownership as the main sources of economic gain. Therefore every migrant, particularly, the early comers looked for ways to benefit from real estate at the utmost possible level. As an example, if they have one house with three rooms they may rent one of the rooms to a newcomer migrant. They employ all the chances to build a second *gecekondu* in their garden as in the form of the continuation of their houses for the sake of giving it for rent. This increased the number of tenants in *gecekondu* neighborhoods. Scarcity of urban land prevented newcomers from making profits out of land or house as the early comers had done. As a result there emerged important transformations in estate system, which provided restricted chance to newcomer migrants and put them economically in a very different position than the early comers.

When we look at the *gecekondu* settlements from a general perspective, there emerged differences between them in terms of their location in the city. Şenyapılı pointed out three different forms of development among *gecekondu* settlements during that period (Şenyapılı, 1998: 311). The *gecekondu* settlements, which were not so big and drawn near to city center with the growth of cities in all directions, were partly or wholly reconstructed as modern neighborhoods. They became composed of apartment houses constructed by big construction firms. Second type of *gecekondu* settlements was again closer to city center but their land values were not so high. They were located close to lower middle class neighborhoods. They had been left by the first settlers in years who moved to close by middle class neighborhoods. *Gecekondu* houses were rented to newcomer migrants in this type of neighborhoods. Since land values did not show a remarkable increase there, rent became the only gain for the migrants. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, designated research setting have experienced such a spatialization in which early comer migrants had rented their houses to the new comer migrants and had moved to lower middle class suburban districts. Third group of *gecekondu* settlements were the ones located in the periphery of the cities. During the period between 1970 and 1980 the inhabitants of peripheral *gecekondu* settlements themselves had initiated the transformation in their settlements (Şenyapılı, 1998: 311). This is the reason why the peripheral settlements as in the case of my research setting had been transformed mostly by the initiative of their settlers. They shaped their space according to their own needs and this is the reason why *gecekondu* settlements mostly had their own centers close by.

To sum up, *gecekondu* population attained an experiential maturity in the city environment during that period. Their numerical importance and accumulated knowledge on the political and economic relations in the city turned them into participating agents having the capacity to divert the strategical acts of planning. The homogenous identity of rural other has been deconstructed as a result of the visibility of differences among *gecekondu* population. This deconstruction is represented in public discourse with an overemphasis on the marginal qualities of *gecekondu* society. The ruthless political struggles between left wing and right wing groups through cultural identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* had made sectarian, ethnic and *hemşehri* differences within *gecekondu* society visible and politically significant. What is more, there emerged differences with respect to economic and social positions of migrants due to the variations regarding timing of migration or diverse occupational chances that urban context had provided.

2.3.2 Strategies of Planning: Dealing with an Immense *Gecekondu* Problem

The year 1963 was the beginning of the planned period that witnessed the implementation of five-year development plans, which continued in the following four decades and resulted from the need for a macro planning activity. These strategical plans include the systematic projections in order to allocate the resources reasonably in the service activities. In the five-year development plans,

the issue of rapid urbanization and accompanying problems were given priority. Nevertheless, the issues were considered in a formalistic manner in these plans in congruence with the general strategical outlook to *gecekondu* problem.

In the first five-year development plan covering the years between 1963 and 1967, the general objective was to prevent the uneven regional development and attain a balanced growth that would, in turn, end the problems of rapid urbanization in large cities. In order to tackle these objectives, investment schemas were prepared; nonetheless, they could not be properly carried out. In relation to *gecekondu*, three principals were foreseen, *improvement* of *gecekondus*' condition where it is possible to do that; *demolition* of the houses in bad condition with no hope of improvement and assured *prevention* of further *gecekondu* construction (Keleş, 1993: 394, 395). In accordance with these principles *gecekondu* law number 775 was put into effect in 1966. This law is important and different than other laws. As mentioned previously, this was the first formal acknowledgement of *gecekondu* settlements and second it brought a detailed trilateral plan to *gecekondu* issue, though takes the issue more as a physical problem rather than social. It transferred the ownership rights of state lands within the municipal boundaries to municipalities in order to appoint them as the direct responsible from the application of the law. After this law was put into effect, the *gecekondu* settlements, that were elected as the regions to be improved had been legalized in time and a degree of development was sustained in those regions. However, this law could not avoid the further proliferation of *gecekondu* settlements, although municipalities took the law seriously. The narratives in the research setting verified the intense supervisions of local government during that period. Most of them

mentioned the year 1968 as the most difficult year for constructing a new *gecekondu*. The state officials, in some regions, including the research setting, pitched tents stayed there for days in order to observe and control the construction activities going on at nights in 1968.

The following five-year plans until 1983 could not develop a permanent solution to *gecekondu* issue due to the amnesty laws implemented in 1976 and 1983. Though, the rate of rural-to urban migration decreased as a result of the urban unrest experienced in large cities, the proliferation of *gecekondu* settlements could not be prevented as a result of populist concerns and also the centralist system of local governing lacking financial resources to prepare or apply construction plans in an efficient way. The transition of municipalities from center-right parties to social democrat mayors in the 1970s in big cities led to the opening of the centralist system of local governing to debate. “*CHP* mayors were voted into the office in major cities like Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. These mayors started to play a more visible role both in national and local politics.” (Ergüder, 1987: 16) Particularly the financial dependency of municipalities on center was severely criticized by *CHP* mayors; however, until 1980 they continued to be dependent for external funds on state (Heper, 1989; Görmez, 1997). Populism dominated the scene of *gecekondu* policies in Turkey. Therefore the planning activity and the laws could not be easily applied. The resistance of *gecekondu* population and their ability to bargain constitutes the basis of populism. In 1969, the voter turnout of İstanbul and Ankara squatters were 51% and 59.7% respectively. Considering the increasing importance of urban votes, squatter votes had become quite critical for the political actors (Danielson and Keleş, 1985: 101). The political context of the

country and the demands of *gecekondulu* had affected the nature of the measures taken by the politicians. With the shifting balance of urban population in favor of the rural migrants with respect to old city dwellers during the 1960s and early 1970s in largest cities, the attitudes and actions of politicians had taken a hesitant form. From the 1960s onwards, the *gecekondulu* laws provided amnesties for *gecekondulu* houses that had been already constructed and sustained sufficient living conditions. The aim of these official pardons was to include already constructed *gecekondus* within the context of construction plans, thereby preventing further proliferation of *gecekondulu* settlements. However, on the tactical level, these strategical decisions brought about unexpected consequences. Amnesty laws most of the time had prompted the rate of rural-to urban migration and, in relation to that, the expansion of *gecekondulu* settlements. The vote seeking political activities as in the form amnesty laws triggered the expectation of legalization on part of the *gecekondulu* dwellers.

During the second period, the legal context of urban planning policies particularly in relation to the problem of *gecekondulu* settlements prepared a suitable context for the proliferation of *gecekondulu* settlements in the peripheries of the cities. The construction, planning and amnesty laws were promulgated in order to consider *gecekondulu* settlements within the formal context of urban planning. However, the apparent intention of the amnesty laws mentioned above had an implicit populist content and concern on part of political actors. The political actors used the amnesty expectations of migrants at every election. On the other hand, the *gecekondulus*, who had attained a certain experiential maturity in political and economic terms in the city, became aware of their bargaining power vis-à-vis

politicians. These developments had further triggered the conflicting interests of different actors in the strategical realm. The public and academic approach to *gecekondu* settlements were still shaped by modernist concerns; however political actors started to attain a hesitant legal and planning approach to the development of *gecekondu* settlements. From time to time, the politicians internalized the modernist approach in relation to *gecekondu* settlements with regard to changing economic and political context.

2.3.3. Public and Academic Approach to *Gecekondu* Settlements Dominated by the Problem of Integration

Notwithstanding the increasing reciprocity between the tactical and strategical realm and the growing participatory agency of the migrants in local politics, the question of integration of *gecekondu* population with city life still dominated the academic approach during these years. The research conducted at the time had been under the strong effect of modernization approach as was the case in previous decades. In that respect, the studies seem to accept the “urban” and “urbanite” conceptions in Western literature and apply theoretical urbanization templates and model there to Turkish experience of urbanization. The degree of integration is measured by applying such behavioral models to the lives of *gecekondu* inhabitants. In most cases, the ideal templates do not reciprocate with the lives, cultural preferences of migrants and the way they integrate with urban economic

and political context in these studies. Then *gecekondü* population is represented as marginal to city context in these studies.

The marginality debate dominated Latin American urbanization literature during the 1970s in a very similar sense with Turkish case. Basic premises of marginality debate can be listed as follows. First of all, urban poor is culturally marginal for the fact that they cannot develop urban cultural habits because of their traditional or rural cultural backgrounds and because of the poverty they experience in urban context. Secondly, they are politically marginal in the sense that they have a tendency to support radical and marginal groups. Their political marginality may be a consequence of another fact that they are ignorant about and indifferent to political issues in such an understanding. Third premise of the marginality debate is that they are economically marginal, since they cannot take part efficiently in the formal part of the economy (see Lewis, 1970; Türkdoğan, 1977).

It would be helpful to examine these marginality tenets with regard to the Turkish context. The premise of cultural marginality, as mentioned in the previous pages, can be accepted as a product of modernization ideal and the ideal of attaining a uniform culture. However, to marginalize rural traditional background of Turkey needs to be evaluated as an ideological choice of the researcher fed by the social distance between him/herself and the migrants considering the fact that urbanization in the modern sense has been a quiet new phenomenon in Turkish history. The culturalism dominating *gecekondü* literature in the 1970s did not

present *gecekondu* “people’s way of life” as the cultural preferences of these people, but as the product of poverty, ignorance or fatalism. However, it is a fact that migrant communities seem to hold to some of their cultural values, and construct peculiar and spontaneous spaces in the city in cultural terms. Insistence of migrants to protect their “traditional” cultural practices is not related to their deprived position in the production and consumption side of economy as put forward by some studies (see, Kartal 1982). Nor it is related to their poverty leading to fatalist and ignorant life style among migrants (see, Türkdoğan, 1977; Yasa 1970). The choice of migrants in cultural terms finds its expression mostly in the way they produce and reproduce their everyday spaces. Moreover, this process does not signify in reality a “*gecekondu* way of life” that can be homogenously defined. This production and reproduction process is kept always alive via the cultural differences of *hemşehri* groups and constant competition in the course of social spatialization as discussed in the first chapter. Paradoxically, the cultural marginality debate that attributes an otherness to *gecekondu* settlements, in some cases refers to a homogenous “*gecekondu* way of life” rural in character vis-à-vis urban culture or, in other cases, to conflict-ridden encounters between different cultural identities (sectarian, ethnic or hometown) and their threatening qualities for national unity. The definitions in public discourse can be accepted as context dependent but always have been part of “othering” process. Academic studies relying on a cultural marginality premise also have some structural and methodological problems. They make an abstract comparison between migrants and “native” city population without ever comparing them empirically. There is no research in urbanization literature for that period that makes a real comparison

between the everyday lives of the squatter inhabitants and middle class residents of the city.

Political marginality premise also needs to be critically evaluated. As in congruence with the political developments summarized in the previous sections, it is not possible to label *gecekondu* inhabitants as politically marginal. Rather they tactically use local political means and participate in city politics more than the middle classes in urban context. As some in-depth research indicate, migrants from the early periods of rural-to-urban migration have certain knowledge about how modern bureaucratic institutions function. In spite of the fact that they may depend on their acquaintances and communal networks¹⁸ as buffer mechanisms in their encounters with the bureaucratic organizations, they have at least theoretical knowledge about how to deal with the system there in case of difficulty (Heper, 1983; Karpat, 1976).

Economic marginality thesis supposes migrants' participation in the informal part of the economy, as an indicator of their economic marginality. However, during those years, the informal part of the economy had played a key role in the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the country. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, *gecekondu* inhabitants provided the supply of cheap and flexible labor seek by the economic system. On the other hand, as Şenyapılı (1978) mentioned, in the consumption sphere of economy they can be considered as quite integrated in

¹⁸ Communal networks are most of the time organized along the lines of being from the same origin (province or village) in *gecekondu* settlements. These networks help migrants to solve their problems with state institutions or other problems related to city life.

the general consumption patterns of city population. Other than that, during the period between 1966 and 1975 early comer migrants were occupied in more organized jobs in service, construction and transportation sectors. The underemployment experienced in jobs like street hawking, porting, boot blacking, parking lot attending and care taking had been handed over to the newcomer migrants. This fact is also supported by the life stories of the migrants in the research setting.

To sum up, the general approach that evaluates integration as the main problem of Turkish urbanization regards all the positive changes in the socio-economic position of migrants during the time spent in the city as positive steps taken on the way to modernization and integration with city life. The second or third generation migrants are supposed to be fully urbanized when compared to the older population according to the premises of these studies which, hardly coincide with the actual situation (see, Sencer 1979: 277; Kartal 1982: 141). As these studies are often quantitative in nature and target large samples, the indicators of integration rely on some predetermined suppositions and models of ideal urban life and behavioral patterns (being well-informed political voters, going to the theater and movies regularly and working in regular jobs of formal economy and dressing in certain ways, for example) in political, cultural and economic terms. However, urban behavioral patterns in these three aspects were defined with a strong reference to the “West” and to the modernization ideal of the Republican Regime. This line of thinking defines “urban” behavior in terms of select cultural ideas/ideals about civilized living and looks down on the inhabitants of squatter settlements as lacking in competence to assimilate “urban life styles” (see, Yasa,

1970, 1973; Türkdoğan, 1977; Kartal, 1982). Although these studies provide rich data about the socioeconomic conditions of migrant population (like the income levels of the families, migration data, demographic data about families, data about the physical appearance of *gecekondu*, etc.) they could barely develop an insight into the everyday lives of the *gecekondu* inhabitants. Moreover, except for some studies, which take the economic and political context of the country into consideration and retain a relational approach to the experiences of *gecekondu* inhabitants with the agents of the city, most studies examine the settlements in the periphery of the cities and the life of their inhabitants by considering a certain degree of isolation on part of the migrants from city life in geographical, social, cultural and political sense simultaneously.

The most important response to marginality debate in urbanization literature was posed by Perlman (1976) in her book “The Myth of Marginality” as a product of the research she had conducted in Rio de Janeiro’s squatters. Roberts (1978), one of the most referred urban sociologists on Latin American urbanization, in a very similar vein, analyzed the underestimation on part of elitist approaches about the resourcefulness of the poor and the extent to which they participate actively in urban economic and political life. Similar understandings began to dominate urban literature after the 1980s with the closure of the distance between the researcher and the researched in Turkish literature and with the dominance of ethnographic methods. In the period between 1940 and 1980, the academic and public approaches have quite similar concerns and an elitist perspective shapes them. However, in the coming decade we encounter a serious disjuncture between approaches of academic works and public debate about “*gecekondu* settlements.”

2.4. 1980-Present Time: Further Commercialization of “Gecekondu” Space

2.4.1 Neoliberal Economic and Social Policies

After the military intervention of 1980, the restoring of the civil rule had taken a few years under the supervision of the National Security Council, the agent of the intervention. The political parties of the 1970s and their leaders were banned from politics for a ten-year time. A new constitution was implemented in 1981, which was restrictive in democratic rights and values compared to the 1960 constitution. New parties were founded under the close surveillance of National Security Council. There were three parties at that time, namely, The Nationalist Democracy Party led by retired General Sunalp occupying right; Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party occupying center and Populist Party led by Necdet Calp, a former private secretary to İsmet İnönü, with the aim of filling the vacuum left by the *CHP* (Ahmad, 1993: 189). Within these three parties Motherland Party (*ANAP*) of Özal differed from the other two by its liberal approach. The political strategy in the 1980s was defined by seemingly two contradicting tendencies. On the one hand, the military regime had taken significant repressive measures in the service of depoliticization policies that aim at mainly disintegrating radical politics and struggles taking place in public context. Such an agenda includes quite remarkable interventions in the everyday lives of the citizens in social and political terms,

which will be detailed below. On the other hand, the same political strategy had given support to first elected government who was a champion of economic liberalism, aiming at total integration with the world economy (Ayata, 1997: 59). The reason of National Security Council's permitting the liberal policies of the government within the quite submissive context of the strategical realm was accepted as closely related to the western support for Özal's party, especially among the financial circles (Ahmad, 1993: 189). The liberal anti-statist and anti-bureaucratic political agenda of Özal brought him the victory in 1983 election, which also reflected the covert intention of people who were uncomfortable with the military's continuing interest and intervention in politics. However, the neoliberal agenda of Özal's party showed great correspondence and continuity with the depoliticization policies of the military regime in the aftermath of the intervention, which will be exemplified with the narratives of the migrants in the following chapters. As a matter of fact, neoliberal economic agenda including seemingly paradoxical instances, fit quite well with the depoliticization policies of post coup d'état period. As Peck and Tickell (2004: 42) mentions, by its definition, neoliberalism contains processes of liberal economic management together with strongly interventionist social agenda, which can be seemingly paradoxical. However, liberal economic processes that are increasingly technocratic in form and therefore superficially "depoliticized" seem to have a complementary relation with a deeply interventionist agenda about some selective social issues like crime, immigration, welfare reform, urban order and surveillance, and community regeneration. In a similar vein, Turgut Özal put the liberal economic agenda in combination with interventionist social policies into effect after the 1983 election.

The neoliberal policies of *ANAP* initiated many transformations in the political, social and economic life of the country and the transformations in *gecekondu* space was not an exception to that general course of events. Particularly, the legitimacy crises *ANAP* had experienced just after the election and the populist policies connected with it had altered the relations of production of *gecekondu* space dramatically. First visible effect of these policies on the socio-spatial transformation of *gecekondu* settlement had become apparent with the populist concerns of the party related to the 1984 municipal elections with the inclusion of two other political parties in the elections. The party put *gecekondu* law number 2981 into effect eight months before the municipal elections. The law had two important differences from other amnesty laws, which were at the same time the underlying reasons behind the milestone effect of this law in the history of *gecekondu*. The law foresees the distribution of title deeds to *gecekondu* settlers who build their houses on state owned lands, lands of foundations or municipal lands with the condition that the settlers would pay the price of the land they had already appropriated. In order to be considered eligible to take title deeds, the settlers are not supposed to own another house or a piece of land in the same municipal district they are located in. The law acknowledges ownership rights to the settlers who have built their houses on privately owned lands with the condition of taking the consent of the landowner. Like other amnesty laws, the official objective of that law is to take *gecekondu* settlements within the context of official planning. However, the extensive consideration of law to include almost all of *gecekondu* settlements within its context, the timing of it and the way it had been applied denote the possible implicit populist concerns of the party. The law could

not reach its objectives due to the way it had been carried out in quite parallel to its neoliberal agenda.

In addition to the above-mentioned law, two-tiered municipal system was established in 1984 just a few weeks before the local elections. This system aiming at general decentralization in the administration of local governments was applied in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. A number of district municipalities were established within each of these metropolitan municipalities (Heper, 1987: 4). “*ANAP* thought devolving of powers to the localities would promote political democracy and make delivering of more and better services possible.” (Heper, 1989: 7) However, the internal impediments of this system when combined with the amnesty law mentioned above, there emerged an extended space of maneuver for the tactical acts of the migrants. Internal impediments of the system seem to be closely related to the financial dependency of district municipalities on the metropolitan municipality. Two-tiered municipal system was established with the aim of bringing a general decentralization and autonomy to local government system in theory. This objective could hardly be realized in practice. The financial dependency when combined with the fiscal gaps and inefficiencies, the district mayors was put into a position to exploit the differences and conflicts among various agencies of the central government. As stated by Öncü (1998: 54) in the absence of a substantial influx of public resources from the center, the “underpinnings of clientalistic power at the local level have come to rely increasingly upon selective implementation of regulatory and bureaucratic codes”. Under these circumstances, there emerges incidents of repetitive budgeting and

people may push their personal demands through clientalistic channels (Heper, 1987: 2).

If the political affiliations of the metropolitan and district mayor are different from each other than the resources of metropolitan municipality are distributed unevenly in most cases. “Even within the ranks of the same party, district mayors and the metropolitan mayor may potentially come into conflict in what one may call ‘the rush to deliver services’ and reap the ensuing political harvest.” (Ergüder, 1989: 37) As stated by Ergüder (1989: 43), metropolitan municipality claims ownership for popular practices and passes the responsibility for unpopular practices (such as *gecekondü* demolition) to the districts. Such a responsible authority problem triggers favoritism both on part of the district mayors and *gecekondulu*.

This problem is also supported by the findings of the research. The mayor of the recent district municipality is harshly criticized by the respondents due to the repressive controls of illegal construction, incidents of demolition and inability of the mayor in dealing with the complicated problems of the localities. On the other hand, metropolitan mayor, Melih Gökçek, in almost all of the narratives is represented as a quite successful local governor due to the spectacular aspects of the services he provides to Mamak in the form of the construction of highways or big recreational areas. In fact, these two mayors are from the ranks of Islamist parties.

There are also cases where the district and metropolitan mayors behave in harmony and are within the ranks of the same party. In that case, the nepotistic policies to one ethnic or sectarian group in localities may easily be employed due to the backing of the central government. The main consequence of these developments has been the growing dominance of favoritism in local politics. Selective implementation of building, zoning, and planning codes seems to be the main instrument through which nepotistic policies have been carried out in neighborhoods (Öncü, 1998: 55).

These nepotistic policies have been seriously effective in the course of the legalization process in the 1980s as was also gathered from the narratives of the migrants. Parallel to the neoliberal approach of *ANAP*, the designation of the *gecekondu* settlers who are proper to be given title deeds and all the bureaucratic work were left to the initiative of certified private technical offices under oath. As stated by Keleş (1984) the responsibility of construction reform plan, an issue of public concern, was left to the initiative of private offices and this brought about some misuses. Until the application of the formal construction plans to these settlements, as an assurance of giving the official title deeds, these technical offices under the oath acted as intermediaries with the responsibility of determining the ones who would take a special certificate called “*tapu tahsis belgesi*”. After the consideration of *gecekondu* houses within the scope of municipal construction and reform plans, these special certificates would turn into real title deeds.

The law also contributed to the further commercialization of real estate system in *gecekondu* settlements, something far beyond the commercialization process beginning in the late 1970s. This was due to the fact that permission was given to the construction of four-story apartment houses on the lands that were considered as appropriate to give title deeds. This law and the related successive laws issued during the 1983-1988 period, in general aimed at the rapid legalization of *gecekondu* settlements and the transformation of these settlements into organized districts composed of apartment houses. Nevertheless, the initiation of the transformation activity was left to the internal dynamics of the settlements and the planning activity was supposed to come after this initiation (Şenyapılı, 1998: 312). The neoliberal policies of legalization of *gecekondu* settlements and decentralization of the municipal system seemed to have an implicit objective of bringing spontaneous apartmentalization in these districts, which was intended to lower the costs of planning and construction of organized and planned apartment districts. Permission given to construct four-story houses was assumed to activate the internal dynamics in local land market and attract the interest of construction firms in such an understanding.

2.4.2 Changing Physical and Social Space of “Gecekondu” and Identity Politics

These developments had led to the whole alteration and intense commercialization of land ownership patterns as a totally a new phenomenon (see Erder, 1997, 1996; Işık&Pınarcıoğlu, 2001). First of all, two phases of *gecekondu* production, which were once considered as the indivisible parts of one process, that are the appropriation of land and the construction of the house have been separated. New actors had emerged as the appropriators of lands in big plots. They divided these lands into small parcels, an illegal activity according to construction law, and sold them to latecomer migrants. The land appropriation stage has started to capture mafia like, speculative and illegal relations (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 160). Secondly, the construction of houses together with labor and construction materials has been commercialized. There emerged a new construction sector in which *gecekondu* has become a commodity to a large extent. In that context, the newly emerging low-income settlements that have been constructed as a consequence of such a process reflect a quite different outlook than the classical *gecekondu* settlements. The recently constructed illegal settlements in particularly İstanbul, İzmir, Diyarbakır and Mersin have quite distinct qualities from the classical *gecekondu* settlements. These settlements are subject to continuous and high rates of migration therefore experience a strong pressure on physical space. As defined by Keyder (2005: 127) “today’s peripheral neighborhoods are distinguished by the unfinishedness of three and four-story buildings, constructed out of cheap concrete

and brick and often lacking a final plastering, that are located haphazardly within what seem to be random settlement patterns.” Another important peculiarity of these settlements originates from the legal status of these settlements. The houses in these settlements are mostly unlawful in nature. In most of the classical *gecekondu* neighborhoods, however, particularly as a result of the amnesty laws established after 1980, *gecekondulus* got their legal title deeds and construction permits, with the exception of some houses topographically built on dangerous sites. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the designated research setting is such a mostly formalized classical *gecekondu* setting, which is quite different than these newly emerged illegal settlements in socio-spatial terms.

The socio-economic differences that were starting to emerge in the previous decade were intensified as a result of the further commercialization of the construction process. Particularly in these newly emerging illegal settlements but also in classical *gecekondu* settlements, the pattern in which an early comer migrant owns more than one house has become widespread. As a result of this process, the number of tenants has increased rapidly (see Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 162 and Gökçe, 1993: 160). This economic difference between newcomer and early comer migrants is accepted as the two sides of the same and dynamic process. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001) refer to this process as “poverty in rotation.” A new phase in the social spatialization of low-income settlements emerged as a result of the economic and social deprivations experienced in low-income settlements, combined with the strengthening of identity politics within the context of close encounters between different *hemşehri*, sectarian and ethnic groups in urban context.

Identity politics has gained impetus by the mid-1980s as a reaction against both the increasing inequalities and intense depoliticization policies through locally suppressive means and with the implementation of neoliberal policies. Identity politics has been materialized around three main axes (Ayata, 1997: 60). First of all, the predominance given to the Sünni interpretation of Islam as an antidote to mainly leftist politics by military regime has given rise to Islamic “fundamentalism” within the context of depoliticization policies of state.

Kurdish uprisings in the Southeastern part of Turkey constitute the second axis of identity politics emerged after the 1980s. The fighting between state security forces and Kurdish separatists that aim at founding an independent Kurdish state in the region have had serious impacts on the post-1980 form of rural-to-urban migration. Kurds of eastern and southeastern provinces predominated rural-to urban migration of 1990s. As stated by Keyder (2005: 131), compared to the previous flows of migration, push factors have become more important than the pull factors in this recent type of migration. The newcomers’ decision to migrate lacks any preparation, previous knowledge or social connection in the city. “This devastation is primarily due to the ethnic/separatist war, itself in part related, in various ways, to globalization and the collapse of national developmentalism.” (Keyder, 2005: 131) The problem of urban ethnicity had become visible with the increasing rate of migration of mainly Kurdish population to largest cities as a result of forced migration (Ayata, 1997: 62). This had two-fold consequences for Kurdish migrants. On the one hand, the increasing interaction

with other groups in the city context produces an awareness of their differences, leading to a strong sense of “them” and “us”. On the other hand, they become aware of the existence of other Kurds from different regions of the country. This closeness in language and life conditions leads them to perceive themselves as collectives, some developing a “minority consciousness.” (Ayata, 1997: 63) The economic deprivations of Kurdish people in the urban context as a consequence of the forced migration constitute another source that strengthens the identity definitions through class awareness. Arising anti-Kurdish sentiment in public perception, sow the seeds of conflict in mainly urban context, when combined with the restrictions of state on making the Kurdish ethnic identity explicit in public space (Ayata, 1997: 64).

Third axis of identity politics, which constitutes the main interest for the thesis, is closely related to the *Sünnification* of state via the policies of military regime and the governments succeeding it. *Alevi*s as the most densely represented sect in Turkey after *Sünni*s have felt themselves threatened by this process. The close encounters between *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s in the urban context, which took a conflict-ridden dimension with the struggles between leftist and rightist militants in the 1970s have entered into a new phase after the 1980s. The main strategy of state in privileging *Sünni* interpretation of Islam has been Ministry of Education’s granting secondary education privileges to religious schools. As stated by Ayata (1997: 69), the number of mosques and religious personnel multiplied and the State Directorate of Religious Affairs became an influential body employing almost 90,000 civil servants. Building mosques even in *Alevi* villages, the opening up of Quran courses and making compulsory religious courses in *Sünni* content in high

schools can be counted among these strategies emphasizing *Sünni* interpretation of Islam over *Alevi*. Religiosity among mainly Sünni people increased parallel to the institutionalized religion. The spread of tariqat organizations and informal religious gatherings mainly among women particularly in low-income settlements have become widespread with the supporting policies of the strategical realm.

The structural transformation in the municipal system regarding identity politics led to the shift of populism from national to local political context (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 166). In this context, strategy's way of dealing with clashing identities at the local level has had certain impacts on the nature of social encounters between different sectarian groups. Coalition governments have defined the period between 1991 and 2002. "The sovereignty of state imposition around the axis of the rising Kurdish question and Pan-Islamism and the sovereignty of market mechanisms around the issues of stability measures and structural adjustment programs were the two most important phenomenon of the time" (Yaşlı, 2004: 43). The victory of Welfare Party (*RP*), conservative Islamist party, in 1994 municipal elections in the largest of cities of Turkey has weakened *Alevi* claims in social spatialization of low-income settlements as a consequence of the display of favoritism. The Justice and Development Party (*AKP*), which came to power alone in the 2002 national election constructed its election strategy on populist criticism of neoliberal strategy and artificially constructed identity politics mainly with regard to Kurdish issue. Advocates of change who formed an opposition to the old ways of governing within the former Islamist Virtue Party,

the successor of the Welfare Party¹⁹ founded *AKP*. It took 35% of the votes in the elections and gained the capacity to change even the constitution owing to its overwhelming majority in the National Assembly (Yaşlı 2004: 39). The success of *AKP* “was considered by many to be a consequence of the rhetoric appropriated by the party in relation to the peripheral settlements.” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 97). In addition to the populist image making, party’s harsh criticism of free market thinking and its stress on social justice strengthened their base to a large extent.

However, the upcoming political strategies of *AKP* have reflected serious contrasts to their election discourse of social justice and poverty in recent years like the previous governments in Turkey. “Particularly their ambition to integrate the country with the world economy and liberalize the economy, including the opening up of urban land to market mechanisms and the operation of global and national private market mechanisms seems remarkable.” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 98) As stated by Keyder (2005: 130), formerly populist politicians now mainly refer to market-mediated demands rather than the potential constituency of newcomer migrants. In that respect, they have shifted their allegiances from populist developmentalism to neighborhood upgrading under capitalist logic according to the author. The display of neoliberal policies and the neglect of welfare and poverty policies in the late party program of *AKP* have devastating effects mainly for *Alevi*s and latecomer migrants mainly Kurd in ethnic origin as the most disadvantaged two groups of the 1990s. Until the 1980s, with the rising tide of social democracy in politics, *Alevi*s became a politically significant group due to

¹⁹ Welfare Party was banned from active politics by the decision of Constitutional Court in 1998 with claim of becoming the centre of activities contrary to the principles of secularism.

their inclination towards leftist politics (Ayata, 1997: 67). However, as a consequence of the developments mentioned above, *Alevi*'s determining agency in local politics has declined to a large extent. The sectarian identities have been revitalized and repoliticized with reference to their religious content due to these processes. It is worth to mention that *Alevism* has reconstructed its identity by the initiatives of *Alevi* organizations and intellectuals in spite of the fact that they might not agree on a uniform representation of *Alevism* against strong *Sünni* domination. As will be made explicit in the empirical chapters, the competition between sectarian and *hemşehri* groups has become more embedded in the social spatialization process during this period due to the increasing reciprocity between strategical and tactical realms.

2.4.3 “Varoş” Replacing “Gecekondü”: Representing Low-Income Settlements as “Illegal”

Beginning by the 1980s, due to the political and economic context mentioned above, the social and spatial distance between low-income settlements and upper-middle and upper class residential areas has further extended. In congruence with the irreconcilable social distance between these two groups, “urban elite” perspective seems to be shaped by a stronger threat perception about low-income settlements. One of the important material reasons of such a negative approach towards low-income settlements is the economic and social polarization and its reflection in the landscape of cities as a serious spatial segregation. “New enclaves

for the wealthier sections of the society emerge in the valuable periphery of the cities, while the urban poor reside in topographically the most unsuitable places for settlement.” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 91) The periphery of the cities, which once attracted little attention from the high-income classes, has become valuable estate as a consequence of the fact that suburban, socially hygienic life has become trendy in the 1990s. That development has brought the two socially most dissociated groups together as the main interest groups of the peripheral land. The upper economic classes used their political and economic influence while the low-income groups have transformed their spaces and appropriate new lands in the valuable periphery through mafia like organizations (Şenyapılı, 1998: 311). In some cases, the physical distance between these groups becomes minimized, which increases the degree of uneasiness on both sides. Inevitably, a new social and legal imaginary that has been internalized by politicians and residents alike’ has emerged in these years (Keyder, 2005: 130). “Hitherto seen as poor people without resources to find adequate shelters, the migrants are now regarded as invaders of public property and beneficiaries of unfair privilege” (Keyder, 2005: 130). This may be considered as one of the important reasons behind the appearance of discriminatory jargon in public debates about illegal settlements particularly after the 1980s showing *gecekondu* settlers as undeserving profiteers of the informal estate system as a consequence of changing construction processes and relations in illegal settlements. This jargon has gained a new form in the 1990s with the widespread usage of the term *varoş* in place of *gecekondu*. *Varoş* as a concept has a stronger emphasis on culturally pejorative, illegal, criminal or underground aspects of these settlements when compared to the concept *gecekondu*. The negative public perception about peripheral settlements that have been reshaped

around the new term *varoş* and the novel usage of *gecekondu* loaded with new meanings have a strong homogenizing effect. They dissolve all the differences between old classical *gecekondu* settlements that have been legalized to a large extent and the new illegal neighborhoods emerged in the largest cities of Turkey after the 1980s. Therefore, *varoş* and the representations identified with the term that mainly define culturally inferior and criminal lifestyles with reference to the newly emerging illegal settlements have started to define all low-income settlements including the already legalized classical *gecekondu* districts. The representations on *gecekondu* and *varoş* point out the illegality of peripheral neighborhoods in a number of ways in public debate.

First and foremost, peripheral settlements are portrayed as illegal primarily referring to the illegal network of their construction including illegal actors like land mafia and speculators. The second source of illegality defined discursively has references to the tension-laden encounters between different ethnic and sectarian groups in low-income settlements. In the third sense, there emerged a portrayal of illegality mainly with reference to the criminal nature of these places as sheltering poor people.

The illegality in the first sense is related to the processes of the construction of peripheral settlements. In this realm, public discussions give references mainly to the concept *gecekondu* rather than *varoş* in defining low-income settlements. *Gecekondu* is mainly identified with illegal construction, its problems and demolition incidents. Some stories implicitly make allusion to represent *gecekondu*

settlers as undeserving beneficiaries of urban land and at the same time aggressive actors in demolition incidents (Hürriyet [İstanbul daily]: 1 August 2002). It is considered as the space providing illegal rent for a network of illegal actors and its inhabitants. It is interesting to note that in parallel to the policy changes on part of *AKP*, their approach and acts regarding low-income settlements have also reflected a certain transformation from rhetoric of social justice and social deprivation to a discourse almost hostile towards illegal housing and settlement (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 98). The classical elitist approach to *gecekondu* settlements, giving references to the importance of migration control to large cities or to *gecekondu* development as an important impediment to civilization seem to be appropriated by Erdoğan in a number of public speeches (Sabah, 1 November 2003; Zaman [İstanbul daily, Islamic in orientation], 27 September 2005). He refers to uncontrolled rural-to-urban migration as presenting a serious security threat to the order of the cities, and for that reason he envisioned *visa* (*nakil il-muhaberi*) application during emigration to large cities as essential. Paradoxically, this approach change has gone together with intense media interest in Erdoğan and his family's visits to poor families in *gecekondu* neighborhoods, particularly during Ramadan (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 99). This perception change on part of the party has a strong connection with their policies regarding EU integration as well as with the neoliberal urban policies they put into operation. In spite of the breakdown of the alliance between populist policies of governments and *gecekondu* due to the nature of new populism²⁰, middle class spectacles still perceive *gecekondu* as the main beneficiaries of the rent of urban land (Demirtaş

²⁰ New populism due to its compromise with global and national capitalists regarding urban land prefers to break an important part of its alliance with *gecekondu* settlers, since the politicians no longer want to offer state land and services to them.

and Şen, 2007: 99). However, as mentioned above, illegal construction is severely criticized by the government nowadays and demolition decisions are carried out with force despite the serious protests and resistance of informal settlers.

The illegality in the second sense is related to the potential of low-income settlements to create a tension between different ethnic and sectarian groups having close encounters. Due to the dense settlement patterns and the ineffectiveness of old migration and settlement processes, the migrants most of the time cannot find chances to settle with their fellow country people, as in the case of classical *gecekondu* settlements up until the late 1970s (Tok, 1999: 83). Identity politics had also contributed to public approach of the conflict-ridden encounters in these settlements. Particularly in the newly emerged illegal settlements, extensive identities, in other words, ethnic and sectarian identities carry greater importance than classical identity formations around small *hemşehri* communities (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-91). Such existence of close encounters between these identities seems to contribute to the claims about the illegitimacy of these places. The usage of *varoş* is mainly encountered in such a context signifying the socially isolated and closed communities and their potential threat to peace and national unity. Particularly, Gazi neighbourhood affair and the incidents that took place on Workers' Day, May 1, 1996 triggered the anxiety of "urbanites". Gazi neighborhood, a low-income unplanned settlement of İstanbul, was held to have a population of 100,000 when it appeared at the forefront of public debate on 12 March 1995. Most of the neighborhood's settlers had migrated from southeastern Anatolia and they were *Alevi* and *Kurd* in origin (Şahin, 2000: 61). A small group of people whose identities were not determined attacked four coffee houses mainly

used by *Alevi*s and a *Cemevi* with machine guns and killed some people there. As a result, *Alevi*s living in the neighborhood, together with other *Alevi*s and leftist groups from different regions of Turkey and İstanbul, while protesting the event, also protested the indifferent attitude of the police forces and fought with police. These struggles turned into serious fights between the groups. The harsh response of police forces in repressing the protests contributed to the warlike nature of the event. The event paved the way for a renewed public perception of *gecekondu* settlements. The Gazi affair was seen in newspapers predominantly as the explosion (boom) of *gecekondu* (Hürriyet: 15 March 1995; Sabah: 19 March 1995). Although, essays about the affair appeared to avoid using provocative remarks, they implicitly identified the neighborhood with violent events by referring to the inherent qualities of *gecekondu*. The history, social, cultural and economic structure of the neighborhood was defined as carrying the potential for such conflict, crime and violence anyway.

The second event that triggered the perception of peripheral districts as inhabiting tension-laden relations took place on May 1, 1996. Thousands of workers from *gecekondu* neighborhoods alongside with many leftist organizations and militants of some illegal organizations initiated a march to Kadıköy, an important middle class district in İstanbul, in order to celebrate Workers' Day. However, the celebrations turned into a struggle between demonstrators and police forces towards the end of the meeting. Some of the demonstrators attacked the police, nearby shops, and banks located on both sides of the road. After these two events *varoş* has been used more often in public discourse. The news and editorials

on political conflicts and social tension in peripheral spaces often make use of *varoş* rather than *gecekondü*.

The third source of illegality depends on the poor living conditions in the newly emerged low-income settlements and their potential for criminal acts out of poverty. Crime is often discussed with reference to *varoş* youths who are portrayed as having a tendency for criminal acts since they are the ones who are affected most from under-consumption in the city (Zaman: 16 February 2003). The increasing rate of crime in large cities is explained almost always with reference to the numerical dominance of peripheral settlers and the dangers associated with that condition (see the editorial of Erol Katırcıoğlu, Radikal: 24 April 2004). The commonly used verb with *varoş* in public debate in the 2000s is “invasion”, referring to invasion of both city spaces and culture. *Gecekondü* retains its meaning mainly as a spatial signifier of peripheral life. Rather than defining particularly the peripheral space, *varoş* started to be used to refer to a way of life, a culture predominantly carrying inferior and negative qualities in contrast to high urban culture. A way of life associated mainly with crime, violence, undesirable tastes and unjust earnings have dominated the definition of *varoş* in the 2000s (Hürriyet: 31 July 2002). Its strong cultural connotation makes the usage of the term vaguer in identifying all inferior aspects in the definition of popular culture with the concept. The identification of the term with a particular way of life or certain tastes, and therefore its transmission to cultural realm mostly brings about the emergence of a representation capturing racist overtones. Etöz (2000: 51) points out the observable fact that *varoşlu* have been labeled as “black Turks” vis-à-vis “white Turks” in news and editorials beginning from the late 1990s. This discursive division

between “black” and “white Turks” though encapsulating ethnic meanings and indicating a distinction between Kurdish²¹ and Turkish identities encompasses this distinction by classifying people if they appropriate urban traits and way of life or not. Therefore the racist overtones in the dominant discourse, besides referring to an ethnic distinction, introduce a novel form of urban racism by supposing a distinction between “urbanites” and “*varoşlu*”. It is interesting to note that early comer migrants of *gecekondu* settlements perceive the latecomer poor population in a somewhat similar manner.

2.5 Conclusion

As stated earlier representation of *gecekondu* space over time constitutes the subject matter of this chapter. The “representation of *gecekondu* space” within a Lefebvrian understanding has never been a homogenous domain. The actors who have taken active role in representing *gecekondu* space through the acts of planning, developing policies, ordering and defining *gecekondu*, had accepted different subject positions such as modernists, populists, urban elitists, etc. Subject positions of representative actors change in relation to their interests vis-à-vis the shifting social and economic context of the country. These various attempts of representing the “other” of the modernist urbanization had been realized also in

²¹ Therefore it mainly refers to the rural-to-urban migrants from the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey

accordance with the changing socio-spatial context of *gecekondu* settlements over time.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the strategical approach of the politicians, state bureaucrats, urban planners and academics in dealing with *gecekondu* space, and tactical acts of migrants exhibit an intertwined character. The dialectical interaction between the “representations of space” (conceived space) and the “representational space” (lived space) in Lefebvrian sense had led to the emergence of certain “spatial practices” as the third component of spatial triad. In other words, the dialectical interaction between representing *gecekondu* space and representational *gecekondu* space as lived through the acts and conceptualizations of *gecekondu* in everyday life have led to the emergence of certain spatial practices which have not been always in conjunction with the suppositions and estimates of strategical realm.

What further complicates the picture is the continuous interaction between the various actors in opposing realms. It is necessary to remind that these actors have different subject and power positions in each realm of the spatial triad. Lefebvre and De Certeau overemphasize the determining capacity and power of strategical realm in producing a modernist space in comparison to the capabilities of tactical realm. Furthermore, Lefebvre and De Certeau mainly attribute homogeneity to these two realms. However, as this chapter discusses in detail, the growing experiential and political power of migrants in the city context had increased the reciprocity between strategical and tactical realms. This reciprocity

had further fragmented the strategical realm, which had never presented a totally homogenous picture even in the early Republican period. The strategical realm had been fragmented around different interests and subject positions in relation to the changing socio-spatial composition of *gecekondu* space.

In the first period of *gecekondu* history, the political actors, Republican bureaucrats, journalists and academics had internalized quasi-uniform discourse about *gecekondu* space that was shaped around the modernist and elitist perception of the time. Different from the first period in the second period, the political actors had internalized a more hesitant subject position with regard to *gecekondu* around populist concerns. In that period, *gecekondu* settlements had become more visible and had rapidly proliferated in the periphery of the cities. Moreover, migrants had gained capacity and knowledge to employ the loopholes of the strategical realm by means of favoritism that had been dominating Turkish politics. The academic approach during that period began to signify the system related causes of *gecekondu* growth but still they emphasized the integration problem of *gecekondu* as the most important urban problem within a modernist perspective. As for the third period, with the increasing visibility of ethnic, sectarian and *hemşehri* heterogeneity in low-income settlements and the increasing effect of identity politics, the threat perception around illegal aspects of *gecekondu* space dominates the public discourse. The middle class spectacles represent *gecekondu* space as an illegal space in terms of its inhabiting conflict-ridden ethnic encounters, poverty and capitalist, mafia-like construction processes. In the post-1980 period, however, academic approach to low-income settlements, has abandoned its modernist and elitist conceptual schema to a large extent. Recently,

in-depth ethnographic methods have gained validity in understanding the dynamics of low-income settlements. Political actors' approach to low-income settlements had taken more hesitant forms with their squeeze between the demands of global capital, urban middle and upper middle class interests and low-income settlements.

CHAPTER 3

THE EMERGENCE OF MAMAK *GECEKONDU* REGION IN ANKARA, THE HEART OF A WESTERNIZATION PROJECT

3.1 An Overview of Ankara's Urban History

Republican Regime's attempt of constructing a modern capital in Ankara after the independence war is depicted often in the writings of many historians as an endeavor to build totally a new and modern space from nothing. Pre-Republican Ankara is portrayed as a small town carrying the traces of Independence War in these writings. Early urban experiences of the town are underestimated with a prominence given to its construction as a Western and modern urban space by the Republican Regime. However, according to archeological evidence, the history of this small town dates back to 3000 B.C., even before the Hittites. Its

acknowledgement as an urban settlement dates back to as early as Phrygian civilization (Balcioğlu, 1993: 62).

Under the Roman and Byzantine rules, Ankara employed a predominant position due to its critical geographical location. Particularly, under the Byzantine rule, the city was given utmost importance in relation to its location on one of the most important long-distance interregional trade routes connecting Byzantium later on Constantinople to the Eastern frontiers (Balcioğlu, 1993: 63). Under the Seljuk rule, the city occupied a secondary importance. However, *Ahilik* system, a guild organization of the time, which was developed as a result of the need to unite all the craftsmen and artisans of Turkic communities migrating from Central Asia to Anatolia, was developed mainly in Ankara (Balcioğlu, 1993: 63). This increased the commercial importance of the city, and also led to the development of the social organization in the city contributing to its urban characteristics.

Ankara had retained its importance as a trade and production center during the Ottoman rule as specialized in woolen fabrics and leather production. Particularly, in the first quarter of the 20th century, Ankara became an important center for the production of raw and semi-finished materials like many other Anatolian cities (Balcioğlu, 1993: 65). Angora wool was the most important of these products that ascribed a privileged economic status to the city. This process had modernized local production forms and enriched certain classes of non-Muslim origin like Greeks, Armenians and Jews. At the beginning of the 20th century the class structure of Ankara was composed of these non-Muslim merchant groups,

government officials, impoverished craftsmen and petty merchants. With the loss of the monopoly of the Angora wool, the changing context of the European economy and the shifting status of Ankara in it, the lively economic atmosphere of the town started to fade a way particularly in the last decades of the Ottoman era (Çağlar, 2001: 38). “It became a small Ottoman town severely damaged by the fire of 1915” (Çağlar, 2001: 38). Towards the end of War of Independence, as was the case in many other towns of Anatolia, non-Muslim merchant population started to leave the country and this led to the gradual transition of commercial activities to Turkish population.

Soon after the War of Independence, both because of the economic consequences of the war and the structural changes in the economic life of the city due this emigration, Ankara had experienced its most stagnant period in economic and social terms. The Turkish population of the city mainly dealt with rural activities (agriculture and livestock) at the time and the social organization of the city had lost its sophisticated nature in comparison to previous periods.

To give a brief account of the pre-Republican history of the city seems important to me for one important reason. The social and economic context of the city was largely undermined within the framework of the Republican Regime’s planning experience as if it was an empty space devoid of already existing “urban traits” and relations. The new lifestyle and the physical space constructed accordingly were imposed upon the native population, which led to their alienation to a large extent. This seems to be closely related to the inherent qualities of

modernist planning strategy of Republican Regime that inevitably brought about an irreconcilability between the realm of “representation of space” (perceived space) and “representational space” (lived space) in Lefebvrian sense. The social duality between “natives” and the “outsiders” in the early years of the construction of Ankara as a capital city reflected the intrinsic limits of the planning activity that was founded upon this irreconcilability between two realms of the space. Moreover, the social duality led to a split in the “social” and “physical” space of the city and the social spatialization following the initial planning years witnessed a process of contesting spaces.

3.2. The Historical Reasons behind the Strategy of Constructing a “Modern” Space in Ankara

The construction of the new capital city from a 20,000 populated small Anatolian town includes many contradictory processes. The main reason behind the decision of moving the capital city from İstanbul to Ankara can be considered as the young nation’s search for a new national identity outside İstanbul, the symbolic and the political center of Ottoman Empire. Similar to the history of Ankara, the planning experiences in capital cities like Canberra, Brasilia or Islamabad, served the purpose of accelerating the process of nation building by constructing a new physical environment that reflects the new life style of the nation (Tankut, 1990, 28). Particularly, when the historical and symbolic importance of İstanbul is taken into account, this decision indicates a radical break from the past. Republican Regime’s objective of constructing a modern capital and developing the region

may also emerge from a need to construct an alternative to İstanbul city economically and symbolically.

Ankara with its central position in Anatolia and its proximity to other Anatolian towns that had been long neglected by the semi-colonial economic and political policies of Ottoman state was accepted by Republican Regime as carrying the potential for better embracing the country (Altaban, 1998: 42). Rather than paving the way to the intensification of inter-regional communication and the development of trade including all Anatolian towns, the economic policies of the time improved communication between İstanbul and European countries mostly. This triggered the uneven regional development in favor of İstanbul and weakened the economic and communicative ties between İstanbul and other Anatolian towns. Therefore Ankara's favorable geopolitical position during the War of Independence as the last stop on the railway that had sustained transportation and communication between İstanbul and Anatolia since 1892, constituted another reason for its selection as the capital city of the young Republic (Erim, 1993: 76).

Moreover, considering the importance young Republican Regime had given to the ideal of secularism, Ankara had to be constructed as a strong secular alternative to İstanbul, which used to symbolize the religious importance of the Caliphate.

The construction of Ankara as a modernist practice and ideal integrates two different attitudes towards the Western world. As mentioned above, it is important

to construct a capital city and a civilized model of life for the young nation far away from İstanbul, which was associated at the time with Sultanate regime and its dependencies on Western imperialist powers. At the same time, as a nation that turned its face to the western civilization, this new city needed the recognition from the Western civilized world as the center of the new nation, which was in the process of finding its place in the modern world.

Yet, the political reservations of European states in recognizing Ankara in place of İstanbul finds its expression in their hesitancy of moving their embassies to this “desperate” and “primitive” eastern town. It is easy to find the expression of this hesitancy in the memories of the early visitors to Ankara. Foreign visitors and officials described life conditions in Ankara as hard and unbearable. D.V. Mikusch, a foreign official, explained the alienating aspects of life for the foreigners in Ankara as follows: “life dozes in a slowness that is peculiar to Eastern people in Ankara” (Evren, 1998: 49). However, for the students coming from the other towns of Anatolia to Ankara for education, the town symbolized civilization with its small restaurants developed from traditional cook places, schools built from hewn stones and big streets with dirt and mud (Evren, 1998: 44). Falih Rıfkı Atay, a bureaucrat of the young Republic, defined Ankara as a symbol for the whole country outside the ramparts of İstanbul.

The European states led by England, campaigned against the idea of recognizing Ankara as the capital city (see Şimşir, 1988: 266, 267). In relation to that, another strong rationale emerged from the practical need of satisfying the

needs of foreign bureaucrats by constructing a modern infrastructure in the city on part of the Republican Regime besides the ideal of constructing a modern life style for the nation. This whole project can be summed up as an attempt to westernize the city against and for the Western world.

There were four main social groups in Ankara in the early 1920s. Besides the “natives” of the city, there were three major groups namely, the students and migrants coming from other small Anatolian towns, the foreign officials, and Turkish bureaucrats. There was an emergent need of accommodation for these three groups. Foreign officials most of the time visited Ankara temporarily and returned to their countries after they had finished their work. In that sense, the first modern buildings of Ankara were the service providers like hotels and restaurants (see Evren, 1998). These modern buildings also provided a space for the western style of urban entertainment that the Republican Regime imposed as the life style of the new nation. As an example, Ankara Palas, the first hotel of the city hosted many Western style dance parties given by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reflecting the new life style of the nation. As stated by Baydar (1997: 197), the interior space of Ankara Palas was produced by mechanisms of control, the gaze of those who are denied entry, and the power of these outsiders’ imagination. “For the privileged inhabitants of Ankara, dressed elegantly in accordance with the fashion pages of local newspapers that brought the latest news from Paris, and having adopted appropriate codes of behavior based on how-to books on “modern manners”, ballroom dancing was part of a performance that they rehearsed only ambivalently” (Baydar, 1997: 198). At the opening night of the Ankara Palas, a ball was organized. Karaosmanoğlu, in his novel “Ankara” portrays the social and cultural

distance between the high state officials and the local population who constitutes the fourth social group in Ankara at that time by referring to this reception:

In their European style dresses and accessories, the guests arrive. The luxurious cars are all parked in front of the hotel. The native population stares at the ball crowd with wonder, astonishment and disgrace having very little idea of what is going on inside the hotel (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 116,117).

The social distance and life style differences between the natives of Ankara and the newcomers to the city from the beginning decreased the possibilities of close social encounters. In cases where the natives and newcomers needed to communicate with each other the differences in their dialects might cause uneasiness. As stated by Evren (1998: 67) referring to the anecdotes of Falih Rıfkı Atay, the local people perceived the newcomers to the city as strangers and did not want to talk to them. Even if they had to talk, they never understood each other because of the differences in the dialect.

Turkish bureaucrats in Ankara city had their mission to carry on the Western life style to the possible extent as the main disciples of the new regime and its modernist framework (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 46). However, adapting to the modern daily habits in the context of male-female relations, entertainment, and consumption was very difficult even for the state officials and bureaucrats due to social and economic reasons. Thus, it is understandable that these new habits were accepted as ridiculous and intolerable by natives of Ankara who were shaped by

the qualities of Anatolian culture and the prohibitions of Islam. Even witnessing these changes was unbearable for some of the natives of the city (Şenol-Cantek, 2003).

The social and cultural distance between the local people and “Western strangers” and the neglect of city’s social context by modernist planning strategy of Republican Regime constituted at the same time its main weaknesses. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the “production of space” in Lefebvrian formulation emphasizes the power and capacity of the strategical realm to produce a totalizing space dominating all other spaces. The spontaneous nature of “other spaces” or the “daily urban reality” is ascribed limited power to divert urban space in Lefebvrian spatial triad. In the cities like Ankara, which was planned as to be the modernist space of developing nations, the spontaneous spaces divert and colonize the strategical modernist space more in comparison to western cities. This is due to the total neglect and assimilation of the “lived space” by the agents of the “conceived space” in such planned cities of developing nations. The causes of such neglecting will be discussed in detail below. It is important to note that this kind of neglect brings about paradoxically certain impediments for the ability of strategical agency to produce a totalizing space.

3.3 The Weaknesses of the Planning Strategy

Strategical planning can be considered as the main component of any modernization ideal and practice. Ankara had become a platform for a significant planning activity from the 1920s to the 1940s. After the initial construction of some hotels, restaurants and other emergent service providing buildings that are considered as the representatives of the First National Architectural Period, a large-scale planning activity set in motion (Evren, 174). The products of this early period clearly reflect the ideal of Republican regime to reach a synthesis between East and West. The planning experiences of the European cities constituted the main model for the planning of Ankara in the coming decade. A competition was held in 1928 among a small number of architects and Herman Jansen was selected as the creator and carrier of the construction activity. His plan was set in motion legally in 1932. The plan included everything from the estimation of city's population growth in 20 years time to the construction of every neighborhood that were organized separately for different social groups in society like high and middle ranked bureaucrats, workers, university teachers and students. Jansen's preliminary plan included basic principles as mentioned below:

He proposed the citadel as the center of the city, surrounded with new districts. The traditional structure of the city would be renovated day by day with the connection of the new parts using the existing road patterns, and extending these roads to the new structure of the city. At the southern part of the city, Jansen proposed a governmental district in "Yenişehir" ["New city" was the planned city that would be constructed on the empty lands circulating the "old city"] newly constructed part of the city, consisting of grand plazas

and monumental buildings connected to the Taşhan square [the center of the “old” or existing city] and the traditional fabric with a wide axis. He proposed low-density residential districts with houses of one or two stories placed in gardens in “Yenişehir” (Çağlar, 2001: 54)

The structural and juridical arrangements were made in order to allocate a large amount of state financial resources to the service of this construction and to centralize the decision making process. During this period, the main institution assembling the financial and political capacity to prepare and employ the plan is Ankara Construction Directorship (Bademli, 1987: 107). The application of the plan had a highly centralized administrative structure.

The premises of the plan particularly in relation to the spatial development of the city on the main axis between two centers of Ankara namely Ulus and Kızılay had been realized to a large extent. Today, still these two centers constitute the main connection axis of the city. However, some neighborhoods that were present in the actual plan could not be constructed. Furthermore, the planners could not control the unintended growth and construction held outside the planned boundaries of the city. There were many reasons for the partial realization of the plan.

The population growth and the rate of migration were high above the estimation of the planners. They could not construct worker and university neighborhoods that were in the original plan since rural-to-urban migrants had built

their *gecekondus* on the lands that were legally expropriated by the state for the construction of these neighborhoods (Yavuz, 1952: 54). The growth of Ankara, the capital city, a city of attraction due to the concentration of bureaucratic posts and many vacant positions, could not be well envisioned by the planners. At the beginning of the 1920s Ankara's population was estimated to be 20,000 people. This number reached to 75,000 in 1927 and 290,000 in 1950. The development rate of Ankara surpassed the ratios in İstanbul and İzmir during the first decades of the Republican Regime (Atalan, 1998: 47). Between the years 1927 and 1950 the populations of İstanbul and Ankara had increased up to 42% and 48% respectively. For the migrants who came to the city particularly with no jobs or a job prospects, there was little chance of owning or renting a house in the legal districts of the city. The real estate prices and rents were high during those years even for the middle ranked state officials. Beginning from the early periods of planning activity this unforeseen development led to the emergence of illegal settlement areas.

These settlements were perceived as temporary structures by state officials, which met the accommodation needs of the migrants of that period as mentioned in the previous chapter. In that sense, they were regarded as providing a more practical solution to the housing problem of the migrants in large cities of Turkey. The politicians were unwilling to demolish these neighborhoods for that reason (Tankut, 1990: 108).

Land speculation constituted the main reason behind tremendous value increases in land and housing prices. It constituted the second main impediment for

the plan. During the period between the late 1920s and 1940s the natives of Ankara and the state officials who had owned some lands benefited from the speculative nature of the real estate market to the extent that their economic power, experience and relations permitted them (Yavuz, 1952: 63). The native population of Ankara could not strategically evaluate the benefits of the land speculation or projected the future value of their lands well most of the time. An anecdote told by Erim (1993: 76), a witness of the period, demonstrates how ignorant and naïve the native population of Ankara were in the decision making process about their lands. A local man who had a large plot of land on today's Atatürk Boulevard, one of the symbols of the Republican's Regime's new Ankara, did not want to sell his land to another native and sold it to an "outsider". He explained his reluctance to sell this plot of land to his native friend in the following manner:

“Look, my father cultivated that field, and after him I cultivated it and you know very well that it hasn't done any good to us, so you should feel yourself lucky. You are a local man. Why should I sell this useless plot of land to you?” which became gold, of course, in terms of land speculation in a few years time (Erim, 1993: 76).

Land speculation can also be accepted as the underlying cause of the housing shortage that had been felt mainly during the late 1930s and early 1940s. The price of land with construction permits boosted during those years, which led to the slowing down of construction activities in general. This also limited constructors' ability in utilizing the empty and available lands for construction that constituted three fourths of the land with permit (Atalan, 1998: 48). Erim's (son of a bureaucrat) childhood memories reflected the consequences of housing shortage in the following manner:

The rents were very high and landlords wanted lump cash payment before moving to the houses. It was like an auction... The one who offered the highest price as lump payment rented the house (Erim, 1993: 77).

Due to that, sharing houses with another family has been an often-encountered fact for civil servants even for the ones occupying important positions. The reaction against Jansen plan and the unwillingness of the bureaucrats to cooperate with planners can be counted as another reason behind the failure of the plan. The nationalist upsurge among both bureaucrats and planners of the time constituted the basis of the reactions against Jansen and his team. This was an attack against the dominance and delegated power of western planners in urban planning. Jansen had been criticized harshly particularly after the 1929 economic depression on financial grounds. The criticism was due to a general reaction against the allocation of nation's resources to foreign planners. Most parliamentarians emphasized the importance of using local human and material resources. Jansen's neglect of the lower- class neighborhoods of Ankara, namely the old city lacking basic infrastructure, had constituted the main point of criticism in the parliament (see Tankut, 1990: 68). The preliminary plan of Jansen whose basic principles are mentioned above differed at some important points from his master plan. In the preliminary plan he had proposed the reconciliation of the old and new parts of the city however; in the master plan he decided a sharp separation of the old and new sections of the city (Çağlar, 2001: 97). This sharp distinction in physical space brought a fragmentation in social spaces of the local people and outsiders symbolizing the traditional and modern face of the city respectively. Yet, it is also worth to mention the role of the parliamentarians on this significant

change of the plan. Young Republic and its parliamentarians agreed to leave the old city outside the scope of the plan because of the high land values there in the initial periods of the planning.

Starting from the time Jansen's plan was accepted, the local or national efforts aiming to change the plan for different purposes have also emerged. Some high-ranking bureaucrats of young Republican Regime benefited most from the speculative inclinations as mentioned above. Particularly, after 1935, these speculative practices and decisions had brought about organized and unorganized developments that were totally out of plan's context. Bahçelievler, Beşevler and Çankaya neighborhoods that are important middle and upper-middle class districts of today's Ankara were constructed as a result of such a process (Bademli, 1987: 107). Jansen was criticized also by the national architectures in the late 1930's for constructing houses and neighborhoods that were not suitable for Turkish life style. As a consequence of the criticisms and the difficulties in the application of the plan, Jansen was removed from the responsibility of implementing the plan in 1938. He also mentioned his dissatisfaction with the unintended developments out of the context of his plan in Ankara at that time before his removal from office by stating his wish that he wanted his signature to be removed from the plan.

To sum up, the main impediments behind the planning activity of Ankara can be categorized into two groups. The limitations intrinsic to any social engineering or modernization project constitute the first group of impediments. The modernization ideals and practices, as was the case in the construction of "modern" Ankara, did not take into account the social and spatial context in which the model

was conceived. To represent a modern space, the strategical realm needs to define its other. Most of the time, the “old” and “traditional” social and spatial structures of old Ankara were considered within the realm of this definition of “other” from a modernist perspective. In order for a modernization discourse to become eternal and powerful this othering process needed to be kept alive. As pointed out by Helvacıoğlu (2002: 138), unlike the modernization premises dominating 1960s public discourse, the conceptual difficulty to call Ankara as a modern city was not a consequence of the presence of “backward” spaces in the form *gecekondu* settlements in it, but rather it was due to the impossibility of realizing a hypermodern imagination. In that sense, pre-Republican social and spatial context of Ankara had been hardly given any reference through planning process. The social and cultural duality in the city as well as the ongoing power of the modernization ideology on urban policy making contributed further to problems of the planning in the following decades. As stated by Balcıoğlu (1993: 78), at one stage during Nevzat Tandoğan’s administration, in order to take a stroll on Atatürk Boulevard, a man had to wear a tie, and if he did not have one, he was not allowed to walk on the Boulevard. To create a new life style via the imposed modernist space of Ankara might reach to such extremes.

As mentioned above, the influence of land speculation, high rate of migration and reactions towards planning activities affected the course of events. The spontaneous social spatialization had most of the time preceded the plan. Therefore, the planning practices in most cases followed these unintended developments even at the very beginning of the highly centralized and powerful first planning period of the Republican Regime. As a consequence of these

developments, there appeared four “cities” in Ankara in time whose spatial characteristics and conditions of production differed significantly from each other (Bademli, 1993). First of these cities was the “old city” or the historical city that can be depicted as follows with reference to its structure in the 1920s:

The urban structure was mainly comprised of housing districts upon the hill where the citadel is placed, and adjacent residential and commercial districts surrounding the citadel. Residential districts comprised of an organic and compact layout with its dusty winding streets and simple mud-brick houses of one or two stories, which were mostly destroyed by the fire in 1915. The administrative center of Ankara was Taşhan Plaza located in the west end of the city, surrounded by wetlands on the West and connected to the station building in its south-west with the station avenue. Around the plaza there existed *Darül-Muallimin* (School of Teachers), the Building of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* [The building would be used as the National Assembly Building, after Atatürk gathered the Assembly in Ankara], *Millet Bahçesi* (People’s Garden), *Taşhan*, *Hükümet Binası* (House of Government), and the post office (Çağlar, 2001: 44).

Bademli calls “old Ankara” as the city that was neglected by the Republican Regime. Old Ankara had turned into the commercial center of peripheral settlements in the following years. Second city was Yenışehir, the new city, which had been constructed by the initiation of Republican Regime as the socio-spatial symbol of modern life style at the south of the old Ankara city in the 1930’s. This city among others displays most the Western urban structures and life style. In the late 1940s and early 1950s a third city that Bademli calls as the “instant city” surrounded both the old and the new city (Bademli, 1993: 69). This instant city was composed mainly of *gecekondu* settlements. In the 1950s and 1960s the destruction of old quarters in order to build new apartment houses created another Ankara, which was named by Bademli as the “re-worked Ankara” or the fourth city.

3.4 Spontaneous Social Spatialization Altering the Course and Implementation of Planning

The emergence of “instant” Ankara in Bademli’s words has played a key role in the transformation of public space and the planning activities in the years to come. In this part, I will examine two incidents of spontaneous spatialization that had serious impacts on Ankara’s public space by means of the development of peripheral settlements. First, I will elaborate on the spontaneous development of the routes of public transportation in Ankara. Second, I will examine the transforming meaning and functions attributed to two city centers of Ankara as a consequence of the unintended social spatialization.

In the 1920s, Ankara was mainly a city of pedestrians in accordance to its topography and its size (Tekeli, 1987: 65). With the rapid increase in population towards the end of the 1930s, the vineyard houses that were located quite far away from the city center and used on seasonal basis mainly by the families of bureaucrats were transformed into permanent neighborhoods. Transportation had become an important issue after that. The small entrepreneurs who gave transportation service with small buses called “*kaptı-kaçtı*” constituted the main agency of public transportation during those years (Tekeli, 1987: 65). The world economic depression had prevented the municipality from taking efficient measures regarding transportation until 1935. With the initiation of municipal bus services in the 1960s, the rate of private initiatives in public transportation was reduced to 35% (Tekeli, 1987: 65). However, in post Second World War years, the

share of municipality in public transportation facilities have experienced retrogression both due to the low production ratio of vehicles and spare parts in the world and the fire that led to the demise of public buses in Ankara (Tekeli, 1987: 67). Between 1950 and 1954, Turkey increased its import opportunities and this had enlivened both public and private transportation facilities. However, when we look at the history of transportation and the share of private initiatives in public transportation in general, it is easy to observe that they had played an essential role in Ankara's transportation. The main reason behind that can be put as the rapid population increase experienced particularly after the 1950s and the instant development of peripheral *gecekond* settlements as a consequence of that. The official public transportation services similar to the planning practices followed spontaneous social spatialization of the city. The municipal supply always remained insufficient.

The deficiencies of municipal services were supplemented by local private initiatives. With the rapid increase of population in Ankara, private minibuses had increased in number, which predominantly provided service to *gecekond* neighborhoods. The normal capacity of minibuses is 14 passengers; however they often take passengers on foot beyond their permitted capacity. The emergence of private entrepreneurs servicing to middle and upper middle class districts follows a similar pattern with the minibuses servicing to *gecekond* settlements. The cars named as “*dolmuş*” gave service to these middle class neighborhoods for years (Tekeli, 1987: 68). “*Dolmuş*” as a concept refers to the quality of the transportation service. These cars similar to “shared taxis” do not start giving service before they are fully occupied by the passengers. Therefore there are no standard time

schedules for their arrival and departure. *Dolmuşes* that gave services to middle class districts were different from minibuses of the time. They were normal cars unlike the minibuses that have the capacity of up to four passengers. In the 1970s the small entrepreneurs, with their *minibuses* and *dolmuşes* have predominated the scene of city transportation (Tekeli, 1987: 68). They seemed to be symbols of the spontaneous aspects of spatialization in the city. Today, *dolmuşes* as small cars no longer give service in Ankara. Rather minibuses today give services to all neighborhoods, whether middle class or low-income settlements. *Dolmuş* had been erased from the scene of public transportation from the early 1980s onwards. Minibuses as well as private buses affiliated with municipality in administrative terms and public municipal buses still retain their share and importance in public transportation. The emergence of private buses corresponds to the 1980s when the public transformation investments had experienced a second phase of stagnation, because of the economic stability programs. During the 1980s the composition of small entrepreneurs had changed and private public buses as compensating both minibuses and municipal buses had entered into the transportation sector as an important agent. Municipalities have controlled and supervised private buses. For that reason particularly in the early periods of their emergence, they had been prevented from giving service to the most profitable routes by the municipality (Tekeli, 1987: 69). However, in time they had taken a greater share from public transportation and have continued to give service until present. It is possible to observe that, with the neoliberal policies put into action in the 1980s, private initiatives have taken an essential part in public transportation. However, even from the 1950s onwards, private initiatives have fulfilled essential roles in public

transportation. Particularly, minibuses have constituted the main means of transportation between peripheral settlements and the central districts.

To tackle the transportation history seems to be crucial in one important respect. Particularly, in understanding the transformative capacity of *gecekondu* spaces on the formation of city space, the history of transportation provides important clues. The unintended and instant developments in the periphery of the city necessitated emergent provision of some services that could not be sustained both financially and planning-wise by the municipality. These local private initiatives that had emerged as a consequence of *gecekondu* formation had determined the shaping of city space later. Planners have taken primarily the already constructed minibus routes connecting peripheral and central districts into consideration while deciding on the official public transportation routes of the city (Tekeli, 1987: 70). These routes mainly extend from centers to peripheral settlements. The account of the shaping of the transportation routes exemplifies the impacts of the spontaneous social spatialization on the strategical realm via the spatial practices of the “lived space”. The private initiatives of transportation instantly developed as to give service to *gecekondu* settlements seem to constitute the primary reference for planning attempts in the coming period.

The transforming functions and meanings attributed to two city centers in Ankara, namely Ulus and Kızılay constituted the second realm in which spontaneous spatialization was effective. Ulus was the center of “old city” and also served as the only center in the early periods of the Republican Regime. Although there was an attempt of creating a new center in the Yenışehir district by the

Republican Regime, Ulus had continued to be the center of state bureaucracy and a critical component of city space providing recreational and shopping facilities for many years. However, with the production²² of Kızılay as the center of the new city and with the impact of *gecekondu* development in the peripheral lands that are closer to Ulus rather than Kızılay on the axis combining peripheral lands with these two centers, symbolic and economic space of Ulus went through a significant transformation. It had lost its attraction as a shopping center for middle and upper classes in time.

Beginning in the 1970s, Ulus started to be associated more with peripheral settlements rather than the middle class districts. Kızılay has served as the center of middle and upper middle classes until recently. Today, Kızılay also is subject to transformation and it starts to serve as the center for lower-middle classes and peripheral settlements like Ulus. In spite of the fact that Ulus has protected its status as a commercial district until present day, the nature of social spatialization changed in conformity with the introduction of new consumption patterns and customer profile by the 1970s. Although the economic profile of the region has changed significantly, the commercial activities have survived to concentrate more in Ulus than Kızılay. On the other hand, the bureaucratic posts constitute a greater share of working population in Kızılay due to the positioning of state buildings there in accordance with the premises of Jansen's plan (Akçura, 1971: 101, 109).

In the 1970s with the increasing utilization of Ulus by *gecekondu* settlers, a functional spatial duality emerged in the district. The small retail and wholesale

²² "Production" here denotes the constructed nature of Kızılay from nothing as a center of modern Ankara in Lefebvrian sense as mentioned in the first chapter.

trading in some parts of the region give service to all the groups in the city, while in other parts of Ulus, the supply is peculiar to *gecekondu* settlers' needs and tastes (Akçura, 1971: 121,122). Kızılay had reflected a more homogenous picture in that sense during the 1970s and 1980s. This emerges from the fact that mainly the middle and upper middle classes of Ankara had used Kızılay as their center (Akçura, 1971: 126). Activities and services peculiar to middle class life have dominated the scene of Kızılay during those years. According to statistics of the year 1969, the ratio of hairdresser shops servicing to women was 66.7% in Kızılay to 33.3% in Ulus; the ratio of associations was 65. 8% in Kızılay to 34.8% in Ulus; the ratio of sheep and goats trading was 0% in Kızılay to 100% in Ulus or the ratio of psychiatrists was 54.3% in Kızılay to 45.7% in Ulus (Akçura, 1971: 126).

In addition, the quality of the activities differs greatly in these two centers. For example, the associations of artisans, small merchants, and people coming from the same village were located in Ulus in congruence with the physical proximity of Ulus with low-income settlements. The associations that can be considered as more institutionalized and modern, such as Lawyers' Association, Women Associations, and Turk-German Friendship association, were located in Kızılay (Akçura, 1971: 127).

The impact of peripheral settlements on the transformation of Ulus was obvious in Ankara. The most important reason behind that was physical proximity of Ulus to most of the peripheral settlements as stated above and the railway connecting Mamak, one of the largest *gecekondu* districts and Ulus easily. Since the roads from the peripheral settlements intersect all in Ulus first and the way to

Kızılay is available only through Ulus, Ulus has transformed from the center of the Republican Regime's Ankara to the center of *gecekondu* settlements in time (Akçura, 1971: 92). The boulevards that were designed to distance the new city from the old city within the context of the “monumental narrative” as told by the Republican Regime, paradoxically functioned as “connections enabling the flow between” the centers of old city and new city, Ulus and Kızılay respectively (Baydar, 1997: 195). The presence of the boulevards enabling the flow between Ulus and Kızılay has constituted the main reason behind the recent shifts in the functions of Kızılay and its giving service to the inhabitants of peripheral settlements who become more mobile.

3.5 “Post-Planning” Planning Strategies in Ankara

The plan that became official in 1957 after Jansen's plan was called as Yücel-Uybadin plan associated with the names of its planners. The political context of urban planning had been transformed to a large extent in chorus with the application of this plan in Ankara. During those years, *DP* gave İstanbul priority in terms of urban development and therefore, investments were mainly shifted to İstanbul. Under the banner of a new planning, big boulevards were constructed and legal expropriations were realized particularly in İstanbul (Altaban, 1998:52).

Yücel-Uybadin's construction plan can be given as an important example to the planning tradition in Turkey that most of the time follows spontaneous social spatialization. Yücel-Uybadin plan's main practice and objective were to

restructure and order the unintended development and to prevent further *gecekondu* development particularly in topographically unsuitable areas (Altaban, 1987: 134). Within the framework of the plan, they foresaw the organization of some unintended residential areas including Mamak region and villages close to it like Üreğil and Kayaş (Altaban, 1987: 134).

Sharing the common fate with Jansen's plan, Yücel-Uybadin plan was unable to make appropriate estimation on demographic development and real estate and housing dynamics in Ankara. More than half of the population was living in the three-four kilometers wide peripheral zones circulating the city in the north and south directions mainly on the most sloppy and highest regions of the city where settlement was dangerous to a large extent at the time (Altaban, 1987: 134). In the period between the years 1956 and 1969, low-income families who were unable to find suitable places for themselves in the formal settlement areas of the city, settled illegally in sloppy districts like Balgat, Dikmen, Aşağı and Yukarı Öveçler, Abidinpaşa, Nato Highway, and Samsun Highway.

The plan could not take all these regions into its framework as a result of certain legal and practical limitations. The planners were constrained legally to realize planning only within the boundaries of municipality (Bademli, 1987: 107). That is the reason why they could not find a chance to do planning in many of the unofficial settlements outside the boundaries of municipality. Moreover, they could not plan new residential districts as Jansen intended; they rather concentrated on reforming the already constructed settlements. Due to the limitations of it, the plan envisioned 750,000 populated, uni-centered, homogenous city neglecting

gecekondu settlements to a large extent (Bademli, 1987: 107). With the law that was issued in 1965 under the name of ‘Story Ownership Law’ (*Kat Mülkiyeti Yasası*), the construction of multiple owner apartment houses in building plots has become possible (Atalan, 1998: 55). This further deteriorated the applicability of laws associated with Yücel-Uybadin plan, because it triggered rapid development of many new middle class neighborhoods. Since the plan ignores *gecekondu* neighborhoods to a large extent, the need for new and additional regional and partial construction plans and applications become inevitable (Bademli, 1987: 109).

The transition of municipal posts to social democratic parties initiated an advantageous period for the urban planning activities of Ankara. The planning activity conducted by Ankara Regulative Planning Office foresaw the planned decentralization of the city on west corridors in 1973. Between the years 1969 and 1984, Ankara Metropolitan Planning Office emerged as the main agent of planning within the structure of Construction and Housing Ministry to sustain the coordination between Ankara Construction Directorship and Ankara Municipality. 3208 hectares of land were nationalized in order to construct *gecekondu* prevention regions in Ankara between the years 1965 and 1976 (Türel, 1987: 61). Some parts of these nationalized lands were utilized effectively by applying housing projects for low-income families while the migrants for the sake of constructing *gecekondu* houses appropriated others and led to a failure of the projects in some regions (Türel, 1987:61). In spite of the fact that many *gecekondu* prevention regions have been put into action during the period between 1965 and 1980, the number of *gecekondus* had increased tremendously at the time and 175,000 new additional

*gecekondu*s have been constructed. This fact points out the failure of *gecekondu* prevention projects that aim at transforming *gecekondu* areas into housing estates for low-income population. On the contrary, these projects further triggered and eased *gecekondu* construction by creating a supply of state owned lands in many regions that can be appropriated for *gecekondu* construction due to the inconvenient and inefficient functioning of these projects. Migrants tactically utilize the delays in the application of these projects by colonizing these spaces.

In spite of the unintended developments in city's spatial transformation during those years, Ankara Regulative Planning Schema that was prepared and applied during the era, where social democratic parties in general took posts in municipalities, have been acknowledged as bringing a dynamic and realistic approach to planning by urban scientists. Ankara Metropolitan Planning Office worked in coordination with Ankara Construction Directorship, Ankara Municipality, universities and other public institutions. The plan envisioned the development of Ankara successfully. The population estimate of the plan, as an example worked out quite well when compared to preceding planning experiences. Ankara Metropolitan Regulative Plan attained success on many projects like Sincan *gecekondu* prevention area, Batıkent, Ankara Industrial District and similar developments.

However, the development of *gecekondu* regions could not be prevented. On the contrary, it gained further impetus during those years due to a number of reasons. As mentioned in the previous chapter, *gecekondu* houses particularly towards the end of 1970s began to be constructed for investment purposes besides

the aim of pure sheltering. Particularly, in neighborhoods that were legalized to a large extent and had transportation and infra-structural facilities, settlers were more inclined to build second *gecekondus* or additional stories. Vedat Dalokay has accomplished many infra-structural improvements in gecekondu settlements in the 1970s. Some respondents of the research emphasize Dalokay's municipal period with happy remembrance due to the projects that had been carried out in coordination with the local people. Dalokay's municipal understanding and practice seemed to give outmost priority to the aim of providing services beginning from the peripheral settlements to city center (Atalan, 1998: 58). The infra-structural services provided during this period contributed to the values of land and housing in *gecekondu* settlements positively. Loose control on *gecekondu* construction for different reasons when combined with the factor of increasing market values of these neighborhoods due the completion of services had led to the construction of new *gecekondus* there for investment purposes during the period (Türel, 1987: 62). The approach to planning had transformed in a positive sense during those years, however, populist policies and applications had been carried out with regard to *gecekondu* settlements. The responsibility was given mainly to metropolitan municipality to prepare and apply construction plans by 1984. Since then, the burden over municipalities in terms of responsibility has increased tremendously.

3.6 The Remarkable Spontaneous Social Spatialization in the Periphery: The Development of Mamak *Gecekondu* Region

Mamak is a huge gecekondu district where 95% of region was composed of *gecekondu* houses. According to 1990-population census, the population of the central Mamak district was put forward as 401,584 while the population of towns and villages that were considered as part of Mamak were 10,600 (Mamak Belediyesi, 1992: 5). The region covers an area of 16,126 while 6000 hectares of it was settlement area. Elmadağ, a small mountain of winter sports, has a boundary with Mamak on the east; Altındağ, an important neighborhood of “old Ankara”, on north and northwest; and Çankaya, the middle and upper middle class district of today’s Ankara, on south and southwest.

To tackle the development of *Mamak* as a huge *gecekondu* region in which Boğaziçi neighborhood is located, is important to understand the emergence of peripheral *gecekondu* settlements in Ankara. The region today called as Mamak, was a village of Ankara in 1884. After the establishment of Republican Regime, Mamak village was acknowledged as a neighborhood of Ankara. The region is located in the eastern part of Ankara. This peripheral settlement was part of Çankaya administrative district in the late 1940s and early 1950s. From the 1950s onwards, there emerged *gecekondu* settlements in this region. In time, the population of Mamak village and other villages on two sides of Samsun Highway has increased due to the migratory flow (Mamak Municipality, 1992:5).

The farthest village on the axis of Samsun Highway to the center was Kayaş. In the west side of Ankara, Kayaş was a quite distant and isolated rural settlement in the 1950s. Then there were the villages of Araplar and Üreğil. Mamak village was located closest to the central districts like Cebeci on the axis of Samsun Highway. Over time, these villages were transformed into large *gecekondu* neighborhoods and the distances between them had been closed with the rapid expansion of each neighborhood. Parallel to Samsun Highway on the southern face of Mamak, small *gecekondu* settlements have expanded and formed today's Tuzluçayır and Nato Highway regions that are quite close to Çankaya district an upper-middle and upper class district of Ankara for now. The rural spaces extending from Kayaş village to the center of Mamak in three kilometers range has been occupied by *gecekondu* settlements from both directions towards the end of 1960s (Akçura, 1971: 72). It is difficult to find out which neighborhood had developed first. Forerunner migrants selected certain lands close by the villages by taking into account various factors such as financial concerns, natural risks, transportation parameters and suggestions of their acquaintances. In terms of landownership patterns, the region reflects a dual character. Some parts of it were state owned lands while other parts were vineyards that were privately owned by the villagers. In that respect, the migrants either appropriated state owned lands or bought lands from the villagers in order to construct their houses.

Rural-to-urban migrants arriving city by means of Samsun Highway preferred Mamak region that is located close on the way to their hometowns as a suitable place to settle. Due to the economic difficulties migrants had experienced particularly in the initial stages of the settlement, the physical proximity and the

easily attained transportation facilities connecting Mamak and their hometowns constituted the major factor defining their settlement decisions. They can go to their hometowns easily as the residents of Mamak, since the intercity buses operate on Samsun Highway. As mentioned above, this was an important phenomenon in the early periods of the rural-to-urban migration when people still protected their close social and economic ties with their villages, which have survived by losing intensity and taking new forms until now.

The migrants in Mamak, to large extent, work in long distances to their settlement, because the region lacks any close by commercial districts. In Jansen's plan, Mamak region was described in relation to vineyards and gardens and this status of Mamak as green belt was supposed to be preserved according to the premises of the plan. The planners left no place to commercial districts in the plan therefore no large commercial districts emerged in the region according to Mamak Municipality activity report 1992 (Mamak Municipality, 1992: 42). In the general land use map of Ankara of the 1960s (Akçura, 1971: 75) it was easy to observe the distance between the commercial districts and Mamak. Therefore, being close to cheap transportation services seemed to constitute an important concern for the migrants. Mamak was connected to Ulus, one of the two centers of Ankara at that time –the center of the Republican Regime at first then the center of the fringes- by railway. This made the transportation costs for *gecekondu* dwellers affordable. Travel to work and emergent shopping needs were sustained by railway at the time. Except for the *gecekondu* districts at the center, no other peripheral *gecekondu* district could utilize railway in the 1960s and the 1970s. In that respect, the expansion of Mamak as a huge region does not seem to be a coincidence.

3.7 Municipal Experiences of Mamak Region

During *DP* era, only 3.5% of Mamak region had construction permit. As mentioned above, in the years where the influence of social democratic tradition had been felt in local governing, there has been greater attention paid to peripheral settlements. In order to increase the intensity of dialogue of these regions with the central districts, both physical construction projects and social projects have been put on the agenda. The transportation facilities have increased and infrastructural services were provided in peripheral settlements as a consequence of the self-help community projects by the municipality.

With the establishment of two-tiered municipal system, five main settlement areas in Ankara gained their status as autonomous administrative districts, which have their own district municipalities but connected to Metropolitan Municipality financially and administratively. Law number 2963 acknowledged Mamak as one of the administrative districts of Ankara with Yenimahalle, Çankaya, Altındağ and Keçiören.

After 1984 with the assembling of Mamak Municipality, the effects of local policies in the social spatialization of the region have increased. The first mayor of Mamak Municipality is from *ANAP*. The first municipal period has been highly criticized in the activity report of the succeeding period of social democratic local government in Mamak. According to the activity report of 1992 where mayor from a social democratic political party was in charge, the preceding period 1984-1989

is defined as the one during which the construction plans had not been properly prepared and applied (Mamak Municipality, 1992: 42). The civil servants whom I interviewed in Mamak Municipality mentioned the fact that they had started their careers in 1989 in Mamak Municipality with the appointment of the social democratic party. In that respect, they were also critical about *ANAP* period and the administration of Gazi Şahin who came duty as the mayor of Virtue Party, an Islamist party descendant of the conservative factions of Welfare Party in 1999. Gazi Şahin is still the mayor of Mamak as a member of ruling *AKP* since 2003. (Zaman Daily, 16.08.2003)

The difficulties I encountered in the search of documents and planning practices for each municipal period and the complaints of municipal officials from different parties about each others' political interventions in the region reflected the nature and effect of favoritism in local politics. Each municipal period of different political parties neglects, denies, criticizes and conceals implicitly or explicitly the experiences and actions of the preceding local government. Moreover, with every new administration, a serious number of municipal officials are taken from the duty and new ones are appointed under the administration of new local government. The underestimation of the policies of preceding local governments by the new local government when combined with estrangement of the experienced personnel who are the members of the opponent parties lead to the loss of accumulated local knowledge about the region and social structure of *gecekondü* settlements. This fact when combined with the difficulties in determining the complicated nature of landownership patterns in the region brought about the improper implementation of

construction laws and policies. This fact further triggered the emergence of unplanned and unintended spatial developments.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1984 *gecekondur* law initiated an immense legalization act in *gecekondur* settlements. During the *ANAP* Period, Mamak Municipality distributed “*tapu tahsis belgesi*” through the mediation of private technical offices under the oath without making a prior in-depth investigation of the complicated land ownership patterns in the region. In a sense, municipality applied the law without a serious consideration of local context. The tactical acts of some migrants who were economically and politically more powerful had turned the legalization process into their advantage within the context of nepotistic policies.

The most ironic aspect of the research conducted in Mamak Municipality is to observe the hesitancy of municipal officials who criticized favoritism going on in Mamak for years in a very harsh manner on the one hand, but mentioned the incidents showing how they internalize favoritism in their individual lives on the other. When they talked to each other following the end of our formal interview, they narrated how they had requested from the demolition officials to ignore places where their relatives were residing during those years.

The common objective of all municipal periods is to transform Mamak and make it an integrated part of the city. Therefore mayors give outmost importance to the construction of modern recreational public places and the realization of urban renewal projects that aim to solve all the complications of land and house

ownership patterns in the neighborhoods and open them to modern construction systematically.

In the early 1990s, under the administration of the mayor from social democrat political party, the issue of legalizing the *gecekondu*s and distributing title deeds according to 1984 *gecekondu* law had been completed to a large extent. The places legalized for construction have increased to 77% during this period and *gecekondu* dwellers were given title deeds. Private offices under oath defined or measured the amount of the land *gecekondu* dwellers have right to own legally. They did it by determining the size of the plot on which *gecekondu* house had been built by mainly taking the word of the *gecekondu* dwellers as essential. This practice was intrinsically open to exploitation both on the part of the *gecekondu* dwellers and architects and engineers making the measurements as mentioned in the previous chapter. The *gecekondu* dwellers may cheat officials on the previous status of the land on which they have built their houses. They may declare the previous status of the land as owned by state or municipality. However, some of these lands turned out to be privately owned lands. This caused a major problem for municipalities because people who were the real owners of these lands explicated their claims by carrying the issue to the court. This constitutes the main impediment behind planning activity of the municipalities and opening of these regions to formal construction. According to the sayings of the municipal officials who took active parts in the legalization process, they experienced a real difficulty in the process of distributing title deeds. The declarations of the *gecekondu* inhabitants about the status of the land on which they built their houses may not coincide with the truth.

Urban renewal projects particularly in *Alevi* dominated neighborhoods have been initiated during social democrat municipal period. The activity reports related to that period also give clues about favoritism in forms of giving service mainly to *Alevi* dominated neighborhoods. Due to *Alevi-Sünni* conflict in the region, municipal officials might get reaction from *gecekondu* inhabitants in some cases as a result of the prejudices on part of each party. Social democrat officials told about incidents where they were threatened by guns and were targeted as “unbelievers” during the application of a destruction decision of a mosque in a *Sünni* dominated neighborhood on the land that is topographically unsuitable for construction. The demolition of *gecekondus* that are occupied by the people, who are in opposition with the ideological stand of the mayor, led to a reaction on part of the migrants. Such demolitions foremost mean a loss of their home for the inhabitants, besides they take the application of civil servants as an attack towards them by their political and sectarian rivals.

In recent years, when the activity reports of the religiously oriented mayor are examined, it is possible to talk about a concentration of municipal services in certain *Sünni* dominated neighborhoods. The urban renewal projects going on in many neighborhoods constitute the main issue in the agenda of the Mamak Municipality. The activity reports reflect the main objective of urban renewal projects in the region as constituting healthy and sustainable living environments by solving the landownership problems of jointly owned lands (Mamak Belediyesi, 2001: 113,114). Green areas and recreational spaces are supposed to be implemented within the framework of this new approach of urban renewal projects.

Particularly in the parts that are very close to Çankaya district, urban renewal projects like Doğukent (East city) and Ege neighborhood are given utmost importance. Because this reflects the chance for Mamak to change its image as a *gecekondu* district and also symbolizes the integration of the region with the city as mentioned by municipal documents. These two projects are located very close to Mamak-Çankaya viaduct reducing the physical and hopefully social distance between two different regions of Ankara.

To sum up, the local municipal history is full of anecdotes about *Alevi-Sünni* conflict and favoritist policies that have been operated by municipal governments. Favoritism seems to constitute the main impediment behind healthy planning of the region and triggers the uneven development. Therefore, some neighborhoods as a result of their late integration into the legal estate market of the city deprive of the material and social benefits coming with systematic construction. The planning activity in Mamak region like the macro planning activities in Ankara, most of the time, follows the unintended developments rather than avoiding or preceding them. There are legal and institutional drawbacks to the planning activity besides the operation of local agents.

Favoritism in politics has contributed to the spontaneity in peripheral settlements. Migrants, in some cases, tactically use favoritism to their benefits, while these acts may work to disadvantage of other groups. Favoritist policies still dominate local politics. However, realizing important urban renewal projects in certain neighborhoods mean a lot to both inhabitants of the region and mayors regardless of their sectarian and political affiliations. Since they help the

integration of Mamak with the city from the perspective of locals, though Mamak as huge gecekondu region have for long transformed the public and political space of the city.

3.8 Conclusion

The construction of Ankara as the capital city of the Young Republic can be accepted as constituting one of the few examples for the imposition of a radically modernist nationalist social and physical space from top to down with a serious neglect of the existing social context of the city. Ankara's urban history, which dates back to Phrygians, and the town's local people, their representational spaces and spatial practices were neglected to a large extent in such an imposition of holistic modernist project. However, the material conditions within which Western modernity flourished, such as industrialization, "the autonomous bourgeoisie subject and a full-fledged capitalist economy did not exist in Turkey" (Çağlar, 2001: 41).

The motivations behind the need to create such a western city reflect the traces of the uneasy and hesitant relation of the Republican Regime with the Western European cities. As stated by Sibel Bozdoğan (1997: 137) "Turkish architectural culture of the 1930s adopted the formal and scientific precepts of Western modernism and yet posited itself as an anti-imperialist, anti-Orientalist, and anticolonialist expressions of independence, identity and subjecthood." That is

the reason why the construction of Ankara representing the modern Turkish state can be accepted as an act *for* and *against* the Western world.

The attempt of Republican Regime to build a model city exposing modern urban space and lifestyle and the continuing effect of such radically modernist ideal create a big rupture between the “lived” and “conceived” space of the city. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, on the word of Lefebvre, the three aspects of his spatial triad- perceived, conceived and lived- go together and there are no antagonisms, oppositions and contrasts between these three moments of the triad, rather there are echoes, repercussions and mirror effects. This model of Lefebvre seems to be valid within the context of his references to mainly Western capitalist cities. However, in planned cities of developing nations, like Ankara, Islamabad, Canberra and Brasilia, there seems to be antagonisms, oppositions and contrasts between the three moments of the triad. This is the underlying reason behind the intrinsic impediment and failure of such radically modernist planning experiences. In addition to the inherent limitations of modernization strategy, there is a second reason of the failure, which is the financial and technical incapability of the developing states. The planning and construction of Ankara reflect well these impediments of strategical realm.

Within such a context the representational spaces or the lived spatial practices of the “weak” may attain capabilities not only to divert strategical space but in some cases to affect the course of planning activity which was the case in Ankara city. The emergence of *gecekondu* spaces that were dependent on the limitations of the strategical planning policies over time seems to alter the course of post-

planning planning practices. The transportation routes and changing functions of the two centers of planned Ankara can be given as examples to the capabilities of tactical acts in creating spatial practices that bring about contested spaces in the city.

The spontaneity embedded in the appropriated nature of *gecekondu* settlements had further strengthened with the emergence of favoritism in local politics after the early 1980s. This will be dealt with in detail in empirical chapters referring to the experiences and insiders' views in Boğaziçi neighborhood of Ankara.

CHAPTER 4

INITIAL PHASES OF SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION: NATURAL SPACE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to evaluate the initial phases of social spatialization in the designated research setting. The transformation of the research site from the vineyards and farms of Üreğil villagers, mainly a natural space, to a *gecekondu* region will be narrated. This narration includes the incidents pointing out the interconnected histories of the development of *gecekondu* space and Ankara. As well, the spontaneous quality of the spatial development in the neighborhood will be undertaken by referring to the spatial practices and *tactics* that *gecekondu* people employ from within the system.

As mentioned in chapter one, critical evaluation of De Certeau's concepts of tactic and strategy via Lefebvre's critique of modernist production of space would

constitute the theoretical framework of this analysis. Both of the theories, as critical of everyday life in modernity appreciate the potential of “tactics” (De Certeau) or “users” (Lefebvre) in their capacity to create differential spaces within the system. However, in both theories this capacity is portrayed in a highly limited manner by an overemphasis of unilateral power relations between strategical and tactical realms, attributing a limited agency to the tactical realm. They both give references to squatter type settlements in their ability to create a differential spatial trajectory within modernist space of strategy however, they mainly define these spontaneous spaces as receptive or submissive.

As will be made explicit by the empirical findings of the research, the tactical acts of migrants from within the system via the everyday social spatialization of the locality seem to have a significant impact on the realm of strategical planning and have a transformative power, though limited, on city space. By having such a theoretical agenda in mind, I will elaborate on the narratives involving the years 1950s and 1960s, the initial settlement years in the neighborhood.

I will handle the research data related to this period on two different levels. First of all, I attempt to pursue the history of spatialization in the region depending on the totality of individual narratives and life stories. Since this study has a local historical dimension, the narratives of the respondents function as the main source of information in understanding the nature of social spatialization in the neighborhood.

At the second level, in combination with the theoretical framework mentioned above, I try to exemplify how migrants define their acts of survival, with regard to both natural factors and supervision of security forces in the initial years of settlement and in the process of constructing their illegal shelters. These acts of survival will be narrated within the context of their positioning with regard to the realm of strategy and to the acts of other groups in the initial years of social spatialization.

To accomplish this task, first of all, I will assess how different groups of migrants at specific periods employ certain tactics with regard to the strategical realm on the vertical level. The traces of the weaknesses of modernist planning attempts and policies from the viewpoints of the *gecekondulus* will be exposed through this assessment.

Secondly, with reference to the acts of *gecekondulu* on the vertical level, I will consider how power relations between different groups in the neighborhood were operated by means of employing tactics vis-à-vis each other on the horizontal level. Some groups, depending on the context and time, may find chances to make near-strategic acts²³ in social spatialization of the locality with regard to the less powerful groups in the neighborhood. The less powerful groups depending on the context seem to act within this near-strategical space of the more powerful groups. Similar to the vertical model of strategy and tactic, the tactical acts of the less powerful groups within *gecekondulu* society may bring unintended consequences for

²³ I use the term near-strategical acts referring to tactics of more powerful groups vis-à-vis the less powerful ones in the neighborhood. They have the ability to make future projections and shape the (social) space of the research setting to an extent. This ability on part of the powerful groups necessitates a concept that transcends the concept of tactic as defined by De Certeau.

the more powerful groups that may change power relations in favor of less powerful groups in the coming decade.

The spontaneity of these settlements seems to emerge from these power relations at the horizontal and vertical levels. To signify the spontaneity embedded in the social spatialization of these settlements is not for the sake of exaggerating the power of the weak but to point out the loopholes of strategy particularly in creating a modernist space as was the case in Ankara. The most important impediment of the modernist strategy specific to Ankara was to undermine the social context of the city while planning and implementing a hypermodern space from top to down. The strategy excluded certain groups from the beginning by creating an urban space suitable for the middle class western urban life. This aspect of strategic planning when combined with other impediments of urban policy and planning as discussed in chapter three seem to provide a more extended space for the tactics of *gecekondu*. *Gecekondu* construction was an unlawful process at first. However, this informality or unlawfulness cannot be defined outside and marginal to the formal procedures and institutions of planning and urbanization policies.

When the urbanization history in Ankara and in other cities of Turkey is taken into consideration, it becomes explicit that, strategy of planning, to a large extent follow the spontaneous developments. As Tekeli mentions “the ex-post regularization of unplanned, de facto developments” is one of most important planning activities that constitutes the planning cycle in Turkey (quoted from Keskinok, 1997: 86). Therefore it seems impossible to think strategy apart from the

tactic of the “other”. The early history of Boğaziçi will be narrated within such a theoretical framework.

4.2 Survival Tactics within the Space of Strategic Loopholes: Urban Agriculture, Railway and Highway

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ankara was a planned capital and was constructed mainly as the center of state bureaucracy. Outside the “urban center” that was built and planned by the *Kemalist* Regime, the spaces in the periphery of the city exhibited mostly “rural” qualities. Although an immense planning and construction activity in Ankara had been taken place mainly by the design of urban middle class residential and bureaucratic districts, a large amount of land in the periphery of the city was left outside the context of planning practically as unorganized and unmanageable natural spaces in the 1950s and 1960s. This seems to be one of the very initial omissions of planning in dealing with the issue of *gecekondu* during those years.

There were farms and vineyards as the lands of small villages in the periphery of the city in combination with state owned lands. The vineyards and farms were mainly concentrated nearby the branches of Hatip River from Cebeci neighborhood to Kayaş village where the vineyards of Üreğil villagers had also been present. The vineyards of Üreğil villagers would later constitute the lands of Boğaziçi *gecekondu* neighborhood. In general, the periphery of Ankara city

inhabited villages and therefore on lands certain agricultural activities had been carried on up until the 1960s. When compared to İstanbul, the development of industrial and finance sector was negligible in Ankara in spite of state initiatives in founding an industrial infrastructure. The periphery of Ankara at the time was taken into the context of the plan as the green belt of the city. Even after the planning activity had been put into action, the rural activity in the periphery of the city had constituted a pull factor for the migrants coming from the villages in closer towns and cities as seasonal labors.

The document representing the municipal boundaries of Ankara in 1926 cited the vineyards and farms of Üreğil villagers as *Davulcu Bağları* (Davulcu Vineyards) within the limits of the city (Şenyapılı, 2004: 307). In the 1930s there have been two important villages other than Üreğil in the region namely Kayaş and Araplar. These three villages had been grown into large neighborhoods associated with their original names today as mentioned above. Üreğil villagers owned big plots of land and dealt with large-scale agricultural activities that seek serious labor force in the early Republican Period. As the village's latest landlord's son, who is 95 years old narrates, there were four or five seasonal rural laborers staying in every house of the village in the most demanding periods of the agricultural calendar²⁴. Üreğil villagers raised tobacco for *Tekel*. It was the state firm that was the only producer of tobacco products and alcoholic drinks at the time. Additionally, villagers had raised variety of vegetables and sold them to the military headquarters nearby and also at vegetable bazaar in the old city center.

²⁴ Extract from field research note no.44, 17 May 2004.

As mentioned in the second chapter, many of the classical *gecekond* studies supposing a transitory model in migrants' adaptation to city assess rural-to-urban migrant's involvement with rural activities in the early settlement period in the city as a resistance to give up their rural ways of life or an adaptive/supporting economic activity for self-consumption. Certainly these findings have a validity varying from the historical context of one *gecekond* district to another. However, the course of events might follow a different path as in the case of the formation of the research setting. Contrary to the conventional studies, the large-scale agricultural activities in the peripheral villages of Ankara directly brought about the first encounters of the migrants with an "urban" context. The underlying motivation behind migration decision of the early comer migrants depends on the supply of rural activities on the edge of Ankara. This process contradicts with the modernization approach in general that delineates agriculture and urbanization as conflicting issues.

The first residents of Boğaziçi neighborhood had been the temporary farm laborers worked for Üreğil villagers. The migrants constituting the majority of the neighborhood today, people from Cemele village of Kırşehir province, worked once as farm laborers in the farms of Üreğil villagers. They were the ones who laid the foundation of the setting. The vineyards of Üreğil villagers in combination with state owned lands had been appropriated by the migrants from Kırşehir and close villages of Ankara first and migrants from Kırıkkale, Çorum, Yozgat, Çankırı, Sivas and Tunceli later.

The journeys of migrants from Cemele/Kırşehir to Üreğil had lasted four or five days in those days. Therefore laborers from Cemele, most of the time stayed in houses of Üreğil villagers. This intimate relation between Üreğil villagers and migrants from Cemele explains villagers' decision of selling small plots of land from their vineyards to migrants in the subsequent years. The forerunner Cemele migrants started to inhabit the region in order to build their *gecekondu* houses by constituting a small community at the time as mentioned above. The first *gecekondus* in the neighborhood were those built on the vineyards or farms of the “native” Üreğil villagers.

As was described in the introductory chapter, a long street now divides Boğaziçi neighborhood -located in a small valley and was once a river- where the market place is situated. The vineyards of Üreğil villagers were placed on two faces of the valley in the early settlement years and that was the reason why today migrants from Kırşehir mainly reside in there. As understood from the narratives of the first comer migrants, Üreğil villagers were more willing to offer their lands from their vineyards rather than from farms due to the low agricultural economic value of vineyards for them. That is the reason why they could be sold so easily to the seasonal laborers partly as a show of respect on part of Üreğil villagers.

Over time, this process had taken impetus; the relatives of the migrants continued to migrate and buy lands from villagers or, in some cases, built their houses on state owned lands next to vineyards and farms. The migrants employed tactics as in the form of “colonizing space” initially during that period. This was the first attempt of migrants in their search for a place for themselves in the city.

The main motivation behind the early comer migrants was not to search for an “urban” job but rather to work in the rural type of jobs in the natural space of the research setting. Even the empirical studies that consider the interconnectedness of the formation of *gecekondus* with economic and political context of the city suppose a certain discontinuity between urban and rural contexts. In explaining the history of *gecekondu* formation in Ankara, Şenyapılı (1985: 114; 1998: 305; 2004: 73) defines the early comer migrants from the villages close to Ankara, searching for seasonal “urban” works in addition to their rural incomes in the village as the main actors of *gecekondu* formation in the topographically unsuitable places to settle like Mamak. The temporary visit of rural migrants in search for a job in Ankara was linked to the push factors in the village by Şenyapılı and she did not give any account of these temporary workers employed in the rural type of facilities in the periphery of the “planned city”.

The topographically unsuitable places for settlement have constituted a suitable natural habitat for urban agriculture and animal husbandry in Mamak *gecekondu* region in the 1940s and 1950s. Even the contemporary literature on shanty towns in Latin America and other third world cities explicates that urban agriculture at the edge of cities on lands and water areas in the urbanized sphere that are available for agricultural use of surfaces constitute the main source of income or subsistence for poor people (Madaleno, 2000: 73). Similar to this recent finding, urban agriculture and animal husbandry in the periphery of Mamak had constituted the main means of survival in the most depressing period of the neighborhood history as defined by migrants. The misery of those early years was related to the poverty coupled with unavailability of certain services in the

neighborhood. The basic needs of survival like dwelling, nourishment and heating constituted the main concerns in a natural environment. Due to these early deprivations, the relations with nature in the initial periods of settlement inhabit both a struggle given to the wild aspects of it and at the same time the utilization of its resources to the fullest extent. These survival tactics with regard to nature made use of the space of strategy that had been left as unorganized and uncontrolled by the planning practice itself even after the settlement of migrants there.

Migrants dealt with small or medium-scale animal husbandry by utilizing the natural environment around them; and/or worked as wage agricultural laborers in the farms of the villagers; and/or they grew up vegetables, fruit trees in their gardens for their subsistence. An anecdote about the utilization of natural resources around by an old woman migrated from a close village of Ankara to the region is given below. This anecdote is also important in understanding the poverty experienced by many families particularly in the early years of settlement:

My God keeps us away from returning to these days. We experienced great difficulty at the time. On the other hand, the taste of yogurt and milk was different and everything was fresh then. When we first come here, there were vineyards and orchards everywhere. Your uncle [referring to his husband] sold butter at the time. We heated the house with *tezek* (dried cow dung). We burned them in the stove. We cut grass and thresh in the farms here, work as laborers. My dear. Life was hard back then. We lived a life of misery at the time.²⁵

Particularly in the narratives and memories of women, the early years of settlement covers an extended place. In the natural flow of the structured or

²⁵ Extract from field research note no. 11, 4 March 2003 (Interview with an old lady from the village of Ankara. His son has a big store selling house appliances and owns a big apartment house in the neighborhood).

unstructured interviews with old women, they usually gave references to these early years most in a highly emotional manner. This seems to have a relationship with the fact that women had extended role and overload in household's economy during those years. In fact, survival by appropriating²⁶ the means of natural space in Lefebvrian sense constitutes the main concern of migrants' daily lives in "urban" context. The appropriation of nature includes tactical decisions and behavior that comes with the possibilities and limitations natural space provides. The domestic works that exhibit such tactical acts in relation to the nature had an extended role in everyday life. Hence the importance of women's labor in the course of these tactical relations with nature made the experience of women demanding and especially remarkable for women.

Not only women, but also children were active in doing agricultural and stockbreeding activities. Putting animals out to pasture was one of the main activities conducted by the children. Particularly the respondents above the age of 50 when asked about the general physical condition of the neighborhood in the 1950s describe the wild aspects nature and animal-breeding experiences similar to the following anecdote:

We bought cows, and went to put animals out to pasture. We went to the hills opposite. We took them to the municipal garbage dam. That is to say, we began to do stockbreeding. We sold their milk. Since here was all green at the time, feeding them costed little. We were so poor then. When we went to school with my brother, the flies set down on us since we smelled like milk.²⁷

²⁶ Lefebvre supposes a distinction between domination and appropriation of space. Domination by technology that is affiliated with capitalism's strategical abstract space tends towards non-appropriation, destruction (Lefebvre, 1998: 343). Appropriated space is a natural space in order to serve the needs and possibilities of a group (Lefebvre, 1998: 166). Rather than dominating the space by employing future projected strategies, migrants appropriate the resources of natural space as an immediate tactic for survival considering the deprivations of initial settlement period.

To sum up, the available natural space in the periphery of the city and the ongoing rural practices in the periphery constituted a habitat and a means of survival for migrants. As mentioned in the second chapter, due to the planning priorities and conditions of the city industrial development in Ankara was highly limited providing job opportunities mainly in three sectors as construction, trading and service in the 1940s (Şenyapılı, 2004: 73, 170). In the coming decades, the low profile service jobs in state sector and trading had constituted a remarkable part in *gecekondu* society's occupational composition parallel to their experiential maturity in the city. As gathered from research data, economic dealing with animal husbandry and agriculture in *gecekondu* space seem to last longer than conventionally defined as a means to accumulate capital for other jobs particularly in trading sector. The early experiences of the migrants in "rural" environment in the periphery of the city not only raise certain questions about the supposed dichotomy between rural and urban spheres but also about conventionally defined ways for *gecekondu* in integrating with the job market of the city. Agricultural activity in the periphery of Ankara constituted the primary step in their integration with city economy.

In addition to the availability of natural space in the periphery of Ankara, the development of Mamak as a large *gecekondu* region has two reasons with strong spatial references on a macro scale. As mentioned in the previous chapter, first one

²⁷ Extract from field research note no. 7, 16 Oct. 2002 (Interview with the owner of a *bakkal*).

is the presence of the intercity train service in Mamak that has sustained cheap transportation to city center from periphery since the 1930s. The migrants often mentioned the presence of railway as constituting one of the main motivations behind their settlement decisions.

The second reason is the presence of Samsun Highway dividing Mamak region into two large portions and its status as the main highway connecting region to neighboring Central Anatolian cities from which most of the settlers of Mamak had migrated. As Mike Davis (2006: 27) puts forward precisely, housing choice is a result of confusing trade-offs for the migrants everywhere in the Third World. “For some people, a location near a job- say, in a produce market or train station- is even more important than a roof” (Davis, 2006: 27). Spatial proximity to cheap means of transportation in two directions, both to the city center and to their villages in their hometowns constitute the main motivation behind migrants’ settlement decisions that is an often-mentioned fact during the course of the research. Mamak region is the most suitable place to settle for the migrants in case they want to visit their villages of origin as easily as possible. Some respondents mention spatial proximity by making jokes about these initial choices of where to settle. When I asked a middle-aged man his ideas about settling in Boğaziçi, he answered in the following manner:

I often get angry with my father. As if there was nowhere, other than Boğaziçi, they had come and settled here. But my father was unemployed at the time and they should be thinking that living in a *gecekondu* settlement would be easier and suitable. I often teased my father by saying: “On the way to Ankara from Kayaş, you saw city sign and immediately settled here, I think.” It was a *gecekondu* settlement at the time and everywhere was vineyards and orchards. Here was the river. There was no road at the time.

My father should be thinking that he could work in the farms here. If he had settled in a different neighborhood he might have lived in real poverty.²⁸

Nevertheless, the construction of the intercity railway in the late 1930s and highway in the 1950s mainly emanated from the objectives of a modernist strategic planning. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the development and improvement of the railway was one of the main strategies of the Republican Regime in their attempt to open the introverted and conservative structure of Ankara as a central Anatolian city to the modern world in social and economic terms (Şenol-Cantek, 2003: 42). Towards the end of the 1930s train station was opened in Cebeci and the railway route between Mamak and Kayaş had been started mainly to carry the middle class families of the new Republican capital to picnic areas in Kayaş that was one of the main natural recreational spaces in those days. Unintended with the planning objectives of the subway, initial tactical decisions of the migrants in the city brought about the emergence of *gecekondu* settlements as spontaneous spaces in that particular region.

Similar to the railway construction, Samsun Highway was constructed as part of such modernist-planning attempt. As mentioned in the second chapter, *DP* had a hesitant approach to low-income settlements and urbanization policies in general. In spite of their early populist policies and their condoning *gecekondu* construction in the periphery of the city, their urban policies in the late 1950s had included radically and despotically modernist interventions in urban space. The construction of big boulevards, highways and modernist buildings and demolitions in the “cancerous” neighborhoods in late Menderes’s terms, were the main activities of

²⁸ Extract from field research note no. 28, 17 June 2003 (Interview with a shop owner from Yozgat).

DP's urban political agenda in those years. The construction of Samsun Highway was part of this radical modernist agenda of *DP*. However, over time, the construction of Samsun Highway had also brought unintended consequences for the agents of strategical planning particularly by altering the real estate values in the region.

Boğaziçi neighborhood in close connection with the ownership patterns of the vineyards has developed from the areas closer to the main road in the 1940s. The natives of the Üreğil village owned all lands on two sides of the Samsun Highway from Boğaziçi neighborhood to Kayaş that was approximately two kilometers in length. The growth of the small and scattered migrant communities on those lands into the emergence of Boğaziçi and other neighborhoods had taken impetus beginning by 1952 with the construction of the highway. The value increases in real estate, with the construction of highway nearby, brought about the declining importance of agriculture in the region. Consequently, the villagers in the periphery sold their lands to the migrants coming in large numbers from different parts of Central Anatolia and from other *gecekondu* neighborhoods of Ankara. In a context where agriculture in the periphery of Ankara had begun to lose its economic significance compared to previous years, *gecekondu* construction had followed a more rapid course beginning by the late 1950s. Besides, the first *gecekondu* law that particularly gave references to the unlawful settlements of Ankara passed in 1948. By means of the law, these unlawful settlements that had been diffused in a 650-hectare area were taken within the context of amnesty. Mamak-Belkeriz *gecekondu* region was one of the places that were taken in the context of amnesty (Şenyapılı, 2004: 133,135). This also had a triggering effect on the development of

Boğaziçi neighborhood in the 1950s within the context of this dialectical relationship between strategy and tactic on the vertical level.

4.3 *Gecekondu* Construction: Tactic versus Strategy on the Vertical Level

As a consequence of the intensity of *gecekondu* construction during that period, *DP* government had taken more severe legal measures in the late 1950s in accordance with its hesitant approach. In that period, the demolition incidents in Ankara have increased in number. Menderes made declarations that the city had been long left uncontrolled and the neighborhoods that he thought as the sources of crime should be tamed (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 51). These severe measures and the similar ones following it in the subsequent years could not avoid the accelerated growth of *gecekondu* construction as mentioned in chapter two. The narratives of the respondents about the construction of their *gecekondus* provide some insights about the loopholes in the legal application of laws and tactics of *gecekondulu* that utilize these loopholes which made the growth of *gecekondu* spaces inevitable.

As understood from the accounts of the migrants, the relationship between them and state officials in duty of demolition seems to be an unwritten game with agreed rules and mutual understanding at an informal level. Each of the parties performed in order to avoid the tension on part of the other. In that way migrants prevented any punishment or violent act. The relationship between state officials who were responsible from the supervision of unlawful constructions and migrants

were in general unexpectedly “loose” or “unmanageable”. Migrants mentioned the informal nature of the relationship that was mainly a consequence of the financial interests of officials. Officials often took bribe from migrants in order to overlook the illegal activity. The second reason of this informal relation was the emotional bond between the migrants and some officials who were also *gecekondulu* and shared the same experience of surviving in the city.

In some cases, where the relationship between parties took on a problematic nature, the incompatibility usually did not emerge from the proper applications of the rules and procedures by the officials but from the tightening of this loose relationship as a result of some personal issue between the migrant and official totally out of its legal context. Depending on the narratives of the migrants, this tightening may have different sources, like sectarian or hometown differences between parties, false performances on part of each party in violation of the game-like relationship or a personal dislike. There was only one unfortunate event encountered in the narratives of the respondents where a *gecekondulu* dweller murdered an official after his fourth attempt of demolition. This incident was related to migrant’s refusal of giving bribe to the official and announcement of official’s asking for bribe to public. In this event, the rules of the game-like interaction between *gecekondulu* and official were totally broken. Despite the sensitiveness of the issue, giving and taking bribe was made totally explicit in the stories of the respondents. The demolition incidents reached their peak point in 1961 just after the military intervention during the temporary government of Cemal Gürsel. An old woman mentioned the importance of giving bribe in protecting one’s *gecekondulu* during that specific period in the following manner:

The military intervention had just been taken place when we came here. Soldiers used to come here, we served tea, and they said nothing about our *gecekondulu*. Then, one day while I carried a very heavy wool bed on my back, I saw the demolishers around our house. I was scared; I remained motionless for a very long time with the bed on my back. Now and back then the demolishers have only had one worry. When you give money, nobody demolishes your house. When they run out of money, they come for destruction.²⁹

In sum, depending on the stories of demolition by *gecekondulu*, each party acts in compliance with the invisible and silent rules of the game under normal conditions. The most often voiced tactic of the officials was to destroy some part of *gecekondulu* that did not lead to the total destruction of the house. In doing so, they accomplished the duty of demolition seemingly, but they gave no real harm to the *gecekondulu* dweller since the damage could be repaired in a couple of hours.

Consequently, *gecekondulu* construction and its prevention from demolition can be read as a showcase of *gecekondulu*'s tactics for survival within the system. In that sense, it seems convenient in that part of the chapter to give a more in-depth account of the tactics *gecekondulu* employ while constructing their houses and the consequences of these tactics. As tackled from the narratives of the respondents, first one of these tactics was to construct *gecekondus* in a very limited time span so that they could avoid the “selective” attention of officials whose duty was to apply demolition decisions. The attention of the officials can be defined as “selective” because, as extracted from the construction stories, the demolition priority was given to the houses that had been most recently built or that had not been

²⁹ Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003 (Interview with an old lady from Kırşehir/Cemele).

completed yet. The criterion of living in a *gecekond* for a long time is narrated as to be one of the most important excuses for the migrants to resist the demolition decision. In that sense, the *gecekond*s that were built most recently carry greater risk of demolition when compared to others. The municipal officials point out a practice, which they had often encountered, during demolition incidents. Just after constructing their *gecekond*s, migrants plant already grown flowers in their gardens that they have borrowed from their neighbors in order to give the impression that they have stayed at the house for months.³⁰

Second tactic of migrants in relation to the second condition of being “selective” on part of the officials was to build houses as small as possible, mostly in shape of “coal cellar” rather than a house. The initial construction of the house in the form of “coal cellar” as commonly named by *gecekondulus* may serve as a legitimate reason for officials to ignore the house. Almost all of the respondents pronounce a resemblance between the initial shapes of their house with coal cellar. “We built the house as a coal-cellar at first” is an often-mentioned sentence at the beginning of the construction stories. The resemblance of the house to a coal cellar would constitute an excuse for them in the game-like relationship they have formed with the official as mentioned above. The late comer migrants most of the time construct their houses near their *hemşehri*’s already established *gecekond*s so that they can present the small house as the coal cellar of the big *gecekond* to the officials. In that sense, the late coming migrants were obliged to use the near-strategical spaces of early comer migrants as a survival tactic in order to escape from the demolition incidents. Unless the family is wealthy enough to build a two

³⁰ Extracted from field research note no. 43, 15 Jan.2004.

or three room *gecekond* at one night, the *gecekond* houses were constructed as small one-room building at first. *Gecekond*s had taken their final form after the addition of rooms convenient with the needs of the family in time. As similar to development of these neighborhoods in an unplanned and spontaneous fashion, the construction of each *gecekond* house totally depends on the experience of building, destroying and rebuilding. The outlook of *gecekond* reflects the effects of this experimental and unplanned construction process.

The third tactic, and may be the most important one for migrants, was to choose the most suitable place to build their *gecekond*s not only to escape from the attention of officials but also to sustain the best possible living standards. The third decision can only be defined as a tactic if we approach it from the perspective of relations between state officials and *gecekond*ulu. However, if we consider the power relations within the community, the decisions of settlement contain some near-strategic acts of future calculations for more powerful groups like the early comer migrants or the migrants from hometowns who are densely represented in the neighborhood. I would like to give an extended account of the first and third tactics below.

4.3.1 “GECE KONDU” Built Overnight by Community: *Hemşehri* Relations Employed as Tactics Operating on the Vertical and Horizontal Level

As mentioned above, the houses under construction had a higher risk of being torn down when compared to the completed ones. *Gecekondu* law number 486 gave full authorization to state officials about the demolition of *gecekondus* that were under construction. For the completed ones, though, officials should have a court decision, which was a difficult, and long process. Mostly it ended up with the protection of the house (Şenyapılı, 2004: 191). Therefore, the demolition priority under normal circumstances was mainly given to the houses under construction. Therefore it was essential to complete the construction invisibly. This invisibility could only be sustained at nights and through rapid construction. *Gecekondu* construction depends on the good management of time. The concept of “*gece konu*du” itself reflects its ontological status of existence that depends predominantly on time rather than space. In that sense, the early conditions of its existence very much coincides with the concept of tactic as defined De Certeau. In that definition, the weak or the “other” of the modernist discourse could only find some place in the space of strategy by consuming it or in Lefebvrian terms by appropriating it in a differential manner by means of the good management of time. Therefore, as defined by the migrants, there was an immediate necessity to move into the house after the construction, so that, the officials would have an impression that the migrants had long been living in the house. As told by an old couple, moving into the house immediately seems to be a necessity for the migrants at the time:

When we first come here, we cut trees, bought briquette and sand. We gathered all our friends and acquaintances and worked collectively. Then the demolishers came. To prevent the demolition, we put haircloth and oar on the house under construction. We needed to move in immediately but we were afraid; the construction was new and everywhere was wet. We couldn't go in; we thought it was going to fall down. My brother stayed in, the first night, in order to prevent the demolition.³¹

The rapid construction can only be sustained with the unconditional help gathered from community. Depending on the accounts of the migrants, if no attempt of demolition takes place, there needs ten or more people to complete a *gecekond* with two rooms in one night. When I asked the migrants to tell their experiences of *gecekond* construction, they mostly referred to the miserable conditions and deprivations at the time. Most of the migrants defined this period as their most desperate and poor period in the region. The feeling of poverty not only emerged from the fact that it was very difficult to attain water, construction materials or tools at the time but as the narratives indicate it was also difficult to get help in terms of human labor. The well to-do migrants told that they had come to the region with a certain amount of money and these migrants mostly mentioned their hiring workers during *gecekond* construction besides the help of close relatives. However, poor migrants were in direct need of all the material and non-material help, they could get. It was at that point, while they were talking about these needs, the definitions of close community were made with reference to the nature of the help, if there was any. I felt the effect of power relations and competition for scarce resources between different groups initially at that point of the conversation though they rarely gave any references to power relations and

³¹ Extract from field research note no. 31, 26 June 2003 (Interview with an old couple from Yozgat).

competition explicitly. They rather use a wording that associates their feelings of disappointment, helplessness, loneliness, and shame. An old woman from a small town of Ankara lacking a community of villagers or relatives describes their feeling of loneliness in the late 1950s as follows:

When we first settled here I never went out of the house. Nobody helped me at the time. There were people mostly from Kırşehir. Anyway there were very few people around here at the time. They never helped. I still do not visit them and they do not visit me. I only got a water cauldron from a neighbor once. That was all.³²

The early comer migrants appropriated the resources of natural space and constructed a working system of survival for themselves and their community. As mentioned above, migrants from Cemele village of Kırşehir were the founders of the neighborhood. They were powerful because of their early appropriation of resources and having a large community of villagers who provided unconditional help to each other. Therefore, the acts of these relatively powerful groups due to their experiences in the neighborhood and Ankara included some near-strategical calculations rather than tactical acts. The reason why I call the acts of early comer migrants as near-strategical is that they seemed to appropriate and control space with some future projections and calculations. They began to control the social spatialization in the neighborhood to the benefit of their *hemşehris* which actually goes beyond the definition of tactic in De Certeauan terms.

Early and well-to-do migrants dig wells in their gardens. As gathered from the narratives of the respondents, most of the time, they want to reserve this source only for their close relatives rather than neighbors. Permission to use these wells

³² Extract from field research note no. 11, 4 March 2003.

seemed to constitute the main source of conflict in public space during those years. In most cases, the house owner gave permission only to the relatives or close villagers. As a consequence of that, many neighbors and mainly women had fights with each other over the issue of water. A shop owner from Yozgat gave an example of these conflicts referring to his mother's experience:

When we settled here, naturally, we had no water. My mother often narrated an incident that she went to a house of our neighbor behind and took water from their well. According to the saying of my mother, the owner of the house took the water bucket from her hand and poured it on the ground with anger. I remember how upset she had become from time to time remembering that incident. The reason for that is we are from Yozgat. 90% of the population here is from Kırşehir. People from Kırşehir don't wish people from Yozgat or Kırıkkale to have settled here.³³

As understood from the stories of the migrants, even the migrants from Kırşehir among themselves were reluctant to share their resources and labor if they are not from the same village or close community. When the nature of solidarity among *Kırşehirli*s is examined through their stories, they rarely voice their reluctance to share resources with their neighbors from other hometowns in a strict manner. However, this emerges as a fact from their narratives that there had been solidarity only among close kin where all the migrants have had scarce resources in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The definition of being *hemşehri* literally refers to being from the same hometown or in other words to the migrants coming from the same province like from Kırşehir, Kırıkkale, Çankırı, Çorum, Yozgat and Sivas. The definitions of

³³ Extract from field research note no. 28, 17 June 2003.

hemşehri in relation to the representations of each province in the narratives of neighborhood inhabitants and stereotypes about these provinces are discussed in detail in the first chapter of the thesis. During the initial period of settlement, unlike its conventional meaning, *hemşehri* as a concept refers to a more restricted group like extended family, relatives or to people from the same village in the narratives of the migrants. This definition refers to a more restricted community that is considered as *hemşehri*.

This becomes apparent with the stories of migrants who had migrated from the densely represented provinces in the region like Kırşehir and Kırıkkale, but had been excluded from the close community network due their being from another town or village of the same province. Wife of the first *bakkal* and a well-known person in the neighborhood expresses her feeling of loneliness with reference to this limited definition of *hemşehri* in the following manner:

There were people from Kırşehir. But nobody helped us [during the construction of their houses and *bakkal*]. Though we earned less at the time, we always had money, although we suffered a lot we were never in need of anybody, thank god... There are a lot of people from Kırşehir in the neighborhood, but they are from a different town. We're from Kaman [another town of Kırşehir]. People from Kaman are not considered as *Kırşehirli* according to people from Cemele.³⁴

Unconditional mutual material and nonmaterial help and solidarity are highly encountered in the narratives of people migrated from the same and densely represented villages. As mentioned above, this help is unconditional and contains the sharing of all resources and putting all opportunities to use for mutual benefit.

³⁴ Extract from field research note no. 33, 30 June 2003.

The most significant incident through which one can understand the nature of solidarity among migrants of close kin and relatives is *gecekond* construction due to the necessity of rapid construction. The difficulties of attaining water for the sake of constructing *gecekond* and doing domestic works are the most often evoked memory in the narratives of the elderly women. Particularly women refer to the solidarity among close kin or migrants from the same village. Women mostly make the restricted definitions of *hemşehri* since women have most of the time a more restricted social environment when compared to men. Even, as concluded by the findings of some research, women due to their restricted living environment, consider neighboring relations even more important than relations with relatives when compared to men (Gökçe et. al, 1993: 332, 333). They acknowledge people as their *hemşehris* only when they are relatives or from close kin. If they come to have acquaintances from other villages or provinces even from other sectarian identities, this is due to the physical proximity of living close together for years as neighbors, which is actually a result of involuntary or contingent location. This will be dealt with in detail in the following sections. As proved by the research of Gökçe (1993: 297) the main means of solidarity in the neighborhood depends on the relations between relatives and *hemşehris*.

Consequently migrants from towns, other than the ones mostly represented in the region, usually mentioned incidents of having hired waged laborers in constructing their *gecekond*s rather than having taken help from their *hemşehris* in the broader sense of the term. In some cases, out of poverty, they could not employ workers. In migrants' accounts, their relatives from the village temporarily came for help and they overworked in order to finish construction as quickly as possible.

These people mentioned almost no incidence of taking help from neighbors during the construction activity. In cases where the migrants are from the close villages of Ankara, they mentioned the daily visits of women in the family to meet the service needs of the construction activity and workers. These migrants who can be defined as “outsiders” depending on their common feeling of loneliness and helplessness gave references to the cooperation and help among themselves in the early periods of settlement. The “outsiders” who were left as in minority position mainly vis-à-vis migrants from Cemele/Kırşehir helped each other under the identity of being neighbors. An old man from a village of Yozgat under-represented in the region explained the difficulties he faced in the initial periods of settlement in the following manner:

I went to a meeting in my child’s school and complained about the laziness of my son to the teacher. He said: “don’t say anything bad to the child. Two students are successful in this class and one of them is your child, encourage him”. Then I came home... We had no electricity at the time but I thought that I had to get electricity so that my child could work. There was electricity in the neighborhood but we had no money to take it in the house. We had a very good neighbor who is from Çorum. He helped me and gave me electricity from his house with a cable. They told him that the municipality might have punished him for that, but he accepted it. He was really a very good man.³⁵

However, the nature of help among “outsiders” seemed to be different from the one among close kin or people from the same village. Giving and asking for help was narrated as less straight forward, the frequency of requesting help was less and the quality of help was limited by giving some tools or permitting the newcomer to use the resources of their houses in return for money like using the

³⁵ Extract from filed research note no. 22, 3 May 2003.

well or electricity for a certain period of time. The lady from Kırşehir/Kaman described the form of getting help from her neighbors of other towns in the following manner:

We had a lady here, a good neighbor. In our first night here, she took my girls and gave hostage to them. She was a woman from Koçhisar [a town of Ankara]. We had no flooding water at the time. I wanted their hosepipe. I told her to control her water meter [so that she could pay the price of water back]. They also gave us a glass of tea. I could never forget this kindness.³⁶

During the course of the research the migrants often mentioned the importance of *hemşehrilik*, particularly in relation to the early periods of the settlement. *Hemşehris* at the initial stages of the settlement refer to more intimate associates like the relatives and villagers who can be considered within the frame of close kin according to the findings of the research.

In a recent study on a *gecekondu* settlement in Ankara, it has been pointed out that *hemşehri*, which once meant “being from the same country of origin”, in time takes an extended meaning for gecekondu settlers, as “being from the same ethnic or sectarian group” (see, Ayata, 1991). This finding holds true also for more recent definition of *hemşehri* in Boğaziçi neighborhood. However, during the initial settlement process and construction of *gecekondu* houses, neither the people from the same province nor people from the same religious sect just depending on these identities felt themselves as obliged to help each other. This finding of the research is supported by the earliest and one of the most sophisticated *gecekondu*

³⁶ Extract from field research note no. 33, 30 June 2003.

research of Karpat (1976). He finds out that the scope of and closeness generated by *hemşehrilik* grows in direct proportion to the distance from the original place. “For Turkish villagers and their relatives and *hemşehris* in the city, blood and communal ties provide the only basis for mutual help and solidarity until these are superseded by or fused into other relations and identities of urban and national origin” (Karpat, 1976: 85, 86).

The lack of water, electricity, and construction materials in the early periods of the settlement put great pressure on the everyday lives of the migrants. The most important tactic, which was to finish construction as soon as possible, could only be sustained by the unconditional help of such community that was defined in a strict and limited way by the migrants.

4.3.2 Near-Strategical Acts Defining Community Settlement

The second important tactic in *gecekondu*’s dealing with the system was to settle in suitable places where they could prevent their *gecekondus* from demolition and from possible natural disasters easily. However, migrants made the decision of where to settle in a rush, most of the time under a certain time pressure by making an assessment of existing material conditions and opportunities at hand rather than spending a certain amount of time for future projection.

Depending on the narratives of the migrants, the opportunities at hand were mainly shaped by their early comer *hemşehris*. These early comer *hemşehris* most

of the time provided suitable lands to buy or to settle on to the newcomers. The decision to construct a house among *hemşehri* community was often voiced by the respondents with an emphasis to the feeling of security during the research. To live within the community make their claims stronger vis-à-vis the system as believed by the migrants, therefore this was the most important tactic employed by *gecekondulus* in the initial years of settlement. Second tactical decision is related to the concerns of natural risks. To calculate the best possible place to settle considering the past stories of disasters as was the case in Boğaziçi and topographical risks seemed to effect their settlement decisions. Thirdly, certain tactics were employed by the migrants to appropriate the largest possible plot of land by constructing some part of their *gecekondus* on the land they bought from the villagers and some on state owned lands. Fourthly, as mentioned above, the concerns about being close to cheap transportation services defined the decisions of where to settle.

Many migrants, however, cannot apply these tactics with a future projection. The possibility on part of the migrants to take these decisions was mainly related to the financial, communal and experiential power they had. In most of the cases, one or more of these decisions do not depend on migrant's "free" choice but on the opportunities and conditions of the time and place. The early comer migrants and the people from hometowns that were densely represented in the neighborhood could make such tactical decisions, while others seemed to lack the means to consider all of them in the initial settlement period.

In that sense, people from Kırşehir/Cemele and Kırıkkale/Halitli, the early comer and densely represented groups often gave positive references to their communal settlement patterns as an advantage particularly with reference to certain moments of social spatialization like the insecure environment of the radically politicized space of the late 1970s. When I analyze the socio-spatial settlement patterns in the region, these two communities seem to position in a more concentrated manner when compared to the migrants coming from other hometowns. As will be discussed later, this makes them well equipped with a certain power to resist any outside interference as a community. The ontological insecurity felt by migrants as a consequence of the unguaranteed living conditions within the space of strategy and the risks of natural space made communal concentration inevitable.

In that respect, the leading migrants from Kırşehir, having a strong financial position bought large plots of land from Üreğil villagers just to sell these lands to their *hemşehris* in order to live close to their acquaintances. This tactical act had turned into a near-strategical one with the growing control of these migrants over space. Other migrants, particularly the ones that I called as “outsiders” above hardly made such strategic plans, rather they have used the opportunities at hand in a limited time span. To put such spatial boundaries for the community has been replicated by different *hemşehri* groups in time, which had made the dialogue between different *hemşehri* and sectarian groups difficult. Such spontaneous social spatialization alters the direction of power relations depending on the political, economic and social context at the time. The effect of it was mainly felt in the

social space of the neighborhood in the 1970s that will be dealt with in the following chapter.

To sum up, the leading role of the early comer migrants, might relate to their early arrival to the region or/and to their economic power or/and to the entrepreneur qualities they have and/or to the respect they have in relation to their social network in village or city. An old woman who is the wife of a contractor from Kırşehir/Cemele describes her husband's attitude towards his *hemşehris* as follows:

He bought all the lands from the top of the street up to here. [She refers to the lands on two edges of a street like 100 meters long. There are approximately thirty houses of Kırşehir/Cemele migrants.] Then he sold these lands only to our *hemşehris* so as to make them our neighbors. He bought them from an Üreğil villager, a respected man and sold them to our *hemşehris* from the price he had bought, with no profit. He gave land only to our people from the village.³⁷

An important Kırşehir/Cemele community formation in the region seems to be made possible with the efforts of people like the contractor mentioned above or with the attempts of wealthy people in the community. Strict social control seemed to be empowered during the period in order not to permit the entrance of outsiders and their constructing *gecekondular* houses in the community area. In almost every decision of settling or migrating to a certain region, the prior settlement of a relative group or people of close community (villager) have played the defining role. Karpat defines these migrants as *kurucular* (founders) and he states their role

³⁷ Extract from field research note no. 41, 19 Aug. 2003.

in shaping the space of the neighborhood as vital (1976: 80) similar to the findings of the research.

Accordingly, the migrants who mentioned about their financial sufferings in the early settlement period chose places to settle considering certain parameters, like the cost of the land, conditions of purchase and *hemşehri* links and help. In that sense, particularly the migrants from certain villages of Ankara, Yozgat, Çorum and Çankırı who emphasized their poverty at the time, preferred to settle in places where land was rather cheap. The land values were very much affected by the considerations of natural factors in the early settlement period. As mentioned above, the natural space and its appropriation in certain ways had constituted the main concern for migrants in those years.

The main component of nature in the late 1950s and early 1960s that occupies the most extended place in the memories of the migrants is the river and the stories about it. The migrants signify the river that run through a valley cutting the neighborhood into two sloppy parts as one of the most important natural reference point in their everyday lives. The narratives of the migrants about the early physical condition of the neighborhood begin most of the time with a highly emotional mentioning of river and the several incidents related to its flooding. The river flooding, which was the main concern at the time influenced the course of spatial development in the neighborhood to a large extent. River flooding avoided migrants to settle nearby river and this risk perception led to a decline in the value of lands on two sides of the river. As understood from the narratives of the respondents, the decision about where to settle was taken mainly with reference to

their positioning vis-à-vis the river. The lands that were near river and a little bit upper parts were the old vineyard areas, which were mainly private property. The lands that were closer to the top of the two hills were mostly state owned lands and topographically unsuitable or difficult to settle lands in the region. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the cheapest lands in the region were the ones near the river due to the often-encountered risk of river flooding. Therefore migrants who were poor in the 1960s mentioned their preference of either the lands just besides the river or the state owned lands on top of the hills. This was due to the natural difficulties and easy and economic availability of state owned lands there.

The vineyards in between were the most expensive lands where it was accepted as both naturally “safe” and easy to settle in the early settlement period. Therefore relatively wealthy migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale appropriated them. The early settlement pattern in the neighborhood contains all these rationales that were mainly related to the limitations and opportunities of natural space as tackled out from the stories of the respondents. These near-strategical acts of relatively powerful groups in avoiding to settle near river were narrated with a serious regret in the coming decades for them in their own words. Since, due to the spontaneous development in the region, the lands between river and top of the hills that were once considered as ideal therefore expensive places to settle had lagged behind the value of lands nearby river by remarkable value increases and the construction of market place there. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the land of the region exhibits a mixed structure in landownership patterns. The planning practices and the municipal interventions of municipality from top to down also played a role in the changing and unintended value increases. These value

increases seem to contradict with the early and near-strategic estimates of well to do migrants, which will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Thirdly, the size and nature of plots that had been selected might incorporate some tactical decisions to utilize the loopholes in the landownership patterns. As mentioned above, the early comer migrants mainly preferred to buy privately owned lands of Üreğil villagers rather than the state owned lands on the sloppy parts of the hill. State owned lands on the upper parts of the hill topographically exhibited undeserved qualities for settling on. However, there were also state owned lands left in-between the farms and vineyards of Üreğil villagers. Migrants who purchased lands from the villagers considered the location of these state owned lands vis-à-vis the land they bought. This consideration was related to their desire of extending their rights to the land by appropriating the state owned lands near the plots they bought from the villagers. They mentioned their desire to build *gecekondus* on such lands that show a pattern of mixed ownership so that they could legalize the state owned lands appropriated and add them to their property in the coming elections with amnesty laws. Thus some migrants constructed their houses not on the land to which they had legal title deeds but on these state owned lands nearby their land. The land officially owned constitutes the garden of their *gecekondus*.³⁸ Migrants knew that the next amnesty law that was going to be established would legalize this unlawful appropriation for the sake of the *gecekondu* house constructed on it. In this way they would extend the size of their land by paying very little money to state:

³⁸ This act can be considered as a tactic of “colonizing space” that seems to transcend the limits of De Certeauan definition of tactic.

We encouraged our father to buy land here because everybody from the village had already bought land in Boğaziçi. He did so. Then we came and bought briquette. We constructed the house mainly on the state owned parts of the land, a little bit behind by paying attention. We left the land with title deed as garden of our *gecekondu*.³⁹

Migrants were aware of the fact that if they could preserve their *gecekondu* until the approaching election, the amnesty law would legalize their *gecekondu*. Their near-strategical acts consider a good estimation strategy's habit of overlooking the unlawful happenings.

4.4 The Story of the River: The Beginning of the Journey from Natural Space to Market Place

The river that once runs all the way through the valley at the center of the neighborhood occupies the most extended place in the memories and narratives of the migrants. Particularly, migrant's early memories about the neighborhood include certain references to the river or incidents related to it. The nature of these memories changes, depending on the gender, age, or economic well being of the migrant. Particularly, elderly women, migrants who were children at the time being and poor families who had settled near river reserve an extended place to river in their memories.

³⁹ Extract from the field research no. 29, 20 June 2003.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, river had constituted a place to socialize for women while washing clothes there. They mentioned about their singing folk songs together with other women or drinking tea or their having picnic near the river. As understood from their narratives spatial relations in the village were replicated in the urban setting in the first settlement years mainly due to the resemblance of *gecekond* space and village. The primordial characteristics of the two spaces, the resources they provide and the qualities they maintain, which define the relationship between women and space and the definition of work, were very much the same. For migrants, river provided many opportunities in the early periods of the settlement as sustaining water and sand for the construction of *gecekond* houses. The migrants used the sand for the construction of their houses and some poor families sold sand to the factories nearby and earned money out of that. A shop owner from Çorum described the poverty they had experienced during the initial years of settlement and their use of river as follows:

I went to junior high school in Mamak. Though the bus ticket was 25 *kuruş* at the time, I often could not afford it with my pocket money. Therefore I often walked from the school to Boğaziçi [the center of Mamak is approximately five kilometers away from the neighborhood]. There was one pair of shoes we shared with my brother in those years. In one occasion, my father could not afford to buy me uniform and was very upset. I pulled sand from river that come closer to our house with flooding and sold it in barrels. Ooo, I made a lot of money out of that [he laughs] and bought the school uniform myself that year.⁴⁰

The river as the most important provider of natural resources for construction like sand and water had been a focal point spatially in the lives of the migrants through the 1960s. Their survival tactics include a necessary and strong relation of

⁴⁰ Extract from field research note no. 7, 16 Oct. 2002.

utilizing the resources of nature. The natural resources led to the construction of small workshops and factories nearby river. These small workshops like ironworker, sand factories, hardware stores or lumber merchant were narrated as the forerunner components of the market place. These workshops were vital for the migrants due to the continuous construction activity in the region either in the form of constructing new *gecekondus* or doing improvements and additions in the already built houses. The necessities of daily life and their unique articulation to natural space determine the course of development and social space in the region during these early years of settlement.

As mentioned before, the river had intimidating effects due to the risk of flooding in the memories of the migrants. Due to this risk, the plots on two sides of the river were the cheapest when compared to privately owned lands in other parts of the neighborhood in the early years of the settlement. The first known flooding took place on September 11th of 1957 in Hatip River and its branches all over Mamak due to heavy hailing. The height of the torrent reached to three meters high in Kayaş and affected all the way Mamak to Kayaş. This was a real disaster, which resulted with the death of 133 migrants (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 59). *Zafer* and *Ulus* daily newspapers -sympathizers of Democrat Party and Republican People's Party respectively- initiated a public debate about this incidence. After the flooding had taken place, the governor of Ankara mentioned that the improvement and demolition policies of *DP* had dramatically reduced the loss of flooding. The closure of the upper part of the river due to the improvement plans of *DP* was said to lessen the damages of the flooding (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 58). The daily, *Ulus*, on the other hand severely criticized these declarations of the governor in the highly

critical atmosphere of public debate on “despotically modernist” and formalist policies of *DP*. *Ulus* represented the declarations of governor as an attempt to legitimize and facilitate the coming demolition decisions by *DP* (Şenol-Cantek, 2006: 59). It is important to note here that *RPP*, a party that was once the ardent carrier of modernist urban policies criticized the demolition decisions of *DP* with reference to that incident. *DP*, on the other hand, unlike its early populist approach to *gecekondu*s seemed to internalize quite modernist and formalist approach in those years with regard to *gecekondu* settlements. This case reflect well the hesitant approach all political parties with regard to *gecekondu* settlements over time with the changing political and economic context.

The flooding did not give much harm in Boğaziçi, since the river in Boğaziçi was only a small branch of Hatip River. But still, over flooding left a residue in the memories of the migrants. In most cases, poor families lacking close and strong *hemşehri* ties and networks settled lands nearby river. While well to do migrants from Kırşehir/Cemele and Kırıkkale/Halitli preferred safe places. Old *muhtar* of Boğaziçi from Kırıkkale/Halitli defined their settlement history as a *hemşehri* community in the following manner:

An old man from our village had come here first. He had a house nearby river in the village and he had suffered from flooding so much there. Therefore, he preferred upper parts in order to settle. That is the reason why we are all here now.⁴¹

An old man from Kırşehir expressed their settlement decisions in a very similar manner as follows:

⁴¹ Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003.

When we first come here, we thought to get a land near river. There was a man who wanted to sell a plot. He wanted 825 *kuruş* [he refers to the cheap values of land nearby river] for each square meter. At that time a flooding occurred and your aunt [referring to his wife] was so scared and we couldn't buy the land. Now it is so difficult for us to climb that hill. In case, we want to do some amendments in the house we couldn't carry sand and construction materials up here.⁴²

The settlement decisions of migrants from Kırşehir have constituted their main regrets in life in the following years with the unintended value increases nearby the river. The poor families, on the other hand, could afford to buy these places not only because the land values there were cheaper but also some influential actors played the creditor and mediator role in the exchange of these lands between Üreğil villagers and migrants.

One of the most important actors was family X from a village of Çankırı. Since the family is from Çankırı, they can be considered in the category of “outsiders” vis-à-vis the migrants of Kırşehir. The power of the family, in that sense, did not emerge from the support they got from their *hemşehri* community in the region. However, they had a peculiar position and were respected by migrants even from Kırşehir due to the certain reasons in their story of settling the region.

They were one of the poorest families in the neighborhood in the early 1960s. When they first migrated to Ankara as three brothers, they began to work in a bakery in Hamamönü. The owner of the bakery offered them a room to stay. Over time, they began to sell bread and small subsistence goods to *gecekondu*

⁴² Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003.

neighborhoods in the periphery of the city on a horse coach in the 1950s. Boğaziçi was one of these neighborhoods. Every migrant in Boğaziçi, mostly *Kırşehirli*s knew them at the time due to their supply of subsistence goods that were terribly needed at the time. Then they opened a small *bakkal* in the neighborhood nearby river due to the low prices of lands there and the central position of the lands close to river as stated by a member of the family. They built one extra room in the shop and stayed in this room at nights. One member of the family mentioned the unconditional help shown by the neighbors to them during the construction of their *gecekondu bakkal* in the following manner:

We bought materials from the warehouse and we dried bricks. Everybody helped. We also worked at nights while doing the construction. Once a watchman came and he got angry with us, because we did construction at night. We had a neighbor from Kırşehir. He told the watchmen not to pick on us. Women from the houses around came and they asked us what our needs were. “Mud brick and water or pickax and shovel?” At that time everything was problem; water was a problem, there were wells everywhere.⁴³

Sliding from the general pattern, the family had been given great assistance in their attempts to build a *gecekondu bakkal*, though they were outsiders vis-à-vis extended *hemşehri* groups. As mentioned above, this seemed interesting considering the fact that people were generally unwilling to offer unconditional help to their neighbors unless they were from the same village. This support can be considered as a consequence of the services offered to migrants in the early period of the settlement by the family, which was repeatedly brought up by respondents during the interviews. Besides that, there was only one *bakkal* during those years in the neighborhood. As stated by the member of the family, the migrants met their

⁴³ Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 Apr. 2003.

constructing a second *bakkal* in the region in a quite pleasant way due to the desperate need of basic subsistence goods in the neighborhood in the late 1950s. In spite of the poverty family experienced during their early years in city, as time passes, due to their good estimates of the needs of the neighborhood they had opened other shops and even two cinemas in the neighborhood in the 1970s.

After having earned certain capital from their *bakkal*, they bought farms and vineyards of Üreğil villagers in big plots or appropriated state owned lands and built houses nearby river or in places close to river for the newcomer migrants who were in need. They sold *gecekondu* houses to the poor in installments. They called themselves as being in the real estate business during the interview. However, more than what a real estate agent would have done, they have managed and controlled the social space of the region by selling land and house to certain people. Depending on the narratives of the migrants who bought lands from the family, it had become obvious during the course of *gecekondu* legalization in the late 1980s that the family did not own all the lands they had sold to the migrants. When we consider the fact that the lands of the region reflected a mixed nature of private and state owned lands, the family seemed to use the state owned extension of the land they bought from the villagers in order to make *gecekondus* and shops on it and sell them. Particularly the shop owners from the villages of Çankırı, Çorum, Yozgat, Kayseri or Ankara, who are considerably rich when compared to other shop owners now, generally mentioned their purchase of land or *gecekondu shop* with the credit of family X. This made the social scene of the market more heterogeneous. The family seemed to contribute to the value increases of lands near river by means of helping poor migrants in opening different shops. The

emergence and growth of market place in turn contributed to their wealth and political connections, which made them even stronger in time. The construction of a big market place in the region was also due to their constituting an example to the newcomer migrants and their help to the entrepreneurs who were the members of the poor families. A wealthy shop owner from Ankara/Kalecik who owned one of the five apartment houses in the market place narrates the help of the family during their early settlement period. As stated by this shop owner, the family not only provided credit opportunities in the purchase of their shop but also introduced them who was the trustworthy customer and who was not. Actually the family seemed to serve as “landlords” in *gecekondu* as defined by Şenyapılı (2004: 193). These landlords usually appropriate state owned lands or purchase others and sell them to the newcomers. In some occasions, they built houses and sell these ready houses on credit. As parallel to the general pattern, family X also opened warehouse shops where they sold construction materials in addition to their role as a mediator for the new comer migrants by providing entrance to the region. They sustained financial favor to the ones who took a bunch of their services.

The river and its transformation from a part of natural space to a market place seem to deserve attention to understand the spontaneous spatial development in the region and unintended consequences of near-strategic acts on part of powerful actors like the family X. Another reason that speeded up the development of market place was the transformation of the riverbed and its branches flowing from the top of the hills to the main paths and routes of the migrants through the way to train station. The common route following river had turned into a big main street in time.

As a result of these factors, unlike the estimates and near-strategic acts of *Kırşehirli*s in the initial period of the settlement, values of lands nearby river had increased considerably. This constitutes one of the most important regrets in the lives of *Kırşehirli* migrants. Though, migrants from Kırşehir constituted the most advantageous group in economic terms in the early settlement period, they have the lands on two sides of the river snatched to the “outsider” migrants. Therefore they could not show much presence in the shaping of the public space of the neighborhood. Most of the shop owners of Kırşehir origin bought or rented shops from the market in the 1980s from the increased prices of real estate. Their authority in controlling the development of public space was negligible when compared to their numerical presence in the neighborhood. On the other hand, the poor migrants who signified their poverty in the early periods and who are from the close villages of Ankara, Çorum, Çankırı and Yozgat gained economic power due to their settlement nearby river and their opening shops there. The near-strategical acts of family X constituted the main reason behind these people’s gaining power in time.

As will be explained in the following chapters, the near-strategical acts of family X gave them a certain control over the shaping of social space of the region. The family behaved as the most influential agent in the construction of market place by controlling the purchase of land and construction and by guiding the newly arriving shop owners in terms of social relations as stated by many shop owners.

The story of an *Alevi* shop owner explicates the family's attempts to control the social spatialization in the region. He mentioned how his father had to put up a fight to own a house and a shop nearby river and how other shop owners excluded them as a result of their struggle with family X. There are only four or five *Alevi* shops at market place composed of nearly 150 shops now. The general exclusion of the lately arriving *Alevi* families from Çorum, Sivas and Tunceli from the most valuable and central lands of the region due to their sectarian identity and timing of migration would have spatial consequences in the subsequent decades, which would be dealt with in the following chapters

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to read the spatial development of Boğaziçi neighborhood in the early settlement period. I try to assess the relationship between the strategical realm, the realm of “modern”, “urban space” as represented and dominated by planners, national and local urban policies; and the tactical realm, the realm of migrants' acts in appropriating the space of nature. The narratives of migrants related to the initial settlement years in the region make it possible for me to read the interconnected and dialectical histories of “strategy” and “tactic”. This dialectical history referring to the case of Boğaziçi necessitates a critical review of the theories by Lefebvre and De Certeau and a reconsideration of the power of strategy and tactic vis-à-vis each other.

A horizontal model of power displays between migrants is added to the vertical model considering the limitations of the latter. The tactical acts of migrants vis-à-vis each other on the horizontal level and vis-à-vis the space of strategy on the vertical level seem to signify a dynamic model. The dynamism in the model and the spatial contingencies that led to unintended consequences seem to constitute the main reason behind the spontaneous development of the region.

The spatial contingencies emerged out of the weaknesses of planning and urbanization strategies of Republican Regime in Ankara were considered with reference to the survival tactics of migrants in Boğaziçi and the spontaneous development of the neighborhood. The impediments of strategy in making future projections about the spontaneous spatial developments and the tactical acts of migrants and state officials within the loopholes of the system were exemplified by the incidents from the lives of Boğaziçi dwellers.

The tactical decisions of early comer migrants seem to transcend the definition of tactic by De Certeau. These “tactics” on part of the powerful migrants can be defined more properly as near-strategic acts of colonizing neighborhood space. In this early period, the natural determinants constitute the context of the power relations on the horizontal level. However, just like the vertical model of power relations, the near-strategic acts would lead to unintended consequences for the powerful groups, like the change of real estate values due to certain spatial factors in the early settlement period. The shaping of social space of the neighborhood by these near-strategical acts on the horizontal and strategical acts on the vertical level seems to contribute to the dynamic nature of power relations. The

early comer migrants from Kırşehir/Cemele, Kırıkkale/ Halitli and the family X seem to operate on the near-strategical level in the 1960s in shaping the social space of the region. However, the unintended consequences of these acts will necessitate a reconsideration of the nature of social spatialization in the subsequent decades.

CHAPTER 5

THE 1970S: THE IMPACTS OF RADICAL POLITICS ON SOCIAL SPATIALIZATION IN THE LOCALITY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to narrate the story of social spatialization in the neighborhood in the 1970s where the public space of the neighborhood had been radically politicized. It also examines the consequences of this political transformation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the tactics employed by the migrants on the horizontal and vertical level vis-à-vis each other and the interventions of strategic agency give social spatialization in Boğaziçi a spontaneous quality.

The near-strategical acts of the founders in the 1960s had led to the exclusion of certain groups from the most critical aspects of the neighborhood space near river basin that had gained considerable value in time. This exclusion had affected

the course of spatialization in the late 1960s and 1970s where the public space had been radically politicized due to the macro economic and political developments in the country. With the radical politicization of space, the groups who had some power to define the course of social spatialization in the previous decade had come under pressure of the previously excluded groups. This was mostly due to the fact that the spontaneity had reached its peak point in terms of its impacts on social spatialization in the locality during the 1970s. The limited capacity and the political bias of the state to intervene in the sphere of the tactical realm added to the degree of spontaneity. The power relations and radically political struggles between militant groups seemed to define the context of social spatialization in the locality almost alone in the 1970s. This attributed certain autonomy and peculiarity to *gecekondu* spaces as different from middle upper middle class districts of the city during the period. The nature of social spatialization in the 1970s in the neighborhood will be evaluated with such theoretical concerns in this chapter.

The respondents narrate the period with a strong emotional depiction of the political struggles, which took place in the public space of the neighborhood. As different from the narratives on the previous decade, there emerges an implicit reference to the identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* as to denote “us” and “them” that were made explicit with reference to the political identities of being leftist and rightist. The *Sünni* or *Alevi* respondents do not approve the struggles going on between young leftist and rightist militants in the public space of the neighborhood in the 1970s. Yet for them this period signifies the moment where they initially locate themselves and their *hemşehri* community within these extended political identities of left and right associated with *Alevism* and *Sünnism* respectively in

their narratives. In that sense, in the memories of the inhabitants, this period almost in all cases is narrated with reference to the politically overloaded identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism*. The politicization of sectarian identities and as a consequence, the *hemşehri* identifications were closely related to the macro political developments of Turkey at the time.

5.2. An Overview of the Political Context in the late 1960s and 1970s

The 1960 military coup against *DP* rule paved the way for a period of two decades of economic and political crisis in the history of the country. The 1961 constitution after the military coup included the bill of civil liberties due to its preparation by a commission of university professors. The opportunities the constitution had provided were only fully exploited from the mid-1960s onwards in political terms (Zürcher, 1998: 257, 266). Political debating societies (*Fikir Klüpleri*) sprang up at all the major universities (Zürcher, 1998: 268). However, the liberty of the period in terms of diverse groups to express themselves when combined with economic crisis and the increasing rate of rural-to-urban migration where *gecekondu* neighborhoods in cities had become ethnically more diverse spaces, led to the surfacing of competing claims. The political landscape of the later 1960s had shown extreme diversity with parties and illegal groups proliferating on the extreme left and right of the political continuum where the two major parties positioned on the right and left of center. These were *JP* (Justice Party) and *RPP* respectively.

JP under the leadership of Demirel won the 1965 parliamentary election with the 52.9% majority of the votes. As stated by Zürcher (1998: 263, 264) Demirel to keep the party's integrity with a very wide range of social groups (coalition of industrialists, small traders and artisans, peasants and large landowners, religious reactionaries and Western oriented liberals) foresaw two strategies. Zürcher defines these policies as *tactics*. However, within the framework of this thesis, these policies are considered conceptually macro *strategies* of Demirel government.

First, he emphasized the Islamic character of the party and the way it stood for traditional values and second, he kept up a constant campaign of anti-communist propaganda and of harassment of leftist movements (Zürcher, 1998: 263, 264). These two tactics seem to reflect the general approach and affiliations of the state in dealing with the politically radical atmosphere of the late 1960s and 1970s. As mentioned in the second chapter, the combination of a persistent balance of payments deficit and an industry that is dependent on foreign inputs, made the Turkish economy extremely vulnerable. More than the social unrest or even the violence in the streets, it was the growing economic crisis, which defined the governments of the later 1970s (Zürcher, 1998: 280).

During those years there was a struggle between rightist and leftist militants in order to control certain spaces in the city. However, as considered by many, the struggle between right and left was an unequal one. The police and the security forces had become advocates of Türkeş's *MHP* (Nationalist Action Party) during the "Nationalist Front" governments of years between 1974 and 1977. "Even under

Ecevit's government (the party of center left), state forces had remained heavily infiltrated by fascists who shielded and protected the *Grey Wolves* (the youth organizations of ultra nationalists) in 1978 and 1979." (Zürcher, 1998: 276) The growing repression on leftist groups by ultra nationalist rightist groups and state security forces associated themselves mostly with nationalist ideology paved the way to political polarization and radicalism in the country. Despite the fact that *Alevi*s supported *DP* in 1950 as a reaction to the authoritarian and centralist policies of *RPP*, beginning by 1957 they had directed their support to *RPP* again. In the late 1960s, *Alevi* youths had become, to a large extent, acquainted with socialism and extreme leftist politics. *Gecekondu*lars began to vote heavily for leftist parties, *gecekondu* spaces gained an oppositional position to the system (Aslan, 2004: 81). Meanwhile the ultra-nationalists mobilized *Sünni* population around *MHP* with policies that equated anti-communism with anti-*Alevism*" (Göner, 2005: 110). As will be mentioned in the following pages, such identification of communism with *Alevism* had turned the identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* into conflict-ridden identities even for the majority of *gecekondu*lars who did not hold any active and obvious political position.

In congruence with the general context of the country, the public space of Boğaziçi neighborhood is narrated as the arena of competition and struggles between leftist and rightist groups in individual stories of the migrants. The developments that brought about the politicization of public space were closely related to the general political context of the country as mentioned above. However, the way the political struggles between groups had taken place in *gecekondu* neighborhoods involve a certain form of spontaneity. The struggles

between extreme militant groups seemed to take place in a more direct and harsher manner in these neighborhoods. In his evaluation of the 1970s, Zürcher pointed out that traditional culture in which honor and shame, an extreme contrast between one's family or clan and outsiders, made the political extremism in Turkey so exceptionally violent (Zürcher, 1998: 277). Traditional conflicts seemed to be taken political connotations in *gecekondu* settlements and some cities where the encounters between *Alevi* and *Sünni* populations were spatially close. The most serious and bloody clashes between *Alevi* and *Sünni* groups took place in anti-*Alevi* pogroms in the provinces of Malatya, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum (Bruinessen, 1996: 8). The Maraş Massacre of 1978, in which 109 people were killed, was directed against *Alevi* neighborhoods in the city of Maraş (Göner, 2005: 115). The spontaneity of these settlements that differentiates them from other neighborhoods of the city was related to this condition of heterogeneity in terms of sectarian identities. In most cases, this had contributed to the negative image of *gecekondu* neighborhoods in public debate as potential shelters for illegal and conflict-ridden identities and groups. As mentioned in the second chapter, this perception in public discourse that had emerged in the late 1970s has continued its existence by taking different forms until now.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter and will be exemplified in the following chapter, the definition of sectarian or hometown identities in the narratives of the respondents may show variations depending on the social context and time. The nature of struggles between leftist and rightist groups might also show variations from one *gecekondu* neighborhood to another. In that sense, the narratives about the neighborhood of the 1970s will hopefully give clues about the

reasons behind such spontaneous happenings that set apart these neighborhoods not only from the middle class neighborhoods of the city but also from other *gecekondulu* neighborhoods in the city.

Depending on the narratives of the migrants, this was a period where state intervention in neighborhood space seemed to be relatively insignificant in security, supervision and planning wise when compared to other periods. Particularly, due to the insufficiency and political bias of state security forces, *gecekondulu* neighborhoods except the ones dominated by *Alevi*s were left to their own dynamics. The struggles between state forces and militants of *Alevi* dominated; therefore leftist neighborhoods might take a quite violent form. As Zürcher mentioned, the authorities were not able to restore order in these neighborhoods. In some cases, whole neighborhoods, might come under the control of one or the other of competing groups and were declared “liberated areas” (Zürcher, 1998: 277). However, Boğaziçi was considered as a *Sünni* dominated neighborhood. In that respect, despite the activities of leftist militants in the locality it was left to a large extent to its own dynamics by state forces. This contributed to the spontaneity of the locality.

As mentioned in previous chapters, Boğaziçi was also socially composed of different ethnic groups that can be identified mainly through hometown connections. The (socio)-spatial encounters between such groups and the immunity they had due to the limitations of strategic power to deal with the tactical acts of *gecekondulu* at the time contributed to the spontaneous spatialization of *gecekondulu* settlements. Beginning by the 1970s the social heterogeneity of the neighborhood

had further increased with the second wave of migration mostly from *Alevi* villages of Çorum and Sivas. There also came a large group of *Alevi*/Kurd migrants of Tunceli from another *gecekond* neighborhood of Ankara called Yenidoğan to Boğaziçi by an in-city, chain form of migration. As Yılmaz (2005: 151) mentioned the *Alevi*s who had lived in their villages as closed and homogenous communities and had migrated to the cities later than *Sünni*s, could not find suitable environment to realize their practices. Considering the obstacles to practice their peculiar religious practices and to make their *Alevi* identity explicit, the socio-economic conditions of the *Alevi*s were not well to do as the latecomer migrants to the city when compared to *Sünni*s (Yılmaz, 2005: 181). “Their gradual integration into the wider society, migration to the towns, education, careers in public service brought them in closer contact and sometimes in direct competition, with strict *Sünni*s from whom they remained socially separated for centuries” (Bruinessen, 1996: 8). As proved by the research of Gökçe et. al (1993), ethnic and sectarian groups as a result of their latecomer status and minority position may mention their conscious preference of close relations only with relatives and close *hemşehri* community rather than neighbors (Gökçe, 1993: 289, 292).

Only from the 1961 onwards, *Alevi*s founded associations, *vaqıfs*, *cem* houses and political parties as to make their voices heard (Yılmaz, 2005: 181). Consequently, in the case of Boğaziçi, the increasing heterogeneity of the neighborhood when combined with the socio-spatial consequences of exclusionary near-strategical acts of the powerful groups in the preceding decade seem to determine the way the competition between groups had taken place in the 1970s.

Depending on the narratives of shop owners in relation to the late 1960s and early 1970s, both hometown commonalities and sectarian identities had played important role in the construction and enlargement of market place. The conflict and uneasiness between different groups in the enlargement period of the market place in the 1960s as gathered from the narratives, explain to an extent the ever-expanding politicization of the market place, the most important component of public space in the coming years. In that sense, the powerful groups who had taken near-strategical decisions in shaping up of market place in the 1960s had suffered most from the political struggles of the 1970s.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was explicit outsider-outsider solidarity in the market place. As was explained, family X from Çankırı was the main actor playing the role of mediator by giving financial and social help for land provision and shop construction particularly in the narratives of the “outsider” shop owners from Yozgat, Çorum, Çankırı and the villages of Ankara. There are almost no *hemşehri* bonds between the family and the migrants who took help from the family. As Erder (1996: 73) mentioned in her field research findings, there needs to be no direct *hemşehri* relations between the founders and the inhabitants. Thus, the founders in her research setting had no *hemşehris* in the region. The family had a similar status in the research setting by having no *hemşehri* community. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, their acceptance by Boğaziçi inhabitants depends on certain other factors. However, this does not mean that *hemşehri* identities defined through sectarian lines had no effect on the preferences of the family in their provision of certain services to the newcomers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, beginning from the very initial phases of the production of

market place to the early 1970s, the family did not welcome *Alevi* migrants to settle near the river. It is interesting to note that few *Alevi* shops already existing are located in a place close to Samsun Highway, the entrance of the neighborhood. In other words, the lands and shops of the family seem to constitute the boundary between few *Alevi* shop owners and the other *Sünni* shop owners. Beginning from the lands owned by the family to the center of the market place there is only one *Alevi* shop. The family seems to constitute spatially the main barrier on the enlargement of the *Alevi* lands to *Sünni* dominated places. *Kırşehirli* shop owners and other *Sünni* “outsiders” also did not welcome *Alevi* shop owners. There is no case I encountered that a *Sünni* landowner or a shop owner has sold his plot or shop to an *Alevi* person. In few incidents, some early comer *Alevi* migrants appropriated the lands near the river and they were able to open shops in the market place. During my interviews with the *Alevi* shop owners and inhabitants, nevertheless, there was no explicit reference to the reactionary attitudes of *Sünnis* during the settlement process. Yet they have often mentioned about the disadvantageous position of *Alevi*s vis-à-vis *Sünnis* with respect to settlement conditions.

The entrance of the market place is not that valuable when compared to other lands in the market because flooding had given serious harm to that part. The *Alevi* inhabitants due to their position as latecomers had resided in topographically the most disadvantageous parts of the neighborhood. *Alevi* shop owners both as a consequence of their latecomer position and because of the resistance of *Sünni* shop owners could not settle places close to the center of market place. The exceptionally rare representation of *Alevi* shop owners in the market place seems to

prove this fact. It is also possible to get clues about the sufferings of *Alevi* shop owners embedded in the narratives of the migrants portraying the scene of market place in the early 1970s. Some shops owned by Kurds or *Alevi*s are counted as present in the market in the late 1960s and early 1970s but they are reported as having been closed then. When I search for the reasons of their closure as perceived by the respondents by asking further questions, a *Sünni* woman⁴⁴, as an example, told that a Kurd/*Alevi* *bakkal* left because they could not stand the attitudes of other shop owners. Some others mentioned about the difficulties of *Alevi*s' presence in the market where the majority of shop owners are *Sünni*.

Unintentionally, the near-strategic attempts of the founders to control the social space of the market and the general discomfort of *Sünni* shop owners with respect to *Alevi*s could not prevent the place to turn into the fortress of leftists in the late 1970s. On the contrary, these exclusionary acts seem to have a close relation with the fact that these founding shop owners mention their sufferings most in relation to the years of political turmoil when compared to other shop owners. This may also explain the willingness of leftist militants to control the region for the period of political unrest besides other socio-spatial reasons. One of these reasons is that the spatial push of *Alevi*s to the part close to Samsun Highway instigates the close encounters between *Alevi*s and Üreğil neighborhood, the space of extreme rightist and ultra-nationalist militants. Such positioning of *Alevi*s had made train station nearby Samsun Highway and the market place as the main grounds of political fights and violence, which will be dealt in detail in the following pages.

⁴⁴ Extract from field research note no. 39, 15 Aug. 2003.

5.3. The Story of the River: The Expansion of Market Place and Its Becoming as the Focal Point of Political Struggles in the 1970s

The “bridge” on Samsun Highway that was once constructed for the sake of crossing the river flowing from Boğaziçi to Üreğil is signified as the symbolizing the boundary between Boğaziçi and Üreğil neighborhoods in the definitions of the migrants. The narration of the neighborhood in the 1970s almost in all cases includes a reference to the bridge separating the political spaces of extreme right and left in socio-spatial terms.

On the other side of the bridge on Samsun Highway, in the settlement of Üreğil close to the train station, most of the residents had been Sünni in origin. The place reflects a more homogenous social composition when compared to Boğaziçi. The extreme nationalist militant groups had controlled the public space there in the late 1970s. On the contrary, the leftist groups due to dense presence of *Alevi* population in the settlements close by Boğaziçi neighborhood have dominated the market place in Boğaziçi. Though, the market space and the places close to it were mainly occupied by migrants from Kırşehir, *Alevi*s settled densely on the hills, on two sides of the road.

As discussed in the previous chapter, natural factors determined most of the decisions of the early migrants. The physical form of the riverbed constituted the main reference point for the migrants in their settlement process. The walking

paths following river and its branches that run from the hills down to the valley had turned into the main roads and streets in the following years. The presence of the river just in the middle of the neighborhood and its proximity to Samsun Highway had made the paths on two sides of the river as the main route used by many people during the day, connecting the far away neighborhoods to the railway station. The only way to the train station had passed over the market place and people living in all the neighborhoods around the research setting in approximately one-kilometer range are narrated to use this route in the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly in the 1970s where the population of the region and their rate of employment in jobs at state sector in city center had increased, the market place had become the predominant part of public space. The residents of the neighborhoods on the upper parts of the region that inhabit *Alevi* residents mostly who do not pay any trip to the neighborhood at the moment had to pass the market twice a day in the old days according to the sayings of shop owners and inhabitants of the neighborhood.

There were minibuses primarily on Samsun Highway in the 1970s. However, as often mentioned by the respondents, a very few number of *dolmuşs* had entered into the neighborhood and upper parts of the region during that period. Depending on the narratives of the respondents, people did not prefer to take these *dolmuşs* since they did not feel comfortable for two reasons. Mainly women mentioned their hesitancy and anxiety about using them because of the position of drivers as total “*strangers*” to them. These distant social encounters between the migrants and drivers had led to the emergence of concerns related to the security and cost of transportation on part of the migrants. In a sense, migrants mentioned their early uneasiness in relation to *dolmuşs* mainly with reference to the indefiniteness of the

relation depending on the informal nature of the *dolmuş* transportation when compared to the train. As indicated by a shopowner⁴⁵, *dolmuş* owners might rent drivers from locality as a tactic so as to sustain intimacy and acquaintance.

Secondly, people had economic concerns about the cost of transportation with *dolmuş*s. The train at the time was mentioned by all to be the cheapest means of transportation. Due to train's status as the predominant means of transportation, *Alevi* people residing on the upper parts of the neighborhood also shopped from the market. This is not the case now with the expanding possibilities of transportation and shopping in different locations nearby. In that sense, many shop owners described the period with a longing for the early 1970s as the liveliest period of the market when their earnings were high. An old shop owner having a warehouse narrated the period as follows:

In the past [referring to the late 1960 and early 70s] this place was livelier than any other place. It was very good... Everybody got off the train down close at the bridge. When minibuses had increased in number, they began to go to upper places. Now a person can go from the front of his house directly to Ulus by minibuses. In case where we accept to sell things on credit or if there is an emergent need, they come and shop from here⁴⁶.

A similar yearning for good old days is observed during the informal conversations with many shop owners. Particularly the ones who experience serious economic difficulty at the moment gave references to these years. Ironically when the shop owners are asked about their most depressing years in the region, they mentioned 1978 and 1979, when political struggles on the streets had

⁴⁵ Extract from the field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003.

⁴⁶ Extract from the field research note no. 30, 25 June 2003.

reached its peak point. The passing five or six years had changed the political and social atmosphere of the neighborhood dramatically.

As will be mentioned in detail in the following chapter, the usage of the market place by the residents of the closer areas had lost its intensity due to a number of reasons. Firstly, with enriching transportation facilities, the market place lost its status as the only available route to the railway. Secondly, Nato Highway had emerged as an alternative route to the city center serving the needs of Boğaziçi and residents of other neighborhoods living on the upper parts of the hills. Thirdly, after the political turmoil years of the 1970s, the identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* had been made explicit in defining “us” and “them” in a more sharpened and exclusionary manner. This had further alienated *Alevi* residents from using the Sünni dominated market place.

5.4. Struggles between Leftists and Rightists Dominating Social Spatialization

It is important to recall that shop owners who mentioned their sufferings most in the late 1970s are the ones socially and spatially close to the family of X. They point out the main reasons behind their sufferings as their identification with the rightist ideology either as a result of their hometowns’ identification with ultra-nationalist politics or the political stands of the people who pay visits to their shops. These shop owners told their experiences about these years as the most depressing ones in their individual histories. Most of them including the member of

X family explained their identification with rightist politics as a false impression on part of the leftists. However, during the interviews they often gave clues about their political standing and their negative approach to leftists in those years. A number of respondents mentioned the incidents where the shops of the family had been bombed for several times in the late 1970s. A member of the family also brought up the incidents of bombing during the interview and he related the issue to the identification of their shop space as the meeting place of rightists similar to the perception of their neighbors in relation to the incident.

The most depressed time was the anarchy period. We went everywhere together as brothers. They [the leftists] have bombed here eight times; two of them were one after another. The reason for that... For example, you come here and we chat... Because of people, coming in and going out of the shop... “Why did you talk to these people and let them stay at the shop?” That was their concern...⁴⁷

There is almost no reference to state security forces and their intervening in the incidents and fights, as they happened to take place depending on the interviews and informal chats with the respondents. In that sense, inhabitants narrate certain tactics they had employed to sustain their security vis-à-vis the pressures of militant groups in the late 1970s. There opened a gendarme station in the garden of the primary school in 1975 at the center of the market. However, as understood from the stories, they seemed to lack behind sustaining security. The shop owners who have their shops close to the center or close to the gendarme station reported that there was no serious incident that had taken place after the gendarme station had come there. However, other shop owners and inhabitants of the region mentioned their sufferings and their ways of solving the problems rather

⁴⁷ Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 April 2003.

than taking help from security forces. Related to the bombing, the member of X family mentioned the inability of the commander in the neighborhood in the following manner:

They bombed here. We had called the police; there was a gendarme station here at the time. No one came from this station. Soldiers arrived from Dutluk neighborhood. Commander asked me where I was from. "I am from Çankırı", I said. He said: "You are a Muslim person I understand". He was a Muslim person too, I understood from his manner [He refers to the commander's rightist political inclinations when he refers to his Muslim identity]. The commander said: "You seem to be thinking going back to Çankırı. [The commander seems to refer to the attitudes of the family feeling dread in relation to the pressures of leftist militants.] But do not do that... Resist." He shouted at the commander in our neighborhood: "How dare you could stay there without hearing the bomb?" Next day, military intervention took place. Then we took a deep breath⁴⁸.

As mentioned in the previous pages, the state security forces could not be defined as holding politically neutral agency during the period. Particularly among police forces, there was an explicit affinity with ultra-nationalist rightist politics⁴⁹. In that sense, the neighborhoods that are mostly constituted by *Alevi* residents were subject to high degree of repression by state security forces. As gathered from the interviews in Mamak Municipality, Tuzluçayır neighborhood, a region very close to Boğaziçi due to its identification with leftist politics and its inhabitation of *Alevi* migrants mostly witnessed continuous war like struggles between security forces

⁴⁸ Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 April 2003.

⁴⁹ Aslan (2004: 132) by referring to his monographic study of a neighborhood that was built as part of "*gecekondu* movement" gave examples to the affinity between some ultra-nationalist civilians and police forces. 1 Mayıs neighborhood was constructed as part of leftist class politics by mostly *Alevi* migrants under the belief that poor classes had the right to appropriate public lands for public purpose (Aslan, 2004: 79). These neighborhoods were defined as "rescued regions" and subject to continuous demolitions and violent incidents (Aslan, 2004: 85). Despite continuous demolitions, they built their houses again and again. In that fashion, 1 May neighborhood also witnessed a huge demolition by state security forces in which a number of migrants were wounded or killed. During the events, many migrants witnessed the presence of civilians who had put on the rosette of Grey Wolves and act on behalf of and with the police against neighborhood inhabitants.

and leftist militants. In that sense, state interference seemed to be high in such neighborhoods. As stated before, Boğaziçi neighborhood exhibits a peculiarity in that sense. The neighborhood is heterogeneous in terms of hometown, sectarian and ethnic identities. It is also known as a religiously conservative neighborhood due to the dense presence of *Sünnis* from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale. In that respect, though the most critical points of public space were under the control of the leftists during the late 1970s, the neighborhood was not subject to any total repression and interference by state forces. Therefore, the struggles between leftists and rightists were taken a more spontaneous form where the tactics people employed on the horizontal level considering the power relations between different groups in the neighborhood seemed to occupy a more extended place in the lives of the migrants when compared to the power relations on the vertical level. In that sense, due to the negligible role state forces had played in the neighborhood during that period, even the shop owners who played key roles in the production of space in the previous decade and who had power and political connections seemed to deal with the repression of leftist militants by employing certain tactics of survival. The leftist militants were often said to visit the shops with the demand of *haraç* (protection money). While explaining their depressions, *Sünni* shop owners give clues about their sympathy to rightist militants and their distant approach to *Alevi*s and leftist ideology:

We had experienced so many troubles from the 1970s to the 1980s. When you went out to the street, they interrogated you all the time by asking where you were from and your name. Our income had declined enormously because we were put in a position to close the shop everyday... They wanted *haraç* (protection money) from us. They broke our glasses and windows.

- Who did these things to you?
- Rightists do not do such things⁵⁰.

The hometown identities had also taken a political connotation during those years for the fact that sectarian identities can be searched through hometown identities. As an example, if you are from certain provinces like Tunceli or some villages like Narlık of Çorum, then it is possible to identify you as *Alevi*. Everybody in the neighborhood had an idea about which villages and provinces are *Alevi* or *Sünni*. In that respect, the militants on the street whether rightist or leftist might put anybody under investigation to learn his hometown identity. That's why some individual shop owners from provinces known for their support of ultra nationalist politics⁵¹ had mentioned about the continuous pressures of leftist groups in that period in the following manner:

In those years, being from Yozgat was accepted as a very bad thing. If you were from Yozgat, you were automatically considered as rightist, *Türkeşci* [supporter of Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of Nationalist Action Party]. It is not true at all. This divisiveness emerged after we had come here. Our village was very close to *Alevi* villages. We loved *Alevi* villages more than the *Sünni* villages. After we had migrated here, *Alevism*, *Sünnism*, being rightist, being leftist, all of them have emerged. In the 1970s... It is a matter of people who come together from 40, 50 different places and settle and live together. The politicians came and deceived our youths in those years. Beneath everything lied material reasons⁵².

⁵⁰ Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003.

⁵¹ As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the provinces of Yozgat and Çankırı were known for their support of ultra-nationalist politics.

⁵² Material reasons here refer to the class dimension of the radical politicization of the neighborhood. This is often mentioned by respondents signifying the politicians' employment of economic deprivations of the youths to make them an integrated part of radical politics. In that respect, "the politicians deceived our youths" is a common statement made by many respondents referring to the late 1970s. Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003.

Another shop owner from Yozgat by using very similar narration explained their identification with the rightist ideology. He also described the fragmented nature of the public space in the neighborhood as follows:

The most depressed period here for us were the first settlement years. The second most difficult phase was between the years 1978 and 1980. I witnessed the killing of a young person here in front of me. When someone got sick, we could not take them to the hospital out of fear. The space from the bridge up here [he refers to the part of the market place close to Samsun Highway far from the center of the market] was the forbidden zone. The other side of the bridge towards Üreğil was another forbidden zone. There were rightists mostly on the other side, but here the majority was leftists. We were under the rule of leftists. Being from Yozgat was so bad. They thought that people from Yozgat were rightists. But this was not the case. We have also many *Alevi* villages in Yozgat. We do not make a racial segregation.⁵³

Despite the fact that these shop owners opposed their identification with rightist militants, they kept their distance to *Alevi*s and leftist politics. This was made explicit in the course of the informal talks with them. These shop owners had developed certain tactics of survival in the insecure and threatening environment of the period. Since most of the illegal incidents and bombings in this period took place at nights, almost all of them mentioned their preference of closing their shops early in the afternoon. According to the sayings of these shop owners who felt depressed most in the period, to close shops early in the afternoon, not to stay in the shop alone without the companion of family members or to avoid guests and social gatherings in the shops can be counted among tactics of avoiding any direct attack by the leftist militants. These tactics, in turn, contributed to serious job loss in the market during the late 1970s. These protection tactics seemed to damage the natural flow of socio-spatial relations in the market place. The nature of shopping

⁵³ Extract from field research note no. 28, 17 June 2003.

and the way shops are employed seem to have a quite peculiar nature in Boğaziçi. Shops are in general social places where the relationship between customers and shop owners seems to be quite informal and to depend on knowing each other for so long. In that sense, I never encountered a case where the shop owner stays in the shop entirely alone during the day. The guests and informal gathering seem to be an essential part of daily life in the market place. The natural flow of life and consumption in the market place, in that sense, had been blocked during that period. The survival tactics employed both by the inhabitants and the shop owners had overshadowed the lively nature of the market. The restricted mobility of the neighborhood residents, in that sense, can also be counted among the reasons for the job loss of the shop owners. Depending on the narratives of neighborhood residents, they had chosen to stay at home unless they were obliged to go outside during that period. The respondents reported the closure of many shops due to the financial and security problems during the period. The ones spatially close to the shop of X family felt this financial loss deeply. The son of such a shop owner narrates how miserable his father felt at the time as follows:

My father had been on equal distance to everybody; he had not been interested in politics. Anyway, he told us how demoralized he had got in those years. He told us about a letter that he wrote a carpet trader in Kütahya. The letter is something like that: "... here everything becomes so disordered. I cannot afford to pay you my debt. I cannot earn anything because I cannot sell anything. I will send you the goods I bought from you and I will close the shop". My father told us that at one time, rightists came for *haraç* at other times, came leftists.⁵⁴

The shop owners had suffered from serious economic impoverishment during those years. These shop owners were mostly the ones having rightist tendencies or

⁵⁴ Extract from field research note no. 14, 3 March 2003.

the ones from the hometowns identified with ultra-nationalist ideologies as mentioned above. However, since the market place was the focal point of interaction in socio-spatial terms, most of the shop owners had suffered from the continuous interrogations and pressures of young militants in those years whether leftist or rightist. Sometimes, one's identity as a *Sünni* in a neighborhood dominated by rightists could not be sufficient to feel secure. The shops as social spaces were narrated under continuous surveillance of militant groups and informants, therefore one's friends from the opposite sects or hometowns might be taken as a proof to the social proximity with the "other" group. During an interview with a shop owner from Kırşehir in Boğaziçi market, I encountered such an interesting story of a forced departure from Üreğil neighborhood to Boğaziçi. This shop owner⁵⁵ narrates how rightists accepted him as an informer for leftist groups. Since he had friends from both leftist and rightist groups, he was forced to leave Üreğil neighborhood, the fortress of extreme right, where he had his house and shop and move to Boğaziçi neighborhood.

To sum up, the market place had become the focal point of interaction in the late 1960s and 1970s. Due to a number of socio-spatial reasons mentioned above, the place witnessed the struggles between leftists and rightists. The heterogeneity of the neighborhood in terms of sectarian identities when combined with the exclusionary attitude of the powerful founders in the previous decade towards *Alevi* residents, led to the reaction of leftists towards these actors and their controlling the region by repressing *Sünni* majority in the market. However, as will be mentioned in the following pages, the control of the public space by the leftists did

⁵⁵ Extract from field research note no. 24, 14 May 2003.

not provide comfort in everyday life for the ordinary *Alevi* residents of the region who were not politically active. The settlements of *Alevi* residents in a loose manner due to their latecomer status had put them into a disadvantageous position when compared to condensed *Sünni* communities who had formed strict control to and resistance against the opposing militant groups' intervening in their community regions.

5.5. Tactics of the Ordinary Inhabitants: Insiders' Space, Protection within the Community

Depending on the course of spatialization in the region, migrants from Kırşehir seemed to lose their power to a large extent in shaping the public space of the neighborhood in the 1970s when compared to initial settlement years due to a number of reasons. First of all, the migratory flows from different hometowns in the late 1960s and early 1970s had made the social composition of the neighborhood more heterogeneous. In that sense, migrants from Yozgat, Çorum, Tunceli and Sivas had emerged as densely populated communities besides migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale.

Secondly, due to their wrong estimates related to settlement decisions, *Kırşehirli*s could not act as the founders of the critical spaces in the neighborhood despite their early comer status. In that sense they could not own the lands that played a critical role in the development of the region.

Thirdly, since they had some community formation from the beginning of the settlement period, they had more inward looking and apolitical approach unlike the migrants from the less represented regions. In that sense, the shop owners who behaved as the leading ones in forming the neighborhood's linkage to local politics are the ones from provinces other than Kırşehir. Despite their relative loss of capacity to take near-strategic decisions in the 1970s, due to the reasons mentioned above, *Kırşehirli*s greatly profited from the advantages of living together as a huge community. In that sense their near-strategic acts in the initial settlement years at least provided a safe habitat for migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale in the insecure environment of the time. Thus early settlers who have found chances to live with their *hemşehris* spatially close felt themselves powerful vis-à-vis leftist groups and the struggles going on between parties in the public space and streets. Many people mention their untouchable position with reference to their identities as being from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale and their settlement in communities. Therefore, among the communities of Kırıkkale and Kırşehir there was almost no mentioning of serious incidents or injuries among the community or near their residential areas in the highly political and violent space of the neighborhood. A woman from Kırşehir described the atmosphere in the neighborhood during the late 1970s in the following manner:

Everybody knows these people [leftist militants]. Both leftists and rightists know them. They killed each other at the train station out of right-left issue. These were the people we know very well. They were leftists our people are rightists. It doesn't matter now. For example, I had friends from Sivas, they were killed in the events.

-How was your relationship with the *Alevi*s residing here? Your neighbors?

-Majority were people from Kırşehir around here... Therefore they could not do anything to us... [*"Bize dış geçiremezler"* in migrant's words.] Most of Fahrikorutürk and Boğaziçi residents were from Kırşehir. Therefore, they

could not go so far. But our neighboring relationship is very good. We have grown together, played together...⁵⁶

I encountered the hesitancy in the narratives of *Sünni* migrants related to their approach to *Alevi*s in almost all of the conversations similar to the anecdote above. On the one hand, for the fact that they had been living together for years, they had *Alevi* friends and neighbors whom they liked. On the other hand, particularly from the early 1970s with the politicization of the neighborhood, the distance between the politically loaded definitions of “us” and “them” though sectarian identities had been widened.

Kırşehir community provided a safe social space for migrants even from other provinces. One of the *Sünni* neighbors from Yozgat living close to Kırşehir *hemşehri* community mentioned the secure environment of the region due the dense presence of *Kırşehirli*s in the region. As a tactic for their survival, families who have no obvious political standpoint prefer to live in isolation at home. In that sense, particularly during that period majority of the inhabitants narrate incidents refer to their loosening ties with public space. The male head of the family from Yozgat narrated their social isolation as follows:

We did not experience any difficulty during that period. I have six siblings; we all stayed at home and mentioned *zikir*⁵⁷. While I was going to or coming from somewhere, nobody told anything to me. I went to work, to Çiftlik (*Atatürk Orman Çiftliği*) everyday. I arrived there at the time of morning call to prayers everyday [about 6 am in the morning]. However, one day, my son wanted to get off the train in Üreğil, but they did not let him. He was so

⁵⁶ Extract from field research note no. 39, 15 Aug. 2003.

⁵⁷ *Zikir* means repeating silently or aloud, the word *Allah*, the ninety-nine names of God, or prayers, which praise God.

scared. They asked him where he was from [his hometown]. He answered that he was from right⁵⁸. They were rightists too. They were *Türkeşçi*. “Nobody could do anything to you” they said to my son. But here, we saw nothing [he means their close environment]. Here people were all from Kırşehir, they [referring to the leftist militants] were scared of entering there⁵⁹.

This protection within large communities seemed to bring some kind of safety perception to the narratives of community members. Despite the fact that Boğaziçi neighborhood and places close to it are narrated as the fortresses of left, *Alevi* residents of Boğaziçi neighborhood mention their sufferings at the time being more and obviously when compared to *Sünni* residents. Particularly, the *Alevi*s of Yozgat and Çorum living nearby or in the middle of the *Sünni hemşehri* communities mention their sufferings and insecurity more in relation to their close residential area. As gathered from the narratives, this insecurity perception seems to be mainly related to their hesitant and in-between position between *Alevi*s of other hometowns and their *Sünni hemşehris*. *Alevi* respondents make references to the exclusionary and violent attitude of *Sünni*s more often while mentioning the period. On the contrary, as will be mentioned in the following section, when the relations between *Sünni* and *Alevi* neighbors will be discussed, *Alevi* neighbors are described by *Sünni* respondents as being protective during the fights between leftist and rightists towards their *Sünni* neighbors whether they are their *hemşehris* or not. As mentioned above, some *Alevi*s of central Anatolian provinces had settled in the neighborhood by mainly taking the *hemşehri* relations into consideration rather

⁵⁸ It is interesting to note here that hometown identities seemed to be often used as a means to get one's political standing in the incidents of the late 1970s as tackled from the narratives of the residents.

⁵⁹ Extract from field research note no. 31, 26 June 2003.

than taking the sectarian identity as the main determining factor. Since *Alevi*s were the latecomers, they had settled, in most cases, as a small community from the same village near a large community of a *Sünni* village of the same province. As an example, the migrants from an *Alevi* and *Sünni* village of Çorum settle nearby each other. In that sense, it is not possible to talk about a dense *Alevi* community settlement except the *Alevi*s of Tunceli and Sivas⁶⁰.

*Alevi*s of Tunceli and Sivas can be accepted as an exception to that since the number of *Alevi*s from these settlements was exceptionally high and by settling in topographically the most unsuitable places to reside they were able to form themselves a relatively autonomous community space. As gathered from the language they used, they could form a protected space. Outside of these protected boundaries, though, they might be treated brutally by rightists, since particularly the *Alevi*s of Tunceli were perceived as the most radical and distant community depending on the narrations of *Sünni* inhabitants. A migrant from Tunceli narrated the injury of his brother as follows:

Yes, I remember those years... I was young then. We played outside in the evening. It was a winter day. I went to my uncle. We heard some gunshots. They shot my older brother while he was on his way to pick me. The bullet went into his chest and went out from his back. Here these upper parts were all under the control of leftists' at the time. Enlightened people... In these lower parts, there are rightists [he shows the residential areas close to the market place]. In Üreğil there were extreme rightists.

-Was he shot closer to Üreğil?

-No, in these lower parts [he shows the residential areas of people from Kırıkkale]. There were some rightists groups here but here was constituted by leftists mostly⁶¹.

⁶⁰ As stated in the introductory chapter of the thesis, some Central Anatolian provinces like Çorum, Yozgat and Sivas were known for their inhabiting *Alevi* villages in great number besides *Sünni* villages. Sivas is a Central Anatolian province known for the dominance of *Alevi* residents. In that sense the migrants from Sivas in *gecekondu* settlements are mainly *Alevi*

⁶¹ Extract from the field research note no. 40, 19 Aug. 2003.

The *Sünnis* of Çorum and Yozgat put their *Alevi hemşehris* into a different category vis-à-vis the *Alevis* of Sivas and Tunceli. As will be mentioned in the following chapter, *Sünnis* of Yozgat and Çorum gave references to their *hemşehris*’ practicing some musts of *Sünni* Islam in order to explain their difference from more radical *Alevis* of Sivas and Tunceli. Generally, the peculiar way of *Alevi* practice of Islam is either neglected or ignored in *Sünni* residents’ narrations⁶². *Alevi* respondents point out one of their most important sufferings as the informing activity among their *Sünni* inhabitants. *Sünni* neighbors had behaved as informants, most of the time and made their *Alevi* neighbors’ identity explicit to the rightist militant groups. The narratives of a number of *Alevi* respondents reflect this informing activity among *Sünni* residents:

-Have you experienced any difficulty in the 1970s?

-We were not able to say that we were *Alevis*. There were some men here, our neighbors [referring to his *Sünni* neighbors]. Their village was so close to ours, Uyurcak village... There were no means of transportation other than train then. At the train station they told others that we were *Alevis*. Ten, fifteen men with guns walked towards me intending to beat me. I said, “Are you not ashamed of yourselves? I am a state officer. I am a member of *CHP*; I have nothing to do with other stuff. I am also from the village of Uyurcak”. Then one of them said, “I am from the same village”. They barely left me free. I lied about where I was from⁶³.

⁶² In the discourses of *Sünni* migrants about *Alevism* and their neighbor’s practicing of *Alevism*, it is inevitable to understand the tendency to identify *Alevism* as a version of *Sünni* Islam rather than a peculiar practice. Therefore, the presence of mosques in *Alevi* villages, the *Alevi* fellows going to mosques for prayer or the *Alevis* who fasted during Ramadan are often given as examples to show the imposed sameness between *Alevism* and *Sünnism*. However, the construction of mosques in *Alevi* villages was mostly part of state policy favoring *Sünni* Islam over *Alevi* interpretation of Islam in the early 1980s. *Alevis*’ accepting or practice of some *Sünni* Islamic obligations seems to be due to the social pressures of their *Sünni hemşehris* living close by.

⁶³ Extract from field research note no. 45, 1 May 2005.

As mentioned in the above anecdote, to hide one's hometown identity could function as a tactic of survival for ordinary residents of the neighborhood against both leftist and rightist militants. Migrants were subject to continuous interrogations about their hometowns at the train station. Moreover, to live in a *gecekondu* neighborhood also made hiding identities difficult due to close encounters between communities. The train station had been the most critical space where direct encounter between leftist and rightist militants had taken place. Almost all of the stories related to the atmosphere of the 1970s in the neighborhood include one important anecdote related to the train station. Migrants had no alternative but to travel by train due to many reasons mentioned in the previous parts. The informal nature of the research setting had made the train as the only alternative means of transportation for a certain period of time. In that sense, particularly for men who were more mobile when compared to women in urban space, traveling by train was narrated as a quite frightening experience due to close encounters with the militants. The train station was unavoidably the meeting point of both Boğaziçi and Üreğil residents since it was the main and most critical point of social space where all the residents needed to use. Consequently, there had emerged furious struggles between the leftists and rightists on this critical aspect of the space in order to gain the control of the train station during the late 1970s as narrated by the respondents who had witnessed these fights. The wife of a former leftist militant defined the extreme importance of train in this manner:

Most of the incidents had taken place in the train. If the train at 7 am belonged to rightists, the other train after that belonged to the leftists. If someone had taken the wrong train by mistake, then, some bad events would

definitely have taken place. Even slaughter could occur. Boğaziçi was mostly a *political* place⁶⁴ [she means space of leftists]⁶⁵.

Despite the fact that the harsh struggles had taken place mainly at the train station, the struggles between leftists and rightists took place also within the neighborhood mainly at nights as mentioned above. Rightist militants due to dense settlement of *Sünni* residents in the neighborhood collected *haraç* from the ordinary *Sünni* residents. The most interesting anecdote related to militants' way of persuading *Sünni* residents for *haraç* was narrated by a *Sünni*, highly conservative shop owner. According to his saying, the rightist militants committed an attack to one of their *Sünni* neighbors' house at night and misinformed the *Sünni* residents in the neighborhood that the "*communists*" did that. He narrated the incident as follows:

There were more *Türkeşci* living close to our house. They shot the houses of their people at nights then they told that communists came and shot the houses. They collected money in return for protection against communists depending on that lie. One day Hacı [a friend of him] kept watch at night to see who were shooting the houses. He saw that *Türkeşcis* came and shot their own people's houses. We got back some part of the money they had collected. They had spent some part of it. We gave this money to the mosque association.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ It is interesting to note that both *Alevi* and *Sünni* respondents use the concept "political" to refer to leftist politics. Political place, political people mainly signify the leftist politics in the discourses of the migrants. "Political" as a concept seems to have a connotation referring to the system opponent nature of leftist ideology.

⁶⁵ Extract from field research note no. 46, 5 May 2005.

⁶⁶ Extract from field research note no. 30, 25, June 2003.

As Bruinessen (1996) mentions not only for the sake of collecting *haraç* but also for recruiting *Sünni* Muslims of the mixed regions, religious extreme right fanned *Sünnis'* fear and hatred of the *Alevi*s. In order to do that they spread “rumors” that *Alevi*s had bombed a mosque or poisoned a water supply unfailingly drew *Sünnis* into the extreme right camp” (Bruinessen, 1996: 8). Taking into consideration the highly chaotic nature of social relationships in the neighborhood, the tactics employed by groups with regard to each other had determined the course of (social) spatialization in the neighborhood. The spontaneity of Boğaziçi and other *gecekondu* spaces had emerged mainly from this fact during the period. The neighboring relations in mixed *gecekondu* settlements like Boğaziçi, within a context mentioned above necessitates a close attention to understand the peculiarity of these settlements, which will constitute the subject matter of next section.

5.6. Living Spatially Close to Each Other: “Sacredness” of Being Neighbors?

In general, being neighbors is considered a “sacred” part of everyday life in *gecekondu*. To be good to neighbors, to respect the boundaries of each other are the predominant values of *gecekondu* life. Depending on research data and depending on my personal observations in different *gecekondu* neighborhoods, the over valorization of being a respected neighbor seems to be almost a norm in *gecekondu* life. It is important to note that the sensitiveness about the issue of “being good neighbor” seems to be closely related to the competition over the ownership of land. Most of the times, the competitions over space and use and exchange value of the real estate constitute the primary concern in everyday lives of the migrants. As

mentioned in the previous chapter, in the first settlement period, being close to one's villagers was very important for the migrants. To form a community is the precondition for them to defend their lands and houses against state forces. Not only they should protect their house and land against state forces, but also they should respect each other's belongings. In that sense, the spontaneous and peculiar nature of land ownership and *gecekondu* construction patterns necessitate a trust relation between migrants. In a condition where the ownership to land cannot be proven by legal documents, neighbors should respect each other's boundaries in order to avoid arbitrary invasion. There are few cases where migrants narrated such disagreement with their neighbors about land issues. They narrated these incidents within the context of the most depressing period for them in the neighborhood. They gave frequent references to the importance and necessity of good neighbors in *gecekondu* life in relation to these incidents. The sacredness of being good neighbors is also closely related to the fact that the distinction between public and private spheres is more difficult to make in *gecekondu* neighborhoods when compared to middle and upper middle class districts of the city. Private lives of the families are often open to public interest due to the peculiar aspects of *gecekondu* space and the domination of community life in these neighborhoods. In an environment where the boundaries of private and public space are not so clear, the migrants often mention the importance of neighbors with good intentions in *gecekondu* life.

The outmost value given to being neighbors in *gecekondu* life becomes noticeable at the moment where the migrants narrate the struggles going on between leftists and rightists in their close residential area. In cases where *Sünni*

and *Alevi* migrants are neighbors to each other, unlike the estimates, respondents mention their avoidance of open conflicts with each other. Particularly, some of the *Sünni* residents narrate incidents where the neighbors from the opposite sect despite their political position have behaved so protective to them for the sake of being good neighbors in the highly conflict-ridden atmosphere of the period. There is almost no explicit reference to an open conflict between neighbors among respondents. *Alevi*s, while referring to these years use a more defensive narration incorporating a threat perception and an explicit reference to their sufferings. The sayings of *Sünni* residents, on the other hand incorporate descriptions about positive and protective behaviors of their *Alevi* neighbors as mentioned above. Despite their reaction and distance to leftists and *Alevi* identity in general, *Sünni* migrants most of the time adopt a positive representation of their *Alevi* neighbors. A *Sünni* migrant from Kırıkkale narrates the struggles taking place near their residential area by referring to their *Alevi* neighbors as follows:

We had closed the doors and windows with pillows during these years. In case they [leftist militants] had seen light and if they had guns; they might have opened fire at houses. We are rightists you know. They [*Alevi*s] did nothing to us since we were neighbors to them. My wife told me, a relative of her, while he was about to get on his car one day, was surrounded by a group of leftists. My wife narrated me that the leftists [their *Alevi* neighbors were among them] were about to beat him, she got out the house and told them that he was her relative. Then they let him go. They did nothing to you if you were a neighbor for the sake of not to behave shamefully⁶⁷.

Another *Sünni* migrant from Kırıkkale narrated how positive the attitudes of his *Alevi* neighbors have been towards him in spite of the fact they have quite opposite political inclinations:

⁶⁷ Extract from field research note no. 25, 15 May 2003.

If you behave good to your neighbors, they will be good to you too. For example, I have a neighbor from Sivas. I do not want to make discrimination, but they are *Alevi* and they were extremely leftists. They gave serious harms to many people [*“Tuttuklarını mahvederlerdi”* in migrant’s words referring to terror years.] They knew that I am a rightist. But, *Allah Razi Olsun*, they haven’t shown any wrong behavior to me for years. Sometimes if they see me as sad, they come near and ask if I am all right.⁶⁸

The importance and sacredness of being neighbors as a predominant value in *gecekondu* life owing to peculiar socio-spatial qualities of these regions seemed to dominate radically political agenda of social spatialization in the 1970s.

It seems so interesting to me as a researcher that *Sünni* residents while talking about the struggles between their leftist neighbors and rightists often give spatial references to these neighbor’s fights with the rightists on the opposite hill rather than rightists in their close residential area. This might reflect the real picture in those years as the fights between groups might take place in long ranges. Still, the inhabitant’s remembering no close incidents of fighting may also give clues about their perceptions of the inappropriateness of fights between neighbors. The similarity between the anecdotes on the same subject may explicate the common approach of *Sünni* migrants related to their *Alevi* neighbors in the following manner:

Our left was resided by people from Sivas and above us people from Tunceli were present. *They had worked actively during those years [she means their militant activities] but had done nothing to us. I do not know if this was related to the fact that we were neighbors. But they often fought with the people on the opposite hill. They fired within long ranges, from here to there [by pointing the gecekondu on the opposite hill].* But neither the ones here nor residing there on the opposite hills did anything to us. They had fired weapons from these hills to each other. I had no problem with neighbors, my

⁶⁸ Extract from field research note no. 25, 15 May 2003.

dear. One of them was from Tunceli. But they were so interested in us. This was because they felt themselves as few in number. I cannot figure it out. They are just behind us, you see... *They could have done bad things to us, nothing like that had ever happened. They were always good to me.*⁶⁹ [Emphasis mine]

A quite conservative woman from Kırşehir who had mentioned her dislike about *Alevi* during the course of an informal conversation used a very similar expression with the above anecdote as such:

There was a woman writing on the wall with mud. I talked to the commander of the gendarme station. I said to him “we are ashamed of her behavior but she does not”. We erased it, and then next day they again wrote it down. On all of the houses there were writings. *But to be honest the same woman, they were from Sivas, had protected us against the attacks and therefore nobody had done anything to us. Since this women’s daughter, they were our neighbors, was a friend of my daughter.* They knew us; therefore, they hadn’t annoyed us. We all stayed at home at nights by closing all the lights. *We heard gunfire from the opposite hill.*⁷⁰ [Emphasis mine]

Similar to the anecdotes above, there was almost no mentioning of an open conflict between *Alevi* and *Sünni* neighbors from the perspective of *Sünni* migrants. At the extreme, the relationship between neighbors of different hometowns had lost its intensity or totally broken as a result of the politicization of *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities. I only encountered two serious cases where there emerged a huge conflict between *Alevi* and *Sünni* neighbors. As a consequence of the conflicts between groups, *Sünni* and *Alevi* families had exchanged their houses in order to live among the migrants from the same sects. If a few number of *Alevi* and *Sünni* families reside in an area dominated by an opposite sect they might come under

⁶⁹ Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003.

⁷⁰ Extract from field research note no. 35, 18 July 2003.

serious oppression of the majority. I talked to an *Alevi* woman⁷¹ from Kars who suffered from such a replacement of places with a *Sünni* family. She narrated how threatened they had felt during the period in Kayaş surrounded by a *Sünni* community from Çorum despite his husband's distance to politics in the following manner:

Çorumlus got up in order to eat during Ramadan. They had stored gasoline in their backyards [I could not understand the meaning of storing gasoline at first. After asking a number of questions, I understood that she was scared from the possible attempts of *Sünni* neighbors to burn their house at night]. They fired their guns at nights. Since we did not have guns we felt very bad. The ones [*Sünni Çorumlus* who exchanged their houses with the family] here went to Kayaş, to our house and we came here to their house. We had a very beautiful house there. I am very upset about that. Here the house was small. We paid the debt of the other house then we added rooms to the one here. Not only us but also some relatives of my husband were with us in Kayaş and they also came here after us. We did exchange of places.

They did this exchange even without taking their furniture. Some members of *Sünni* family from Çorum, the other party of the exchange made their feeling of discomfort explicit because of having lived among an *Alevi* community as narrated by their *Alevi* neighbors. An old *Alevi* woman narrated how they liked one of the two brothers in the family but according to the saying of the woman the other brother and his wife reflected their feeling of uneasiness openly to their *Alevi* neighbors. She narrated the family's hesitant approach towards them in the following manner:

We often visited them. However, one day, we heard that Osman told *Sünni* neighbors here that we were left among *Alevi*s and they did not give comfort to us. In reality nothing bad happened. People from Yozgat and Sivas resided here. Ayşe the wife of Osman, behaved so good to us, face-to-face... Then she talked after us as *Kızılbaşlar* and unclean people. In those years it was

⁷¹ Extract from field research note no. 56, 6 Oct. 2005.

said that they had some *hemşehris* in Kayaş and they told their *hemşehris* that they were not comfortable here⁷².

In general, during the course of the interview and depending on my observations, other than the exchange mentioned above and the case of shop owner who moved from Üreğil to here, I encountered no case of such conflict and discomfort between neighbors from different sects. In case, a few number of *Sünni* and *Alevi* families had been left among a community of migrants from the opposite sect they might feel themselves threatened and uncomfortable in the highly radical political atmosphere of the period. In general, the discourse of *Sünni* migrants related to their *Alevi* neighbors reflected their distance and prejudices about *Alevism* in general, on the one hand, but on the other, they gave references to the incidents exemplifying the goodness of their *Alevi* neighbors towards them. The positive evaluations about the humanity and good attitudes of *Alevi* neighbors in particular would not evolve into a general optimism and tolerance without prejudices about *Alevi* society in the narratives of *Sünni* respondents. On the other hand, *Alevi* people mentioned their sufferings more often and their expressions about *Sünni* migrants in their close environment was more defensive when compared to *Sünnis*. *Alevi*s' good treatment of *Sünni* neighbors may not be necessarily linked to their good intentions only. *Alevi*s were put into a position to develop certain tactics vis-à-vis their neighbors due to often mentioned informing activities on part of *Sünni* neighbors related to leftist activities of *Alevi*s. *Sünni* respondents may, in some cases, mention their informing of the "unlawful" behaviors of their *Alevi* neighbors explicitly. The examples to that, I encountered mostly among the narratives of women since women are the important actors and

⁷² Extract from field research note no.45, 1 May 2005.

the real carriers of the relationship with neighbors. Their perception of the period is quite different than men's. While men seem to have knowledge about the incidents in the public space of the neighborhood transcending their close environment, women give references to their male children and their sufferings in the public space and their neighboring relations during the period. They usually do not have a general knowledge about the incidents between groups in the wider public space of the neighborhood. But they give information about the incidents, which happened to take place around them. As an example, they may have a clear track on the uneasiness between neighbors but they most of the time do not have an idea about what had been going on in the market place. The betrayal of *Sünni* neighbors seems to constitute one of the important themes in *Alevi* women's narratives. As mentioned above, *Alevi* and *Sünni* migrants who had migrated from different villages of the same province seemed to live as neighbor communities. An old *Alevi* woman narrated how his son was betrayed to rightists for the fact that he pasted Atatürk's⁷³ picture on his notebook.⁷⁴ The one who had informed him was the son of a *Sünni* neighbor from a village very close to theirs. For that reason the child was surrounded by a group of *MHP* sympathizers who wanted to see his notebook as told by the women and beaten up seriously for being *Atatürkçü*, therefore communist. When they had found him he was unconscious.

The informing activity was quite common despite the fact that the neighbors were specifically careful about their attitudes towards each other along everyday

⁷³ "The reason behind most *Alevi*s' positioning themselves in support of Republican ideology is related to the "laicist" reforms of Republican regime targeted *Sünni* communities that had been traditionally and historically the "other" of *Alevi*s" (Okan, 2004: 93). Therefore, *Alevi* people identified themselves with Atatürk as a hero and Republican Regime's secular policies.

⁷⁴ Extract from field research note no. 45, 1 May 2005.

interaction. However, the narratives of women with reference to the period point out a general estrangement in the social relations between *Alevi* and *Sünni* neighbors with the politicization of these identities. A quite expressive *Alevi* woman made the feeling of insecurity among *Alevi*s vis-à-vis their *Sünni* neighbors explicit in the following manner:

-Have you experienced any uneasiness with your neighbors during the period?

-Yes of course, there appeared a distance between us. The girls were used to play outside in the garden together. We often went to visit our neighbors in the past, but during that period we haven't seen each other that much. It was told that people from *MHP* put some machine guns in the garden of a neighbor from Yozgat [a *MHP* sympathizer]. But then, the youths of Sivas have found and taken them. It was said that their plan was to rake the entire neighborhood. You know here is an *Alevi* neighborhood. There was another story... People from Yozgat, because of the fact that there were so many *Alevi*s in Boğaziçi had planned to fire all *Alevi* households. They took off from Yozgat in buses but before the buses had arrived here, the intervention took place. They were left on the road.⁷⁵

The loss of trust on part of neighbors would be triggered in the coming decade where the state's policies of repression had been practiced in the neighborhood through intense informing network by the 1980 military intervention. This will constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.

5.7. Conclusion

The public space of Boğaziçi in the 1970s had witnessed struggles between leftist and rightist militants in close connection with the general political and economic context of the country. The spontaneity of *gecekondu* spaces in general and

⁷⁵ Extract from field research note no. 52, 10 Aug. 2005.

Boğaziçi in particular, emerged from the way these struggles had taken place in socially mixed composition of the region and from peculiar social spatialization in the region. Due to state's inability and reluctance to intervene in the radically political space of Boğaziçi, the spatialization in the neighborhood had taken a highly spontaneous and autonomous form during the period when compared to other moments in neighborhood history. The explicit struggles between militant groups or the implicit ones between ordinary residents through informing activity or giving secret support to militants exhibit a form of display of tactics on the horizontal level. Once powerful groups, who were able to take near-strategic decisions in shaping public space, in the previous decade had come under serious repression by leftist militants. The exclusionary acts of these groups in the 1960s had led to unintended spatial consequences that made the public space of the neighborhood dominated by leftists. The train station had constituted the main point in public space where furious struggles had taken place. In highly radical political atmosphere of the neighborhood, the hometown identities had been radically politicized due to these identities' reflecting sectarian affiliations. In spite of the fact that living together as neighbors, spatially close to each other for years had brought about a learning process between sectarian groups. Even though they appreciated their neighbors' good attitudes as peculiar cases, *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities, in general, had become a predominant reference point in defining the "other" for both groups. However, it is not possible to neglect the heterogeneity among *Alevi* community depending on hometown differences. The neighboring relations had not taken a conflict-ridden form explicitly; however, the relations had taken great damage in the period, which will affect the course of social spatialization in the coming decade.

CHAPTER 6

AFTER 1980: NEOLIBERAL STRATEGY, IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF SPACE

6.1 Introduction

Military intervened in politics in 1980 with the claim to restore necessary conditions of democracy in the country. The strategy of military regime was to restrain the radically political nature of public space and mainly urban terror. In conjunction with macro strategies of the military regime, the 1980s seem to be the years denoting the repressive interventions of security forces with the aim of avoiding active politics in public space of the locality. This strategic act of military regime to control and manage public space has led to a general degradation of active politics and aloofness in social relations. Not to speak about politics is defined as the only way to avoid possible troubles in migrants' expressions in such an atmosphere, which will be dealt with in the following sections.

My research findings indicate that the strategic decision of the military regime to “depoliticize” the radically political space of the neighborhood had been realized in three interrelated processes. First of all, at the local level, state security officials seem to utilize a secret information network by encouraging some migrants to inform about other inhabitants in the neighborhood. The public space of the neighborhood at the time can be best defined as a paranoid space where communication out of close *hemşehri* or relative cycle and political talks in public had been avoided.

Secondly, at the macro level, the effect of neoliberal policies have been felt in the shaping up of neighborhood space and claims to it due to a number of reasons beginning by the 1980s. As mentioned in the second chapter, the legalization of *gecekondu* lands with the neoliberal policies of *ANAP* (Motherland Party-MP), the first civilian government after the intervention, had increased the value of *gecekondu* land and led to the further commercialization of the real estate market in newly legalized “*gecekondu*” neighborhoods. This was also the case for Boğaziçi. The reforms of decentralization in local government⁷⁶ system coupled with the neoliberal policies that have triggered urban entrepreneurialism, the low-income settlements were open to dynamics of urban land market. This brought unintended developments where the value of real estate in some low-income settlements declined totally, while some others gained value as a consequence of the contingent interplay of different dynamics like the resistance of local groups to market

⁷⁶ As stated in chapter two in detail, in three urban centers in Turkey- İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir- a two-tiered municipal system was established in 1983. District municipalities under metropolitan municipality began to serve as being responsible from the preparation and application of construction plans in their districts. By this law, most of peripheral *gecekondu* districts that had been built until that time were taken in the legal borders of district municipalities and connected to Metropolitan Municipality in administrative terms. (Heper, 1987: 1)

mechanisms, the spatial location of the neighborhood and the strategic decisions of local government. The establishment of district municipalities under metropolitan municipalities in big cities inevitably had made local political competition between political parties as more responsive to the demands of “*gecekondu*”. In parallel to these developments, the public space of the research setting had gained predominantly an economic meaning for its inhabitants, which in turn led to a general increase in the demands of the inhabitants for necessary services and the application of plans in accordance to their advantage. This in turn, had further increased the value of “*gecekondu*” houses and lands.

Thirdly, as part of the strategic act of suppressing active politics and dominating the ideological claims of particularly leftists, military regime initiated and the succeeding civilian governments carried out the policy of privileging *Sünni* interpretation of Islam as an antidote to ideologies of Marxism and Kurdish separatism (Göner, 2005: 116; Okan, 2004: 93). *Sünni* version of Islam had been presented implicitly as the formal understanding of religion by state and *Sünni* religious courses had become compulsory during the period as a consequence of this policy. The state’s repressive politics towards mainly to *Alevi* leftists in the aftermath of the intervention and their making religious courses compulsory in high schools had alienated *Alevi*s from supporting *ANAP* in the late 1980s despite the fact that they had given support to the party in its initial coming to power (Schüler, 2002:168). As a result of these developments, crystallization of *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities with reference to their religious content seems to determine the course of everyday life beginning by the mid-1980s. The claims to space in economic and religious terms had determined the form of political relations

between the realm of strategy and tactic on the vertical level. The power relations on the vertical level seem to become more reciprocal and the strategic realm had become more responsive to the tactical realm during that period when compared to other periods in the neighborhood history. In this chapter these three strategic spheres of suppressing radically political atmosphere of the late 1970s and the consequences of the strategic acts on the tactical level will be discussed.

6.2 Paranoid Space: The Isolation of Social Relations in the Neighborhood

Depending on the narratives of the respondents, the first strategy of state forces in suppressing the radically political space in the neighborhood seems to depend on getting information about the “previously illegal” activities of the people or any kind of political talk in public through migrants from the opposite sect or opposite political stand. The intimate relations between neighbors and *hemşehri* groups that had taken great damage in the late 1970s had further receded due to the lack of confidence in social relations. Migrants’ portrayal of the 1980s mainly embodies feelings of suspicion, anxiety and insecurity on part of individuals that define social relations. Speaking about politics was severely restricted by the possibility of being reported by neighbors and friends to the police. The typical definition of the period can be exemplified by the sayings of a migrant from Kırıkkale in the following manner:

After the revolution [he means the military intervention in 1980] there had emerged a lot of trouble. Everyday they [the state security forces] took a trip here and collected people. Nobody could talk to each other. Informing

activities had often taken place; therefore people hesitated to talk to each other. These were bad times.⁷⁷

The village-like qualities of social relations had severely eroded during this period. Many people interviewed told incidents of being taken by the police for questioning. The highly repressive atmosphere of the early 1980s in terms of state power to define the course of social relations in a strict way inevitably had necessitated a distance with politics in individual's perceptions about the period.

The state suppression was used mainly against leftists in the aftermath of the military intervention. The active leftist militants of the 1970 had suffered most from the pressures of the security forces with the denunciation of their neighbors. The story of an active leftist militant, who is a *Sünni* himself, which is an exceptional case, reflects such a suffering. He stayed in prison for about ten years as a result of the denunciation of his *Sünni* community. This was narrated, by one of his closest *Alevi* friend who owns a shop in the market.⁷⁸ At some point of the conversation, his friend implied the unfaithfulness of his neighbors. In his words, “Even the ones whom he took the school to Üreğil⁷⁹ do not recognize and respect him now. He was also offended by his own people [referring to his *Sünni* neighbors].” I developed a friendly relationship with this militant during the course of the research. He shared details of his life story with me except the incidents of

⁷⁷ Extract from the field research note no. 25, 15 May 2003.

⁷⁸ Extract from field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003.

⁷⁹ Due to the fact that Üreğil neighborhood was occupied by mainly rightist militants, it was very difficult for people from Boğaziçi to pass there. However, children should go to the school on the other side of the bridge in Üreğil. This militant had taken children and accompanied them to the school.

the late 1970s. However, in his presence, his friends told anecdotes about how intimidating and powerful figure he was for the rightist militants at the time being. I also have a chance to observe the uneasy relationship he had with his *Sünni* neighbors. He continued his friendship with a number of trusted *Alevi* friends and neighbors though.

The *Sünni* and *Alevi* population, who have no direct relation with the political issues of the time, had emphasized the apolitical nature of the public space in the 1980s. The question: “How have the tension laden relations in the 1970s been calmed down in time?” is mainly responded by people with reference to the declining importance of politics in time and the increasing intensity of economic concerns of individuals to earn their daily bread. This perception of individuals about the period seems to have close connection with the neoliberal policies of the late 1980s. At the macro level, the changing structure of the job market and the increasing unemployment rates have resulted in the fragmentation of community based claims and solidarity during the period. This has made families and individuals more constrained with economic concerns, which contributed to the detachment of their communal bonds to a further extent. The common discourse in individual narratives portraying two decades following the military intervention as a period where the political concerns have been replaced by the struggle to make a living seems to signify this process of individualization. A *Sünni* migrant defines this transformation in everyday lives of the individuals as follows:

After the intervention you could not even talk to your best friends unreservedly. Now everything is good. People understand that there is no good coming from politics. Everybody is after earning their daily bread. Life

was hard for everybody at the time being. These issues had lost their importance; there are no left or right anymore.⁸⁰

The ones who had actively participated in the political struggles in the late 1970s and their families emphasized the very same premise that both leftists and rightists are the victims of the period. A member of the previously militant leftist family from Tunceli narrated the nature of the social relations in the 1980s as follows:

There was no longer a tension like that; even the leftists and rightists had become friends to each other. Another reason for that is to live together for so long. Everybody knows each other here. Now the leftists and rightists sit together, talk and discuss about politics. In addition, the events and relations have taken a more economic turn. To earn bread money has become important; people do not care about left and right, any longer... They believe in who has given them more money.⁸¹

As mentioned above and will be discussed in detail in the following sections, this change of approach among migrants towards political issues and their emphasis on economic concerns have close relation with the preeminence of economic determinants in the social spatialization of the locality by means of neoliberal policies.

⁸⁰ Extract from field research note no. 23, 5 May 2003.

⁸¹ Extract from field research note no. 40, 19 Aug. 2003.

6.3 The Effect of Neoliberal Policies on Neighborhood Space

The uneasiness in social relations due to a lack of trust following the period of open struggles between leftists and rightists and the repression of active politics in public space should not lead one to a quick conclusion that the public space had become to a large extent depoliticized in the 1980s. On the contrary, the legalization of *gecekondu* neighborhoods with neoliberal policies of the 1980s has made politics more embedded in the production of public space when compared to previous periods. This has one strong relation with the fact that the relations in the production of space have come to be determined by economic motives and concerns more by the legalization of most *gecekondu* neighborhoods beginning from the 1984 onwards. With the *gecekondu* law established in 1984, most of the *gecekondu* settlements that had been built until that time were legalized. By means of legalization in these neighborhoods, the estate prices and rents in *gecekondu* districts had increased and these spaces had become open to the influence and dynamics of urban entrepreneurialism more. Particularly, the early settlers had benefited from this condition. Boğaziçi has also been taken within the framework of legalization activity by the introduction of the first extensive construction plan of the region. It began to be prepared in 1985 during *ANAP* district mayor ship. The law no. 3194 gave the right to authorize construction plans to the municipal governments in 1985. Mamak Municipality was established as a district municipality, an extension of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and it was given the authority to make and apply construction plans. The *gecekondu* settlements in

the periphery of Ankara had been joined with the city as their legal parts under municipal governing during that period.

Until 1989, approximately 10% of Mamak region had been taken in the framework of the construction plan and legalized according to municipal officers. The operation of legalization in only a limited area in Mamak until the late 1980s is said to reflect the inability of the first district mayor of the region from *ANAP*, Mehmet Akgün, to prepare a well-defined construction plan and operate it efficiently. As supported by the sayings of some inhabitants and municipal officers, the mayor had given priority in legalization process to some neighborhoods from which the party had gotten the main support. In that sense, the parts in migrants' narratives about the political acts of Mehmet Akgün, the first district mayor, reflect a certain stress of the beginnings of a feeling of favoritism and injustice in the local politics. The major legalization activity in the region had taken place between the years 1989 and 1995. Social democrat mayors had been in power during that period and most of Mamak *gecekondu* settlement was legalized. The remaining part was not legalized due to the geological inconvenience of the region for construction. Many respondents defined Selahattin Öcal as the most effective social democrat mayor who came to duty in 1989 by both *Sünni* and *Alevi* residents. However, some *Sünni* respondents also signify the decisions that had taken during his term favoring mainly *Alevi* migrants. In that respect, the aftermath of the highly political atmosphere of the late 1970s as a period seems to take place in the memories of the migrants with reference to struggle given to get legal right to their lands and houses with best possible conditions vis-à-vis one's neighbors, and "other" groups and in relation to that, by carrying an awareness of possibility

about partial treatment on part of district municipality according to sectarian identities. The increasing knowledge of migrants about local politics, their awareness about nepotistic policies and their willingness to utilize favoritism for their interests related to real estate had increased the power of particularly early comer migrants. This implies that they are no longer transitory migrants but active participants having a say in local politics.

The most remarkable aspect of local politics seems to be constituted around the competition over legalizing and planning the neighborhood space between mainly *Alevi* and *Sünni* communities. This reflected a significant transition from an explicit and harsh political struggle in the public space, namely a space of politics to a struggle going implicitly through space that is a politics of space. The reciprocity and responsiveness of the relations between strategical and tactical realm, on the vertical level, intensifies with the increasing power of migrants to define the fate of local politics. That is the reason why the respondents narrate the activities of social democrat mayors between 1989 and 1999, Selahattin Öcal and İsmail Değerli respectively, within the sphere of favoritism. Particularly, *Sünni* migrants define the period as advantageous for *Alevi* population. One of the municipal officers who were actively engaged in the legalization process at the time and who is an *Alevi* himself admitted the incidents of favoritist practices then as follows:

The private construction offices under oath determined the condition of lands at the time. 30% of people's land was considered as the right of municipality and people were obliged to pay this amount to the municipality in order to be included within the context of construction plan. However, the holder of the right decided the value of the land. The municipality was the injured party because of that. For example, if they fixed the value of their land as 10, the

municipality could not say it was 5. We constructed committees and determined the jointly owned lands. The offices under oath did the ground measurements. We distributed the technicians to six different regions. We, in all rounds, sent officers to different regions in order to avoid favoritism. But things like that had happened, we could not prevent them.⁸²

Apart from nepotistic policies of the municipality, the legalization process itself has some loopholes that were open to exploitation. As mentioned in the second chapter, the responsibility that had given to the private construction offices under oath and the informal relation between the inhabitants and officials had caused migrants' abuse of these relations to their advantage. The narratives of Boğaziçi inhabitants revealed the fact that the legalization of the houses during the period had not led to an automatic increase in the prosperity of all. The informal moments in the actualization of legalization had brought injustices to different groups in society depending on their political and sectarian standing. The ones having legal title deeds to the land were put in a more disadvantaged position with legalization vis-à-vis the owners of the *gecekondur* houses on state owned lands. In other words, the ones who legally bought the vineyards of Üreğil villagers could not take the advantage of legalization as much as the ones who had built their houses on state owned lands. Because, the migrants who had their houses on state lands got their formal title deeds according to the declaration they gave about the size of their lands to private construction offices under oath. The inhabitants often give examples about the exploitation of the relationship between the inhabitants and officers under oath. As a tactic, the ones who had no title deeds gained right to the state owned lands on which they had built *gecekondur* houses depending on

⁸² Extract from field research note no. 42, 21 Dec. 2003.

their verbal declaration about size of the land. They used the opportunity to declare their land sizes larger than its normal size of their gardens and extend their rights to the land by including the state lands around within their declaration. The poorest ones who have settled on the steepest parts of the neighborhood suffered from the legalization process most. These places were taken within the construction plan as the green areas, which have transformed into public recreational areas in time.

In addition to legalization, the integration of neoliberal consuming spaces [the opening up of different shops selling international brands] increased the value of real estate prices in the market place. Particularly the established shop owners restored their power in economic and political terms beginning by the late 1980s. In general, they had benefited from the application of construction plan in the region and the transformation of public space. This process has turned them into powerful agents again who could take near-strategic decisions. This restoring of power on part of shop owners had contributed to the spontaneity of neighborhood space in terms of posing an alternative spatial development to the mainstream tendency of apartmentalization in *gecekondu* areas.

Apartmentalization of *gecekondu* districts is conventionally considered as the integration of these districts with city space and the solution of the problems at least in appearance by public perception. However, apartmentalization of *gecekondu* districts, in some cases, poses no real solution to the problems of low-income settlements, on the contrary, even triggered the problems with their unplanned nature and their potential of altering the social rhythm of everyday life in these districts. Moreover, the legalization of the neighborhoods will not

inevitably bring apartmentalization, in reality as expected by the modernization approach. As mentioned by Brenner and Theodore (2004: 8), the neoliberal capitalist territorial organization is always unpredictable and deeply contested because free from the market value of a certain land, social attachments to place persist as people struggle to defend the everyday practices and institutional compromises from which capital has sought to extricate itself. Local actors may resist the neoliberal act of “creative destruction”⁸³ not only to defend everyday practices or as a result of their emotional attachment to *gecekondu* space but also for the fact that durability of the built environment as it is can be more beneficial for its holders. This potential spontaneity in the neoliberal strategic spatial practices operates similarly as a factor behind the late apartmentalization in Boğaziçi. This subject will be dealt with in detail in the following sections.

It is worth to mention that, with the operation of neoliberal policies, economy had come to constitute the main axis of everyday life. The public space was used and produced by the social relations that were predominantly determined by economic relations and assets of individuals. The proliferation of consumption choices has led to the diffusion of new shops selling national and international brands in the market place or the modern means of consumption into the economic transaction process. The presence of the typical traditional *gecekondu* shop besides chain supermarkets that are preferred to a large extent by the migrants for food

⁸³ This concept is developed by Brenner and Theodore (2002, 15). According to the authors, the actually existing neoliberalism should be analyzed with reference to two dialectically intertwined but analytically distinct moments: “the (partial) destruction of extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market-oriented reform initiatives; and the (tendential) creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital. Two important caveats must be immediately added to clarify this conceptualization of actually existing neoliberalism as a process of institutional creative destruction.” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 15)

shopping reflected such a hybrid structure. The contradictory view of a collapsing old *gecekondu bakkal* with recent advertisements of newly emerged goods and a computer print of the statement “visa card is available” hanged on its window is a commonly encountered scene in the recent outlook of the market. The social spatialization in the neighborhood and particularly in the market place has been determined more by economic relations in the 1990s. The value increases in *gecekondu* land with neoliberal policies mentioned above and changing structure of local government system had increased the effect of favoritism and clientalism in local politics; which will constitute the subject matter of the following section.

6.4 Favoritism as the Side Effect of Neoliberal Strategy: The Increasing Importance of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* as Part of Politics of Space

The increasing effect of favoritism regarding ethnic and sectarian identities in local politics seems to be a fact of the 1980s. Schöler (2002: 117) relates this fact to two main reasons as the decreasing charisma of political leaders in conjunction with the loss of the ideological cores in party programs and the increasing domination of identity politics with the declining validity of class based politics after the collapse of the socialist bloc. The repression strategy of military regime mainly towards leftist ideology and its prioritizing *Sünni* Islam as the official religion of state both led to the inability of social democrat parties to use ideological means for political support in the aftermath of the intervention and an attempt on part of *Alevi*s to

revitalize *Alevism* mainly as a belief system. In parallel to these developments, the social democrat tradition in local politics have followed a more clientalistic way of sustaining support from urban poor rather than employing ideological discourses to do that (Schüler, 2002: 119).

As was the case also in Boğaziçi, the domination of social democrat mayors in local politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s in mostly low-income neighborhoods has put particularly *Alevi* communities in an advantageous position for a short time to use their political connections in the appropriation of space vis-à-vis other groups. The Alevis' support for *SHP* (Social Democratic People's Party) in majority seems to be a consequence of the party's favoring individualistic understanding of religion. *SHP* explicitly put its position in the debates about Quran courses in 1986 and 1987 and mentioned the impossibility of giving concession from traditional *Kemalist* and laicist understanding (Schüler, 2002: 171). The intimacy between *SHP* and *Alevi* society can be well exemplified by *SHP's* nomination of *Alevi* candidates in 1987 national elections particularly in cities where the social polarization between *Alevis* and *Sünnis* were rife and support of *Alevis* for *SHP* was high (Schüler, 2002: 184). As mentioned in the previous sections, local government system in big cities was reformed with the introduction of district municipalities besides metropolitan municipalities. The social democrat mayors had been in duty in the late 1980s in both Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and Mamak district Municipality. This had strengthened the ability of social democrat officials to employ clientalistic means to receive the support of *Alevis* in the region. From the perspective of *Alevis* the 1980s in local politics seem to be beneficial for their claims to space in economic and political

terms. If their disadvantageous position as the latecomers to the city is taken into account, their need to use the clientalistic means more when compared to *Sünni* migrants seems to be understandable. As also shown by the findings of a *gecekondü* research by Gökçe et. al (1993: 311), *Alevi*s mainly answer the question: “How do you resolve your problems in state institutions?” as by means of finding acquaintances in state departments rather than by themselves individually. Clientalism for *Alevi*s seems to function as a tactical means to overcome the obstacles put forward by strategical realm.

In that respect, the reality of last two decades in the neighborhood has been an implicit competition that is dependent on the use and production of public space between different groups but mainly between the old rivals that is *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s in the aftermath of the highly radical and fierce battles of the late 1970s. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous section, favoritism that has come to be embedded in local politics beginning from the 1980s has come to replace the explicit competition between *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s in the context of leftist-rightist struggle. In that sense, the municipal treatment of the subjects and the production of public space in Boğaziçi have acquired a highly political content depending on the political and sectarian affiliation of the mayor. The interviewees narrated the municipal service provision and the financial penalties given particularly to shop owners with direct references to *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities or distinction. *Muhtars* as the local headmen are the most important actors who articulate the local needs, demands and knowledge with the municipal level politics. As pointed out by the findings of Erder’s (1996: 272) research in one of the biggest low-income settlements of İstanbul, migrants counted *muhtarlık* as the most visited local

institution that comes before mosque, municipality, coffeehouse, *kaymakamlık* (the office of kaimakam) and political parties. Therefore *muhtars* seem to be the preeminent witness and actors of the politics of space in the region by the 1980s as mentioned above. One of the previous *muhtars* of the neighborhood give an example to the favoritist policies of a social democrat mayor of Mamak in this way:

Mamak Municipality was social democrat at the time. There weren't any people from right in the municipality then. When Selahattin Öcal came to duty, all department heads were Alevi. The services were given to places where *Alevi*s were residing densely. To give an example, we had a place left for public bazaar with legal expropriation on the upper side in our neighborhood when İsmail Değerli [the mayor succeeding Selahattin Öcal] came to duty. However, he made the bazaar constructed in another place [he refers to the place on the boundary between Boğaziçi and Akşemsettin neighborhoods where *Alevi* people are residing densely]. I mean he did not let the bazaar built on the suitable place left for that purpose; he expropriated another place and made the bazaar assembled there, close to his own people.⁸⁴

The same person told a story where naming a school had become a problem between him and *muhtar* of adjacent neighborhood. He explained how he had applied to the Ministry of Education for the need of a primary school in the neighborhood. According to his saying, the construction plan including the plan of the school was accepted in 1989. However, female *muhtar* of Akşemsettin who is an *Alevi* had insisted on naming the school as “*Devrim*” [meaning revolution in Turkish that was the motto of left in the late 1970s]. According to the *muhtar*, this was a totally illegitimate claim on part of *Alevi muhtar* since he initiated the

⁸⁴ Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003.

construction of the school in his neighborhood. He explained the effort he showed in naming the school as “*Şehit*”⁸⁵ *Murat Eroğlu İlkokulu*” in the following manner:

She had used her connections a lot and tried to give the name “*Devrim*” to the school. I went to the *kaymakam* and Ministry of Education and suggested the name of a soldier who had lived in our neighborhood and died while serving in the army. The ones living in Akşemsettin were using their votes in that school. *Alevi*s were in majority in Construction Council. *Muhtar* had printed voter cards under the name of *Devrim İlkokulu*. For that election, the school was admitted as *Devrim İlkokulu*. Then we gave it its formal name.⁸⁶

Similar to the complaints of the Sünni *muhtar*, Sünni shop owners define the period in the late 1980s and early 1990s by giving references to the biased attitudes of *zabıtas* (municipal police officers) working under social democrat mayors and who are defined by shop owners as mostly *Alevi*. They point out the main reason behind the close surveillance of social democrat *zabıtas* during the period as the identification of the market space with *Kırşehirli*s, therefore it is being considered as the space of *Sünni* and religiously conservative people. The social democrat municipal attitude in the late 1980s and early 1990s about this particular space is narrated as always more uncomfortable vis-à-vis the attitude of recent religiously oriented conservative municipal cadre. Almost all of the shop owners mention their sufferings during the governing of social democrat mayors. The most often narrated complaint was the frequent visits of *zabıtas* to control and supervise the acts of shop owners in compliance with rules and regulations. Financial penalties for the proper and healthy functioning of the market are explained as the main

⁸⁵ “*Şehit*” refers to a person who dies while serving Turkish state or Islam. The rightists name places after *şehits* so as to signify their nationalist sensitivity.

⁸⁶ Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003.

instruments of politics according to the traders. Both *Sünni* and *Alevi* shop owners mentioned the feeling of pressure during that period as a result of the continuous control of the municipal officers. *Alevi* shop owners narrate their sufferings like the *Sünni* shop owners for the recognition of market as a conservative space by the 1980s on. One of these *Alevi* shop owners compared this stressful period with the actions of religiously oriented municipality of nowadays as follows:

When the leftist mayors were on duty, inspectors [*zabıtas*] were coming from the municipality every two weeks. Now these ones [recent municipal police officers from *AKP*] come once a year and they, most of the time, return back without fining anybody. These people do not touch the poor and the needy ones. If I do not know their real face, their services are far better than the leftist municipalities.⁸⁷

Sünni shop owners mention the relative depression they had felt during the period when social democrats were in charge of Ankara Metropolitan and Mamak district as opposed to quite peaceful and profitable period coming just aftermath of the military intervention in 1980. They described the period of social democrat mayors as one of the most stressful periods despite the fact that they also narrated stories related to their power and political connections against the acts of municipal officers. Also on that issue, respondents signify family X as the leader of local resistance against the “unjust treatment” of municipal officers. The family by using their political connections and local social power they had seemed to lead the resistance on part of the shop owners. According to the narratives of the shop owners, during İsmail Değerli’s period, a social democrat mayor, *zabıtas*

⁸⁷ Extract from field research note no. 7, 5 Nov. 2002. In spite of the fact that *AKP* party was not in power in that period, some migrants, in their recent expressions used *AKP* in order to refer religiously oriented parties with reference to past politics also.

prohibited the exhibition of goods in front of the shops on the street. Shop owners were obliged to put their goods inside their shops. X family had a grocery and particularly for them, the exhibition of vegetables and fruits in front of the shop was a necessity. The member of the family narrates how they had found an acquaintance who held a critical position in the municipality and had resisted against the controls of the *zabıtas*. He particularly emphasized the fact that this had constituted a model for other shop owners and the supervisions had become rare as a result of this act. Some other shop owners' narratives as exemplifying the leading and powerful shop owners in the region as follows support this narrative:

-Who would play the leading role in transmitting the complaints of shop owners to local politicians?

-The big shop owners, the leading ones... For example, in the past there was a municipal police officer... At the time of leftist municipality... Karayalçın period... This person who groused the shop owner was Alevi but the grocery owner was from *MHP*... They were from opposite fractions. In order to make him to take back two boxes [from the pedestrian way], he had often fined him. He said: "Take the boxes in, do not put them outside." We could not even leave a chair outside at the time. They [the leading shop owners] come together among themselves like 15 shop owners. They did a sudden visit to the municipality and also arranged people from important places. They made the mayor warned the principal [of municipal police officers]. The principal was persuaded then the issue was concluded.⁸⁸

The power of shop owners had been further restored with the declining power of social democrat dominance in local politics. Political Islam has gained momentum starting with the noticeable victory of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi-RP*) in the 1994 local elections, which was the case also in Mamak and therefore Boğaziçi neighborhood.

⁸⁸ Extract from the field research note no. 14, 3Apr. 2003.

The 1994 local elections signified the beginning of a new period in the history of low-income settlements. *Gecekondu* residents, who had been left as the “other” in Turkish politics until the 1994 local elections, accomplished a kind of democratic revolution against the central elite powers and this was the first time where people defined as the other for years had direct power in determining urban policies (Yalçintan and Erbaş, 2004: 40). Some relate the success of *RP* to its appeal to the economic needs of low-income settlers rather than its religious orientation (Özler, 2000: 53). Besides economic factors, the local political success of the party depends mainly on migrants’ disappointments with the inefficiency of the local services previously provided by the social democrat parties, the suppression of leftist politics in the peripheral settlements by state security forces since the late 1970s, and the success of the *RP* in grassroots organization and campaigning. The disappointment felt by the residents of peripheral settlements for years towards the social democratic tradition that had once a strong basis in the peripheral settlements were well revealed in the 1994 and 1999 local elections. *RP* tried to mobilize the urban poor, who had suffered from the liberalization policies of the 1980s that had had such a negative impact on peripheral social and economic groups (Dağı, 2005: 25). It attracted 19% of the votes nationally and gained 329 mayor ships including Istanbul and Ankara. The victory of *Adalet and Kalkınma Partisi- AKP* (The Justice and Development Party) that came to power alone in 2002 national elections, having a strong Islamic basis was announced by a widely read newspaper *Sabah* just after the Election Day as an “Anatolian Invasion” (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 97). These developments triggered the divide between secularist and Islamist groups and urban elite perspective evaluates considers the

return to all kinds of community formation in low-income neighborhoods as dangerous for national unity as mentioned in chapter two.

The dominance of the religiously oriented parties in local politics with the popularization of conservative Islamic practices among *Sünni* population particularly living in low-income settlements has opened a new phase in urban politics. In parallel to these developments, shop owners mention about the relative comfort they have experienced as Melih Gökçek came to duty. As stated by *Sünni* shop owners mainly, the control and supervision of police officers had become looser due to this transformation in local politics. In other words, shop owners relate the relaxation of municipal control beginning by the mid-1990's to the identification of market place with *Sünni* conservatism. Many shop owners emphasize this connection similar to the anecdote below:

We open our shops on Sundays. The head of the municipal police here in Mamak is from *AKP*. In my opinion, they think that all shop owners here are *AKP* supporters. Therefore he does not pay any visits to the region. We open the shops on Sundays and we do whatever we want.⁸⁹

As mentioned above, the shop owners, particularly the ones who could adapt their shops to the changing consumption patterns or open new shops in congruence with the newly emerging demands had gained a certain economic and political power as a result of neoliberal policies after the 1980s. These shop owners were the ones who had settled the market earlier and commonly they had more than one

⁸⁹ Extract from field research note no. 5, 10 Oct. 2002.

shop in the region. Despite their complaints about the period of social democrat mayors, particularly the leading ones have the power and connections to resist the acts of municipal officers at the time. In the late 1990s, regardless of the effect of economic crisis, primarily the established shop owners seemed to gain increasing power depending on my observations. These are the ones who seem to have power to take near-strategical decisions that might unintentionally shape the neighborhood space. This will constitute the subject matter of the following section.

6.5 The Near-Strategical Decisions of Shop Owners vis-à-vis the Paradoxes of Strategic Realm

Unlike the estimates of the neoliberal strategy, the legalization of *gecekondu* houses and lands by means of private construction offices and under the supervision of two-tiered municipal system had not brought necessarily the attraction of large construction firms that are willing to invest on the peripheral lands on which low-income settlements had already been established. On the contrary, as Erder (1996: 158) mentioned, the preparation of construction plans and their application bring settledness of all social layers and power structure in *gecekondu* neighborhoods as they are. Since the planning attempts and applications tend to protect the existing structure as it is and this conserves the legal small parcels as they are which, in turn, avoids the entrance of the big construction firms with capital to such low-income neighborhoods. The real estate system in these neighborhoods seems to depend on the small property ownership and individual

legal title deeds to land and houses. Therefore as pointed out by Erder (1996: 158) elegantly, the new physical and social relations emerged after legalization in such neighborhoods hinder two groups on the extreme poles, the poor and big capital from entering the real estate market in these regions.

The neoliberal shaping of urban space brings unintended and contingent happenings⁹⁰. As Weber (2004: 183) discusses in her article on neoliberalism and urban redevelopment, the distant and big capitalists will only invest on an urban property if the property is recognizable beyond its unique character embedded in space and if it is believed to sustain short-term returns. If these conditions are not met, disinvestments may occur in certain regions that may constitute the reason behind the uneven urban spatial development within the context of redevelopment of urban land under neoliberal strategy according to the author. This argument may shed light on the reluctance of big investors to invest on some *gecekondu* neighborhoods. The complicated nature of property ownership patterns in *gecekondu* neighborhoods might constitute a reason to understand why the big investors behave reluctant to invest in *gecekondu* settlements despite the

⁹⁰ Even there emerges a recent theoretical distinction/classification between “ideal-type” versus “contingent” neoliberalism. Ideal type of neoliberalism depends predominantly on Hayek’s and Friedman’s selective reading of classical liberal project in opposition to egalitarian turn within liberalism that began with John Stuart Mill and continued through the work and influence of Keynes (Hacksworth & Moriah, 2006: 511). The core principles of ideal type liberalism can be listed as follows: 1) The individual is the normative center of a society; 2) The market is the most effective means through which individuals can maximize their own utility functions; 3) State actions that interfere with either individual autonomy or market relations lead to an autocratic society regardless of their intentions (Ibid., 511). “Contingent neoliberalism” conceptualization emerges, on the other hand, from a three groups of criticism to the contested nature of ideal-type definition of neoliberalism as defined by Hacksworth and Moriah (2006: 512). First group has challenged the ideal-type neoliberalism on geographical grounds. “They argue that localities filter and define neoliberalism at least as much they (localities) are filtered and defined by such ideas.” A second group in close relation with the first group has challenged the internal consistency of neoliberalism itself. They suggested that neoliberalism entails a form of state intervention that contradicts one of its basic premises- that of minimalist state. A third group of thought challenges the emphasis on neoliberalism within cities given the presence of other parallel processes and ideologies, like neocorporatism, neocommunitarianism and neostatism.

legalization of the neighborhood. If the majority of the neighborhood residents under the leadership of influential actors act in total compliance with *muhtars* and local politicians to attract such investment, the neighborhoods, may turn into middle and upper middle class suburban districts. Even in such cases, there is a great possibility to come up with serious problems due to under representation of certain groups.

The legalization of the neighborhood and the value increases of land do not bring consequential apartmentalization in also Boğaziçi due to the reasons mentioned above but mostly because of the increasing power of influential shop owners in taking near-strategical decisions. The dependency of apartment construction on the choices of the shop owners in the region had one important spatial reason. Spontaneous apartmentalization in previously *gecekondu* neighborhoods should be initiated beginning from the two edges of the main roads for practical reasons. Only then, apartments in other parts of the neighborhood can be built accordingly. The constructors are also more willing to build apartment houses principally on the edge of the main roads. This common pattern of apartmentalization is also valid for Boğaziçi. As mentioned above, shop owners owned the lands on the edges of the main road in the neighborhood passing through the market. Depending on the narratives of the respondents, some shop owners in compliance with their interests have acted near-strategically and resisted the requirements of the construction plan that had changed for a number of times. Shop owners in their narratives; give frequent references to their or other shop owner's acts of altering the course of spatial development mainly in two spheres.

First of all, some of them are recited as having slowed down the application of construction plan by using their connections with municipal officers. The construction plan is supposed to give the main road its final form. The construction of the road according to the plan is not possible without the partial demolition of some shops or houses on the edges of the main road, which would work to the disadvantage of some shop owners.

Secondly, as stated by the respondents, some shop owners as the owners of land may not prefer to give their lands to the constructor and want apartments to be built in place of their shops and houses due to the unprofitable nature of this transaction for them. If they have sufficient financial assets, they mention their preference to build apartments by themselves without using constructors. Five apartment houses in the region had been built likewise. Since if they choose to give their lands to the constructor, what they get in return would be one or two flats from the constructed apartments. In this respect, unlike the expectation of modernization approach that the value increase in land and planning would eventually bring apartmentalization, there are few apartment houses in the neighborhood despite the quite old age of the neighborhood. The unwillingness of most shop owners in giving their lands to the constructors for apartment construction can easily be tackled from their narratives. The shop owner who owns one of the five apartment houses in the region narrated the late apartmentalization process in the region as follows:

The apartment construction remains very slow here. The most important reason here is that shop owners are residing on the edges of the main road. Look at the apartment on the other side. They, themselves, built their apartment just like us. If they gave their land to the constructor, they got only one fifth or one sixth of the apartment. Since everybody is a trader here, we

all know about financial issues a little bit. We are not satisfied with what the constructor offers.⁹¹

The unprofitability of having two or three apartment flats in return for their lands is related to the rent earnings they are already taking from their real estates in the market. When apartments are constructed, the basement is designed to be shop spaces and the upper flats are used as family residents in general. Traders who own three or more small *gecekond* shops on their lands may prefer the condition to remain the same since the rent revenues from them would be greater than the returns they would get from the apartment construction. Traditional *gecekond* shops are so small that there can be three or four shops on the same plot owned by a shop owner, which make the rent earnings of the shop owners quite satisfactory from these shops. This finding of the research is supported by the cases in many Third world cities as put forward by Davis (2006: 83) that the legalized squatting in Third World cities triggers *slumlordism* as a fact where the rent revenues from slum areas may be profitable when compared to invest in some other places in the city.

In such an old *gecekond* neighborhood that is close to important highways and where there is such a big market place, the apartmentalization should have already been taken place. However, the presence of shop owners as the main property holders of critical locations for construction, they have a potential to show a resistance to strategy's project of "spontaneously modernizing" these regions by means of apartmentalization.

⁹¹ Extract from field research note no. 10, 2 March 2003.

Shop owners define another obstacle behind apartmentalization that operates against their interests. The apartment construction necessitates a change of place on part of shop owners at least for a certain period during the construction process. The shop owners, in general, mention their unwillingness to move out even for a while with the concern of losing their customers. Besides that, if a plot of land is owned by more than one person, which is the case for some shop owners in the market, no one shareholder should oppose the apartment construction in order a construction permit would be given to that plot. Depending on the narratives of the migrants, in some cases, this constitutes a barrier to apartmentalization. In general, the reasons behind the late apartmentalization reflect the increasing power of shop owners in determining the socio-spatial development in the region in relation to the legalization of the research setting in the late 1980s.

Some shop owners and other residents of Boğaziçi relate the belated application of the construction plan of the main road in the market place to the power of some shop owners in employing the favoritism in local politics to their advantage. The construction plan of the main road has been changed for several times and it could not have been applied properly until the late 1990s. In my last visit to the region, the application of the plan has still not been completed due to the resistance of some shop owners as signified by other shop owners. When you enter the market from Samsun Highway, the shops on the left side have mostly been damaged and affected by the planning acts of Municipality. The *gecekondu* shops and houses were built in a haphazard version in the market and they do not follow a straight line. When the application of the plan is completed, excess parts

of the shops and houses outside the context of the route of the road in the plan will be demolished. Some parts of the shops or the houses of traders were already severely disturbed in accordance with the conditions of the plan. Shop owners evaluate the leaning of the road more on left edge rather than right in different ways depending on their shop's location on the left or right or their political affiliation.

There are two types of explanations about that incident. First type of explanations defines the the application of the plan in its latest form leaning more on left as a result of technical necessity rather than as an act with political connotations. Second category of explanations, on the other hand, defines the decision and application of the municipality mainly as a political act resulting from the imposition of shop owners who have used their connections in the municipality. In most cases, the respondents signify the political connections that are against their own political affiliations.

First type of explanations relate the construction of the main road leaning more on left rather than right edge with a technical necessity mainly for two reasons. The presence of public buildings like primary school and mosque on the right side is signified as the most important technical reason behind the latest construction plan of the road. Secondly, some technical explanations give references to the fact that the right side of the road is topographically suitable for construction when compared to the left side. Despite the fact that some shop owners suffered from the extension of the road themselves, they may define the process in a purely technical manner. These are the influential shop owners who

define their relations with municipal planners and officials more active when compared to others. The owner of one of the disturbed houses, a member of X family explains the partial demolition of the house in accordance of the plan as a technical necessity and relates this to the topographically suitable nature of their side. The internal cross sections of their house become visible and the house seems to become totally useless as such. The part of the house annihilated can be easily perceived. The door that was once opened to the hole from the salon becomes visible now on the front side of the house. In spite of this fact, the owner of the house mentioned his satisfaction about the proper application of the plan and the payment of their deserving in return for their loss during the metropolitan mayorship of Melih Gökçek. The physical conditions restrict the possibilities for extension to the right according to the man and if the political connections have played such an important role as people assume he told, they would have the power to use this most but this was not case.

In addition to dealing with the form of the latest construction plan many shop owners complain about the belated construction of the road due to the favoritist policies of the previous municipalities. Many of the conservative *Sünni* shop owners who had no sympathy for favoritism operating to the advantage of social democrats or/and *Alevi*s in the region blame social democrat municipalities as responsible for the delay. Some shop owners also point out that the construction plan had taken its last form during the social democratic metropolitan mayor of Murat Karayalçın. Therefore these respondents attributed the responsibility of their sufferings to social democrat municipality rather than the recent municipality who has been applying the plan.

These different interpretations may reflect factual cases sometimes, but most of the time the stories are filled with rumors contradicting with other stories showing the traces of respondents' biases. A conservative *Sünni* shop owner explained his sufferings due to the application of the construction plan that has been changed during social democrat municipality. The recently constructed road passes through the land where there was a shop and house of them. Therefore municipal officers demolished their shop and house. He seemed angry at the incident, which happened in 1996. In some part of our conversation, he lowered his voice and said that the road was not put as passing their land in the actual plan. However, in his opinion, later *Alevi*s put pressure during Karayalçın's period and the plan was changed. According to him, in the second version of the plan, the road with a slight arc was put as passing in front of their shop. He accused the owners of the bakery close to Samsun highway for that. The bakery was located just on the entry of the neighborhood from Samsun Highway. If the actual plan has been applied the bakery should be demolished. They have delayed the application of the plan by using their political relations as stated by him⁹². This is a common accusation about the owner of this bakery shared by many shop owners. A *Sünni* shop owner from Yozgat explains the same incident as follows:

We had a famous bakery here once just on the entrance of the market [He mentioned the fact that the bakery was located just on the place where the extension of the main road that once was river would be initiated]. They were the ones who had showed the main resistance to the development [with certain anger]. They were the reasons why no progress had taken place here for years.⁹³

⁹² Extract from field research note no. 2, 25 Sep. 2002.

⁹³ Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003.

The owner of the bakery is from Karadeniz, though not *Alevi* in origin; he is said to have acquaintances in municipality when social democrats were in power. Therefore, *Sünni* explanations of the issue reflect the *Alevi* political connections with the municipality and the favoritism as an ingredient part of social democratic municipal tradition. An *Alevi* shop owner, on the other hand, interprets the same event by rejecting the arguments about social democrat nepotistic policies by linking the belated application of the plan to the legal and financial barrier in front of the municipal officers in dealing with the owner of the bakery as follows:

At the entrance of the market [from Samsun Highway] there was a bakery just on the corner. This road could not be built properly because of this bakery until now. The bakery shop should be demolished according to the plan. The owners acted in a clever manner and insured their shops very much above the real value of it. Therefore the municipality could not afford to pay the insurance money in order to demolish the shop for years.⁹⁴

This same shop owner, however, shares a similar criticism in relation to the improper attitude of the owner of bakery causing the delay of plan's application. The construction of the main road constitutes a cure also to the serious problem of flooding. As a result of the delay of the road extension, the recent and last flooding incident in the region had given so much harm to the market according to the shop owner. In this recent flooding, as a result of heavy rain, people with their cars and in the buses were dragged from the market to Samsun Highway for like 200 meters. Shop owners hardly saved their lives according to the stories.

⁹⁴ Extract from the field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003.

There are cases where shop owners who are densely presented in the neighborhood like the ones from Kırşehir are accused for delaying the progress in the neighborhood. Since they are in majority and have powerful position as a group, they were said to take part in nepotistic politics as to be affected least from the drawbacks of the plan. A shop owner from Yozgat gives references to this issue in a general mood of uneasiness “outsider” shop owners have felt for *Kırşehir*lis for years as such:

Our place was two meters a head but we took it back [because of the construction plan]. The shop became smaller, very much smaller than past. We are not pleased with the Municipality. They did nothing, like to draw a proper construction plan [referring to the spontaneity of the plans]. The municipality is not helping us; they don’t even have a concern like that. I have been here since 1967 and the progress should be more than that. We cannot construct our apartments, for example, we were eight people but my uncle died and we are 16 [share holders] now. There are so many problems related to infrastructure. Look for example; they could not even complete the construction of this road since 1983. There will be elections in ten months. As an example, the ones on the opposite side have acquaintances in the municipal council. They had already got all their deserving but they did not take their shops back. They are all from Kırşehir. Therefore there is no reason to expect any development here.⁹⁵

The increasing power of shop owners is expected to define the implicit competition going on between *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s after the 1980s through the production and use of space. It is interesting to see that, one of the most possible areas of competition between them, namely consumption sphere is dominated by the economic concerns rather than concerns related to sectarian or *hemşehri* identities. This will constitute the subject matter of next section.

⁹⁵ Extract from field research note no. 34, 3 July 2003.

6.6 Consumption Determinants: Prices or *Alevi/Sünni* identities?

The increasing effect of neoliberal policies on the neighborhood space coupled with repression of active politics by state policies brought about the predominance of economic relations in employing and producing the space. The radically political space of the neighborhood in the late 1970s had turned into a space of economy. The shops and commodities in the market had been qualitatively and quantitatively proliferated in the 1990s. In such a context, once highly political categories of being *Alevi* and *Sünni* or ethnic differences seem to have very little effect or seem to work as criteria for a limited group in defining the consumption choices. At least, both on traders' and customers' side, the tensions implicit are not made explicit in the expressions of the inhabitants and their portrayal of consuming habits. There are few incidents I witnessed during my stay at different shops making the tension explicit. The following anecdote by a *MHP* sympathizer member of the family X explicates such an implicit tension between trader and customer as a result of ethnic distinction:

[After the formal interview]

You should treat every kind of people good as a trader. For example, that man, a second ago stand just beside me. You do not say to his face that he is a Kurd, *Tuncelili*, or any other thing but you are giving him service. He has seen that we have been talking here, planted himself just beside me and sung a folk song [He tells these things with certain anger and strong degradation.]⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Extract from field research note 16, 8 Apr. 2003.

Interestingly, there are a number of examples as narrated by the shop owners and some inhabitants that material transaction between the people from the same sect or hometown may lead to an unfavorable positions for both sides. An *Alevi* shop owner defines his uneasiness with his *Alevi* customers in the following manner:

-Are your customers mostly *Sünni* or *Alevi*?

-To tell you the truth, the opposing group [he means that his customers are mostly *Sünnis*] comes more often. There is envy among our people. Our condition [he refers to his prosperity vis-à-vis other *Alevis*] is so to say good. They become jealous of our conditions. However, if something bad happens to them, who would run to help them? If something political happens, again we mobilize all our opportunities. The others [*Sünnis*] also know who we are but they like our honesty and kindness. And they also had enough of their own people's hypocrisies therefore the majority of my customers are *Sünni*. More than that, our own people use the condition of being *Alevi*. They ask for money, you give; they do not pay you back. These things often happen.⁹⁷

As well, from the perspective of the customers, the social proximity in terms of being *hemşehri* or having common sectarian identity with the trader may not be a favorable condition where there emerges a difficulty in bartering. An old couple narrates the difficulty in the following manner:

We do not prefer to buy anything from an acquaintance. Then they cheat you as a friend. It is far worse than shopping from a stranger. Other than that you cannot barter with a friend. Shopping from a stranger is better. You can put the price as you like.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Extract from field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003.

⁹⁸ Extract from field research note no. 36, 20 July 2003.

From the traders' perspective sectarian identities seem to hardly constitute a serious concern. Being trustworthy and reliable customers is the most important criterion for shop owners in selling goods on credit. In that sense, hometown commonalities play a minor role in shop owners' decision of selling goods on credit to certain customers.

From the customer's perspective, on the other hand, the economic concerns, spatial proximity of the shop and the possibility of shopping on credit that is dependent on knowing each other for long seem to have a strong effect on consumption choices. Particularly in relation to food shopping, almost all of the respondents mention their preference of big supermarkets that had been opened beginning by the early 2000s in the market. The supermarkets are defined as more suitable for the respondents mainly because they can use credit cards in them. The markets in competition with each other sell some goods particularly food below real prices by taking the risk of loss. Therefore mainly for food shopping they are seen as the only alternative recently by the migrants. Therefore the *bakkals* and old groceries have suffered most from the opening up of these markets. They defined their incompatibility with the markets in the following manner:

They started business here two, three years ago. They, of course, put an impediment before our job. I went to wholesale food market to buy goods for the shop. We chatted with the directors of Nazar and Gima [The supermarkets that have branches in different locations of Ankara city]. They said that they have bought one kilogram of tomato from 600,000 Turkish Liras and sold it in the market from 500,000 Turkish Liras. They said: "We sell tomato and cucumber by losing money and reflect this loss to other goods in the market". We cannot compete with them. Is it possible? I am asking to you.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Extract from field research note no. 16, 8 Apr. 2003.

For their other needs like clothing and house appliances, they go to the shops with which they have developed some kind of trust and intimacy for years. They mainly buy things on credit from these shops. Traders mention their function as an economic buffer mechanism in the region through delaying the debts of customers for a number of months. Therefore shopping and selling on credit is still a norm in the paradoxically modernized space of the market as a tactic on part of shop owners to compete with the big supermarkets and the shops in other parts of the city. Poor people in general have difficulties in paying their debts to shop owners. Particularly when shopping for health is the case, the condition of poor people become more obvious. Owner of the most visited pharmacy gives the most remarkable examples about the issue:

-Do you sell medicine on credit?

-[The pharmacist showed me a box in which there were different jewelries and identity cards that had been left as guarantee in return for their debts by the customers.] Here there is an identity card and a driving license left a year ago. He left the driving license in place of 3.5 million Turkish Liras debt. If they want to take new driving license they have to pay much more. They, in some cases, have left their earrings. I took them to the jewelry shop next door. They said that they are copper.¹⁰⁰ [She laughs.]

Moreover, the inhabitants, for the sake of not cutting their close relations with *bakkals* they have known for so long may prefer to shop from them time to time in order not to upset them. The respondents, in some cases, tell about their emotional discomfort vis-à-vis these *bakkals* for their choice of supermarkets for food shopping. They do not want to offend *bakkals* not only for the sake of their close

¹⁰⁰ Extract from field research note no. 18, 25 Apr. 2003.

personal relations with them but also for the financial comfort they provide in times of financial difficulty. The continuity of the old and trustworthy relations with *bakkals* constitutes a guarantee for the inhabitants in various ways. This trust relation between the customers and *bakkals* can be well exemplified by the sayings of a *bakkal* below:

People generally go to supermarkets for their collective shopping needs. The ones who do not have money and have minor needs come to us. The ones who shop from me are all acquaintances. Yesterday a woman who had shopped from Özsoy [a supermarket in Boğaziçi] came to me with her packets in hand. She said: “Haydar I did something stupid. I shopped from the market. Please calculate what I have bought so that I can see if I was cheated”. I said that I could not do something like that.¹⁰¹

In spite the fact that the market place has been “modernized” with the integration of neoliberal economic space in the neighborhood, the traditional way of economic transactions play a vital role for the inhabitants particularly for the needy ones. Even though these newly opened shops seem to affect the business of traditional shops in a negative way, since old shops perform an important function as a buffer mechanism that avoids crisis, they still continue their existence in the market.

¹⁰¹ Extract from the field research note no. 7, 16 Oct. 2002.

6.7 Revitalization of *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities: The Politics of Religious Spaces

As mentioned above, the military regime's efforts to propose *Sünni* interpretation of Islam as a remedy for leftist ideology and Marxism has not only strengthened the popular basis of Islam in low-income settlements in big cities and in provinces where *Alevi*s reside densely with *Sünni* population but also led to the revitalization of ethnic and sectarian identities that have always been in minority position. Islam became one of the main components of the ruling ideology as a bulwark against the leftist movements of the 1970s. The approach of state towards *Alevi*s in particular has always reflected a hesitant position. From the establishment of the Republic onwards, on the one hand, the secular basis of state has always been pointed, which has constituted the reason behind most *Alevi*s' loyalty to Atatürk and his party *CHP*, but on the other hand, from that time on, *Sünni* Islam has been put in a privileged position vis-à-vis other interpretations of Islam. As pointed out by Göner (2005: 119) the dominant public perception in Turkey paradoxically excludes Islamist tenets and at the same time groups who define themselves outside of *Sünni* Islam. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, a state institution, considers only *Sünni* Islamic religious needs and practices legitimate while neglects all other interpretations of Islam including *Alevism* despite their duty in principle to provide religious services to all Muslim citizens without discrimination (Göner, 2005: 114). The official approach to *Alevism* is well revealed with the book named as "Alevilik Bektaşilik Debates" prepared by Presidency of Religious Affairs. Depending on this source, some premises summarizing state's official

ideology about *Alevism* can be counted as follows: *Alevism* cannot be thought as an independent religion or extension of other systems or ethnicities; *Alevism* cannot be thought as an Anatolian interpretation of Islam which attributes general values of Islam like tolerance, peace, humanism to *Alevism* only and excludes *Sünni* interpretation of Islam; and *Alevism* cannot be identified with communism [quoted from Yılmaz (2005: 177)].

As a consequence of the hesitant approach of state towards *Alevism*, the serious conflicts and fights between *Alevis* and *Sünnis* around leftist and rightist ideology in the late 1970s and rise of postmodern discourses of multiculturalism and identity politics after the 1980s, there has appeared a “re-politicization of *Alevilik* in the 1990s” (Erman and Göker, 2000: 100). As argued by the authors, this re-politicization is qualitatively different from the pre-1980 politicization of *Alevis* as part of Socialist movement. Recently, *Alevi* communities emphasize their identities more with references to religious and cultural qualities. In that sense, the previously radically political identity claims that had gone with class issues and economic deprivation of *Alevi* groups as mentioned in the previous chapter had been replaced with religious claims and understanding of *Alevism* as an egalitarian world view and way of life. “In an interview at the Karacaahmet Foundation, Vahap Güngör argued that “when the axis of politics was left-right we (*Alevis*) chose to be on the left; but now the axis of politics is Shari’a versus Laicism and we choose to be *Alevis*.” (Göner, 2005: 125) This fact also has an important connection with the rising *Sünni* Islamic fundamentalism and long lasting and assimilating discourses of *Sünni* Islam.

In parallel to these developments and hesitant strategy of state regarding identity politics, *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities have lost their explicit political connotations in the narratives of the respondents, to a large extent, when they refer to the late 1980s. They only regard sectarian identities as political in the context of favoritism out of the context of left and right. In general, the religious content of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* has dominated the respondent's narratives in relation to recent incidents of social spatialization.

The way the public space is used and produced by these two groups had also transformed to a large extent. As mentioned in the previous sections, the boundaries of and the competition between *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s in public space that was once radically political, have become more embedded in the production and employment of space. Being *Alevi* and *Sünni* seem to dominate the narratives of both sides explicitly while talking about the spaces and life styles of the "other". *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities, in terms of their recent connotations for the migrants, define "other's" religion rather than political identities of left and right. In that sense, despite the suppressive policies of state, inhabitants do not neglect the awareness of their group identity and preserve a certain degree of tension and uneasiness towards the "other" group. Akyüz (1994, 157) who had conducted a research in Boğaziçi neighborhood on religious life and modernization argues that there exists a sharp distinction and awareness among migrants about *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities. The percentage of the people who define religion as the main factor behind the choice of friends and social interaction is 53.6%, which is quite high as defined by Akyüz (1994, 158).

Depending on the context of the relationship between the *Alevi* and *Sünni* migrants, the definitions of the “other” may show variations. In cases where *Alevi* and *Sünni* families have had a long history of neighborhood relations with each other, the uneasiness in the narratives of the respondents may be replaced by the praises of the good attitudes of their neighbors despite fact that they are *Alevi*s or *Sünni*s. Particularly for *Sünni*s who carry relatively more prejudices and superficial codes about *Alevi* people, appreciation of *Alevi*s, in most cases, depends on knowing each other for so long as neighbors as is the case in the anecdote below:

Neighbors give no harm to each other. This is a rule. In this region people are living densely, close to each other [he means the heterogeneity in terms of sectarian identity]. These people [he means *Alevi*s] are open-minded persons when compared to our people. My relatives living there [he means among *Alevi*s] had better neighboring relations. There is not jealousy among them. They do not have so many children. They are certainly more tolerant.¹⁰²

However, even in these cases, the recognition and prejudices of the distinction between the *Alevi* and *Sünni* lifestyles and the undeserved qualities of each lifestyle has dominated the expressions of respondents. In cases where the trust between *Alevi* and *Sünni* neighbors has taken a great damage in the late 1970 or through informing activity in the early 1980s the relationship between neighbors can be totally broken. In the narratives of both *Sünni*s and *Alevi*s, one can sense the act of othering implicit in the sentences while talking about the people from the opposite sect and their undeserved or lesser qualities. Particularly *Sünni* respondents reflect their prejudices combined with a neglect and ignorant attitude about *Alevism*. The superficial codes about *Alevi* faith in the expressions of *Sünni* migrants are highly present and obvious. During the research, the general approach

¹⁰² Extract from field research note no. 29, 20 June 2003.

of *Sünni* migrants about Alevism was often voiced with a completely superficial overtone and knowledge about *Alevi* belief system and with certain ignorance. This fact has been supported by the findings of many studies (see Göner, 2005; Çakır, 1996: 64; Akyüz, 1994). As Göner points out by referring to the sayings of an *Alevi* interviewee, *Sünni* neighbors refuse friendly offers from her family on the grounds that “the meat *Alevis* offer is not edible” (Göner, 2005: 114). These prejudices in everyday life at societal level, according to Göner, operate as crucial informal mechanisms by which the access of *Alevis* to political and economic resources is blocked. Some *Sünnis* identify non-practicing of *namaz* and *oruç* (to fast) during Ramadan among *Alevis* with atheism in Boğaziçi neighborhood as pointed out by the findings of Akyüz (1994: 149). It is necessary to note that these prejudices are most of the time present but not made explicit all the time in the narratives of the respondents.

These negative value judgments exist in hybrid form with the pleasant personal experiences with *Alevi* friends in the narratives of the respondents reflecting this inconsistent state of mind, under all conditions, contain an awareness of difference between *Alevi* and *Sünni* life styles. The *Alevis* who accept and apply some religious obligations of *Sünni* belief system like *hac* (pilgrimage) and *namaz* are appreciated in such often-encountered expressions. The sayings of a *Sünni* woman from Kırşehir well explicate this bewildered state of mind. She wants to emphasize her neutral position vis-à-vis *Alevis* but gives clues about her prejudices and real approach hidden among sentences in the following manner:

Around here, there are not so many *Alevis*. *Kırşehir*lis are living here... People from Sivas are generally *Alevi* in origin. The drummers no longer go

there [the region where people from Sivas are residing densely] during the Ramadan.¹⁰³ They started beating the drummers there. They do not fast, you know. You are not Alevi, are you? [She asked the question with a certain concern to behave shamefully. I said “no”.] Neighboring relations have been very good though. I like *gecekondu* life because of neighborliness. Nobody knows each other in apartment life. *Alevi*s of Yozgat and Sivas reside here. Among them, there are people who went to *hac* and a number of them also go to mosque and pray. The number of these may increase but their people give so much reaction. I have relationship with a number of them. Actually we are close to all of them. We do not make discrimination. In my opinion, these men who visit the mosque become Muslims.¹⁰⁴

This anecdote is a typical of *Sünni* and conservative approach that I encountered a number of times during the research. The story of *Alevi*s’ beating the drummers in Ramadan and their non-practice of *Sünni* Islamic obligations was narrated by *Sünni* woman as a proof to their non-believer position in an attitude of total neglect of *Alevi* rituals. The commonsense idea about *Alevi*s as being non-Muslim is quite in compliance with the hegemonic discourse of state that heightens *Sünni* Islam as if it is the only legitimate interpretation of Islam. That is the reason why in the 1990s within the context of the re-politicization of *Alevism*, *Cem* foundation, a broadly based *Alevi* organization, has aimed at introducing *Alevi* culture and beliefs. They want state to perform the same kinds of activities in the month Muharrem- regarded as the holy month by *Alevi*s- that it does in Ramazan (Göner, 2005: 130).

¹⁰³ Ramadan is the holy month in *Sünni* Islamic belief system. Muslims fast along daytime during Ramadan. In order to feel satiated, they had to wake up at night and eat something before daylight according to the rules of the religion. Drummers, traditionally walk along the streets at nights to wake people up during Ramadan. This tradition is still being practiced in cities in Turkey. *Alevi*s also fast, but in a different time and form than *Sünni*s.

¹⁰⁴ Extract from field research note no. 39, 15 Aug. 2003.

*Alevi*s also accuse *Sünni*s for malpracticing *Sünni* Islam and for behaving hypocritical, in practicing their rituals. Akyüz (1994: 149) mentions that *Alevi*s mainly criticize the formalistic nature of *Sünni* prayers and signifies the inefficiency of praying five times a day, wearing a headscarf or fasting if your heart and mind is full of immoral and inhumanely ideas and emotions. An *Alevi* shop owner while talking about the *Cemevi* in the region and *Cem* meetings gives references to the hypocritical attitude of *Sünni*s in the following manner:

In the past, the rules of *cem* were harsher, now they are not like that. For example, they [Sünnis] fast; but at night they sleep with their wives. Our fast is not like that you cannot even drink water. During the fast, rather than sleeping with your wife you cannot even share the same bed. For example, this *Halitli* village association they are from *MHP*. They fast during the Ramadan. Then they gather at nights in the association and gamble until four in the morning. I don't understand their way of fasting. Another thing, everybody can take part in *Cem* meetings according to our rituals. A third person [It means that a person who is not *Alevi*] or women and men together... Can you discriminate people in front of Allah? But they discriminate people as man and woman.¹⁰⁵

Depending on my observations in Boğaziçi, the production and use of religious space constitutes the most important ground, where *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s continue and signify their differences from each other within the context of revitalization of identities vis-à-vis each other. In other words, the production of religious spaces for both sides becomes the main means of preserving their identities. The production of religious spaces is considered mainly the responsibility of community rather than state, in that sense, the informal mechanisms through which these spaces are produced mainly depends on the political and social networks that these groups have vis-à-vis each other. As

¹⁰⁵ Extract from field research note no. 19, 26 Apr. 2003.

pointed out by Erder (1997: 123) in her study on a low-income settlement, it is considered by migrants, in general, that some services are the responsibility of state while others can be a product of cooperative work or totally should be solved by the community depending on the accounts of *muhtars*. In *muhtars*' understanding, the laws of Turkish Republic give the responsibility of building schools to the state, while the mosques to the community. In that respect, according to Erder, many issues from the construction of mosques to sustain housing are considered as community responsibilities while service provisions related to transportation, sewage system, electricity and school are considered as the responsibilities of state (Erder, 1997: 123). This is the case also in Boğaziçi where the mosques and *Cemevi* in the region had been built as a result of community effort.

State policies encourage *Sünnis* to build mosques, while construction of *Cemevi* as a space of prayer has still been considered as illegal despite the pressures of EU in relation to *Alevi*s' rights of practicing their rituals in a free way. Military regime had followed policy of suppression and assimilation of *Alevi*s by means of opening mosques in *Alevi* villages and calling upon all *Alevi* to attend worship in the mosque in the 1980s. *Sünni* Islamists' reduction of Islam to a single interpretation explains the support of them to military regime's such assimilationist policies (Çakır, 1996: 64). From the mid-1990's onwards, the domination of religiously oriented parties in local politics had further eased the conditions of religious practices and rituals for *Sünni* residents in low-income settlements. This dramatic change in the political preferences of the *gecekondu* settlers has also affected the approach towards these settlements by the "urbanite" sections of society, who have appropriated to a large extent modernist, republicanist and,

therefore, strongly secularist tenets as mentioned in chapter two. From this tension, there has emerged a divide of laicism versus Islamism groups altering the leftist and rightist divide of the 1970s. This secular anxiety of urbanites has led to a hardening of the exclusionary discourse. Meanwhile these developments have instigated the spread of political Islam on everyday life in *gecekondu* settlements. Local religious communities and gatherings have increased in number, particularly in the 1990s. The illegal tariqat¹⁰⁶ (*tarikāt*) organizations and closed religious community formations have attracted considerable attention from the public and this has also contributed to the urbanite's anxiety (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 97).

As concluded by Akyüz (1994: 150) in his findings on Boğaziçi neighborhood, the percentage of migrants who mention membership to a tariqat as useful for proper practicing of Islam explicitly is 37.1%. This is a quite high percentage if one takes into consideration that tariqat membership is forbidden by law. The intense surveillance of security forces on illegal *zīkr*¹⁰⁷ gatherings during the period of social democrat dominance in local politics had been loosened in the late 1990s as learned from the informal conversations with the respondents. Other than that it is important to note that, I personally encounter many religious gatherings¹⁰⁸ among women and hear the voice of *zikirs* rising from the houses so

¹⁰⁶ *Tarikat* is a word of Arabic origin, which is defined as 'a method of moral psychology for the guidance of individuals directing their lives toward a knowledge of God' in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, 1987.

¹⁰⁷ The common essence of all tariqat organizations is *zīkr*. Tariqats teach Muslims mostly how to practice *zīkr* in order to be close to Allah by mentioning his names in a right way. (Akyüz, 1994: 147)

¹⁰⁸ They mainly prefer their neighbors from their hometowns in order to make these gatherings close to outside. The participatory observations made in two religious gatherings show that these gatherings perform two important functions for the women. First of all, they talk about religious issues and try to find answers to their questions about daily issues via the religious teachings. They also feel themselves as released from their everyday problems with the comfort of worship.

often during my strolls in the neighborhood. *Sünni* women mentioned about their sufferings related to both home meetings and meetings at masjid during the governing of social democrat mayors. In recent years, the religious meetings, particularly at certain houses that were raid before have been watched over by the gendarme forces. The intense supervision of such gatherings by state security forces led to a perception of illegality among the inhabitants about some of these gatherings. Some *Sünni* women do not prefer to go to gatherings at certain houses rather they themselves organize religious meetings in their houses with smaller groups. When compared to *Alevis* though, it is possible to argue that *Sünnis* express their demands and beliefs more easily and comfortably. In that respect, as observed in the research setting, *Sünnis* seem to feel themselves quite comfortable vis-à-vis *Alevis* and local political actors in making their religious claims to public space explicit. As also proved by the findings of Erder's (1997: 130) study, *Sünni* communities meet no difficulty in sustaining local aid for the construction of mosques and Quran courses in the neighborhood unlike the *Alevis*.

Despite the fact that there is no reference to an open competition over space in religious terms, there is a certain dislike showing itself in the narratives as an intimidating awareness or neglect about each other's religious spaces. The ignorance and neglect on part of *Sünnis* about *Alevi* society and belief system

Secondly, these religious gatherings take the place of *gün*, which is the traditional way of regularly coming together for women in Turkey. During the whole ceremony, all the windows were closed despite the fact that the weather was so hot. In some part of the conversations, they have mentioned their concerns about unexpected attacks. They said that similar meetings in the neighborhood were done everyday. The continuous supervision of women gatherings by state security forces has led to a reservation on part of women. They give extreme importance to the privacy of these meetings and it is very difficult to integrate in these gatherings as a researcher.

agitate *Alevi*s most as understood from the narratives of the respondents.¹⁰⁹ This neglect on part of *Sünni*s has gone together with the continuous dominance of *Sünni* Islam and its obligations on *Alevi* population. While *Sünni* respondents seem to be indifferent about *Alevi* belief system and *Cemevi* as the space of *Alevism*, they expect *Alevi*s to play roles in the production and recognition of *Sünni* Islamic space. The construction of mosques in the region well reflects these expectations of *Sünni*s from the *Alevi* residents of the region. As mentioned above, mosques and *Cemevis* are built with the donations of the community in *gecekondu* neighborhoods. Mevlana mosque on the upper parts of Boğaziçi neighborhood just on the boundary between Boğaziçi and Akşemsettin has a construction history that can constitute a good example for this process. *Alevi* population resides densely in this region. Despite the fact that *Sünni* inhabitants are aware that *Alevi*s do not pray in the mosques, both *Sünni* and *Alevi* respondents gave references to the strong claim of construction committee on *Alevi*s to take active part in and donate the construction activity. Listening to the construction of the mosque from the head of the construction committee and from *Alevi* residents living close by reflects two sides of a coin.

Mevlana mosque has no minaret and this is evaluated as a serious problem both by *Sünni* and *Alevi* people residing close to the mosque for different reasons. The head of the mosque construction committee relates the unfinished view of the

¹⁰⁹ “From time to time the former Welfare Party (WP) made sympathetic calls to *Alevi* communities and invited their “religious brothers” to the party ranks... However, especially after the Sivas event and its aftermath which witnessed the pro-event reactions of *Sünni* Islamist media and *Sünni* politicians, as well as the anti-*Alevi* and/or assimilationist declarations of the high-ranking WP members, a great majority of *Alevi*s today, regardless of their political dispositions have become highly suspicious of the pro-*Sünni* politics.” (Erman&Göker, 200:109) In 1993, *Sünni* Islamist residents of Sivas committed a massacre to participants in an *Alevi* cultural festival by setting their hotel on fire.

mosque without minaret to the dense settlement of *Alevi* population in the neighborhood. He mentions about the difficulties of collecting donations. The collection of donations had mainly taken place in the coffeehouses as the most important public places. Owners of the coffeehouses are people from Yozgat and mostly Yozgat *hemşehri* community seems to use these two coffeehouses. In that respect, the head of the construction committee states coffeehouses as the most suitable places to collect donations for the mosque. People give their alms during Ramadan that is a necessity in *Sünni* Islamic practice as in the form of donation to mosque construction. However, despite the donations of community, according to the saying of the head of construction committee, there is a need to travel to big mosques in the city to collect further donations. Still these attempts weren't sufficient according to him because of the dense presence of *Alevi* people in the neighborhood. He relates the difficulty of collecting donations in the neighborhood mainly to this fact in the following manner:

We have furnished the mosque with green carpet lately. We bought catalytic stove. It gets cold from time to time. We are going to construct a natural gas heating system. For the time being we put a cauldron and heat the mosque with oil. In the past, we had gone everywhere with our receipts in our hand. We went to Ulus, to the big mosques there. It is very difficult to collect donations here; there are so many *Alevi*s in this neighborhood. The reason for the mosque to look like [without minaret] is mainly because of that.¹¹⁰

Sünni respondents in the region relate the matter to the *Alevi*s' unwillingness to donate and their lack of Islamic faith. On the other hand, the scene of the mosque without minaret was made explicit by a number of *Alevi* inhabitants as linked to the possibilities of abuse of the donations or the clumsiness on part of the

¹¹⁰ Extract from field research note no. 53, 3 Sep. 2005.

mosque construction committee. They mentioned the fact that they have donated the mosque financially on a continuous basis but still the mosque has an unfinished view, which was a shame. The following anecdote seems to illustrate the ideas of *Alevi*s well:

-Have you ever donated to the mosque construction committee?
-Of course, the ones in the committee and the *hocas* (hodjas) collect money. We had given money for several times. But look at the mosque. It has no minaret. Have you ever seen a mosque without minaret? Is it possible? To give an example, if I describe my address to someone as the house near the mosque, nobody can find the house, because there is no minaret. Since 1973 there has been no minaret. They collect money all the time. Can't one construct a minaret in 32 years?¹¹¹

Besides that, *Alevi*s mention their awareness about the fact that *Sünni* people perceive the main reason behind the lack of minaret as their dense presence in the region, which make them quite outraged related to the issue. They narrate their feelings of being treated unjustly by the committee members despite the fact that they had donated the mosque for several times. *Sünni* respondents, on the other hand, give answers to my questions related to *Cemevi* in a mood of total ignorance, neglect or discomfort. Regardless of the fact that I was quite sure about the answer that I was going to take, I asked some *Sünni* inhabitants if they had helped by any means to the construction of *Cemevi* in the region in order to get their reactions. They behaved as being quite shocked with the question despite the fact that they perceived *Alevi* donations to the mosque as totally normal and expected.

¹¹¹ Extract from field research note no. 55, 4 Oct. 2005.

Similar to the findings in Boğaziçi, in Erder's (1997: 136) study, the respondents who define themselves as *Sünni* accept *Alevi*s mainly as a *hemşehri* community; however, they were quite reactionary and opposed to the explicit practicing of *Alevi* rituals in public. In that sense, the opening of *Cemevi* in their neighborhood seems to constitute a big concern for them. *Alevi* groups, therefore, if organized around their community are met with cultural, political and administrative obstacles in most cases according to Erder. This finding also holds true in the case of Mevlana mosque.

The construction of *Cemevi*, in that sense, is narrated to be a product only of *Alevi* efforts rather than a community attempt in the neighborhood like mosque construction. The construction of only *Cemevi* in the region was initiated in 1995. Despite the dense presence of *Alevi* population in the region, there was one *cemevi* in a quite large area. The *cem* meetings are made by turn according to the hometowns of migrants. People from Yozgat, Tunceli, Sivas and Çorum all commit individual ceremonies in winter. All of them have different *dede*.¹¹² People from Çorum and Yozgat were said to come together more often, because their *dede* are living in the neighborhood unlike the other *dedes* in the village. Other than the *cem* meetings in winter, *Cemevi* seems to be an empty space. As understood from the narratives of *Alevi* respondents, *Cem* meetings are committed rarely and *Alevi* religious practices seem to be more fragmented when compared to *Sünni* collective action in production and employment of their religious space. The fragmented nature of *Alevi* society's demands and interests constitute the most important obstacle behind the difficulty of community action in neighborhoods like Boğaziçi.

¹¹² *Dede* (Holy men) is religious leader who belongs to a hereditary priestly caste and who directs *cem* ceremonies. Every village has its own *dede*.

The fragmented nature of *Alevi* society depends to some extent, on the inherent qualities of *Alevi* rituals and belief system. The rituals of *Alevism* necessitate, in some cases, the inclusion of close community as a result of its need to preserve the privacy of the group. As pointed out by Okan (2004: 74) the reasons behind *Alevi*s' not permitting even the *Alevi*s from other villages or *Sünni*s to participate in their *Cem* meetings emerge from the belief of them that the problems of the community should be kept as private. Besides that, *Alevi*s depending on where they live may hold different positions in interpreting Islam. The *Alevi*s of the villages in Çubuk and Beypazarı or the towns of Ankara, perform the *namaz*, therefore accept a more *Sünni* version of Islam, while the Kurdish and Turkish *Alevi*s of Sivas do not approve this and look at these issues with a considerable distance. This fragmentation can also be followed from the associational divide and claims of *Alevi* organizations in public space in the 1990s. The perception of two broadly based *Alevi* associations has greatly divergent positions with regard to the interpretation of Islam. *Cem* foundation adopts a definition of *Alevism* as "Turkish Muslimness" while Pir Sultan Abdal Foundation accepts *Alevism* as a secular and democratic way of life rather than mainly as a religious identity. The European *Alevi* Union Federation and Hacı Bektaşî Veli Foundations seem to find themselves an intermediary position between these two understandings of *Alevism* (Okan, 2004: 125). *Alevi* respondents, during the conversations make their understanding of *Alevi* belief system explicit and they may show such variations. Particularly, once radically leftist *Alevi* militants accept an understanding of *Alevism* similar to the standpoint of Pir Sultan Abdal or Hacı Bektaşî Veli Foundations. Among the more conservative *Alevi* groups, *Alevi*s of

Çorum and Yozgat, the consideration of *Alevism* as a Turkish Muslimness seems to be widespread. The fragmented nature of the search of *Alevi* identity after the 1980s has also to do with the deterioration of traditional *Alevi* culture and rituals like *dedelik* with the urbanization of Alevism. The *dedes* lost their important role in the city environment particularly as a result the increasing communication facilities. Besides, the spread of Marxist leftist ideology among *Alevi*s and as a result of the class understanding of leftist ideology, *dedelik* began to be considered within the sphere of exploiter-exploited relation (Yılmaz, 2005: 149). The fragmented nature of *Alevi* society is well revealed with the fact that they cannot unite under the roof of one political party. The former leader of Turkish Union Party (*Türkiye Birlik Partisi-TBP*) that was established in 1966 with the claim of representing *Alevi* society, Mustafa Timisi connect the lack overall *Alevi* support to the distance of *Alevi*s to the idea of *Alevi* political party that unite all interests in *Alevi* society (Schüler, 2002: 163).

The fragmented nature of *Alevi* society when encountered with the hegemonic domination of *Sünni* Islam and society, it becomes understandable why *Alevi* community in Boğaziçi cannot build and use *Cemevi* as easy as *Sünni*s' producing and employing their religious spaces. As mentioned above, there is also a legal barrier to the construction of *Cemevi* and this fact has been hardly criticized by *Alevi* organizations in recent years. Even, in cases where *Cemevi* projects have been presented as social and cultural foundations rather than places for prayer, the possibility of recent religiously municipal cadres' resistance to give construction permission by putting forward pretexts seems to be high. This is the case also in Boğaziçi. For this reason, *Cemevi* has an unfinished outlook and depending on the

sayings of the head of the construction committee, also close relative of *dede* of Çorum, municipal officers put important legal impediments in front of them. They still fight with the officers in order to prevent the building from demolition. He narrates the legal impediments in the following manner:

We experienced great difficulties in taking construction authorization. We showed a coal cellar as our address. We cannot do a legal opening. They [municipal officers] said that it was built on the land of *ASKİ* (Ankara Water and Sewer System Department). We would like to go to the municipality in order to put our claims but they always postpone our meeting. *ASKİ* is near the police station and besides them is the big water depot. This area is seen as the green area in the construction plan. During the municipal period when *CHP* was in power in Mamak, these areas were all legalized and opened to construction. But they want to put impediments before us [as in the form of setting forth the land of *Cemevi* as in the status of *ASKİ*'s land].¹¹³

In spite of the fact that the presence of *Cemevi* and its construction has a highly symbolic meaning and importance for *Alevi* people, the space seems to be an empty one in everyday life except some meetings conducted for a certain period in a year. This has something to do with the illegal quality of space at the moment. However, more than that, these places gained attention and extreme importance in times where the manifestations of identities are needed. In that sense though, *cemevi*, *masjid* or village associations may not be considered as lively and “full spaces” they are standing as the spatio-symbolic indications of *Alevi* and *Sünni* or *hemşehri* identities. Even for the ones who are not so committed to the gatherings done in *Cemevi*, the difficulties of building a *Cemevi* and the possibility of its demolition constitute an important concern. Therefore, it is possible to understand through a spatial perspective that *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities as mainly religious identities seem to protect their implicit importance after the 1980s. The increasing

¹¹³ Extract from field research note no. 50, 5 Aug. 2005.

domination and imposition of *Sünni* Islam over everyday life have led to the revival of *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities. The religious recognition on both sides has affected the neighboring relations and particularly the way women have gathered and formed relations with women from the other sect. As being neighbors and due to spatial proximity, *Alevi* and *Sünni* women may see each other; however, they do not visit each other specifically. Most of the time, women gatherings include the women from the same hometown or from the same religious sect. This has one important reason more than a mere coincidence. Most of the time women gatherings among *Sünni* women happen to be for the purpose of religious sharing as mentioned above.

6.8 Conclusion

The course of social spatialization in the neighborhood beginning in 1980, in general, has been affected by the “depoliticization policies” of the military regime and the succeeding civilian governments. The suppression of active politics by means of close surveillance of security forces in the locality, the general imposition of neoliberal political agenda and the strengthening of *Sünni* interpretation of Islam over *Alevi* can be considered as the most important components of this depoliticization strategy. The suppression of active politics by means of security forces’ close surveillance and the emergence of an informing network among migrants have further alienated *Alevi* and *Sünni* migrant communities from each other.

The neoliberal economic policies, on the other hand, had broken down the community claims to a large extent and replaced them with the economic concerns of individuals. The policies have also started an immense legalization movement in *gecekondu* settlements. This legalization process has been operationalized via a reform of decentralization in local government system and the mediation of private construction offices under oath. Neoliberal policies seek the “spontaneous apartmentalization” in these settlements by making *gecekondu* lands subject to market mechanisms and to the interests of big construction firms as attractable peripheral lands.

However, the loopholes of the neoliberal legalization strategy that was open to abuse both by migrants and officials in duty; the increasing local agency of migrants with the growing favoritism in local governing; the complicated nature of land ownership patterns and the increasing reciprocity and responsiveness between tactical and strategical realm, in general, led to the emergence of unintended consequences in spatial terms. Late apartmentalization in the designated research setting can be given as an example to these unintended consequences. In congruence with the growing reciprocity and responsiveness between strategical and tactical realms, there has emerged a transition in the locality from “space of politics” to a “politics of space”. In other words, the radically political nature of the public space in the late 1970s has been replaced by an implicit competition between *hemşehri* and sectarian groups that has been embedded in and defined by diverse claims over the social spatialization of the research setting by the 1980s.

The third component of depoliticization strategy that is the domination of *Sünni* Islam over *Alevi* has led to a general revitalization of *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities mainly in religious and cultural terms. This revitalization of identities has had a serious effect on the nature of social spatialization in the locality. The widespread practice of *Sünni* Islam in research setting particularly after the mid-1990s has brought about a threat perception on part of *Alevi*s. In that respect, besides economic claims, religious claims to space have determined the course of social spatialization beginning by the mid-1990s.

Unlike the nature of spontaneity that was mainly a consequence of the minimum or non-intervention of strategical realm in the 1970s, the spontaneity of social spatialization in the last two decades has been a consequence of the growing local agency that is able to take near-strategical acts and the increasing reciprocity between the strategical and tactical realms on the vertical level. This reciprocity, however, has functioned mainly to the advantage of these powerful groups having the capacity to take near-strategical acts rather than the migrants that ought to behave tactically within the context of strategical realm on the vertical level and near-strategical realm on the horizontal level.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The main theme of this thesis is social spatialization in the locality. Individual stories of migrants are the constitutive ingredients of this story. They illuminate certain critical moments of social spatialization that are considered crucial for this research. In this section I will explain the main points of my research findings. After these general empirical conclusionary remarks, possible theoretical contributions of the thesis will be emphasized.

The story of social spatialization began in the 1940s, the times where the first encounters of forerunner migrants with the locality had taken place. Aside from the macro political, social and economic reasons behind the rural-to-urban migration, the emergence of a *gecekond* neighborhood in this particular locality had been closely related to the early planning strategies of Ankara city with unintended consequences. The main reason behind these unintended consequences depends on the irreconcilabilities between the “conceived” and “lived” spaces in the initial stages of the planning activity in relation to Ankara city. The lands in the periphery

of the city were considered as the green belt and recreational areas for the urbanites of the city in the context of strategical planning. In fact, these lands had hosted large agricultural activity as the main supplier of food for state institutions and tobacco for Tekel in the 1940s and 1950s. The first encounters of the rural-to urban migrants took place within the boundaries of the city in a context where “urban agriculture” had brought paradoxical consequences for the modern urban plan in Ankara.

The reason behind the arrival of first migrant group from Kırşehir was to work as agricultural laborers in Üreğil villagers’ farms and vineyards. This seems to constitute an important challenge to the conventional acceptance of modernization approach that delineates agriculture and urbanization as conflicting issues. Interestingly, the relation between the rural-to-urban migrants and the native villagers in the periphery of the modernist city had supplied the first context of the formation of the locality. The initial nature of the social and trust relations between native villagers of Üreğil and some migrant groups had even defined power relations in the locality between different *hemşehri* communities in the coming decades. In the research setting, the main reason behind Kırşehir *hemşehri* community’s appropriating certain critical spaces in the locality is their building close relationships with the villagers to their advantage. They could take near strategical decisions mainly in terms of which lands to buy or appropriate with the calculation of natural risks of the time. They had bought the vineyards and farms of Üreğil villagers in good locations from the best possible price by calculating all natural risks.

As gathered from the narratives of the migrants, the development of locality as a *gecekondu* region had two important spatial reasons. These are the presence of railway connecting these peripheral lands with city center and the presence of Samsun Highway connecting the central Anatolian cities and towns with Ankara. In fact, the railway and highway had been constructed as the outcomes of the modernist interventions of *RPP* and *DP* in the city space respectively. However, these strategical interventions had led to the unintended growth of *gecekondu* settlements in Mamak. These two incidents of strategical intervention had contributed to serious increases in land prices. Thereby, agricultural lands were put on the market to be sold as *gecekondu* lands to the arriving migrants. The first amnesty law in 1948 had triggered the *gecekondu* construction in the locality and Mamak in general. As was identified in individual narratives, by the 1950s, there had emerged a dense migratory trend to the locality.

The construction of *gecekondu* houses as an illegal process witnessed the initial display of certain tactics of the migrants vis-à-vis the realm of strategy. The narratives about the construction of houses reflect a game like relation with unwritten rules between the migrants and state officials who had the duty to apply demolition decisions. In the narratives, giving bribe to the officials in charge is the most often encountered tactic to protect the houses from demolition. To form close personal relations with the officials or to sustain the conditions of unspoken rules of the game like relation provide ways to protect the house from total demolition. As gathered from the narratives of demolition, sometimes, in order to give the impression that rules had been applied properly; officers damaged a part of the house that may not cause the demolition of the entire house.

There were certain tactics employed by the migrants in the course of the construction of *gecekondus* houses. To build *gecekondus* rapidly, in one night, can be counted as the most important one among these tactics. Officials gave demolition priority to the houses under construction or that had been recently built. Another tactic was to construct the house as something else in appearance, at first, by attributing different functions to it. As an example, most of the *gecekondus* houses under the “strict” and “selective” supervision of the time had been presented as “coal cellars” to the officials as a masking tactic. Within the context of this game-like relation, the officials overlooked this masking tactic.

The rapid pace of construction necessitated close community solidarity. Early migrants who have established close *hemşehri* community in the region mentioned their advantageous position with regard to the community help both in material [as sustaining restricted resources of the time for their *hemşehris*, for example, permitting them to use their wells, providing construction material and food] and non-material [mostly labor]. In the narratives of migrants it is also possible to understand how they had defined *hemşehri* in this early settlement period. Unlike the conventional considerations in the literature, *hemşehri* refers to a very intimate group like relatives or at most people of the same village rather than the migrants of the same province.

Settlement decisions also included some tactical moments especially for the early settler migrants who have had a chance to make choices in the empty space of the locality at the time being. The natural factors, the river being the most

important one, had represented an important concern in the decisions of the migrants about the most proper place to settle down in these initial years of settlement. The initial settlers had taken their decisions about where to settle with mainly natural spatial indicators. For instance, they have taken into account the possible dangers (river-flooding had often taken place in the 1950s after heavy rains) and resources that the river poses for construction (water and sand). Other than the lands near the river, the upper sides of the hills seem to be considered as improper to settle by the migrants in topographical terms.

The second important tactic for the migrants to survive in the “insecure” and “unknown” space of the locality was to settle close to their *hemşehri* community. Wealthy migrants among Kırşehir community due to their relative experiences in the locality and their close social relations with Üreğil villagers bought large plots of lands from the villagers to sell to their *hemşehris* later.

Thirdly, migrants with certain future estimations appropriated large plots of lands that included state owned lands in combination with the lands they bought from the Üreğil villagers. By “colonizing the lands” of mixed ownership on which they had built their *gecekondus* on, they gained the right to state owned lands in time with amnesty laws and legalization decisions of the strategical realm. Particularly beginning by the 1950s with the emergence of multiparty politics until now, the practices of political agents in the strategical realm via amnesty laws and legalization decision as part of populist policies hesitantly have gone together with the degraded representation of these settlements and expressions of the urgent need to modernize them.

The near-strategical settlement decisions of the wealthy migrants in places distant to river considering the risk of flooding led to unintended consequences and unprofitable results for the migrants in the 1960s and 1970s though. This was due to remarkable value increases in the lands just on two sides of the river due to the construction of market place there. Since the river provided the natural resources like sand and water that were desperately needed for construction of *gecekondus* at the time, the first small workshops and a number of sand factories were built near the river in the 1950s.

This triggered the construction of the market place there. The wealthiest shop owners in the region who own few apartment houses present in the market now had been the poorest ones and the ones lacking *hemşehri* bonds in the initial settlement years and who had no choice but to settle near the river due to low prices of these lands. X family who had been identified as the most influential family in the locality and who had determined the course of social spatialization in the market to a large extent was one of these poor migrant families. *Kırşehirli* migrants, on the other hand, often mention their regrets regarding their choices of not settling close to the river and some of them blamed the forerunner *hemşehris* for this “false” decision.

The following decade is specified as the most remarkable second moment in the history of the locality. In the 1970s, the social spatialization in the neighborhood had taken a radically political turn in congruence with the macro political and economic conditions of the country. Struggles between the rightist

and leftist militant groups had mainly defined the course of social spatialization on the horizontal level. The narratives of the respondents about this period include emotional depictions of the fights between militant groups, strong feeling of insecurity and sufferings of mainly youths and male members of the family. These sufferings are narrated as a consequence of the continuous interrogations of militant groups. The *Sünni* and *Alevi* respondents alike mention their disapprovals about the struggles between militant groups that had taken place during this period. Yet, this period signifies the moment where they located themselves and their *hemşehri* community within the polarized identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* associated mostly with leftist and rightist ideology respectively. In the narratives, the sectarian identities of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* emerged as politically overloaded identities of this period.

The near strategical acts of powerful *Sünni* shop owners had excluded mainly latecomer *Alevi* migrants of Çorum, Sivas and later Tunceli from taking lands and shops in the most critical component of public space in previous decades. This had affected the course of social spatialization in the late 1960 and 1970s. Unintentionally, the near-strategic attempts of the founders to control the social spatialization in the market place and general discomfort of *Sünni* shop owners with respect to *Alevi*s could not prevent the place to turn into the fortress of leftist militants in the late 1970s. This unintended consequence seems to have one important socio-spatial reason. Exclusion of *Alevi* groups from the central and valuable lands of the market place to lands close to Samsun Highway and the settlement of *Alevi* migrants of Tunceli on the upper parts of the hills nearby Samsun Highway instigated the close encounters between these groups and

residents of Üreğil neighborhood on the other side of the highway who had been mostly *Sünni* and supporter of ultra nationalist militant groups. Therefore the train station as adjacent to highway, which is located just in between these two neighborhoods is narrated as the most crucial point in public space where open fights and even incidents of killings had taken place between leftists and rightists with reference to this period.

The spontaneity embedded in the social spatialization had been felt by the migrants to the fullest extent during that period due to the limited capacity and the intention of state security forces to intervene in the tactical realm. The relation between strategical and tactical realm on the vertical level seems to have been the weakest of all periods during those years. There is almost no reference to security forces and their intervening in the incidents and fights, as they happened to take place in relation to this period. Since Boğaziçi was mainly known for its inhabiting *Sünni* migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale, the locality was not subject to any total repression and interference by state security as had been the case in some neighborhoods resided totally by *Alevi* migrants. Due to the limited interventions of state forces, the shop owners who had the power to take effective near-strategical decisions in defining the course of social spatialization in the previous decades point out their sufferings and repression of leftist militants more when compared to other shop owners. They used such tactics as closing the shops early in the afternoon, not to stay in the shop without the companion of family members and to avoid social gatherings that might be evaluated by militant groups as political gatherings. The pressure of militant groups either by attacking the shops or by collecting protection money had contributed to serious job loss during the

late 1970s, which is the most often pronounced complaint of shop owners related to the period besides insecurity. Shop owners' tactics for survival seem to be the main reason behind the job loss since this had damaged the natural flow of socio-spatial relations in the market place. The restricted mobility of the residents for security reasons had constituted another reason behind job loss. They define these years as their most difficult period in the region.

Since the interaction between the strategical and tactical realm had been the weakest of all periods during the late 1970s in the locality and the interaction between groups via the social spatialization of the neighborhood involve a serious dose of spontaneity due to that, residents seemed to find protection mainly within their *hemşehri* communities. In that respect, the prior settlement decisions in communities had proved to be a successful security mechanism particularly for the more homogenously and densely settled communities like migrants from Kırşehir and Kırıkkale. On the other hand, the *Alevi* and *Sünni* communities of heterogeneously represented provinces in sectarian terms like Yozgat, Çorum and Sivas mention their sufferings more related to the political incidents due to their dispersed location and tense relations with neighbors of the opposite sect.

Mostly male migrants mention their sufferings as a result of continuous interrogations of both leftist and rightist militants in their way to work. Almost all of the male respondents identify one incident from which they had suffered or that they had witnessed. Most of these incidents are narrated as to take place at the train station. During these interrogations, one's hometown identity and in relation to that political affiliation seem to constitute the core of the investigation. This is related

to the fact that one's village of origin is often identified as one's sectarian affiliation. Within this context, some residents as a tactic of survival lied about their hometown identities depending on who was doing the interrogation.

The narratives related to the 1970s, despite the highly chaotic nature of social spatialization emphasize the importance of being neighbors. Being a good neighbor as an important value embedded in *gecekondü* life due to certain socio-spatial factors seems to have transcended the highly political nature of social spatialization at the time. Particularly some of *Sünni* residents narrate incidents where their *Alevi* neighbors despite their political position had behaved protective of them. The good attitudes of neighbors from different sects to each other seem to be related to both parties' unwillingness "to behave shamefully" to each other in their own words. The respondents who are neighbors to a family of opposite sect almost give no reference to an open struggle between each other during those years. Rather they may mention about the fights of rightists and leftists as happened to take place outside the social and spatial context of these neighboring relations albeit one of the neighbors might have militant involvements. At the extreme, in some few cases, the relation between *Alevi* and *Sünni* neighbors might have lost its intensity or totally broken down due to the operation of stereotypes and prejudices mainly on part of *Sünni* neighbors. In cases where one or two families reside in a region that is dominated totally by the residents of the opposing sect there emerged certain problems. I encountered a case during the research where an extended *Alevi* family had felt the need to exchange their houses with a *Sünni* family residing in an *Alevi* dominated region due to the pressures of *Sünni* community.

Sünni respondents *mainly* portray their *Alevi* neighbors as treating them good and protective during the period. This seems to be related not only with the good intentions of *Alevi* neighbors but it has some material reasons as well. *Alevi*s had been put in a position to develop certain tactics of survival vis-à-vis the informing activities of their *Sünni* neighbors. *Alevi* respondents do not give reference to any open conflicts between neighbors, however, after developing a certain trust relation; a number of them narrate the incidents in which their *Sünni* neighbors reported them to the police in the late 1970s. Some *Sünni* women openly mentioned that they had informed some of their *Alevi* neighbors to security forces for their illegal activities like writing certain leftist slogans on the walls. Mostly women give references to the nature of relations with neighbors in those years since they have been the main carriers of the relationship with neighbors now and then.

The third period as specified by the narratives of the migrants seems to have peculiar qualities differentiating it from the previous periods. This period in the 1980s is the one that explicates best the development of reciprocity between the strategical and tactical realms.

Immediately after the military intervention, the main course of social spatialization had been governed mainly with the repressive strategies of military regime to suppress active politics in the locality. Three main strategies can be identified in these “depolitization” strategies. First one was to control the active politics in the locality by utilizing a secret information network by encouraging some migrants to report about other inhabitants in the neighborhood. Secondly, on

the macro level, the neoliberal economic policies have brought certain consequences that designated economic concerns of the migrants as the major determinant of social spatialization rather than the political fights between the militant groups. Legalization of *gecekondu* lands and houses within the framework of neoliberal policies of post military regime when connected with the reforms of decentralization in local government system have not only brought a general increase in real estate values in the locality but also led to a more reciprocal relationship between migrants and local politicians. New municipal system made local politics more responsive to the demands of *gecekondu*. The increasing power of migrants in influencing the strategical acts of developing plans or providing certain services to the locality seems to be the defining quality of this period.

Thirdly, as part of the strategic act of suppressing active politics in general, military regime initiated and civilian governments succeeding carried out the privileging of *Sünni* interpretation of Islam as an antidote to ideologies of Marxism and Kurdish separatism. In congruence with this strategy, the practice and effect of *Sünni* Islam had become widespread in everyday life especially in low-income settlements. Particularly after the mid 1990s, low-income settlements had become the main supporters of religiously oriented conservative political tradition. In parallel to these developments the re-politicization of *Alevism* had mainly taken place with reference to cultural and religious content of the identity with regard to the strategical policies of making *Sünni* interpretation as the hegemonic interpretation of Islam.

All these strategies have led to a transformation in the course of social spatialization in the locality from the “space of politics” to a “politics of space”. The legalization of *gecekond* neighborhoods with neoliberal policies of the 1980s, the increasing responsiveness of local politics to the demands of *gecekond*, the favoritist policies depending on the sectarian affiliation of the mayors in charge and the increasing religious claims of *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s over the social space of the locality have made politics more embedded in the social spatialization when compared to other periods.

The narration of local politics in conjunction with the macro policies of the time includes a certain stress of the beginnings of a feeling of favoritism in the narratives of the migrants. The aftermath of the highly political atmosphere of the late 1970s as a period seems to take place in the memories of the migrants with reference to struggle given to get legal right to their lands and houses with best possible conditions vis-à-vis one’s neighbors, and “other” groups. In relation to that they carry an awareness of possibility about partial treatment on part of the local strategical agents. The incidents of favoritism dominate the narratives of respondents in relation to the period that begins by the mid 1980s and lasts until recent years. Favoritism in politics seem to emerge out of the fact that the reciprocity and responsiveness of the relations between strategical and tactical realm on the vertical has intensified with the increasing power of migrants to define the fate of local politics. Therefore, the open struggles between leftists and rightists in the social space of the late 1970s have transformed into a more implicit competition between *Alevi*s and *Sünni*s or different *hemşehri* groups embedded more in the production of public space.

The social democrat municipal tradition in the 1980s that had been followed by the Islamist conservative municipal tradition by the mid 1990s are narrated as favoring *Alevi* and *Sünni* groups in the locality respectively. Particularly, *Sünni* shop owners give important references to their perceptions of favoritism during social democrat mayorship. The municipal police officer's intense and frequent supervision of the conditions of trading in the market place is the most often emphasized example of the biased attitude of social democrat mayors to the shop owners in *Sünni* dominated market place. Powerful shop owners, by means of using their connections to critical posts in the strategical realm, also showed strong resistance against these policies.

The strategical realm as dominated by the neoliberal political agenda mentioned above leaves many loopholes and uncontrollable spaces where tactical acts may be employed. The legalization process through the agency of private construction offices under oath has brought about such uncontrollable processes. As an example, the ones who have no title deeds gained right to state owned lands on which they had built *gecekondu* houses. The decision depended on their verbal declaration about the size of the land they had appropriated previously.

Legalization as a general strategy has brought unintended consequences, which in turn challenged its main objective that is the modernization of *gecekondu* districts. The legalization process and the integration of neoliberal consuming spaces in the market had restored shop owner's power in economic and political terms because these developments contributed to increases in the value of real

estate prices in the market place. Interestingly, this restoring of power on part of shop owners had contributed to the spontaneity of neighborhood space in terms of posing an alternative spatial development to the mainstream tendency of apartmentalization in low-income settlements. Due to the spatial necessity of initiating apartment construction from the edges of the main street in the market place, the shop owners gained certain agency in determining the course of apartmentalization process in the locality. However, shop owners had benefited greatly from the legalization process because the legalization process protected the traditional structure of small *gecekondu* shops as it is. Thus, shop owners have not behaved so willingly to change the spatial structure of the market by apartmentalization because the rent revenues from these traditional *gecekondu* shops had increased, with the rise in the value of real estates. Therefore “slumlordism” for many shop owners is more beneficial than the gains they are supposed to get from the constructors in return for the apartments constructed replacing their shops.

The consumption patterns had also changed with the opening of big supermarkets in the market place. The migrants often mention their preference of shopping for food from these supermarkets for the attractive prices there and the possibility of using credit cards. However, they also state that they do not want to offend their *bakkals* or other shop owners whom they had known for years for the fact that these shop owners had still provided traditional and informal shopping opportunity of *veresiye* (shopping on credit) under conditions of economic need. It is also necessary to note that *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities or *hemşehri* relations have played relatively a minor role in determining shopping choices for the migrants and

trust relations for the shop owners providing the opportunity of *veresiye*. Economic concerns, knowing each other for so long, and spatial proximity had mainly defined the parameters of shopping concerns.

The third strategy of state's imposing of *Sünni* interpretation of Islam as an antidote to leftist politics contributed to the redefinition of *Alevi* and *Sünni* identities mainly with reference to their religious content. The narratives in relation to this period cover such religiously overloaded definitions of *Alevism* and *Sünnism* rather than referring to the political connotations of these sectarian identities. Parallel with macro policies favoring *Sünni* Islam over *Alevism*, *Sünni* residents exhibited an attitude of ignorance containing certain prejudices and superficial codes about *Alevi* belief system. These negative value judgments about *Alevi* belief system seemed to exist in hybrid forms with an appreciation or mentioning of the good character or intention of *Alevi* friends or neighbors who have been known closely. In general, the recognition and prejudices embedded in the distinction made between *Alevi* and *Sünni* lifestyles have dominated the expressions of respondents with reference to recent social relations between different sectarian groups. In cases where the trust between *Alevi* and *Sünni* neighbors had taken a great damage in the late 1970s or through informing activity in the early 1980s the relationship between neighbors could be totally broken.

In general, it is possible to observe the increasing effect of religious concerns besides economic concerns in defining the course of social spatialization in the neighborhood. In that respect, the production of religious spaces has constituted an important part of social spatialization. There is no reference to an open competition

between sectarian groups over public space in religious terms in the narratives of the migrants. However, there is a certain dislike showing itself in the narratives as an intimidating awareness or neglect about each other's religious spaces. While *Sünni* respondents seem to be indifferent about *Alevi* belief system and *Cemevi* as the space of *Alevism*, they expect *Alevis* to play active roles in the production and recognition of *Sünni* Islamic space. Informal religious gatherings among *Sünni* women had become widespread despite the pressures of security forces mainly during the years of social democrat dominance in local politics but have loosened recently. These gatherings have replaced the traditional gatherings of women called as "*gün*". Therefore, the possibility of *Alevi* and *Sünni* women coming together as neighbors had become nearly impossible and women of two sects had further isolated their relations with the repolitization of sectarian identities with reference to their religious contents mainly in this period.

Unlike the nature of spontaneity that was mainly a consequence of the minimum or non-intervention of strategical realm in the 1970s, the spontaneity of social spatialization in the last two decades has been a consequence of the growing local agency that is able to take near-strategical acts and the increasing reciprocity between the strategical and tactical realms on the vertical level. This reciprocity, however, has functioned mainly to the advantage of these powerful groups having the capacity to take near-strategical acts rather than the migrants that ought to behave tactically within the context of strategical realm on the vertical level and near-strategical realm on the horizontal level.

First of the main empirical conclusions that can be drawn from the research data is that the ethnic identities through sectarian and hometown affiliations have constituted the main means by which the migrants have developed certain tactics in dealing with the strategical acts on the vertical level and other tactical acts on the horizontal level. In that respect, *Alevism*, *Sünnism* and *hemşehrilik* have played vital roles in migrant's developing tactics in conjunction with the political and economic context of the strategical realm, which have attributed these ethnic identities changing values and definitions overtime. *Secondly*, the growth of the locality as a *gecekondü* region can not only be considered as an unintended consequence of urban development but also must be considered as a by product of the sum of modernist strategical acts that have captured diverse and paradoxical acts and decisions within themselves. *Thirdly*, empirical data give important examples from the reciprocal and interdependent relation between the tactical and strategical realm. In other words, the tactical decisions and practices employ the structural means or loopholes of the strategical realm rather than having an autonomous existence. From the other way around, the strategical realm as to define and redefine its modernist project always needs its "other". However, different agents of the strategical realm represent and define this "other" differently depending on the macro political and economic context of the country and socio-spatial transformations in peripheral settlements. Depending on the political and economic context, the agents who may have different agendas in the strategical realm may represent and deal with the tactical realm by using different means. *Fourthly*, the research data support the criticisms that were posed to the homogeneous and static definition of strategical and tactical realm in chapter one. The actors in the tactical realm, depending on their relations with the agents in the

strategical realm may attain active and determining agency in the social spatialization of the locality. This agency on the tactical level transcends the limits of tactical acts as defined by De Certeau. Therefore they are defined as near-strategical acts throughout the empirical chapters, since they have certain capacity to take decisions with a certain sight of future and producing and employing their space. This capacity not only affects the course of social spatialization in the locality but also leads to certain spatial and temporal moments of resistance on part of the powerful migrants against strategical realm. As exemplified by the empirical findings, these resistances emerged against the interventions of the strategical realm in the locality in terms of the application of the legalization decisions, construction plans, provision of certain services or the legal supervision of the political, commercial and real estate activity. On the macro level, these near-strategical acts even have some transforming and determining capacity on the agency of strategical realm as can be best exemplified by the “post-planning” practices and policies. *Fifthly*, just like the operation of strategy-tactic on the vertical level, the interdependent relation between the near-strategical acts of the more powerful groups or actors and tactical acts of the less powerful groups on the horizontal level may bring unintended consequences via spatial contingencies. These unintended consequences might alter power relations in the locality in time depending on the general social, political and economic context.

The empirical findings also support the premise that the main competition between the groups has taken place mainly with reference to the appropriation of and competition over space. This seems to be related with the general spontaneity embedded in the formation of *gecekondu* settlements. The identity definitions of

hemşehri and sectarian groups have a dynamic nature that have been altered and contested depending on their positionality vis-à-vis each other in the course of social spatialization.

After making these general empirical and theoretical conclusions, I would like to mention the possible areas to which studies similar to this thesis may contribute. The belief in the need to increase the number of such studies constitutes the main inspiration behind the thesis. First of all, in today's cities, it is not possible to develop inclusive, participatory, democratic and successful planning and urban policies without local knowledge of social spatialization particularly in relation to low-income settlements including a serious dose of spontaneity. It seems highly important to understand the processes and patterns through which these localities had been produced by means of a dialectical interplay of strategical and tactical realm. This understanding may hopefully develop a new approach of urban governance that transcends the limits and impediments of conventional urban planning and policy understandings. It becomes even more crucial to develop a more inclusive and democratic understanding of local governance with the operation of neoliberal political strategies that trigger the spontaneous nature of social spatialization in low-income settlements, which in turn increase the social and economic inequalities dramatically between more powerful migrant groups and late comer, "ethnically other" less powerful groups.

Secondly, space-sensitive methodological and conceptual approach used in the thesis may hopefully constitute an inspiration for other studies on low-income settlements. Spatial approach or in Lefebvrian sense "spatiology" provides rich

conceptual tools to understand everyday life or history in low-income settlements. On the theoretical level, social and spatial cannot be thought apart regarding the theoretical and empirical discussions in the thesis. On the empirical level, “to have a space of one’s own” constitutes the basis of everyday life due to the spontaneous nature of these spaces and close encounters between different identity groups in *gecekondu* settlements. Therefore, spatial analysis is vital to understand the social dynamics in the neighborhood.

It is also important to note that the close encounters between different *hemşehri*, ethnic and sectarian groups have not always resulted in conflict-ridden relations as have been represented and exaggerated by public discourse for the last three decades. As the cases of neighbors from the opposite sects show, despite a continuous explicit or implicit competition over space that has changed its intensity and nature depending on the context, living close to each other for years and to take part in social spatialization in the region together have brought migrants an understanding and learning process about each other’s life worlds. Findings of the research also give clues about the uses of spatial dialogue and the dangers of spatial fragmentation of different identity groups if one considers the socio-spatially created nature of social identity.

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APPENDIX A

Questions Guiding the Organization of Semi-Structured Interviews, Informal Conversations and Observations with Regard to Neighborhood Inhabitants

Basic Demographic Concerns:

- 1) Name, Surname
- 2) Age
- 3) Education history
- 4) What is your occupation?
- 5) What are the jobs that you have done from the first years of your presence in the city until now?
- 6) What is the year of migration from the village/town to the city?
- 7) Where did you migrate from as a family?
- 8) What were the reasons behind your migration?
- 9) Where did you settle first in Ankara?
- 10) What were the different places that had been resided in Ankara in years?
- 11) When did you first arrive to this neighborhood?
- 12) Have you ever changed place/house in the neighborhood? For what reasons?
- 13) What were the factors behind your decision to settle in this particular neighborhood?
- 14) Do you own the house that they are living in?

In case they own the house:

- 15) How did you construct the house?

- 16) Did you get any help from anybody during the construction? If yes, what kind of help did you get?
- 17) Did you hire workers during the construction?
- 18) Did you get any financial help in the course of the construction? If you did, from whom did you get financial help?
- 19) What kind of difficulties did you encounter in the course of construction of your *gecekond*?
- 20) What kind of reactions did you get from your neighbors or other migrants living in the close environment during your settlement?
- 21) From whom did you buy the land on which you constructed your *gecekond*?
- 22) If you built your house on state owned land, who did play the mediating role in the appropriation of the land?
- 23) Do you have legal title deeds to the land?
- 24) Do you have construction permit for the house?

In case they own the house, but they are not the first owners of the house:

- 25) From whom did you buy the house?
- 26) Under what conditions did you make the payment?
- 27) Did you get any financial help from somebody?
- 28) Who was the first owner of the house? What was their reason of selling the house?

In case they do not own the house:

- 29) Do you reside in the house as tenants?
- 30) If not, under what conditions are you residing in the house?
- 31) Who is the original owner of the house?

General Questions Regarding the Early Settlement Period:

- 32) What kind of difficulties did you experience related to living in *gecekond* in the initial settlement period?
- 33) Did you take any help from your neighbors for your immediate needs like water, electricity, tools and labor power in the initial settlement period?
- 34) Has your house ever been demolished during or after the construction?

- 35) If yes, what was your attitude in dealing with demolition?
- 36) When did the infrastructural services like water, sewer system and electricity become available in the region and for your house?
- 37) What did you do in order to demand or get these services?
- 38) Have you ever done any changes in the house? If yes, what kind of changes and additions did you make in the house?
- 39) Do you own a house in other parts of Mamak or Ankara? If yes, how did you buy the house?

Questions Regarding Public Space:

- 40) How did you choose the place for settling down when you first came to the district?
- 41) In that period, with whom were you in relation in your near environment?
- 42) How was your relation with these people?
- 43) Where were they from?
- 44) How was the physical appearance of the district in that period?
- 45) Did you experience a disaster in the district in this period or later (like flood, landslide)?
- 46) If you did, how were you affected by this event or how other people were affected?
- 47) Was there any shop/store for buying food, clothes etc. when you first come to the district in the close environment?
- 48) If there were, which ones did you prefer?
- 49) What were your reasons for preferring these shops?
- 50) What kinds of shops were there in the district in the early settlement period?
- 51) If there were not such shops, where did you do shopping?
- 52) In case you were shopping from the shops in your near environment, were you paying cash or on credit?
- 53) If you were paying on credit, did you have any affinity with the owners of these shops? (in terms of *hemşehrilik*, neighborhood or being *Alevi/Sünni*)
- 54) How frequently and for what reasons you were going to the city center in the early settlement years?
- 55) What kind of transportation means were you using?

- 56) What is your opinion about the transportation system of the time? (What are their perceptions about the advancement of transportation over time?)
- 57) Which was the most difficult period for you in financial terms?
- 58) In these financially hard times, did you receive financial aid from anybody?
- 59) In the neighborhood, which was the hardest period regarding your social relationships?
- 60) With whom and what types of problems did you experience?
- 61) What kind of hardships has been faced in the neighborhood between 1975 and 1980?
- 62) Were you influenced by the political struggles of the late 1970s? How?
- 63) What is your opinion about the municipal services?
- 64) What can you demand from the municipality for your neighborhood?
- 65) What do you do in your spare times?
- 66) Where do you do your clothing shopping?
- 67) If you do your shopping from the neighborhood, which shops do you prefer? For what reasons?
- 68) Where do you do your food shopping?
- 69) If you do your shopping from the neighborhood, which shops do they prefer? For what reasons?
- 70) Where do you go to buy your other needs?
- 71) Do you go to mosque/cemevi? How frequently?
- 72) Which mosque/cemevi do you prefer? What are the reasons behind your preferences?
- 73) Where are the families living in your close environment from?
- 74) How are you relations with your neighbors? (the history of neighboring relations)
- 75) Do you have your village association in the neighborhood?
- 76) If yes, how was your village association established?
- 77) If yes, what kinds of activities are taken place in these associations?
- 78) If no, where is your village association in Ankara?
- 79) Do you participate in the activities of village association?
- 80) How frequently do you go to the city center and for what reasons?
- 81) Which hospital do you prefer to go when you are ill? For what reasons?

- 82) Which schools did you attend for your primary and secondary education?
- 83) Is there any school in the neighborhood back then?
- 84) How were the schools constructed in the neighborhood?
- 85) How were the mosques constructed in the neighborhood?
- 86) How was the cemevi constructed in the neighborhood?

APPENDIX B

Questions Guiding the Organization of Semi-Structured Interviews, Informal Conversations and Observations with regard to Shop Owners

- 1) Name, Surname
- 2) Age
- 3) Education history
- 4) What are the jobs that have been done by the shop owner from the first years of his/her presence in the city until now?
- 5) What is the year of migration from the village/town to the city?
- 6) Where do they migrate from as a family?
- 7) What are the reasons behind their migration?
- 8) Where did the family settle first in Ankara? What were the different places that had been resided in Ankara in years?
- 9) When did you first arrive to this neighborhood?
- 10) Have you ever changed place/house in the neighborhood? For what reasons?
- 11) What were the factors behind your decision to open shop in this particular neighborhood?
- 12) When did you first open this shop?
- 13) Have you had another shop in the market place previous to this shop?
- 14) Did you construct the *gecekondu* shop by yourself?
- 15) If yes, how did you acquire the land on which the *gecekondu* shop was constructed?
- 16) How did you construct the shop?

- 17) During the construction, from whom did you get help in material or non-material terms?
- 18) If you did not construct the shop by yourself, how did you buy the shop?
- 19) How did you make the payments of the shop?
- 20) What kind of reactions did you get from other shop owners during the construction of the shop?
- 21) From whom did you buy the land on which you constructed your shop? If you built your shop on state owned land, who did play the mediator role in the appropriation of the land?
- 22) Do you have legal title deeds to the land?
- 23) Do you have construction permit for the shop?
- 24) Which was the most difficult period for you in financial terms?
- 25) In these financially hard times, did you receive financial aid from anybody?
- 26) In the neighborhood, which was the hardest period regarding your social relationships?
- 27) With whom and what types of problems did you experience?
- 28) What kind of hardships has been faced in the neighborhood between 1975 and 1980?
- 29) Were you influenced by the political struggles of the late 1970s? How?
- 30) What is your opinion about the recently opened supermarkets in the market place?
- 31) How is your relationship with the municipal officers and zabitas?
- 32) What do you think about the policies of local government?

The incidents that are taken into consideration during the participatory observations in the shop and informal talks with the shop owner:

- 33) What are the things sold in the shop?
- 34) How is the shop space used in daily life?
- 35) What are the conditions of shopping?
- 36) Does the shop owner sell the goods on credit?
- 37) If yes, how does the shop owner select the customers who are creditable?

- 38) Is the shop space used for functions other than trading like, social gatherings, association meetings etc.?
- 39) Is it possible to group the customers of the shop under one homogenous category with regard to the sectarian, hometown, ethnic identity of them?
- 40) Does the shop owner have customers from other neighborhoods?
- 41) If yes, how does the shop owner define the reason behind customers' preference of this shop in particular?
- 42) Is there any person or institution from which the shop owner gets material help or credit?
- 43) Is there any person or institution to which the shop owner gives credit or donations regularly?
- 44) What are the political inclinations of the shop owner?
- 45) Does the shop owner have a membership to any political party or organization?
- 46) Do the political inclinations of the shop owner have any impact on his selection of trusted customer to give goods on credit?
- 47) Has the shop owner ever given reference to the religious issues?
- 48) Has the shop owner ever given reference to the identities of Alevism and Sünnism by any means?
- 49) How does the shop owner define the nature of his/her relations with the neighboring shop owners?
- 50) Does the shop owner define any group or individual with whom s/he has an uneasy relationship?
- 51) Which aspects of the history of market place is emphasized more by the shop owner?