

SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: THE FACTORS BENEATH THE
INVASION

A Master's Thesis

by

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September 2013

To my family

SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: THE FACTORS BENEATH THE INVASION

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of

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ABSTRACT

SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: THE FACTORS BENEATH THE INVASION

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This thesis claims that there are other factors, apart from the Soviet aggression, which are equally important in clarifying the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the idea that the Soviet Union would be pleased to see a client regime in her neighbors is embraced, more arguments are needed to be discussed to explain such a large scale invasion. Soviet Union and Afghanistan had developed sincere affairs since 1950s when the Soviet investments began to reach a substantial level. Well then, how this good relation deteriorated and finally resulted in an armed struggle? In fact, the Soviet efforts to build a socialist regime in Afghanistan bore fruit in 1978; nevertheless only in one year, the USSR invaded a country which put a red star in its banner and never posed a threat to the Soviet lands. Kremlin might have considered Afghanistan was a piece of cake comparing to its former military actions but the results were beyond the Soviet expectations.

Key Words: Soviet Aggression, Afghanistan, Reforms, Islam

ÖZET

SOVYET-AFGAN SAVAŞI: İŞGALİN ALTINDA YATAN SEBEPLER

Aydıntan, Mehmet Ali Emir
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Bu tez, Afganistan'ın Sovyet işgalinde Sovyetlerin saldırganlığı dışında başka faktörlerin de eşit derecede önemli olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin komşularından bir tanesinde yandaş bir rejim görmekten mutlu olacağı fikri kabul edilmekte ancak bu büyüklükte bir saldırı olgusunun açıklanmasında daha fazla görüşün tartışılması gerekmektedir. Sovyet yatırımlarının hissedilir şekilde artış gösterdiği 1950'li yıllardan itibaren Sovyetler Birliği ve Afganistan samimi ilişkiler geliştirmişlerdir. Peki, bu iyi ilişki nasıl bozuldu ve nihayetinde silahlı bir çatışmayla sonuçlandı? Aslında, Sovyetlerin Afganistan'da sosyalist bir devlet inşa etme çabaları 1978 yılında meyvesini vermişti, yine de sadece bir yıl içerisinde SSCB, bayrağına kızıl yıldız koyan ve asla Sovyet toprakları için bir tehdit oluşturmayan bir devleti işgal etti. Kremlin, önceki askeri deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak Afganistan'ın kolay bir lokma olduğunu düşünmüş olabilir; ama sonuç Sovyetler Birliği'nin beklediğinin ötesindeydi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sovyet Saldırısı, Afganistan, Reformlar, PDPA, İslam

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Lastly, I am also utterly thankful to my parents and grandparents, I still follow the principle what they thought me in the first days of my education which is “Do not stick with what you believe, open your mind to different ideas, be fair and gentle to the opposition and finish what you go for.” I am glad not to abandon the people who trust in me I will never let them down.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is a land-locked country, having no serious natural resources as well as a very remote state from the international arena. Despite the geographical and economic setbacks, history of Afghanistan is enriched by internal conflicts, invasions, and wars. From the Alexander the Great in the ancient times to the United States at present day, many super powers have had warlike relations with this country. It is an unknown fact that whether or not the conjuncture and geographical location hindered the Afghans to live in a peaceful country. Whatever the reasons of the ill-fate experiences; agony, backwardness, illiteracy, famine, poor agricultural and infrastructural conditions came as heritage.

As soon as the Russian advance arrived at Central Asia in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became strategically important for Russia. On the other hand, the British apprehension stemmed from the Russian encroachment which could threaten her precious colony in southern Asia, namely India.¹ Therefore both powers, in the late nineteenth century, reached an agreement which turned Afghanistan into a

¹ Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia*, (London: Butler&Tanner, 1990) , p. 5.

buffer zone, between the lion and the bear.² This rivalry entered into another phase when German presence engendered Russian and British interests in the wake of the First World War. Even though Imperial Russia and the Great Britain were allies, the Russian revolution in October 1917 fundamentally changed not only the fate of the World War, but also the entire Russian policies.

The Russian revolution was an opportunity for a fresh start between the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR)³ and Afghanistan, because the RSFSR announced that the treaties signed with Imperial Russia were null and void. Russian efforts devoted on igniting fire of revolution in colonial states.

Having been fighting for years in various fronts, the British army was exhausted, but still was a part of balance of power in Central Asia. The end of the First World War was a golden opportunity in Central Asia where the lack of authority permitted the declaration of Afghan independence. However, Afghanistan was a poor and an underdeveloped state as well as bitterly needed foreign aid in certain areas. Many countries gave positive respond to the Afghan request of foreign aid, so a considerable size of assistance rained especially on peaceful needs of Afghanistan. Within those aid givers, some states became sharply pointed for the amount of the aid: the British, the Soviet Union, and Germany. The last was the

² Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 1985), p. 2.

³ The Soviet Union was established on 30 December 1922, until it was called Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. For more information see: Ronald G. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the successor states*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)

country which caused to take strict precautions as well as a temporary agreement of the first two states. What Nazi Germany was trying to do was to diversify the fronts by gaining allies from any place on earth just to increase the certainty of her victory.

The Second World War transformed the world map as well as left the Soviet Union alone in Central Asia where the British would not be able to balance the Soviet presence. In fact, Soviets maintained a policy of good neighboring like giving long term credits, entering construction business in Afghan provinces, having trained the Afghan army officers and established bilateral but superficially equal relations. In 1947, Pakistan emerged in southern Asia as a neighbor to Afghanistan. Afghan government hoped that the Pashtuns living in the Northwest Frontier Province, in other words, Pashtunistan became independent or inclined to be a part of Afghanistan. Thanks to the British coercive policies, Pashtuns had to choose either to join Pakistan or India. As a Muslim dominated region, Pashtunistan, annexed to Pakistan. After that time Pashtunistan issue aroused the most disputed single event causing hostile activities between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan had never forgotten the Pashtunistan issue; moreover the Afghan governments escalated the tension which allowed subversive activities such as fomenting Pashtuns inside Pakistan. Sustaining venomous policies by the Afghan authorities impelled Pakistan to close her borders with Afghanistan. For a country, whose main income based on agricultural goods, a two or three days long embargo was enough to finish off her entire economic activities. Whenever imposition of

Pakistani embargoes came up as a punishment to the Afghan economy, the Soviet Union saved Afghanistan from bankruptcy through purchasing the Afghan agricultural goods before they went rotten.

The United States exercised a containment policy towards USSR with Islamic states, so Pakistan was an indispensable part of that policy. Therefore, Afghan requests for the US military equipment was rejected by the US for the sake of green belt around the Soviets. The Soviet Union was unrivalled in Afghanistan owing to US foreign policy of Pakistan. Soviet policy makers were well aware of being the only alternative for making cooperation and developing mutual relations with Afghanistan. Eventually, the Soviet influence gained a momentum during 1950s. From building mills, bakeries to highways and passes, the Soviet Union started long term investments in order to rebuild Afghanistan. What is more, Afghan army was equipped by the Soviets, Afghan officers were dispatched to Soviet Union for military trainings, and many Soviet advisors were located with their families in Afghanistan. In 1964, a constitution was proclaimed, the following year People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which was a communist party founded in 1965. Due to the personal interests and problems but not ideological differences, PDPA split into two fractions as *Khalq* (masses) and *Parcham* (banner).

Public dissatisfaction due to the lack of stability, Mohammed Daoud executed a coup d'état and seized the power. Daoud tried to diminish the Soviet influence in his country to ban all political parties and forced them to join his National

Revolution Party, oppressed the Leftists and explored the source of money by looking for allies such as Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, which were not friendly to the USSR. Kremlin foresaw the Afghan move in such an environment that a Communist Afghanistan was not more than a dream, so they precipitated the progress of revolution by supporting the Leftists who were pro-Soviets then they contributed to reunification of *Khalq* and *Parcham*.

On April 17, 1978, the assassination of Mir Akhbar Khyber, a prominent figure of the *Parcham* faction gave rise to mass demonstrations against the Daoud regime. Harsh precautions exacerbated the situation. A military revolutionary council claimed to cut the violence throughout the country and conduct a coup in April 1978, which was also called as Saur Revolution. The Revolutionary Council proclaimed the formation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Consequently, it was the first time in Afghan history a Communist government had begun to rule the country. Internal havoc combining with the armed struggle against Soviet interests in Afghanistan left no option Moscow but to conduct a military operation since the Afghan Communist Party was not able to control the country.

After the World War II, the Soviet Union, for the first time, used military force to a country outside the Soviet bloc, even though mutual relations were warm enough. Afghan government was busy with having personal revenges but not ideological differences while the country was dragging into a chaos. The Islamic revolution in Iran awakened the Soviet cadres to move quickly before the Islamic

revolution would be a model for the entire Muslim Central Asia. The US was shaken by the Vietnam War and Watergate in domestic politics. Further, the US was busy with the Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis in Iran; Afghanistan was again at the corner of US policy priorities. What makes the Soviet-Afghan War different from the other contemporary conflicts is that the Soviet impact had already infiltrated to the Afghan government since 1950s, nevertheless the Soviets decided to invade when a communist party was ruling for the first time in Afghan history.

Academic researches demonstrate that the aspiration of the Soviet Union in keeping Afghanistan as an ally is the main reason of the Soviet invasion. Rests of the reasons are not seriously discussed, especially by the Western authors. It can be asserted that the Soviet sources are highly speculative about the Soviet-Afghan War. Thus, in researching the reasons of the Soviet invasion, I prefer to emphasize on Western sources as well as to illustrate the dynamics of Afghanistan in a historical content. Inquiring the facts under the Soviet-Afghan War, I would like to show that reducing the decision of invasion into a couple of arguments only gives a general outlook for the war; however it is insufficient to provide a deep understanding of the whole story. A school of thought settled in the arguments about the Soviet invasion that sooner or later the Soviets would invade Afghanistan and turn it into a part of Soviet bloc; in other words the USSR to justify her aggression, abused the internal disorder in Afghanistan as a cloak.

This thesis is designed by five parts to provide a complete picture of my proposed thesis: the first chapter gives a concise framework of the thesis; second chapter analysis core idea about the Afghan people and the roots of the Anglo-Russian rivalry. Third part discusses the further rivalry and the position of Afghanistan in the international community with rich literature on the relevant research subjects of the study. Fourth chapter presents the main argument to establish a framework for the study. The last chapter consists of a conclusion part which discusses final arguments.

CHAPTER II

FROM CONFRONTATION WITH THE GREAT POWERS TO THE ROOTS OF THE INDEPENDENCE

Afghanistan has a rough climate in all seasons pertinent to her mountainous (Hindu Kush and Pamir Range) terrain.⁴ Winter conditions are harsher with the effects of terrestrial climate and the country suffers from drought especially in summers. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan (nearest seaport is Karachi Pakistan, almost 1.150 km. away) neighboring with China by *Wakhan corridor*,⁵ Iran in the west, Pakistan shares the longest border (2430 km) in the south, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the north. Majority of the population can speak Pashtu and Dari, latter is a dialectic of Persian; despite of the fact that over many different languages are spoken.⁶

⁴ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), p. 3.

⁵“The Wakhan Corridor is generally thought of as extending from the Afghan village of Eshkashem at its lower or western end to the Vakhjir Pass at the Chinese border on the east. For location, altitude and conditions of various Wakhan passes see the table on pages 19 - 20. At the eastern end, the border is divided by a westward salient of Chinese territory—one segment continuing to the northeast and the other to the southeast. Consequently, Afghan territory actually extends east of Vakhjir Pass on the north and on the south. From Eshkashem to the easternmost point of Afghanistan the distance is approximately 350 kilometers, whereas to the Vakhjir Pass it is only 300 kilometers. The corridor is widest (65 kilometers) in the middle, where it includes the Nicholas Range; it is narrowest along its western third, where the width is 13 - 25 kilometers except for a breadth of 30 kilometers at the headwaters of the north-flowing Ishtragh River. At the western entrance, the corridor is 18 kilometers wide.” (International Boundary Study of the Afghanistan-USSR Boundary (1983) by the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research) www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS026.pdf

⁶ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 3.

2.1 Afghanistan and her People

According to World Health Organization (WHO), in 2009 31,412,000 people were living in Afghanistan with a low life expectancy: 47/50 and 1,006 dollars for a gross national income which makes the country officially one of the poorest countries in the world.⁷ Various nations exist in Afghanistan even though Pashtuns and Tajiks dominate the population. Pashtuns constituted % 42, Tajik % 27, Hazara % 9, Uzbek % 9, Aimak % 4, Turkmen % 3, Baloch % 2, and others % 4 (Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Pashai, Nuristani, Gujjar, Arab, Brahui and Pamiri, Qizil Bashes)⁸

Fazil Ahmed Burget⁹ urges that:

The data about the number of people who live in Afghanistan is mostly based on rough calculations. Moreover; no census of population has ever been made in Afghanistan. After 1964, during the post constitutional period, approximately 12 million people were living in Afghanistan. When the monarchy was overthrown in 1973, around 16 million people existed in Afghanistan. Although there is still a disinformation about the number of the people who belong to an ethnic group, Pashtun domination has always been a certain fact. It is true to say that there are three ethnic groups in Afghanistan: Tajiks (Persians), Turks (Uzbeks, Turkmen, Aimaks, Tatars, Kirghizs) and the Pashtuns. Pashtuns have been the ruling ethnic group since Tajiks and Turks who are living in Afghanistan are seen potential trouble makers with their connections with Iran and the Turkic world. Therefore, both the Russians and the British have chosen the Pashtuns the only ethnic group

⁷ <http://www.who.int/countries/afg/en/>

⁸ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>

⁹ Fazil Ahmed Burget who is an Afghan born academician has many publications on Afghanistan. Spending many years in Afghanistan gave him enough time for observation and analyse the facts. He devotes his academic career in Turkish universities (Ege and Gazi University) especially on history. His proficiencies at Pashtun, Dari and Turkish language enable him to reach various sources and perspectives. Fazil Ahmed's knowledge and advices on Afghan recent history enlightened me as well as gave me a new viewpoint.

creates less problem. Nowadays, distributions of population over the ethnic groups depend on the man who runs the Afghan Statistic Office. If the head of Statistic Office is Tajik oriented, he probably would try to increase the Tajik population by registering the other ethnic groups under Tajik population. For example Fazıl Ahmed is an Uzbek originated man and his mother tongue is Uzbek but according to his birth certificate his mother tongue is Dari. Afghan state reports are bias and no academic research can be constructed. People who are living in city centers are visible so that CIA facts predicate on density of province as a result of that rest of the population is calculated on those assumptions. Still, the date of CIA is considered to submit one of the most deeply analyzed facts that one can trust.¹⁰

Roughness of the geography reflects a mirror image on Afghan society. Rugged mountainous terrain and continual of invasions have contributed to create isolated communities therefore individual loyalties like family and tribal affiliation become more important than the meanings of nation.¹¹ Due to the lack of unity, independence, and conscious of being a nation; cooperation and consensus are appeared within a tribal level. The chiefs and the prominent families codify their rules in *jirga*,¹² council, which has developed as an instrument of defense organization and harmony in tribal life.¹³

Being as a highway of conquest Afghan economy has not utilized industrial and technological advance for that reason vast amount of economy based on agricultural activities. Next to agricultural activities, animal husbandry, the herding

¹⁰ Interivew with Fazıl Ahmed Burget.

¹¹ Harvey H. Smith, et.al. 4th eds. *Area Handbook For Afghanistan*, (Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 5.

¹² Jirga is one of the *Pashtunwali* institutions which is going to be explained in following pages, means a board of elders, an assembly, concert for conversation and consultation in a tribal way of life. In fact, the jirgah system is not limited to Pashtun tribes. It is universal. The Arab tribal community use the term of shura for such meetings and consultations. [Sherzaman, Taizi. "Jirga System in Tribal Life," *Cultural and Geographical Research*, Vol.1, no.11 (April 2007), p. 5.]

¹³ Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, (London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 25.

of sheep, goats and cattle absorb the largest portion of the labor force.¹⁴ Although transportation and costs stand as serious problems in front of Afghan natural sources, natural gas (at Sheberghan and west of Mazar-i Sharif) and minerals like coal, beryl, iron, and lapis lazuli are also found in Afghanistan.¹⁵

Again, lack of national consciousness hindered to build a modern state. For the Afghan tribes, the state should be out of their interests; state must only be responsible for protecting the national boundaries which provide stability and security from the foreigners.¹⁶ Tribal life in Afghanistan, where obedience is absolute, has developed its own rules, apart from the official justice system. These unwritten ethical codes, among the Pashtuns, design the whole social life which is called *Pashtunwali*.¹⁷

Pashtunwali regulates the social life which consists of some sort of rules and expected to be obeyed by every member of the conglomerate. In the absence of a modern law system, those codes facilitate to maintain the order. Unwritten rules are taught through generations as the rate of illiteracy makes almost impossible to turn the rules into a modern law system.

¹⁴ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* p. 25.

¹⁵ Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, 3th eds. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, (Washington: Foreign Area Studies The American University Print, 1986), p. 22.

¹⁶ Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 14.

¹⁷ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* p. 15.

The most important principles are:

1. *Namus*, honor, could be describe as which is directly related to the role of women, her behaviors and the results; women must be protected
2. *Nanawati* means that people running from the law are allowed to seek refuge and shelter
3. *Tureh* means men must be courage. Cowardice is perceived as the weakness of a person
4. *Melmastia*, hospitality, involves the requirement of giving shelter and protection
5. *Badal*, means basically revenge, the *Pashtunwali* allows to take revenge in certain conditions
6. *Sabat* is loyalty to one's family, friends and tribe
7. *Nang*, honor, helps to reduce the level of violence among groups
8. *Imamdari* people must behave in a moral way
9. *Isteqamat* persistence in everything from study to beliefs
10. *Ghayrat* gives the people to defend their property, honor, and family honor.¹⁸

From the first day of the modern state system has been established, it is not hard to interpret that central governments of Afghanistan are incapable of controlling the entire population where a bunch of people claim to execute their own rules. Besides the strength of the tribal affiliation, Islam is the most comprehensive and binding element among the Afghans.¹⁹ People tend to identify themselves in religious terms, such as almost all Afghans are Muslim, either Sunni or Shia. Tribal loyalty matters against the other tribes to obtain more power within the country; religious binding is a sharp weapon against the foreign invaders motivating the Afghans to defend their country.

¹⁸Erinn Banting, *Afghanistan: the People*, (New York: Crabtree Publishing Company, 2003) p. 14. http://books.google.com.tr/books?id=f18cd15sc7wC&lpg=PP1&dq=inauthor:%22Erinn+Banting%22&pg=PA14&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false p.14

¹⁹Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, p.14

Afghans were met with Islam in the seventh century by the Arab invaders and by the ninth century the Arabs gained more or less full control of the region where Islam proclaimed its triumph over Zoroastrianism.²⁰ A significant role has been attributed to the religious leaders in an unorganized Afghan social life. Religious leaders, (*mullah or ulema*) are the primary sources of education. Moral attitudes especially religious activities have penetrated both in urban and rural life in a country where social mobility is weak.²¹ In a decentralized country which suffers, from a lack of systemic education, generations are grown at the hands of the religious leaders where skeptical perception of science and contemplating the facts do not exist.

2.2 Early Confrontations Of Britain And Russia In Central Asia

The first recorded invasion of Afghanistan took place in sixth century BC, when Darius I of Persia brought it under his control. In the following centuries, Sakas (Scythians), Parthians and Kushans, kept the country successively under control.²² In modern times Britain invaded Afghanistan three times to halt the Russian advance through Central Asia and this rivalry is also named as the Great Game. Nonetheless these invasions were not successful enough to build another India in the region.

²⁰ Smith, *Area Handbook For Afghanistan* p. 45.

²¹ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 23.

²² Amalendu Misra, *Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 13.

The Afghan State was born under the consensus of the tribes with a Monarchy from Durrani (also known as Abdali)²³ tribe which was one of the most powerful Pashtun families under Ahmad Shah Durrani, known as the founder of Afghanistan, in 1747. From his era on, all of the Afghan kings were chosen from a specific tribe of the Pashtun clan. By the end of the eighteenth century the Durrani Pashtuns (Sadozai and Mohammedzai) conquered the west and north of Kandahar.²⁴ Ahmad Shah Durrani's Afghanistan reached her largest borders in 1760s, from Central Asia to Delhi and from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea.²⁵ Due to the internal upheavals and constant conflicts with formidable neighbors, large borders could not be preserved under Afghan dominion. Weak state organization, lack of obedience to the central authority and tribal tendency of the population created a short lived empire.

Afghanistan gained international importance in the nineteenth century when the French and Russian had showed their appetite to the British sphere of influence in southern Asia. Successful French campaigns in Egypt and Syria encouraged Napoleon to infuse deep of Asia by training the Persian army against the Russians, however, in 1807, Russians defeated Persians, and under treaty of *Gulistan*²⁶ a vast territory was ceded to Russia.²⁷

²³ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 32.

²⁴ Smith, *Area Handbook For Afghanistan*, p. 45.

²⁵ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 22

²⁶ An important agreement signed between the Russian Empire and Persia. After Napoleon's defeat, Russia and Britain resolved their major differences. When the Ottoman Empire also agreed to peace terms and stepped out of the conflict (Treaty of Bucharest, 1812), Russia concentrated more forces on the Caucasus and by 1813, Persia, left without allies, agreed to the terms of the Treaty of Gulistan.

In response to those activities, Britain approached Afghanistan with a treaty called Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809, a mutual defense agreement with *Shah Shuja*,²⁸ the Amir of Afghanistan.²⁹ The agreement also included securing the trade routes to India vital economic income of Britain. The British, in the name of protecting India, developed a strategy called forward policy based on creating buffer zones on the possible invasion routes of Russia by capturing the target territory in order to provide further benefit. British anxiety had risen from the Russian stable advance since 1600s towards India. At the beginning of the nineteenth century only 2.000 miles separated the two empires from each other and this kind of closeness could have brought catastrophic results.³⁰

British considered forward policy as the only way to halt the Russian advance. For that reason building quasi barricades seemed to be a good tactic in order to contain Russia. Besides, Britain claimed to enlarge her trade route through Central Asia, Bukhara and Khiva were chosen as the main targets of the commercial penetration.³¹

According to the treaty, Russia annexed all of Transcaucasia, except the Khanates of Erevan and Nakhchivan. Thus Persia lost the Khanates of Baku, Sheki, Qarabagh, Ganjah, Kiuba, Shirvan, parts of Talish, and most of Georgia. George Bournoutian, "Husayn Qulī Khān Qazvīnī, Sardār of Erevan: A Portrait of a Qajar Administrator", *Iranian Studies*, 9, No. 2/3 spring - summer, 1976), p. 167.

²⁷ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 363.

²⁸ Shah Shuja was the last king from Sadozai tribe, and the first was the Ahmad Shah Durrani. See, T.A.Heathcote. *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1983), p. 216.

²⁹ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p.41.

³⁰ Hopkirk. *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia*, p. 5.

³¹ T.A.Heathcote. *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1983), p. 20.

2.3 Anglo-Afghan Wars

From the 1820s, the British had conquered most of India afterwards a growing apprehension began about how the Russians would react.³² Indian princes might have been encouraged by the Russian presence for cooperation against the Imperial Britain which would lead a possible unrest in Southern Asia. After the Russian victory over Iran in 1828, the first serious move came by supporting Shah of Iran to initiate a military campaign against Herat, the gate of western Afghanistan, a province that was believed historically belong to Iran. The Russians succeeded to convince the Persians to lead an attack on Herat, but the Afghans rebuffed their enemies. Although the attack was resulted in failure, the Persians did not lose the patience and continued the siege until the British warned the Shah of Iran the one of the consequences of pursuing territorial claims was the war with Britain.³³ By respecting the British intimidation, Persia postponed her dreams on Herat as they could not afford such a devastating war even Russia would have wished such an opportunity to arm the Persians against her arch enemy.

The adventure of Iran was part of a Russian policy to offset the British dominant role in Afghanistan. In 1838s, St. Petersburg dispatched an envoy, whose name was Vitkievitch, for promoting good relations between Russia and Afghanistan. However, this was evaluated by the British that the Russians were after

³² Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 41.

³³ Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 23.

their own agenda.³⁴ British insisted on the Afghans to dismiss the Russian envoy, in return to the British aid in lifting the siege of Herat.³⁵ In the end, Britain decided to interfere in Afghan affairs more actively by persuading Shah Shuja, ex-king of Afghanistan, and Ranjit Singh, King of Sikh Empire, together to invade Afghanistan.³⁶ In doing so, Britain would establish a friendlier regime and to strengthened her western frontiers.

Whereas before the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-42) had started, Dost Mohammad as the Amir of Afghanistan asked for British protectorate to regain Peshawar from the Sikhs; he promised to fight against Shah of Iran.³⁷ However, Britain decided to support Shah Shuja not only because of Dost Mohammad's connections with Russia or his persistent claims over Peshawar but also Shah Shuja was eager to give more concessions. Shah Shuja accepted a relatively disadvantageous agreement with the Sikhs which prohibited him from negotiating with any foreign state without the consent of British government.³⁸

The First Anglo-Afghan War caused a fierce reaction among the Afghans. In sum, the British Indian army was defeated, a force of 4.500 men and some eight million pounds were wasted, and pro-British Afghan Amir Shah Shuja was killed.³⁹

³⁴ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 57.

³⁵ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 371.

³⁶ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p.58.

³⁷ Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 24.

³⁸ Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 100.

³⁹ Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 24.

Within the negative results of the preemptive war, losing the chance of capturing Afghanistan gave the most harmful damage to the British prestige. Nevertheless, British retaliation came in burning of Kabul and restoration of Dost Mohammed Khan to the Afghan throne⁴⁰. After exile, Dost Mohammed had mounted to consolidate the unification of Afghanistan taking the support of tribal chiefs to put down the uprisings.⁴¹ In response to the British military actions, late in 1839, Russia invaded Khanate of Khiva as a counter-move.

The Russians were nervous about the possibility of British encroachment into their commerce a densely populated Muslim region, would turn against them. A mass rebellion movement in any Muslim Khanates might have been followed by the others in a domino effect, in the end Russia might get a profound loss in Central Asia. After exhausting campaigns Britain and Russia agreed on a *détente* in 1844, the same year the Russians established a base in Khiva, a step to southern Asia.⁴² On the other hand, British and Afghan forces expanded their lands without any clash of interests: British conquered large parts of northern India and Dost Mohammad regained Mazar-i Sharif, Khulm, Kunduz, Qataghan, Badakhshan and Qandahar.⁴³

With Russian support, once again, Iran started to scratch Herat issue in 1850s which resulted in British-Persian War.⁴⁴ For sure, the Russians did not expect a

⁴⁰ Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 24.

⁴¹ Smith, *Area Handbook For Afghanistan*, p. 48.

⁴² Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 84.

⁴³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 401.

⁴⁴ Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 84.

Persian triumph from the war but incessant Persian attacks had a wearisome effect on the British military strength. The British had to divide her forces according to threat perception that well suited the Russian interests.

Between 1844 and 1878 Afghanistan was rather a peaceful country comparing to the rest of Central Asia. Annexations of Tashkent in 1865, Samarkand in 1868, and Bukhara in 1869 provided a vital advantage to Russia against Britain.⁴⁵ Prior to the annexation of Central Asian Khanates by Russia, Britain was by far the unique imperial power in the region; in contrast Russia had only small opportunities in reaching the Indian subcontinent. By conquering Bukhara, Russia not only closed the gap in the rivalry in Central Asia but also brought a kind of balance to the British presence in the region. Thoroughly, Russia became an alternative actor for the British dominions who wanted to enhance bargaining power against Britain or had hopes for independence. Significance of Bukhara emanated from her close relations with Afghanistan. Bukhara on the other hand, was under Russian protectorate since 1868.⁴⁶ Naturally, London wished to observe Russian activities and affairs of Bukhara from Afghanistan in order to measure either these movements were destructive or not. As a result, British government requested Sher Ali, successor of Dost Mohammad Khan, to accept a British mission in Herat.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 81.

⁴⁶ Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, (Oxford:Westview Press, 1988), p. 34.

⁴⁷ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 406.

Meanwhile, a Russian mission had already been sent to Kabul under General Stoliatov in 1878 with a letter suggesting to sign a mutual security treaty including the road buildings and telegraph lines. The crucial point was the offer of stationing Russian troops on Afghan territory.⁴⁸ Louis Dupree emphasized that Russians did not ask any permission for sending the mission and Sher Ali failed to stop the convoy which had already set forth.⁴⁹ Even though Amir Sher Ali⁵⁰ incurred a Russian *fait accompli*, he also refused to host a permanent British mission which was the main reason of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) to balance the Russian presence. It seemed unnatural to bear the risk of a war with Britain only by accepting the Russian mission where in return rejecting the British. Attitude of Sher Ali demonstrated that he was supported by St. Petersburg and that become apparent when he appealed the Russians for substantial assistance. Another significant occurrence which had a great impact on altering the British foreign policy was the result of the British elections. Conservative Party (1874-80) prevailed against the Liberals so once again a forward policy was adopted and intensified British stance in Afghanistan.⁵¹

Having dissatisfactory outcomes of diplomatic efforts, Britain appealed to a military option. In December 1878, a British army of 35,000 men invaded

⁴⁸ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 85.

⁴⁹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 408.

⁵⁰ Sher Ali died at the gate of Mazar-i Sharif in February 1879 when he was fighting against the British army. His throne was taken by his rebel son Yaqub Ali was sent into prison before the Second Anglo-Afghan War emerged.

⁵¹ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 108.

Afghanistan through Khyber, Kurram and Bolan.⁵² Sher Ali left the country and demand help from the Russians.⁵³ Russians, refused to send military aid on the account of difficulty of transporting troops and arms across the Hindu Kush but in reality they had to deal with Berlin Congress and wished no further hostility with Britain in Asia.⁵⁴

Second Anglo-Afghan War ended in 26 May 1879 with a treaty at Gandamak, an ironical place where the British army had made the last retreat from Kabul in 1842.⁵⁵ Conditions of the war were also destructive for Afghanistan such as:

...accepting the British control over the foreign policy in return for the promise that British troops, arms and money would be available to assist Mohammed Yaqub Khan, son of the former Sher Ali Khan against any unprovoked aggression, ceding of Kandahar and Jalalabad but keeping the Khyber Pass and finally British occupation forces were to be withdrawn as soon as the climatic and medical conditions allowed but meanwhile the Afghan civil governors should resume the local administration without British interference.⁵⁶

Second War like the first one, did not changed the British preponderance on Afghanistan. Even partition of Afghanistan for the sake of a more secure India was on the agenda. Contrary to the British plans, the partition was not realized for various reasons but existence of a foreign power with brutal ruling exercises created a kind

⁵² Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 13.

⁵³ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 81.

⁵⁴ J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, (Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific Honolulu, 1986) p. 8.

⁵⁵ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 35.

⁵⁶ Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 114.

of xenophobia in Afghanistan. Eventually British resident, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was killed, as a reaction, on September 1879, just two months after his arrival, by a group of soldiers who assigned to protect him.⁵⁷ After the death of British resident in Kabul, internal disorder was spread and the clashes between British and Afghan forces became a part of daily life.⁵⁸

Further occupation plans of Afghan lands were considered not to bring any benefit to Britain. A withdrawal scheme was about to be implemented without provoking the Russians for a pre-emptive attack into Afghan territory between Amu Darya and the Hindu Kush.⁵⁹ Inadequacy of Sher Ali's administration urged the Britain to seek a possible successor in order to maintain territorial integrity of Afghanistan after the British evacuation had finished.

The closest nominee was Abdur Rahman, nephew of Sher Ali, grandson of Amir Dost Mohammed, who had spent 11 years in exile in Samarkand and Tashkent, and who was taking a generous stipend from governor-general and commander of the Russian forces in Central Asia.⁶⁰ Abdur Rahman's position in the country was so strong that British had to accept him as the Amir of Afghanistan; otherwise in the very act of retreating from Afghanistan the British army would be in danger.

⁵⁷ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 409.

⁵⁸ Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, (London: Verso, 1988) p. 14.

⁵⁹ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 95.

⁶⁰ Angelo Rasanayagam, , *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, (London:I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 1.

Amir Abdur Rahman, Iron Amir,⁶¹ (1880-1901 r.) also took concessions from the British including a guarantee that there would be no British agents anywhere in his state and he would not be asked to join an anti-Russian pact; Kandahar should be united with the rest of Afghanistan, in return, Kandahar would remain independent and the territories ceded in the treaty of Gandamak would remain under British control.⁶² In delayed reaction, the Russians invaded Afghan held territory for the first time in 1885 by occupying Panjdeh a Turkmen village less than 100 miles north Herat which brought the powers on the brink of war.⁶³ The occupation of the Pandjeh Oasis provoked a crisis, since the area was traditionally an Afghan territory that paid tribute to the governor of Herat. Britain guaranteed asylum to Afghanistan on the condition of controlling Afghan foreign relations in return any attack from Russia would be considered a threat to London.⁶⁴

In the years between 1880 and 1907, the British tried to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with Russia. At this point, British pressure had worked where the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia was fixed except for the line along the Amu Darya River.⁶⁵ Actually, in the absence of British forces, the main aim of London was to prevent the Russian manipulations into the ethnic groups of northern Afghanistan.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Abdur Rahman Khan gained the title Iron Amir, because of his policies towards the people who oppose his authority. His punishments were cruel (executions, deportations) and he had implemented his reforms with an iron will.

⁶² Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 144.

⁶³ Smith, *Area Handbook For Afghanistan* p. 49.

⁶⁴ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 9.

⁶⁵ Amstutz *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 8.

⁶⁶ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 117.

2.4 New Borders of Afghanistan

Demarcating the eastern and southern limits of the Afghan domain finally settled the tense relations between Britain and Afghanistan. In November 1893, an earnest step was taken by Sir Mortimer Durrand, Foreign Secretary of British India and the founder of the *Durrand Line*.⁶⁷ Mortimer Durrand persuaded the Afghans to sign an agreement for fixing an area approximately 1,200 miles running from Sinkiang to Iran.⁶⁸ The Durrand Line was designed to bring stability to the frontier regions. However, the construction of the Durrand Line served at a well-known fact apart from fixing concrete Afghan frontiers which was to cut off a potential confrontation of great powers. In its final form, the line almost ignored ethnographic or topographic factors: tribes, sometimes villages were divided. It could be alleged that the line deliberately divided to create an artificial area, thus the British easily eliminated the raising opposition to its presence. A brilliant maneuver not only dragged the attentions to anywhere else but also initiated a long time standing dispute in the region.

At first, Amir Abdur Rahman, successor to Sher Ali, refused to accept the limits of the line which detached many of the eastern Pashtun tribes from his dominations; nonetheless, an increase in his stipend from 1.2 million to 1.8 million rupees as well as free right to import of arms and ammunition were enough to

⁶⁷ The Durand Line continues to be the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This division has been the subject of many controversies and interpretations in the last hundred years. To the Afghans it is a symbol of diktat but Pakistan claims that it is an international frontier.

⁶⁸ Smith, *Area Handbook For Afghanistan*, p. 50.

persuade Amir Abdur Rahman.⁶⁹ Even though the border settlement was mostly completed, Russia did not relinquish her diplomatic and economic claims in Afghanistan whose foreign affairs fully were controlled by Britain. Finally, the Russians requested the right to establish direct relations with the Afghan government to settle border and other problems in 1900 culminated in new negotiation process over the interests of the two rival powers in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.⁷⁰

Twentieth century did not begin so different from the last one for Afghanistan, just the actors and alliances were about to change. Russians had both internal and external matters to solve. First of all, the war with Japan in 1904-1905 was ended with an explicit defeat and a humiliation to her military strength. Secondly, Tsarist government was attacked by revolutionary uprising at home. Following the defeat, Russia decided to base her foreign ambitions on more rational dynamics.

By 1906 the Russians and the British were discussing partition of Central Asia and the Middle East. By 1907, after 18 months of negotiations, they had reached an agreement called: Convention of St. Petersburg. By signing the convention Russia agreed that Afghanistan laid outside of her sphere of influence, no agents would be send into the country and would confer directly with Britain on all matters relating to Russian-Afghan relations. Britain in return agreed neither to

⁶⁹ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 101.

⁷⁰ Amstutz *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 9.

occupy or annex any part of Afghanistan nor to interfere in the internal affairs of that country.⁷¹

The Anglo-Russian Convention had failed to fulfill British hopes of settling the problems with Russia in Central Asia. The British were co-acting with Russia in Central Asia, whereas same Britain was struggling to stop Russian ambitions for the Straits and warm water ports.⁷² Russia and Britain were seemed to be allies when a greater threat had appeared to their presence than their own mutual discord. At the end of the nineteenth century despite the intense Russian penetrations into Afghanistan Britain had still been the utmost dominant power. During the process of designing borders of Afghanistan, neither ethnic structure nor geographical features were taken into account. Britain and Russia planned everything without Afghan participation. Therefore, artificial state borders were created just to serve a unique purpose: to distinct the great powers from a direct confrontation.

Insufficient financial resources thwarted to maintain the fight against the tribes which did not accept to unify around Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Thus, he had to pursue a dependent policy to Britain. Sometimes Abdur Rahman Khan played off Britain and Russia against each other to secure his throne. Generally, his anxiety arose from the Russian offensive politics in which he was a close witness when he

⁷¹ Amstutz *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 9.

⁷² Ira Klein, "The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia, 1907-1914," *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 11, no. 1 (1971), p. 137.

was living in Tashkent under Russian protectorate, forced him to establish warm relations with Britain.

Abdur Rahman's words best describe his Russian fear:

...The Russian policy of aggression is slow and steady, but firm and unchangeable. Their habit of forward movement resembles the habit of an elephant, who examines a spot thoroughly before he places his foot upon it, and when once he puts his weight there is no going back, and not taking another step in a hurry until he has put his full weight on the first foot, and has smashed everything that lies under it...⁷³

Abdur Rahman maintained the role of a tough ruler as well as a reformist to modernize the country. As a tough ruler, he was eager to control the Non-Pashtun tribes and other power centers. His attack on the Hazarajat which led to the massacre of thousands of them and the dislocation of thousands demonstrated his iron will.⁷⁴ He did not also hesitate to use the Islamic terms in order to gather the country under one rule and legitimize to his power. He blamed the great powers of being united in the task of destroying Afghanistan and its Muslim heritage.⁷⁵ After his death, Habibullah, one of his sons assumed the throne.

⁷³ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ Carol J. Riphenburg, "Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, no. 1 (2007), p. 10.

⁷⁵ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 130.

2.5 Afghan Nationalism and the Road to Independence

During the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-1919 r.), a group of people who educated in foreign countries like Britain, France and Turkey were to be the center of Afghan nationalist political movement. They were willing to transform Afghan tribal regime into a nation state system which had implemented in the success of developed states. Under the leadership of intellectual and politician Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), prime ideologue of this movement, it was assumed that only interpretation of modernity would be the panacea for the backwardness of Afghanistan. Mahmud Tarzi was an important political figure who had grown up in exile in the Ottoman Empire, gained, Amir Habibullah's sympathy owing to his ambition in building an independent state.⁷⁶

Mahmud Tarzi embodied his ideas, combining with the experience that he gained during his journey to European countries and Turkey in the nationalist newspaper *Siraj Al-Akhbar* (The light of the News). Subjects in his newspaper were mostly about social inequalities, injustice, lack of national unity, western imperialism, and the ill-treatment of the Russians to the Muslims. These topics made the newspaper very popular among the Afghans.⁷⁷ Mahmud Tarzi did not even hesitate to bring harsh criticism to Habibullah's administration even though he was aware of living in an autocratic-ruled country like Afghanistan where such

⁷⁶ Magnus and Naby, 1998, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 39.

⁷⁷ Ursula Sims-Williams, "The Afghan Newspaper *Siraj al-Akhbar*," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 7, no. 2 (1980), p. 119.

unfavorable behaviors to the King would have bred mortal consequences. Veneration to Tarzi might have given him an exceptional position or a kind of courage in his writings; more than that two of his daughters married two of Amir Habibullah's sons.⁷⁸

The editor of *Siraj Al-Akhbar* Mahmud Tarzi incessantly praised the Japanese victory over Russia and represented it as an Asian triumph over the Europeans.⁷⁹ Doubtlessly repercussions of the Russo-Japanese war were more far reaching than expected. Asian victory brought a huge question mark of Western superiority image. Besides, obedience to the imperial powers, independence became an alternative way of co-existence. Japanese modernization was a perfect model for those countries which aimed to be free from imperial hegemony, merged the tradition with science and technology, and lastly achieved economic and political progress without impairing national culture or discarding the monarchy.⁸⁰ It was clear that the conditions of Japan were different from Afghanistan's; still the methods could well be implemented for reaching the modernity, a helpful instrument in the road of independence.

The outbreak of the World War I was the milestone of Afghan independence. While Mahmud Tarzi was gradually adopting an anti-British stance in his writings, Amir Habibullah was maintaining a policy of neutrality. The Sultan of Ottoman

⁷⁸ Ursula Sims-Williams, *The Afghan Newspaper Siraj al-Akhbar*. 119.

⁷⁹ Magnus and Naby, 1998, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 39.

⁸⁰ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 209.

Empire, the Caliph of the Muslim world, declared a war along with Germany in 1914 at the same time he called on a jihad, holy war, against Entente powers. Habibullah Khan rejected to declare jihad by saying "...jihad must be proclaimed inside Afghanistan by Afghan religious leaders..."⁸¹ Still, he had to resist both internal pressures and the Ottoman-German attempts to provoke the anti-British activity in India.

While negotiations were continuing between Afghanistan and a Turco-German mission either to participate in WWI along with Turks or not in 1916, Amir Habibullah Khan accepted a sudden attack to the Indian border areas where Pashtun tribes were influential enough for creating trouble for Britain only if his army would be accompanied by a large Turkish army.⁸² Amir's maneuver was to satisfy the anti-British pro-Turkish feelings of his people, but it was enough for the Germans to realize that the Afghans would follow a wait and see policy in order to be sure who would be the victor. Otherwise any risk-taking policy might have culminated in the fragmentation of Afghanistan.

By the end of the World War I, Russia and Britain were not acting together anymore. Russia was so busy with her own affairs; they had a civil war that had to be managed. Russian Revolution had a profound effect on the development of Afghan nationalism. Actually, the revolution itself did not drastically change the course of

⁸¹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 434.

⁸² Heathcote, *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, p. 167.

events in Afghanistan. Namely, a consciously working class did not exist that intended to revolt against the bourgeoisie, capture the basic state administration, or adopt a communist style in their state organization. Honestly, there was hardly any reason to be inspired by the Russian Revolution for the Afghans in 1920s, therefore only civil war within Russia was a source of hope to find the proper time for independence.

Britain, on the other hand, had already exhausted from fighting in various fronts. They profited from the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920, obtained full control in Near East, Persia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.⁸³ As a countermove, the Bolsheviks announced that all the treaties that had been signed during the era of Russian Empire were null and void. In order to wage the civil war, the Bolsheviks supported nationalist liberation movements in colonial countries; hence they gave fundamental aid to the neighboring countries in their struggle against imperialism. As a result of the appeasement policy, Bolshevik leaders relinquished the lands that had once been claimed by the Russian Empire. Since they could not have afforded an enmity of Muslim population, the infant regime in St. Petersburg was vulnerable to the external and internal challenges.⁸⁴

Afghanistan was then got a golden opportunity where no actor seemed to object her demand for independence. By the way, Amir Habibullah desired to be

⁸³ A. Lobanov Rostovsky, "Anglo-Russian Relations through the Centuries," *Russian Review* Vol. 7 no. 2 (1948), p. 51.

⁸⁴ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 42.

rewarded by full independence after maintaining a policy of neutrality. Although the Ottoman-German pressure was so overwhelming during the war, the Afghans did not move against British interests in southern Asia. However, Amir's insistence on refraining from British shadow at foreign relations disturbed the British. While Habibullah Khan was on the eve of negotiating he was mysteriously murdered on a haunting trip, in his sleep at Qala Gosh.⁸⁵

After Habibullah's death in 1919, Amanullah Khan had established his authority with the support of army. He was a committed reformer urging his ideas of modernization from emancipation of women to the state administration, economic and social system. Entire reform package of King Amanullah was motivated by building a nation state in Afghanistan where national consciousness was gradually increasing, basic requirements were almost accomplished. In line with the efforts of being an independent state, King Amanullah, appealed the anti-imperialist Bolsheviks as they denounced that Tsarist Russian ambitions had not been followed. Lenin did not leave Afghanistan alone and emphasized his opinions in a letter that had sent to King Amanullah.

Lenin wrote:

“The Workers and Peasants Government instructs its embassy in Afghanistan to engage in discussions with a view to the conclusion of trade and other friendly agreements... (and to pursue) together with Afghanistan the joint struggle against the most rapacious imperialistic government on earth Great Britain. The Afghan people wish to

⁸⁵ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 117.

receive military aid against England from the Russian people. The Workers and Peasants Government is inclined to grant such assistance on the widest scale to the Afghan nation, and to repair the injustice done by the former government of the Russian Czars by adjusting the Soviet-Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at the expense of Russia.”⁸⁶

Besides economic and military aid to Afghanistan, the Bolsheviks also promised the return of some border regions that the Russians seized in 1885.⁸⁷ The Bolsheviks inclined to create an anti-British block from countries who were demanding for independence in Asia, a trump card to weaken the British status. Thus, the Red Army could use entire force on against the White army, only resistance body on the road of a communist state while the British presence was endangered by the mutinies of the aggrieved nations.

Being very determined to annul the treaty of *Gandamak*, Amanullah declared the independence. Soviet Russia was the first country who recognized the Afghan independence whereas the declaration was rejected by Britain.⁸⁸ To persuade the British, King Amanullah sent the troops down through the Khyber Pass however the third war between Britain and Afghanistan would be resulted with the defeat of the Afghans.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Amstutz, *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p.11; Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Vol. 1 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), p. 425.

⁸⁷ David Gibs, “Does the USSR Have a Grand Strategy? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 24, no. 4 (1987), p. 367.

⁸⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, “Lineages of the State in Afghanistan,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, no. 11 (1988), p. 1196.

⁸⁹ Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 5.

Suffering from the wars with considerable losses in World War I, the British army was literally frayed as they had no endurance for tolerating another occupation in southern Asia. Thus, Britain accepted the full independence of Afghanistan with the treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919.⁹⁰ This was a great victory as well as an official recognition of Afghan independent state. A febrile energy on establishing diplomatic affairs spent to introduce new Afghan state was free to conduct further bilateral relations with other states.

2.6 Soviet Russia: New State with Old Claims

As soon as the Bolsheviks consolidate their power after the civil war, Communist Russia reclaimed the territory in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Baku was the first victim of the Soviets, reoccupied in April 1920; Armenia fell in December 1920 after a border conflict with Turkey; Georgia was the last domino stone in the re-conquest of the territory of the former Russian Empire.⁹¹

Messages that had been given in the early days of the revolution such as the right of self-determination to the aggrieved nations of Asia and having close but equal relations with Kremlin were just tactics to secure the southern borders for a while. According to Lenin, Asian and African nationalist states could be allied

⁹⁰ Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 5.

⁹¹ David Kelly, "End of the great game: British intervention in Russia's Southern Borderlands and the Soviet Response" *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* Vol.13, no.4 (2000), p. 95.

against Western and imperialism.⁹² Ironically, before the October 1917 Revolution, Lenin used almost the same words about the national and ethnic ambitions in order to topple down the Tsarist Russia.

In the name of developing bilateral relations, the first international agreement of Afghanistan was signed with Soviet Russia in 1921. The treaty gave the Afghans trade rights with the Soviet Union and a promised subsidy about one million gold rubles in return for the territories in Panjdeh area which were planned to cede Russia or Bukhara, according to the result of plebiscite, in the nineteenth century.⁹³ Amanullah's struggle in regaining Russian seized territories at Panjdeh was ignored by the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that the Afghans with the treaty of friendship in 1921 attempted continuing diplomatic pressure to assure the independence of Bukhara and Khiva, both states were reconstituted as republics under the Soviet administration. In the meantime, the Soviet regime was recapturing the territories that had been given away during the Russian Civil War; in 1924, Red Army put an end to the autonomy of the states of Khiva (Khorezm) and Bukhara.⁹⁴

The Soviets promised that each colonial land would be free to use the right of self-determination or to join the Soviet Union; in practice latter was the case. One by

⁹²Kelly, "End of the Great Game: British intervention in Russia's Southern Borderlands and the Soviet Response", p. 87.

⁹³ Amstutz, *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 12.

⁹⁴ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 20.

one Central Asian states were annexed to the Soviet Union, except Afghanistan as it was an indispensable component in fomenting the separatist movement in India. Meanwhile, the Soviets had serious difficulties in controlling the *Basmachi* Movement,⁹⁵ a movement motivated by Islamic patterns with an armed struggle against the Soviet annexation in Central Asia. Thus, the Soviets discontinued establishing a communist Afghanistan and gave the ultimate priority to the Sovietization of Turkestan.⁹⁶ It is clear that from the first day of the formation of the Soviet Union, creating a communist Afghanistan was on the agenda; however the conditions were not suitable to build such a satellite state.

Apart from the Russian cruelty to the *Basmachi* Movement, Amanullah Khan, as a part of the Islamic World, was naturally growing sympathy to the Movement; moreover he sent Afghan troops to his northern frontier to secretly correspond with the former Young Turk, Enver Pasha who was later killed while fighting against the Bolsheviks.⁹⁷ Although the *Basmachi* resistance continued during the late 1920s, it could never successfully challenge the Soviet regime as none of the rival *Basmachi* leaders had any long-lasting political programs. Lack of political vision and long-run ambitions, the movement was divided into pieces; it

⁹⁵ The origin of the *Basmachi* Movement is based on Ergesh Beg's personal outbreak against the Soviet policy in Turkestan who was responsible for securing Kokand. He initiated guerilla warfare after the collapsed of the Kokand Autonomy and in time, the revolt spread to entire Turkestan region against the Sovietization. *Basmachi* was a pejorative word which was used by the Russians for the people who prolonged their struggle. See, Ahad Andican, *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi* (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2003), p.172.

⁹⁶ Andican. *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi*, p. 172.

⁹⁷ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 448.

survived as long as it did only because it seemed to the indigenous peoples a lesser evil than Bolshevik rule.⁹⁸

The Soviets demanded the withdrawal of the Afghan forces from the border zones (an island in the Amu Darya in 1925); in relation to this incident they received a declaration of non-interference from King Amanullah. At the end, border dispute was solved with the Treaty of Non-Aggression which was signed between Afghanistan and Soviet Union in 1926, contained protection of Russia and Afghanistan to prevent third-party nations and subversive political activities from using their territory.⁹⁹ By signing of this treaty an air corridor was established between Kabul and Moscow via Tashkent¹⁰⁰ thereby Afghanistan got one step closer to her communist ally.

Afghanistan desperately needed to normalize her relations first with Britain and with the Soviet Union; then a world-wide recognition must be provided in order to facilitate the domestic reform progress, a long-term dream of King Amanullah. Prior to the initiation of the reforms, Afghanistan must have erased the portrait of a buffer zone, squeezed by two great powers. Although the Afghans gained full independence after the treaty of Rawalpindi, no other state formed concrete relations and Afghanistan was still perceived as a buffer state between Russia and the Britain.

⁹⁸ Kelly, "End of the great game: British intervention in Russia's Southern Borderlands and the Soviet Response," p. 95.

⁹⁹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 448.

¹⁰⁰ Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 47.

The only way to break the formulaic aspect of Afghanistan was to cultivate warm relations with states like France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Iran.¹⁰¹ By doing so, not only King Amanullah achieved large scale recognition but also he achieved to diminish the dependence on Russia and Britain.

King Amanullah was an innovative leader but he became an adamant reformist after he had gone on a tour of Europe, Russia and the Middle East in 1927-1928 with his wife Queen Sureyya.¹⁰² He was so influenced by the wonders that he had seen during the grand tour. As soon as he had finished his visit in Western countries, a series of administrative, economic, social and educational reforms started at a revolutionary pace. Leon Poullada alleged that King Amanullah's reform package was one of the far reaching modernization programs ever to be attempted in Asia.

...The pretentious reforms included the establishment of a Western-style constitutional monarchy, a cabinet of ministers, discouragement of the veiling and seclusion of women, establishment of independent judiciary, reorganization of central government and political parties, inauguration of girls' schools, introduction of secular education and regulations in religious sector.¹⁰³

The founder of Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was one of the greatest sources of inspiration for King Amanullah, warned him in such a large

¹⁰¹ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 54.

¹⁰² Thomas Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 13.

¹⁰³ Leon B. Poullada, *Reforms and Rebellion In Afghanistan, 1919-1929*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 77.

scale reform a strong and well-trained army, and a loyal and disciplined bureaucracy were needed.¹⁰⁴ However, while Amanullah was on his grand tour, photographs of Queen Sureyya, unveiled and wearing Western-style dresses, at European state receptions, were circulated in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ This angered the tribal and religious leaders eventually led the anti-modernist rebellions.

King Amanullah was so determined to implement the reforms even if he had to crush the religious leaders who opposed the reforms. In regards to quick reform activities, the abolition of the role of tribal leaders in administration, and abuse of the *Loya Jirga*¹⁰⁶ (Grand Council) by King Amanullah had alienated the tribal aristocracy.¹⁰⁷ Finally, arrest of Hazrat Sahib, an influential religious leader of Shor Bazaar region, was the birth of the anti-reformist activities.¹⁰⁸ In late 1928 Afghan regime started to shatter as the King's palace and the British consulate in Jalalabad were burned down.¹⁰⁹ Sequential outbreaks in various places in Afghanistan ended with the declaration of new Amir of Habibullah (Jan-Oct. 1929 r.) better known as *Bacha Saqqao*¹¹⁰ (Son of a water carrier), by the clergymen and Sufi leaders.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 22.

¹⁰⁵ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 256.

¹⁰⁶ "The phrase *Loya Jirga* is Pashto and means grand council. The institution, which is centuries old, is a similar idea to the Islamic "shura" or consultative assembly. Historically it has been used to settle inter-tribal disputes, discuss social reforms, and approve a new constitution. Hundreds of men wearing turbans, Persian lamb hats or embroidered quilt coats would pack into a vast hall. Long debates would take place in Pashto and Dari, with the inclusion of the occasional Quranic quote in Arabic.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1782079.stm

¹⁰⁷ Leon B. Poullada, *Reforms and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929*, p. 77.

¹⁰⁸ Andican. *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi* p.199.

¹⁰⁹ Andican. *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi* p.199.

¹¹⁰ Bacha Saqqao who was a son of a poor peasant was making money by carrying water to houses in Kabul. In those days, most of the houses were lack of plumbing water carriers supplied drinking water. According to some reliable sources Bacha Saqqao was trained as a corporal by Turkish officers in a regiment. After his fiancée had been married off someone else, he killed the guy who was about

In January 1929 King Amanullah abdicated the crown in favor of his oldest brother, Inayatollah Khan, escape to Italy where he died in 1960. British and the Soviets were worried about the spreading upheavals in Afghanistan. In particular, the British apprehension was constructed on if Tajik influence had increased in Afghan government, control over the tribes along the frontier would have been very difficult.¹¹² Former Chief of General Staff, Nadir Khan was the most suitable candidate to reclaim the political power against *Bacha Saqqao*. Nadir Khan was from Mohammedzai clan a branch of Durrani, a member of a prominent Pashtun family cousin of folded King Amanullah as well.¹¹³

During his command in 1919-1924, Nadir Khan suggested King Amanullah to put down an insurgency in Mangal tribe in Khost without using force.¹¹⁴ The insurgency almost consumed two years' worth of revenues. For that reason the reform program was halted for several years. Having been rejected on applying peaceful methods, Nadir Khan resigned from his post for health reasons then was appointed as the ambassador to Paris where he established good relations with the Western countries.¹¹⁵ Popularity of Nadir Khan combining with substantial British support brought him to India for taking the crown back from *Bacha Saqqao* in 1929

to marry his fiancée. Therefore he had to engage bandits in the mountains. [Ömer Erden, "Afganistan'da Gerici Bir Hareket "Beççe-i Saka" *Atatürk Dergisi* Vol. 4, no. 1 (2004), p. 207. dergi.atauni.edu.tr/index.php/ad/article/.../1098]

¹¹¹ Barnett, "Lineages of the State in Afghanistan," p. 1199.

¹¹² Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 60.

¹¹³ Andican. *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi*, p. 202.

¹¹⁴ Andican. *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi* p. 274.

¹¹⁵ Andican. *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi* p. 274.

just after two months of his ruling.¹¹⁶ Following Nadir Shah's accession to the Afghan throne, the new regime in Afghanistan relaxed the quick modernist reform package that Amanullah introduced.

Concessions were made to religious conservatives in the fields of women's rights and Islamic Law as well as Muslim judges were allowed to interpret law than they had had before the reign of Abdur Rahman.¹¹⁷ He adopted a slower reform process with wider participation but this time the process was not freed from Afghan realities. Afghanistan improved from the civil turmoil in reign of Nadir Shah lasted only for several years, in 1933 he was assassinated and his young son (only nineteen years old) Mohammad Zahir Shah succeeded him until 1973.

¹¹⁶ Erden, "Afganistan'da Gerici Bir Hareket "Beççe-i Saka," p. 208.

¹¹⁷ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 60.

CHAPTER III

SECOND WORLD WAR & COLD WAR EFFECTS IN AFGHANISTAN (1953-1973)

Political stability together with economic growth brought a visible increase of wealth to Afghanistan. Nadir Shah (1929-1933 r.) and his successor Zahir Shah (1933-1973 r.) focused on improving the army at first, then developing the transportation and communication infrastructure. On the account of requiring external assistance to actualize those goals, geographically remote nations were to be chosen.¹¹⁸ Lesson was learned that taking assistance from neighboring powerful states was not a rational choice, which resulted in enhancing external influence to the disadvantage of the Afghan interests. That was to say, security reasons prevailed thereby the far away developed nations were preferred to refrain from any bitter confrontation.

3.1 German Interest in Afghanistan

German pressure was not enough to persuade the Afghans going into World War I on their side. However, in the wake of the World War II, Germans took their chance again by meeting the very core needs of Afghanistan. Thanks to German

¹¹⁸ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 25.

assistance in 1930s, most of the construction of school buildings, industrial and power facilities like factories or hydroelectric plants were completed in a fascinating speed. By 1938, Lufthansa put a direct flight between Berlin and Kabul; Siemens and Telefunken furnished telecommunications fittings.¹¹⁹ With the inclusion of foremost German technical advice and credits; the Western investments on business had largely contributed to the development of Afghanistan.

Even though, the flow of multinational investment was at its climax, Afghanistan had still been dependent on purchasing military equipment from Britain. In fact, the Afghan Government incessantly requested British a guarantee against possible Russian aggressions; pertinent to take concrete steps. In line with this policy, the Afghan Prime Minister went to England in 1937 to seek a clear British support for the joint defense of his country.¹²⁰ The British did not want to sign their signature under such a binding promise, so the Afghans received a negative response.

British hesitancy was the primary factor to turn German experts into businessmen. In 1936 a German loan of 27 million DM was released to rearm the Afghan army with German equipment.¹²¹ As the external relations expanded in 1930s, application of Afghanistan to the League of Nations was endorsed in 1934, the same year the United States accorded official recognition of Afghanistan.

¹¹⁹ Milan L. Hauner, "Afghanistan between the Great Powers, 1938-1945," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 14, no. 4 (1982), p. 484

¹²⁰ Milan Hauner, "The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India 1938-1940," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, no. 2 (1981), p. 230

¹²¹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 25.

Membership to the League of Nations would provide protection and a universal proof of recognition of the Afghan nation state. While Afghanistan was strengthening her position in international area; Western World had been in trouble with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the chaotic situation of the regions where Britain was very influential.

Structure of the League of Nations allowed applying sanctions but it was not capable enough to end the crises that were initiated by the aggressors. Needless to say, a coalition of the world nations could not able to build a peaceful world; failure of the system impelled the Afghans to seek assistance in case of being threatened by any hostile state. Afghanistan concluded the Saadabad Pact in 1937 with Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, first regional security umbrella which the nation has enjoyed when Germany started the World War II.

As soon as the war began in Europe, a non-aggression pact was signed, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, between the Nazi and the Soviets in August 1939 which created a shock effect on global scene. Previously, Germany and the Soviet Union, as two arch enemies were expected to fight each other. For that reason, mass German armament had been condoned by the western nations. In an Anglo-German war scenario, Germans might have invaded Afghanistan to reach to the heart of British India. British also would initiate a preemptive war as they did twice to remind the Afghans that they were historically designed for a buffer state. To achieve the project of creating a communist Afghan regime and to spread Sovietization in the region, the

Soviet Union would have caught in a march through Afghanistan, in line with the agreement of non-aggression pact with the Nazis. None of the scenarios were in favor of Afghanistan; in either way as surrounded by three war machines, technologically superior states, Afghan, had no ally to balance the other.

Although King Zahir Shah issued a proclamation of neutrality at the beginning of the war, when there was still a large group of German non-diplomatic personnel resided in Afghanistan. In the meantime, the ink of the non-aggression pact was still dry; the Germans initiated the Operation Barbarossa, invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Afghans took a deep breath when Germany went to war with the Soviets since both states would be busy with each other which meant that Afghanistan would less occupy the international agenda.

The British and the Soviets escalated the pressure on Afghanistan. For expelling all non-diplomatic personnel, who were taking part in subversive activities against their interests, the Afghan government had hardly any other option but to force those people since both states had invaded and occupied Iran, a fresh example, after their similar demands were ignored.¹²² In the end, the World War II ended with the downfall of the Nazis. There was no need to worry about respecting the balance among Germans, Russians, and the British because a new order was established.

¹²² Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 54.

3.2 Post World War II Order and Pashtunistan Issue

The actors of the new international system were less in number than the old one. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came up as the two representatives of two blocks. Britain was at the lowest limits of her power after having fought in so many fronts for a long time, the economy was almost in bankruptcy, human resources were voraciously consumed. Loss of British prestige in India and in the Muslim world demonstrated that India could not be kept under British dominion anymore. The best option was to withdraw without causing any instability after their presence.

In 1947, the British government abandoned Southern Asia, proposed independence of India, by ratifying independence of Pakistan. Afghanistan was not glad to be the neighbor of newly born Muslim state who possessed Pashtun tribal areas (Pashtunistan). Neither India nor Afghanistan benefited from the existence of Pakistan which would become another source of disagreement in Southern Asia.

In the absence of Britain, as a great power, to balance the growing influence of the Soviet Union would be a matter of apprehension. Being without a rival in Asia, the Soviets began to plan how to magnify their influence. Following the Soviet Union's achievement on having a wide range of mobility in the region, the strategic importance of Afghanistan was not expired in fact a new role attributed to the country from the north. The emergence of the United States as the fresh economic

and military superpower appeared to be the only alternative to Britain in counterbalancing the Soviet ambitions. When the Soviet troops refused withdrawing from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946, Afghan leadership hoped that the power of Great Britain to act as a barrier against the expanding Soviet Union would be replaced by that of the United States.¹²³

Due to the US little interest in Afghanistan, diplomatic missions were not exchanged until 1943.¹²⁴ Afghanistan was evaluated by the US army experts as a country with no strategic importance to the United States. In 1946 Afghan request for US aid in repairing old irrigation dams, building new canals to increase agricultural production in the Hilmand River¹²⁵ Valley was rejected on grounds of being too vague in economic concepts.¹²⁶ Official inauguration of the Afghan-US relations started with the agreement for the construction of a dam on Hilmand River in southern Afghanistan between Morrison Knudsen Company of Boise, Idaho and Afghan government.

Through the International Cooperation Administration together with the Import-Export Bank and Morrison-Knudsen latter spent 54 million dollars on the

¹²³ Alam Payind, "Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 21, no. 1 (1989), p.109.

¹²⁴ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 149.

¹²⁵ Hilmand River is the longest river in Afghanistan, joins its major tributary, the Arghandab at Qala Bist, about 350 miles from its source high in the Hindu Kush, and continues to the Sistan Basin, another 250 miles. Seasonal flow varies greatly, but the river is usually perennial. The problem however is not the lack of water but adequate control. (Luis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p.482.)

¹²⁶ Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, (London: Pergamon Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 71.

project;¹²⁷ the United States had gradually become a direct supporter of the project. Misuse of water that had provided from the newly erected dams caused decrease of products as well as soil erosion that could once sustain several rotations of seasonal crops, became unusable.¹²⁸ Hence the relocation programs for tribal nomads to settle in this farmland, such as property rights, tax privileges and small grants, were too weak to gain any popularity.¹²⁹ The American involvement in Helmand Project was to continue for over three decades, and was finished only in late 1978, after the insurgency against communist regime.

The British withdrawal from India raised the hopes of Afghan government that the Pashtuns who were living in the Northwest Frontier Province would be given a right to choose either to be independent or become a part of Afghanistan.¹³⁰ However, the British plebiscite dictated that the Pashtuns had two options: either to join India or Pakistan. Naturally, the Pashtuns as a Muslim nation chose to join Pakistan. Since the Northwestern Frontier Province was formerly part of Afghanistan, the Afghan claims about the Pashtun areas of Pakistan were not only about ethnic concerns but also on historical grounds.¹³¹ Pashtunistan was the main barrier between two independent Muslim states that in 1947 Afghanistan had opposed Pakistan's membership to the United Nations on the plea that this new state

¹²⁷ *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 27.

¹²⁸ Peter G. Frank, "Problems of Economic Development in Afghanistan" *Middle East Journal* Vol. 3, no. 4 (1949), p. 425.

¹²⁹ Frank, "Problems of Economic Development in Afghanistan," p. 425.

¹³⁰ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p.54.

¹³¹ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences*, p. 24.

was occupying Afghan regions. In fact, whenever the Afghan government applied her aggressive nationalistic policies on Pashtunistan, Pakistan retaliated back by closing the frontier to Afghan trade, blocking the natural route for most Afghan exports and imports.

Afghan insistence on Pashtunistan region also affected her relations with the USA. In other words, it was the main barrier in front of taking the US military aid. Emerging from World War II with an obsolete military force, Afghanistan had to modernize her army to suppress tribal revolts, to strengthen the central government's authority and to possess a force of deterrence against the Soviet Union.¹³² When the Afghans approached the Americans for arms supplies, the US government appraised that the Afghan army with the US support would have fomented the Soviet Union for taking extra precaution which would increase the tension.¹³³ The US also had suspicious that the American equipped Afghan army might have marched into Pashtunistan where they were assumed as a potential aggressor. Adding that, a potential US-Afghan military cooperation would irritate Pakistan in the first days of the Cold War in which Pakistan was perceived a key player in containing the Soviet Union.

The Americans regarded that Iran and Pakistan were more precious for their grand strategy against the Soviet Union. The US ignorance of Afghanistan was not

¹³² Amstutz *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p.21.

¹³³ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 150.

only stemmed from underdeveloped infrastructure of Afghanistan, but also her poor relations with Iran and Pakistan.¹³⁴

3.3 Warming up the Relations between Afghanistan & USSR

As a result of the uncompromised policies in every aspect, Afghanistan was alienated from the Western World, whereas the Afghans repeatedly applied for US assistance in order not to be abandoned to the Soviet mercy. Again, after a border clash over Pashtunistan, Pakistan blockaded the borders in 1948 bilaterally was vital to an economy largely dependent on exporting fresh fruits. The only alternative outlet was a transport route through eastern Iran which was extremely poor. Other one was through Soviet Central Asia, and Afghanistan's relations with the USSR began to warm after the Soviets helped the Afghans evade a Pakistani slowdown of transit trade in 1950.¹³⁵

Not so surprisingly, the Soviet Union took the advantage of the opportunities that were presented and, stood by the Afghans with economic and political support. Finally, the Soviet endeavor worked and the Afghans were driven into the Soviet orbit by an agreement providing duty-free transit of Afghan products through Soviet territory and exchange trade facilities.¹³⁶ To create further opportunities the Soviet

¹³⁴ Gibs, "Does the USSR Have a Grand Strategy? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan," p. 368.

¹³⁵ Rubin, "Lineages of the State in Afghanistan," p. 1203.

¹³⁶ Payind, "Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation," p. 110.

Union was the single country, strongly and publicly supported the Afghan stance on the Pashtunistan issue.

Afghanistan gained her independence but was not liberated from the status of being a buffer zone. The actors were changed but the traditional politics were the same and Afghanistan was closer to become a Soviet satellite more than ever. Twentieth century was the century that the Afghans celebrated their prolonged dream of independence. Nevertheless, process of breaking the chains was not smoothly realized. In particular, three events became the three steps of the Afghan independence. First a sense of nationalism had to be cultivated.

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, which aroused the Afghan self-confidence, grew the idea that a mighty state could yield to an Asian state. Secondly, noteworthy to mention, writings of Mahmud Tarzi in *Siraj Al-Akhbar* were very influential component in forming the nationalist consciousness. Third one was the conjuncture of the World War I that brought the dynamics together while the world was at war.

Meanwhile, Russia had to retreat from the World War I as the revolution has embraced the country. Contrary to the habits of Imperial Russia, micro nationalist movements were supported. British on the other hand, consumed a great deal of her resources and exhausted of fighting for sequential four years. Primary objective was achieved but as soon as the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the imperial Russian

threat was revealed for the sake of exporting communism as a growing threat to the existence of independent Afghan state.

As though the British and the Russians had been too puny neighbors, German interest to Afghanistan appeared prior to the World War II. This time German attempt was stronger than the first German expedition during the Great War. Regarding to gain the hearts, vast German investment flew in the Afghan lands. However, Nazi menace was overthrown by the tripartite alliance. Afterwards, Britain had no energy on keeping her statue of world power; they turned the title over to the USA.

British sphere of influence comprised a huge land with many countries in which those were vulnerable to exploitation in case of any instability. British withdrawal without pointing her successor from Indian subcontinent meant that British blatantly handed over the entire region into the Soviet Union. Actually, British weakness was welcomed by the Afghan rulers just after the Second World War but then they perceived without Britain, there would hardly be any state to balance the Soviet dominance. Apparently in balancing the Soviets the only nominee was seemed to be the US. Afghan attitude towards Pakistan and her uncompromising stance at Pashtunistan issue made removed any possible US-Afghan rapprochement.

Afghan nationalism reached at its peak with Pashtunistan issue; hence the establishment of a new born Muslim state in southern Asia, namely Pakistan, became

the focal point of Afghan foreign policy. Instead of finding a middle course, the US explicitly supported Pakistan forasmuch as there was no need for compromising to include Afghanistan in the Western block. There were adequate states around the Soviets to play with. Ignorant policies of the US in Asia left no choice for Afghanistan but to establish good relations with the Soviet Union.

Security concerns and historical anxiety of being a buffer zone compelled the Afghan leaders to follow the traditional balancing policy. However, it did not work when the US emerged as the successor of the former British sphere of influence. Herein, Afghan nationalism contributed to two purposes. Afghan nationalism brought the independence, but later excessive nationalistic feelings hindered a possible alliance with the USA. Therefore, the Afghans reluctantly approached the Soviets at the first years of the Cold War.

Imperial state system and its colonialist policies downed with the Second World War. It was time for a race for the ideologically motivated systems: the winner would set an example of a politic-economic model; the loser would be erased from the international scene. A coined word which perfectly described the situation between the two hostile poles, the Cold War, became the core determinant of the international politics for three decades. Early strategy of the Cold War for both powers was to enlarge the capacity via financial aid or military pacts. That was to say, if security coverage had been required, one should have declared its affiliation either to Western or Eastern bloc.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan was keen on precipitating the nation building process, the country desperately needed funds. Lack of financial resources, industrial facilities, and trained manpower were the main handicaps that labeled them as non-profitable and backward state. It was quite impossible to reach at a modern state level without taking foreign aid, but it was not an easy job for a country which had no charm for investment. On the other hand, war time expenditures, during the Second World War, almost bankrupted most of the wealthy states; so several countries left, who could lend money to the Afghan King. Furthermore; the USA and the USSR, prior to the Cold War, had already declared that Afghanistan was at the corner of their consideration. Somehow, Afghanistan should drag the attentions of superpowers without blackening her nonalignment position.

3.4 Reign of Daoud: Plans for Gaining Strategic Importance

As an attempt, “an Afghan delegation was sent to Washington in 1949 to request credits more than 100 million dollars for completion of the Helmand Valley and related projects.”¹³⁷ The result disappointed the Afghans in which the US only approved 21 million dollars with a high interest rate.¹³⁸ Neither the US credit responded to the great expectations of Afghanistan, nor had the Soviets good news for a country out of Soviet bloc.

¹³⁷ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 121.

¹³⁸ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 121.

However, Stalin's death in 1953 changed the climate hastily and pioneered the relaxation of Soviet policies specifically towards underdeveloped states outside the iron curtain. New administration in Politburo conceived the advantages in strengthening the relations with Third World countries which would offset the Western influence. The USSR organized the first five year economic plan of Afghanistan. Besides, giving advisory support, new credits, and projects were on the agenda of Kremlin.

To increase her credibility, Afghanistan had to retouch her infamous reputation of being a tribal state. The best way was to establish a parliament to explain the world that tribal state was evolving. In this manner, democratic experiment brought a Liberal Parliament to Afghanistan in 1949, which designed to form the political parties, freedom of speech and press. Thus, as soon as some of the newspapers like *Watan* (Homeland), *Nida-yi Khaq* (Voice of the People) and *Angar* (Burning Embers) mushroomed, objection to the ill-management of the ministers, budgetary and the system of the elections arrived at country wide.¹³⁹ Primarily, Liberals gathered around *Wikh-i Zalmaiyan* (Awakened Youth Movement) which was an anti-imperialist movement consisted of the intellectuals and the students from Kabul University.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 25.

¹⁴⁰ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 25.

Developments towards a more democratic system were seen as a threat by the ruling elite who had broad authority to abuse. Growing critiques, led by the above mentioned newspapers, were threatening the positions of the cabinet and even the King. Not so surprisingly, Afghan government decided to take strict precautions against the liberals; a ban was implemented on the opposing newspapers. Situation in Afghanistan was deteriorated with the combination of economic problems, mostly related to Pakistan. Whenever the Pakistani authorities closed the borders the Afghan economy, heavily dependent on exporting fresh agricultural goods, was terribly hit. Plus, course of the events in the Pashtunistan issue flourished to the disadvantageous of Afghanistan. Literally too, there was no single country supported the Afghan claims. Again, being isolated in her policies in 1953, the Afghan government had nothing to do but to resign.

Drastic changes had also outburst in the same year (1953) within the Afghan ruling circles. The younger members of the royal family challenged the domination of the king's surviving uncles, namely Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali.¹⁴¹ During the family crisis Zahir Shah, the king of Afghanistan, associated with Sardar Mohammad Daoud, the former war minister, Lieutenant General, ex-ambassador to Paris, head of the police and commander of the Kabul central armed forces, first cousin and nephew of assassinated King Nader Shah,¹⁴² to obtain the power. The forty-three-

¹⁴¹ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 59.

¹⁴² Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 59.

year-old Mohammed Daoud became the prime minister of Afghanistan; in return King Zahir Shah got rid of his opponents.

Mohammad Daoud Khan barely experienced all critical positions in state administration. He was a hope for the people who were eager to transform the country into a modern nation and a hope for the political prisoners who were sentenced to prisons owing to their reformist activities during the post Second World War era. He kept his promise during the first days of his reign on condition that if those prisoners would not have participated in opposition against the regime.¹⁴³

It was clear that dealing with internal opposition, launching a reform program, and maintaining an uncompromised foreign policy on Pashtunistan could not work together. To achieve all these aims, reorganization of economy must be the first mission. An economic system must be settled which would not suffer from the punishments of Pakistan. The state income must be enriched by industrial facilities, mining business, and technological advancements in order to provide a self-sufficient state. Before that, Daoud had to sacrifice some of his reform packages in favor of a stable economy. Once the dependency of agriculture was decreased, Daoud believed that most of the fundamental problems of Afghanistan could be solved.

In accordance with Daoud's foreign policy, on 27 January 1954, just four months after he had seized power, the first Soviet-Afghan agreement was announced

¹⁴³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 497.

when the US was planning to arm Pakistan.¹⁴⁴ The Soviets agreed to lend 3.5 million dollars credit for the construction of two grain silos, a flour mill, and a bakery.¹⁴⁵ This was the first agreement for the Soviets had given such a considerable amount of money since the death of Stalin who had no habit of helping the neutral nations. The aid-giving era to Afghanistan was started by the Soviet Union: an easy path to the nonaligned nations.

As a sign of Soviet sincerity, agreements with Afghanistan followed one after another. “The construction of gasoline pipeline in July 1954 across the Amu Darya including three gasoline storage centers and the two million dollars’ worth road building equipment”¹⁴⁶ were some of initiative programs by the Soviets. Soviet assistance also brought the Czech and East German credits to Afghanistan; thereby five million dollars to build three cement plants in 1954 came as the first East European aid to the Third World.¹⁴⁷

3.5 Growing Soviet Interest in Afghanistan

While Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud was on the honeymoon with his communist friends; he had still a desire to approach the Americans for not being a hopeless client of the USSR. “In October 1954 Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud

¹⁴⁴ Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 23.

¹⁴⁵ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 23.

¹⁴⁶ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 25.

¹⁴⁷ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 25.

sent his brother to Washington to make appeal to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for military assistance”¹⁴⁸; nevertheless the US had no intention to have arms dealing business with Afghanistan.¹⁴⁹ Despite the fact that Russian historical claims still created suspicious among the Afghans, pragmatic concerns prevailed. Thus, being without any alternative, the Afghans turned for the Soviet aid.

Again in 1954, a conflict occurred in Bajaur, tribal territory north of Peshawar that borders on Kunar Province of Afghanistan to the west, between Afghan and Pakistani troops, where the Pakistan army used the equipment that had been bought from the USA against Afghan soldiers. Albeit, the US government protested the Pakistani government for using the US weapons against Afghanistan, Ayub Khan,¹⁵⁰ the President of Pakistan, rejected the protest in a public speech.¹⁵¹ The Afghan frustration against the USA did not only stemmed from her ignorant attitude towards Afghan development programs but also US backed Pakistan was exercising aggressive politics regardless of the warnings.¹⁵²

In December 1955, Prime Minister Bulganin and Premier Khrushchev went to Afghanistan; in accordance with the peaceful coexistence policy which was the

¹⁴⁸ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 25.

¹⁴⁹ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 25.

¹⁵⁰ “General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Pakistani army’s chief of staff, seized power in a successful coup d’état. Wishing to continue the dialogue with Pakistan, Mohammad Daoud sent Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, his brother, to Pakistan to meet with Ayub Khan. Unfortunately, the new Pakistani leader, instead of listening to the Afghan views lectured Naim about Pakistan’s military might and its ability to take Kabul within few hours. Ayub Khan, a Pashtun himself, proved to be more uncompromising than his predecessors with regard to the Pashtun problem...” See Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 90.

¹⁵¹ Payind, “Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation,” p. 111.

¹⁵² Payind, “Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation,” p. 111.

first high-ranking official visit ever graced the Afghans. During the visit, a large scale economic assistance was released adding to the modernization of the Afghan army with T-34 tanks, MIG-17 jets¹⁵³: the Soviets granted 100 million dollars credits, some of it for military aid and the rest for development projects highways, bridges the Bagram airport in the north of Kabul¹⁵⁴, and the Salang Pass tunnel.¹⁵⁵

The main purpose of the Soviet leaders, after returning their famous India tour was to halt Afghanistan from being a part of the Baghdad Pact which was a Western product for preventing communist incursions.¹⁵⁶ For that reason, the Soviets showed utmost will by declaring that the Afghans had some sort of rights on Pashtunistan issue. A critic move remained the Afghans that they had found a substantial ally to maintain their prolonged claim on Pashtunistan. In his speech, Bulganin told “We sympathize with Afghanistan’s policy on the Pashtunistan issue. The Soviet Union stands for a just settlement of the Pashtunistan question which can

¹⁵³ Edward Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, (Great Britain: Biling & Sons Limited Press, 1985), p. 93.

¹⁵⁴ Misra, *Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence*, p. 22.

¹⁵⁵Salang Pass is a product of the cooperation of the superpowers in Afghanistan. The Tunnel is at an altitude of over 3,300 meters above sea level. The most important mountain pass is the Salang Pass “(3,878 meters); it links Kabul and points south to northern Afghanistan. The completion of a tunnel, in 1964, reduced travel time between Kabul and the north to a few hours. Previously access to the north through the Kotal-e Shibar (3,260 meters) took three days. The Salang Tunnel at 3363 meters and the extensive network of galleries on the approach roads were constructed with Soviet financial and technological assistance and involved drilling 1.7 miles through the heart of the Hindu Kush. Before the Salang road was constructed, the most famous passes in the Western historical perceptions of Afghanistan were those leading to the Indian subcontinent. They include the Khyber Pass (1027 meters), in Pakistan, and the Kotal-e Lataband (2,499 meters) east of Kabul, which was superseded in 1960 by a road constructed within the Kabul River’s most spectacular gorge, the Tang-e Gharu. This remarkable engineering feat completed in 1960 reduced travel time between Kabul and the Pakistan border from two days to a few hours. The roads through the Salang and Tang-e Gharu passes played critical strategic roles during the recent conflicts and were used extensively by heavy military vehicles.” (Nancy Hatch Dupree and Thomas E. Gouttierre, *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, Library of Congress Online Catalog) [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0031\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0031))

¹⁵⁶ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 508.

be properly solved only if the vital interests of the peoples inhabiting Pashtunistan are taken into account.”¹⁵⁷ Bulganin wholeheartedly supported the Afghan demands for “an impartial plebiscite” in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan¹⁵⁸ which thwarted Afghanistan from falling into Western defense agreements network.

Soviet economic aid combining with the reorganization of the Afghan army brought new challenges to the Afghan *bitarafi*¹⁵⁹ policy. Kremlin started to dispatch Soviet experts and troops in order to train the Afghan soldiers in using the sophisticated military materials. In return, some of the Afghan officers were sent to war academies in the USSR. As a result of the cultural interaction, Soviet way of life and ideas influenced the young Afghan officers who would later take part in state administration. The Soviets caught an opportunity for propagating their regime among the Afghans to build a Soviet style administration in Afghanistan. It seemed an expected situation in an environment where the Eastern and Western sides yearned for gaining new allies. If the US had been more enthusiastic than the Soviets, there would have been a bunch of Afghan officers who lived for the American dream.

Growing Soviet influence, in various fields, was the breaking point for the US policy makers to initiate a countermove. Military pacts and economic aids were working well in Asia, but geographical containment policy required a wider umbrella

¹⁵⁷ Sangat Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal*, (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970), p. 29.

¹⁵⁸ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 508.

¹⁵⁹ Concept of not taking sides, being impartial

to limit the Communist ideology, so in that point Afghanistan became one of the key states or in other words Afghanistan was not a state of having little or no importance to the US interests anymore. The rule of the Cold War dictated that if a non aligned nation had been dominated by one block the other would try to decrease the effect of its rival, because losing an impartial state meant losing the prestige. As a matter of fact, the US joined the race of rebuilding Afghanistan which included construction of highways, airports, tunnels, and dams.

At first, the US assistance concentrated on agricultural goods. The United States donated one hundred thirty thousand tons of wheat to Afghanistan in the period of 1956-1959, under the agreement of US Food Aid Program.¹⁶⁰ Then, the US started to invest in educational programs: scholarship to Afghan students at American universities and projects to expand-upgrade the local educational services. Progressive US technical and advisory assistance reached an annual rate of 15 million dollars that had given to the Afghan government by the end of 1950s.¹⁶¹

In the meantime, the Afghans asked for an American assistance in building a new transit route through Iran to the port of Chahbahar on the Persian Gulf¹⁶² since Pakistan formed “closing borders” as a habit in any case of conflict. Iran and the United States announced that there was no way for viability of the project since

¹⁶⁰ Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 38.

¹⁶¹ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 130.

¹⁶² Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 27.

3,600 miles of new roads had to be constructed.¹⁶³ Having been rejected by the US on transit route project, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud went on cooperation with the USSR and renewed 1950 transit agreement for five years.¹⁶⁴

Different from Amanullah, Mohammed Serdar Daoud was a self-possessed leader in maintaining the internal order. He was pushing forward the modernization program simultaneously; each reform packages were under scrutiny if those reforms were against the religious law or not.¹⁶⁵ He increased the control over the tribes, and sublimated the forcible collection of land taxes in 1959.

Once, Mohammed Daoud's advisers had concluded that *purdah*¹⁶⁶ for the women was not a compulsory in Islamic law, members of the royal family, including Daoud, high-ranking civilian and military bureaucrats' wives and daughters appeared unveiled during the ceremonies to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Afghan independence in August 1959.¹⁶⁷ Daoud's modernization policies antagonized the opposition which consisted of the conservatives and nationalists from rural areas. Mohammed Daoud did not ban the *purdah* as he was smart enough not to galvanize the extremists. When the resentment to his reforms began to arouse, as a matter of

¹⁶³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 507.

¹⁶⁴ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 507.

¹⁶⁵ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁶ Clothes which are obligatory for women in some Islamic countries cover the body from head to toe with a kind of texture.

¹⁶⁷ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 34.

precaution, Mohammed Daoud arrested the Islamic mullahs from countryside who were forerunners in slowing down the speed of modernization.¹⁶⁸

By the way, Pakistan continued her aggressive foreign policy against Afghanistan, by conducting military operations in Baluchistan. In September 1960, an armed clash occurred between Pakistan and Afghan armies that cut the diplomatic relations again.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, Pakistan, third time in eleven years, had closed the borders for two years. When Afghanistan was on the verge of a substantial economic crisis, the Soviets curtailed the effects of economic distress by giving an airlift to the Afghan agricultural goods. If the agricultural goods had been waited for certain of period they would have been rotten. Soviet Union which had a very bureaucratic and awkward structure in decision making process, astonishingly moved so fast to rescue the goods before they were perished. Soviet asylum intensified with an offer, a totally \$450 million, to finance the entire second five year plan (1960-1965) if only “the Soviet advisers placed at the highest level in all Afghan ministries.”¹⁷⁰

Mohammed Daoud must have known that the Soviet assistance, mostly saved the Afghans from falling into bankruptcy, did not just for supporting a non aligned state which confronted with a Western backed enemy, Pakistan. Since there was no unreturned help in interstate relations, especially in the heydays of the Cold War, the Soviet Union wanted to inject the Soviet notion in Afghan administration as a

¹⁶⁸ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History From the Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, (Cambridge, MA: Capo Press, 2002), p. 227.

¹⁶⁹ Payind, “Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation,” p. 113.

¹⁷⁰ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 27.

payback to the Soviet comradeship during the very hard times of Afghanistan. Installing Soviet advisers to the Afghan ministries would turn the country into a complete client regime so that Mohammed Daoud gently turned down the offer.

In searching alternative trade routes, Afghanistan signed a transit agreement with Iran in 1962, which ran from the port of Khurramshahr, on the Persian Gulf, by rail to Tehran and Mashad and from there by truck to Herat.¹⁷¹ As the Pakistani embargo was continuing in 1962, not only Soviets helped Afghanistan by giving an airlift to the Afghan exports, which were to be shipped to India, but also the United States provided ten cargo flights to India, a week for forty weeks, at no cost to the Afghans.¹⁷²

Even though abundance of Soviet aid to Afghanistan made possible to handle the border disputes with Pakistan, Afghanistan harshly suffered from her backward economic conditions. In addition to the economic difficulties, Mohammed Daoud's commitment on Pashtunistan issue brought the country on the brink of war in several times. According to Abdel Samad Ghaus, deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan under Prime Minister Daoud, "gaining the support of the Soviets on Pashtunistan, brought no practical progress or any further achievements."¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 92.

¹⁷² Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 92.

¹⁷³ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 92.

King Zahir Shah must have seen the worsening situation in the country that he stepped in to break the opposition bloc that Daoud's policies had created. In 1962, King Zahir Shah was trying to find a solution by establishing a face to face relation with influential tribal leaders.¹⁷⁴ First, Afghan-Pakistani border dispute had to be solved immediately in which both states seriously losing money. However, in order to restore the relations, either Pakistan or Afghanistan must compromise in their Pashtunistan politics. There seemed two options either Mohammed Daoud or Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, retreated from their staunch politics.

As well as having loyalty to the King, Mohammed Daoud was the most significant figure in decision making process. However, he was not the ultimate man. Ayub Khan was the supreme leader of Pakistan and there was no need to discuss his decisions. It was quite understandable that King Zahir Shah who was willing to find a solution to the mortified relations with Pakistan, requested the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud in March 1963. Mohammed Daoud peacefully stepped down from his office, made no trouble, and did not abuse his position against the King.

Finally, border dispute with Pakistan was solved then the gates were reopened. Later on, settling down the border dispute cut down the political and military confrontation which provided a more prestigious place to Afghanistan in international community. Now, King Zahir Shah had the power to take steps towards a modern state with a set of written rules which regulated the frame of Afghanistan.

¹⁷⁴ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 37.

3.6 New Constitution of Afghanistan and Establishment of the Political Parties

After King Zahir Shah dismissed Daoud Khan smoothly, he proclaimed a new constitution, *Assasi Qanun*, in 1964 which consisted of 128 articles and eleven titles. The constitution started with “In the name of God, the almighty and the just” and recognized “the Islam is the sacred religion with the provisions of *Hanafi* Doctrine.”¹⁷⁵ King had the right to appoint prime minister, judges, chief justice and justices of the Supreme Court high-rank civil and military officials.¹⁷⁶

When the constitution of 1964 is well analyzed, one can realize that freedom of communication, freedom of thought, inviolability of property and dignity of human being are actually the basic pillars of a modern constitution. By the way, what made the constitution less effective were the King’s excessive rights and his strict control over the vital state organs. Nevertheless, new constitution recognized no legal limitation to the power of tribal and religious leaders. Adding that neither in economic nor in political life a role was attributed to women. The Afghan constitution might have satisfied the monarchy but it was not more than an attempt to fortify the will of the King.

¹⁷⁵ Constitution of Afghanistan 1964

<http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=afghanenglish>

¹⁷⁶ Constitution of Afghanistan 1964

<http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=afghanenglish>

Two bodies established by the Constitution of 1964: a new legislative council, *Wolesi Jirga*¹⁷⁷ (House of People) and political parties. The latter was established even though the constitution did not promulgate the “law of political parties” and the “provincial assemblies’ law”¹⁷⁸ which were *sine qua non* for the political reforms, new parties established.

Four parties namely, *Hezb-e dimūkrātīk-e Khalq-e Afghānistān* (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan), *Hezb-i Islami* (Islamic Party), *Shola-ye Jawed*, a pro-Chinese party (Eternal Flame Party) and *Afghan Mellat* (Afghan Nation Party) represented four main political trends in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁹

- 1) The conservatives, made up of the ruling elite, religious elements, and the business elite, who were mainly interested in maintaining the status quo.
- 2) The liberals or social democrats, consisting of the westernized upper class and some sections of the middle class, who favored a reformist approach and a mixed economy.
- 3) Leftists, mainly drawn from the educated middle class, and the *Setem-e-Meli* (splinter radical group), who worked for a socialist revolution.
- 4) The fundamentalist groups, made up of some sections of the educated middle and the lower middle classes, who worked for an Islamic revival.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Constitution of Afghanistan 1964, “Article 43: Members of the Wolesi Jirgah (House of the People) shall be elected by the people of Afghanistan in a free, universal, secret and direct election, in accordance with the provisions of the law.
<http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=afghanenglish>

¹⁷⁸ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 114.

¹⁷⁹ Tahir Amin, “Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (1984), p. 377.

¹⁸⁰ Amin, “Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future”, p. 377.

Within those political parties, the PDPA which was founded by Nur Mohammad Taraki¹⁸¹, (general secretary of the party), Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin in 1965, a pro-Soviet party in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology, virtually by alone dominated the Afghan political history for three decades. Nur Mohammad Taraki had such a great responsibility to prepare the party for the upcoming elections in September 1965, nine months after PDPA had officially formed. Naturally, the party could not be able to organize to reach the masses, but won three seats in the parliament.

One might know that three seats (Babrak Karmal, Nur Ahmed Nur and Faizan) in the *Wolesi Jirgah* that was valued as a failure in the wake of growing Soviet influence on Afghan political life. In this context, Taraki and Karmal's Moscow visit, in the eve of the Afghan parliamentary elections, indicated that the PDPA was seeking a Soviet hand to have better results in the elections. Anwar asserted that during the visit "a collection of Taraki's short stories *Zindigi-i-Nau* (New Life) was published in Moscow and smuggled to Afghanistan."¹⁸² Another proof of trying to acquire the Soviet support was that the PDPA cadres compelled the

¹⁸¹ "The son of a Pashtun shepherd, Taraki was born in a provincial village in 1917. Just a teenager, Nur Mohammed Taraki got a job in a fruit company which sent him to Bombay where he learned Marxism from Indian communists. In 1937 he returned to Afghanistan and worked in several government jobs, including that of editor-in-chief of the official news agency. In 1952 the government sent him to Washington, D.C. to serve as press attache in the Afghan embassy." (Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences*, p. 30)

¹⁸² Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 44.

party members to learn Marxism-Leninism and encouraged them to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁸³

King Zahir Shah appointed Mohammed Yousuf as prime minister in October 1965 just after the parliamentary elections, not so soon, criticisms raised against his cabinet for corruption and nepotism.¹⁸⁴ On 24 October 1965, a group of students burst into Parliament, occupied the members' seats and the following day the demonstrations resulted in several killings of activists by the gun fires of Afghan troops.¹⁸⁵ Bitter events had finished the Prime Minister Mohammed Yousuf's career and he was replaced by Mohammad Hashim Maiwand. Prior to his resignation a press law was endorsed in 1966 which allowed publishing newspapers.

In April 1966, *Khalq* (the people) started its publication by harboring the Soviet ideology. But the radical and anti-constitutional discourse earned a notorious name "subversive journal"¹⁸⁶ to *Khalq* newspaper. Maiwand's response against the newspaper was to exercise an immediate ban. In 1967, the PDPA, mostly related to the methodological and ideological differences, split into two pieces: *Khalq* (same name of the newspaper) headed by Nur Mohammed Taraki and *Parcham* (Banner or Flag) under Babral Karmal.¹⁸⁷ Two founding members of the party had also personal

¹⁸³ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 44.

¹⁸⁴ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 47.

¹⁸⁵ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 45.

¹⁸⁶ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 96.

¹⁸⁷ In some resources the division of the PDPA in 1967 brought four factions instead of two "Khalq, Parcham, Setami Milli and Grohi Kar." <http://newscentralasia.net/2012/04/19/Afghanistan-the-need->

disagreements “Nur Mohammad Taraki came from a lower-class, rural orientated background, while Babrak Karmal had many friends and relatives in upper-middle class,”¹⁸⁸

One of the causes of the rift was the question of how to react against the ban on *Khalqi* newspaper. As a result of the opposition, Babrak Karmal acquired a legal permission for publishing the *Parchamis* in July 1968 under the press law.¹⁸⁹ In fact, both wings were in favor of giving a self-determination right,¹⁹⁰ but with different intentions. *Khalqis* defended a workable autonomy for the nationalities inside Pakistan; whereas *Parchamis* perceived the self-determination as a first step for the annexation Pashtunistan to Afghanistan.¹⁹¹ Needless to say, *Parchamis* stance and the way they approached to the problems were more nation-oriented than the *Khalqis*.

By expressing their “loyalty to the King,”¹⁹² Babrak Karmal’s *Parcham* group aimed to stay within the constitutional system. Hence they were willing to create a democratic national front. It could be inferred that their image of being Marxist-Leninist line was just a tool to realize the needs of the Afghans. On the contrary, *Khalqi* supporters purely devoted their ideas on Soviet doctrine. That is

to-be-politically-incorrect/ However, “the four faction” argument does not include sufficient academic background therefore I take the two faction argument as a fact.

¹⁸⁸ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 172.

¹⁸⁹ Magnus and Naby, 1998, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 114.

¹⁹⁰ Fred Halliday, “Revolution in Afghanistan,” *New Left Review*, no.112, (November-December 1978), p. 18.

¹⁹¹ Halliday, “Revolution in Afghanistan,” p. 18.

¹⁹² Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 172.

why; Nur Mohammed Taraki rejected to be a part of the existing order as he believed in Red Revolution.

Since both parts were unsuccessful to obtain rural support, they could only organize in major cities. Plus, in those areas *Khalq* outnumbered than *Parcham*.¹⁹³ Illiterate and conservative rural life hindered most of the population to interfere in current politics. *Khalq* and *Parcham's* close ties among high level military ranks allowed an easy but illegal access to power for controlling the majority. When the winds of Marxism blew at full speed in Afghanistan, some Islamic organizations were born in 1967, both as a reaction to the Soviet growing influence and the secularization of Afghan society.¹⁹⁴ Members of the Islamic organizations were students and university professors including Ghulam M. Niazi, Professor Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, Dr. Saeed M. Musa Tawana, and Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani.¹⁹⁵ Those people were the people who opposed losing the prestige and power of Islamic principles in a changing political climate.

Among Islamist activists *Jamiat-i Islami*¹⁹⁶ became a significant organization since some of the members were inspired by the other Islamist groups from different

¹⁹³ Raimo Väyrynen, "Afghanistan," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 17, no. 2, Special Issue on Imperialism and Militarization (1980), p. 95.

¹⁹⁴ Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (2001), p. 9.

¹⁹⁵ Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," p. 9.

¹⁹⁶ Islamic Society founded in 1967 by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Ethnically Tajik government officially recognized by most governments even after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Major figures included the official leader of the Northern Alliance, ousted president Burhanuddin Rabbani, and its military leader, General Muhammad Fahim Khan. Primarily, it composed of Northern (non-Pashtun) membership. Supported by Pakistan and Arab states, it operated mainly in the Panjshir Valley under commanders such as Ahmad Shah Masud, who commanded a force of twenty thousand fighters.

countries like Egypt and Pakistan. Modern interpretation of Islam encouraged the members of *Jamiati Islami* to build a political system which based on reorganizing the Afghan social life according to the Islamic principles. Political views of the Islamist activists were not only inspired by the middle class values, but also by the socialist ideas that spread throughout Afghanistan, especially after the PDPA had been formed.¹⁹⁷

The first serious attempt to organize the students at Kabul University who had great concern in Islamic way of life was *Jawanan-i-Musalman* (Muslim Youth).¹⁹⁸ The *Jawanan-i-Musalman* was the cradle for the Islamist groups such as *Hizb-i-Islami*, *Jamiat-i-Islami* and *Ittihad-i-Islami*¹⁹⁹ some members would later become the legendary figures of Afghan resistance, like Gulbadeen Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, unlike the Leftist activities, Islamic organizations compelled the Afghan government to take strict measurements, caused a sharp fall of the Islamic parties popularity. Eventually, people who had sympathy for Islamic organizations became radicalized and was forced to maintain underground activities.

Student activities and internal conflicts together overloaded the Maiwandal's cabinet. Prime Minister Maiwandal, according to his health problems, resigned from

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1181?_hi=0&_pos=13

¹⁹⁷ Oleg Sarin and Levy Dvoretzky, *The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union's Vietnam*, (Novato: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 33.

¹⁹⁸ Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future," p. 377.

¹⁹⁹ Antonio Giustozzi, "Between Patronage and Rebellion: Student Politics in Afghanistan," *Brief Paper Series*, Afghanistan Research and Evolution Unit (February 2010), p. 2-3.

his post in 1967. Afterwards, his foreign minister Nur Mohammad Etemadi was appointed by the King Zahir Shah as the new Prime Minister of Afghanistan. However, none of the precautions were enough to stop the student demonstrations. Left wing students were blaming the cabinet for the situation that they were in. What is more, they demanded “greater student political rights and the relaxation of academic standards.”²⁰⁰

Nonetheless, tension between Islamic and Leftist radicals was so escalated that the government had to implement a compulsory break at the Kabul University for six months in 1971. Afghanistan was dragged into a bitter confrontation without any obvious external intervention that the mullahs were threatening “the women who appeared on public without a veil would be sprayed acid on their face and when they wore stockings, they shot at their legs with guns with silencers.”²⁰¹ Etemadi could stand the chaotic situation for four years and eventually he resigned in 1971.

3.7 Afghanistan Losing Her Worldwide Importance

Deterioration further stiffened as the importance of Afghanistan was diminishing due to the other serious problems that the world had to deal with. US involvement in Vietnam War became the major foreign policy and military objective. As the Americans were fighting against the Communist Vietcong, the money which

²⁰⁰ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* p. 171.

²⁰¹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 60.

was reserved for the Afghans was melting down. The Vietnam War almost cut the US supplies, one of the great contributors to needs of Afghanistan as well as a vital element for balancing the Soviet influence. Hence, the US policy that had been implemented during 1970s rejected further assistance programs to the foreign countries. U.S grants and loans fell from 387,900,000 dollars (before 1967) to 1,440,000 (aid between 1969 and 1970).²⁰²

The Soviet Union had also serious problems: supporting the Vietcong against the US was an important item in the budget, China stood as an alternative communist system, and the Cold War rivalry became intense in the Middle East. They had to diversify their resources therefore another dramatic fall was seen for the Soviet aids from 44.7 million dollars in 1967-68, to 30.5 million in 1968-69, to 28.4 million in 1969-70.²⁰³ Adding that, the Soviet Union was planning to approach Middle Eastern states and China seemed as a rising threat to her unique communist system. Nevertheless, the USSR which absorbed %40 percent of Afghanistan's exports became the dominant actor by 1970.²⁰⁴

Foreign investment and foreign money were the core dynamics of the underdeveloped Afghan economy. For almost two decades, the Afghan governments were trying to create a wealthy modern state with technological industrial facilities and a good export rate in spite of the fact that there was not a general agreement

²⁰² Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 144.

²⁰³ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 144.

²⁰⁴ Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, p. 94.

among the people whether the democratic monarchy was a proper system or not. Especially, the students had a firm enthusiasm on state administration. In relation with the economic setbacks, the educated people were having difficulties in finding proper jobs. The system produced educated surpluses at both the university and secondary school levels.²⁰⁵ During 1960-1970s, university education brought about a literate mass better to describe “educated elite” embraced different political ideas. In such an environment, the Islamists and Leftists founded many followers within the students who were not only interested in political life but also were willing to change the system.

Building an educated class was the Afghan governments’ project in order to be liberated from backwardness and compete with the neighboring states. True to say, the claim of the educated class was far reaching than the expected. New generation demanded to share power with the ruling elite. Since there was a sharp ideological distinction among those young people, they could not develop a strategy to obtain what they wanted. Besides, the tones of the demonstrations were containing violence so that the police did not hesitate to use disproportional force to rebuff.

The constitutional monarchy was exhausted by engaging economic difficulties and internal upheavals. Although Afghanistan was trying hard to establish strong economy by inviting Western and Eastern technologies, decreasing foreign funds and dependency of agricultural products made almost impossible to run the

²⁰⁵ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 107.

country. Furthermore, student demonstration was another factor which divided the country into ideological camps. When the Afghan government was struggling to stabilize the country, a terrible incident occurred. In 1970, a famine in which up to 500,000 people died of starvation hit the country. According to Rasanayagam “the number of deaths during the famine of 1971-72 was variously estimated at between 50.000 and half a million, with the poorest regions, such as the highlands of the Hazarajat.”²⁰⁶ As those events were thought together, the cabinet or even any Kingdom could not keep their possession; therefore Afghanistan was seeking a fresh blood to recover.

²⁰⁶ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History*, p. 60.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET INVASION: INVADED OR INVITED?

During 1963-1973, Afghanistan was almost “legally” reconstructed with the introduction of a new constitution and a set of rules which regulated the social, economic, and daily life. However, efforts for building a more democratic Afghanistan had not worked well during the constitutional period; even the King himself was threatened by the mass demonstrations, organized by student groups. King Zahir Shah could neither find a perpetual solution to the parliamentary deadlocks nor was he successful to become the source for the unity. His “cutting the linkage between the royal family and governance”²⁰⁷ policy left him alone in the state administration.

As the situation was deteriorated, Soviet Premier Nikolai Podgorny visited Afghanistan in May 1973 to make an important point to the Soviet Collective Security System²⁰⁸ (SCSS) when the Soviet military aids fell %60 since 1969.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Anthony Arnold and Rosanne Klass, “Afghanistan's Divided Communist Party,” in Rosanne Klass, ed., *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (New York: Freedom House, 1987), p. 144.

²⁰⁸ In June 1969 at the Moscow International Meeting of the Communist and Workers parties, Leonid Brezhnev spoke about the need for a system of collective security in Asia. A few days earlier an article in *Izvestiya* signed by V.V. Matveyev had described the proposal in somewhat broader terms. In the West, Brezhnev's plan for collective security in Asia was greeted with surprise but an immediate explanation was provided: the proposal was believed to be directed against China. Subsequent Soviet statements attempted to dispel this impression of stressing that the proposal was

Persistently, Kremlin wished to see Afghanistan under her security umbrella otherwise, nonalignment policy of Afghanistan did not meet the Soviet interests. Naturally, Premier Podgorny was sent there to represent Leonid Brezhnev's demands for joining the SCSS but the Afghan Prime Minister Mohammed Musa Shafiq politely turn down the offer as the system was essentially directed against China.²¹⁰

In line with the nonalignment policy, Afghanistan refrained from attracting hostility of China because pro-Chinese instruments were strong enough to start an upheaval within the country. Therefore, Podgorny's visit ended without making any agreement except "reaffirming the achievement of security in Asia requires the joint efforts of all countries of this area."²¹¹ A historical circle of vicious "being isolated" was revealed again for Afghanistan, but this time the Soviet Union estranged in the name of playing the balances.

4.1 Mohammed Daoud as the First President of Afghanistan

The year 1973 did not only bring curse on Afghan politics but also it would be remembered one of the most depressing years in the world. The decision to withdraw the US troops from Vietnam reverberated as an international fiasco, since

not directed against any one country or group of countries, but on the contrary was intended to establish "friendly", "good neighborly" cooperation with a number of Asian states. Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, no. 12 (1973), p. 1082.

²⁰⁹ Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," p. 1082.

²¹⁰ Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," p. 1082.

²¹¹ Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," p. 1082.

the US was the first superpower who lost such a small-sized war. In addition to the military humiliation, the US was shaken by the Watergate scandal in domestic politics. Those incidents produced a strong reaction that the US public attention focused on “political ethics.” The US stopped interfering remote areas to face her own problems, thus the aid that had been given to Afghanistan descended into small amounts.

On the other hand, Yom Kippur War, emerged as the greatest Arab-Israel War, leaped the tension in the Middle East. In response to the failure of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in the war, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) put an embargo on exporting crude oil to the countries maintaining pro-Israeli politics. Due to the embargo, many oil exporting Arab states earned tremendous money from the skyrocketed price, hit the ceiling by %200. Again, in 1973, Pakistan, the arch enemy of Afghanistan, divided by two as Bangladesh and Pakistan, an opportunity was born to settle the old time accounts like Pashtunistan issue and Durrand Line.

It seemed that the world was burning with regional and international crises where another evolution/revolution had happened in Afghanistan. While King Zahir Shah was on a trip to Italy for a medical treatment for eye problems and therapy for lumbago (a kind of back ache),²¹² Mohammed Daoud, with the help of military

²¹² http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/asia/23cnd-shah.html?_r=0

officers some affiliated with the Parcham faction of the PDPA,²¹³ initiated a bloodless coup d'état²¹⁴ on July 17 1973 which led to an exile to King. As soon as, Mohammed Daoud seized the power, he abolished the monarchy and introduced republic. Actually Mohammad Daoud's words explained why he made the coup: "I have acted to abolish a corrupt and effete government, a pseudo-democracy based on personal and class interests which has taken Afghanistan to the edge of an abyss."²¹⁵

International reaction to the 1973 coup was fairly positive. The US quickly recognized the republic of Afghanistan, gave stronger support more than former Afghan governments, by offering more economic aid, especially in the Helmand Valley project.²¹⁶ The Soviet Union, too, welcomed the new Afghan republic after the coup d'état. The Soviets thought that the role of the PDPA in the coup could spread the Leftist tendency first within the army than within the Afghan people. It would also generate Soviet sympathizers even though the Marxist-Leninist ideas were far from embracing the majority of Afghanistan. Daoud's collaboration with the PDPA in his second era tantalized the Soviets to penetrate the Afghan affairs easily.

²¹³ Nazif M. Shahrani, "War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan," *American Anthropologist, New Series*, Vol. 104, no. 3 (2002), p. 719.

²¹⁴ Selig S. Harrison suggests that a group of Soviet-trained military officers whom Mohammad Daoud utilized in seizing the power, had connections with Soviet Military Intelligence Agency (GRU). The problem is that the author does not list the names of the officers who are believed to have in Soviet Intelligence network. Adding that it is not surprising information the Afghan-Soviet intelligence cooperation. The ideologically motivated system would follow a kind of exporting their regime and the best way to infiltrate agents inside the vital organs of a country. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1995), p. 14.

²¹⁵ John C. Griffiths, *Afghanistan: Land of Conflict and Beauty*. 4th eds. (S.l.: Andre Deutsch Ltd, 2011), p. 136.

<http://worldmun.org/upload/HSC.pdf>

²¹⁶ Leon B. Poullada, "The Road to Criss, 1919-1980," in Rosanne Klass, ed., *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (New York: Freedom House, 1987), p. 54.

Kremlin decided to keep her relations at a high level, to infuse the strategic points of the ruling mechanism to hoist the red flag on Afghan skies.

Contrary to what the USSR wished for, Western influence, even the US aid was decreasing, seemed to be growing. For example, Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan was founded in 1973 in order to allow sponsoring the Western bloc including France, Britain, the United States, and Japan.²¹⁷ Besides, western aid, having close relations with Middle Eastern countries broadened potential allies of Afghanistan as well as they became alternative power centers to the Soviets.

Admittedly, one might question how Daoud was picked as the new leader of Afghanistan, who was alienated from the field of politics for consecutive ten years, was living his own life refraining from current political debates. Anyhow, recent developments in Afghanistan must have encouraged Mohammed Daoud to raise his voice against the King, in contrast to his first era as he had made no objection when he was requested to resign from his post in 1963.

First of all, Mohammed Daoud had a desire to take the action for more than a year²¹⁸ he just waited for the conditions were matured enough. Prior to his second era, he was personally supervising construction of a maternity hospital in Sharara

²¹⁷ Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 59.

²¹⁸ Hasan Kakar, "The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, no. 2 (1978), p. 210.

where he was supposed to plan his upcoming reign in details with his “friends.”²¹⁹ Setting aside Daoud’s preparation for taking the action, economic reforms of King Zahir Shah did not run for the benefit of Afghanistan. In fact, the profit that the private enterprise had made; was flowing abroad, especially to Pakistan and Iran.²²⁰ No protectionist law was passed for the sake of Afghan local industries and commercial men;²²¹ therefore Afghanistan became a kind of free market that any foreign business man could exploit.

Second, Mohammed Daoud was seen as a hero for his past performance on driving the reforms and his utmost efforts to increase the prestige of Afghanistan around the world. One can also assert that Mohammed Daoud’s policy on Pashtunistan could able to reset the popularity of the monarchy as King Zahir Shah pursued a more compromising policy with Pakistan and kept the relations as warm as possible. Moreover, Daoud’s commitment to Pashtunistan increased the idea of being a nation as well as produced an alternative loyalty to monarchy.

Once the more comprehensive loyalty was obtained via nationalist feelings, the less tribal family connections would be the reason for privileges. Daoud also preserved his respect to the King and did not plot behind him even after his resignation was requested in 1963. His behavior must have deemed very prudent in

²¹⁹ Kakar, “The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973,” p. 213.

²²⁰ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 73.

²²¹ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 73.

the eyes of the Afghans that his second era and the way he took the office did not cause of a bloody reaction as the whole country was severely polarizing.

Thirdly, when Daoud was Prime Minister, between 1953 and 1963, under the tutelage of King Zahir Shah, had limited authority to realize what he planned for the future of Afghanistan. He was aware of that a progress was needed to remove the democratic difficulties of Afghanistan; thus second era came up with a second chance to fix all those problems by Daoud's methods. So to say, Daoud's vision and state experience, comparing to the *Parcham* and *Khalqi* leaders made him the most suitable and qualified person. In addition to the qualification issue, Nur Mohammad Taraki or Babrak Karmal the leaders of Leftist fractions were highly speculative, and their parties did only represent a small portion of the population. Thereto, probably none of them would have run the country as smoothly as Daoud could do.

Still, Daoud owed PDPA for the help that they gave during the coup. Daoud showed his gratitude by employing a bunch of *Parchami* sympathizers at state departments and taking four *Parcham* party members into his new cabinet as ministers.²²² The republican, fifty members, Central committee became the supreme power body of the state and most of the officers who had taken part in the coup found seat in the committee.²²³ After the coup, *Parcham* remained the only political organization working openly; even the *Khalqi* fraction was better organized in the

²²² Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, p. 101.

²²³ Sarin and Dvoretzky, *The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union's Vietnam*, p. 35.

military and bureaucracy,²²⁴ when the rest of the political organizations were excessively worried about the ambiguity. The *Parchamis* were so dauntless up to rent an office in a hotel named Spinzar at Kabul to operate comfortable.²²⁵

Mohammed Daoud chose *Parcham* for coalition, rather than *Khalqi* group, but this should not be evaluated as an unexpected move. One can assume that *Parchamis* were less radical and their policy making principle based on cooperating the current system. Whereas, *Khalqis* believed the power would come only with a sudden revolution. Nonetheless, the coalition was a limited one because the *Parcham* adopted Marxist-Leninist Line, so the leader of *Parcham*, Babrak Karmal, did not want to be remembered as the man who marched for the power through Daoud. Both Daoud and Karmal were taking the advantage of the situation until one of them had powerful enough to eliminate the other.

Daoud's cooperation with the *Parcham* kept the *Khalq* away from having political influence, accessing the important seats in the cabinet as well as broke the hopes of recruiting militants from civil and military bureaucracy. However, the lesson was learned by the *Khalqi* leaders: "there was no need to wait until the phases of a revolution would blossom or to cultivate the masses for a revolutionary conscious. The only thing was needed to penetrate the correct circle of military

²²⁴ Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 17.

²²⁵ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 73.

officers in this manner they would have the equal power that Parchamis had reached. Hafizullah Amin was assigned to hire *Khalq* members within the armed forces.²²⁶

4.2 Cruelty on Opposition

By the way, to make his second era permanent, Daoud began to dispose his old opponents or potential rivals Mohammed Yusuf Abdul Shah Wali and Musa Shafiq and Hashim Maiwandal.²²⁷ However, Hashim Maiwandal's death, when he was waiting for his trial, was announced by the government as a suicide, put an extra overshadow on Mohammed Daoud's regime. After all, the international community alleged that there was a government's finger on the death of Maiwandal²²⁸ as the interior minister and chief of the investigation commission were controlled by the Parchamis. Prior to the 1973 coup, pro-Soviets in Afghanistan had formidable rivals from the ultra leftists, to the pro-Chinese Shula-ye Jawid and the ethnic leftist group Sitam-i Milli (Against National Oppression).²²⁹

It was quite understandable that President Daoud decided to liquidate the "Opposing Leftists" that was why; he escalated the oppression against the pro-Chinese and radical left-wing elements. What incomprehensible was Daoud's rough

²²⁶ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 68.

²²⁷ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 73.

²²⁸ Mohammed Hashim Maiwandal actually died from internal hemorrhages resulting from being kicked in the abdomen by the chief Parchami in charge of his interrogation, while lying on the floor as a result of previous blows. His body was secretly buried by the police department in the graveyard at south-east of the city which was discovered in 2004 by Daoud Malikyar. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Hashim_Maiwandwal

²²⁹ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 112.

policies against the Radical Islamist while he was struggling with the Leftists simultaneously. Mohammed Daoud obliged the many supporters of “Sitam-i Milli Shula-ye Jawid, Hezb-i Islami, Jamiati-i Islami and Harkat-e Islami”²³⁰ fled to Pakistan in order to maintain their activities without having any trouble. People, who devoted their lives in Islamic principles and insisted on staying in Afghanistan, had to pursue their activities through underground movements. Pressure on Islamist fundamentalists precipitated the illegal structures within the country which was mostly ignored in those days.

By the invitation of the members of the Islamic parties of Afghanistan, Pakistan did not propose to protest an unlawful implementation of Daoud’s government. To a simple scale, Pakistan was just playing “Islam card” namely; to harbor the victims of Daoud’s pro-Soviet regime would dwindle the support that was provided by the Moslem World to Afghanistan. It was also alleged that Pakistan also furnished military training camps to Afghan dissidents and up to 5000 Afghan opponents were trained at secret camps in Peshawar.²³¹

Iran, the western neighbor of Afghanistan, was another Middle Eastern, non-Arab country, benefited from the oil crisis in 1973. To arrive at an economic wealth enhanced the self confidence of Iran towards being more active on regional politics. The nearest threat to Iranian territorial integrity had double-sides. The growing

²³⁰ Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 73.

²³¹ Amin, “Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future,” p. 378.

Soviet influence in the Middle East came to the forefront and Afghanistan stood on the trans-passing route. Afghanistan could be used as a military base and an intelligence station to infiltrate the Soviet agents into Iranian territory. Albeit, Afghanistan was not fully engaged to Kremlin, her pro-Soviet tendency was clashing with Iranian interests.

Secondly, Mohammed Daoud's support on the Pashtun and Baluchi irredentists against Pakistan was also seen as a threat to Iran because military installations were constructed along southern Iran where Baluchis were living.²³² Fragmentation of Pakistan would have galvanized Baluchi and Pashtun minorities within Iran ultimately that would also brought about an internal conflict as the country was making good money. Therefore, Iran Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza, was willing to put an end to the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

To break the Afghan obstinacy, Shah Mohammed Reza decided to deport approximately one million Afghan laborers.²³³ What Shah of Iran was trying to do was to put an unofficial economic embargo, a kind of intimidation, to the Afghans in order to convince them to accept the Iranian demands. Losing their jobs meant for the Afghan workers that they were unable to feed their family and on returning home, few people would find job and the rest would exacerbate the unemployment rate as well as blew the inflation in the country. Extra one million unemployed

²³² Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 39.

²³³ Hafizullah Emadi, "Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan." *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, no. 1 (1995), p. 4.

people were enough to sink the fragile Afghan economy; as a result, probably no one ignored the risk of being the burden of such destruction.

To find a middle line, Mohammed Daoud sent his brother Mohammed Naim, as the special envoy to Iran. Finally bilateral talks produced positive results between Tehran and Kabul. First, in July 1974, Afghanistan signed an agreement with Iran, comprising transportation and industrial projects; estimated cost was calculated about \$1 billion.²³⁴ In October 1974, the Shah also promised to give extra \$2 billion over a period of ten years, and concluded an agreement to build a railroad from Kabul to Mashhad city.²³⁵ The rail road allowed Afghanistan to initiate a trade through Iranian ports. As a proof of Iranian friendship, “construction of sugar, cement, wood, cotton textile, and paper plants were erected in various Afghan provinces, and granted \$10 million credit to the newly established Export Promotion Bank of Afghanistan.”²³⁶ In order to increase its influence on Tajik population, Tehran Radio started broadcast in Dari,²³⁷ an effective tool for Iranian propaganda, for creating a cultural awareness.

Rapprochement with Iran, and other oil-rich Muslim nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, supplied profound pecuniary resources to Mohammed Daoud to run the country. Apart from economic concerns, by establishing close relations with Muslim world, Mohammed Daoud tried to erase the accusations of

²³⁴ Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 64.

²³⁵ Emadi, “Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan.” p. 4.

²³⁶ Emadi, “Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan.” p. 4.

²³⁷ Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 16.

being infidel because his regime was known as pro-Soviet. Daoud's close relation with Kremlin was abused by Pakistan in order to block any potential link between Islamic World and Afghanistan. Taking the Arab support would assure the Afghan people on how the relations were great with the Islamic world and would disprove the Pakistan's propaganda that Daoud's regime was pro-Soviet.²³⁸

Abrogation of the monarchy neither brought an economic welfare to Afghanistan nor did it change traditional *bitarafī* policy. Despite the fact that Daoud began to exercise his reforms such as: nationalization of banks, introduction of fixed working hours, amendments in the education system and extended medical care²³⁹ living conditions did not improve what it planned. The most important reform appeared to be the "land distribution"²⁴⁰ where a considerable amount of Afghan people was living in rural areas. Prolonged dream of building a modern nation stuck again to the financial incapability moreover those reforms were met strong opposition by the tribal and religious leaders.

President Daoud's strategy was not different from the strategies of the democratization period (1963-1973), he was just struggling for being an impartial state by diversifying his allies. Finally, he would be bold enough to generate politics freed from Soviet influence. His cooperation with the PDPA was a temporary agreement until Daoud consolidated power. Afterwards, he began to dismiss the

²³⁸ Dilip Mukerjee, "Afghanistan under Daud: Relations with Neighboring States," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, no. 4 (1975), p. 310.

²³⁹ Sarin and Dvoretzky, *The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union's Vietnam*, p. 36.

²⁴⁰ Sarin and Dvoretzky, *The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union's Vietnam*, p. 37.

members of the PDPA from the government. Despite the fact that Mohammed Daoud promised a republican administration by taking the basic rights as granted he did not propose to share the authority of ruling in fact he was looking forward to cracking down the ruling elite according to his own will.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union worried about the descending role of the Leftists in Afghan politics where President Daoud launched a campaign of repression. In July 1974, Mohammed Daoud removed two hundred Soviet-trained officers and sent some of the communists to foreign services²⁴¹ He was so determined on eliminating all fractions of Leftists but he was also so gentle towards in the replacement process. Instead of pointing any specific group, he used the “corruption and inefficiency”²⁴² card as he explained in a speech “we have no connections with any group and linking us to any group or movement is a sin.”²⁴³

He put a firm distance between his cabinet and the PDPA by replacing Interior Minister, Faiz Mohammed, with a former chief of police Kadir Nuristani who was notorious on quelling the Communists.²⁴⁴ President Daoud dismissed the top military officers from their posts however the rest of the Soviet educated officers remained in military so he could not eradicate the roots of the pro-Soviet people. Finally, in 1975, Mohammed Daoud declared his initial goal to melt down all political parties under his the new politic formation: National Revolutionary Party

²⁴¹ Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 17.

²⁴² Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 58.

²⁴³ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 57.

²⁴⁴ Sarin and Dvoretzky, *The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union's Vietnam*, p. 35.

(NRP). Further he demanded that all the party members join to NRP. That was to say Khalq and Parcham would be prohibited from political activities also eradicate the hopes of both wings of the PDPA, to become a part of ruling.

While President Daoud had to deal with the problems that were generated by Pakistan, he also engaged in removing the remnants of the Leftists from his cabinet in 1975. The outcome of having trained the Afghan fundamentalists by Pakistani authorities, an insurgency occurred in Panjsher Valley on July 1975.²⁴⁵ The insurgency did not turn into a general uprising as the rural ulama rejected the call for Jihad.²⁴⁶ People who were living in rural areas did not interest in whether the communists or Islamists had seized the power; because in either way, state policies had little or no effect on them.

4.3 The 1977 Constitution of Afghanistan

At home and abroad, Mohammed Daoud was surrounded by the complicated issues. Finally, he started to give concessions from his unchangeable politics. In 1976, Daoud had to stop claiming on Pashtunistan which was his prolonged foreign policy objective, made him so popular in his first era. Relaxation in the bilateral relations started “when the President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, offered help to the victims of floods and earthquakes in northern Afghanistan which was accepted

²⁴⁵ Amin, “Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future,” p. 378.

²⁴⁶ Rubin, “Lineages of the State in Afghanistan,” p. 1207.

by Daoud despite the intense pressure on receiving Pakistani aid.”²⁴⁷ Mohammed Daoud did not disappoint the goodwill of Pakistan, so the shuttle diplomacy brought them closer. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mohammed Daoud succeed to march towards the peace hand in hand. The first sign of improving relations was the acceptance of the Durand Line as the international boundary by Afghanistan. In return, Pakistan would release the National Awami Party (NAP)²⁴⁸ leaders from Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Province.

Winds of change encouraged Mohammed Daoud to take fundamental steps in domestic politics. In January 1977, he decided to make fresh constitution ratified by *Loya Jirgah*, but he did not allow participation of the PDPA members in the constitution process and in serving in the *Loya Jirgah*.²⁴⁹ The new constitution included “fundamental economic and social reforms, a land reform, and elimination of exploitation in all its forms.”²⁵⁰ The most challenging item in the 1977 constitution seemed to be the nationalization of the big industries and protecting the national resources.²⁵¹ The acts of the constitution underlined that Mohammed Daoud did not desist to create a real nonaligned country, no matter how he had good relations with imperial or neighboring states.

²⁴⁷ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 127.

²⁴⁸ The National Awami Party was pledged to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. It would seek to establish through constitutional and peaceful means a democratic and social system free from foreign control and devoid of communal differences, oppression, and exploitation. The party envisaged the development of Pakistan into a welfare federal state on the basis of fully autonomous units of East and West Pakistan, except defense, foreign affairs, and currency.

²⁴⁹ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 119.

²⁵⁰ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 119.

²⁵¹ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, p. 119.

Mohammed Daoud was a typical Asian leader who had his own ways in consolidating the power, adding that sharing power meant for him a waste of time in building a pretentious state in the region. As a result of his personal ambitions Daoud desired to establish one party system led by the *Hezb-e-Enqelab-e-Meli* (National Revolution Party), further he inserted a statement into the constitution which made the National Revolution Party as the only party that the progress of the revolution could be maintained.²⁵² Thus, there would be no objection to Daoud's decision; no opposition could discuss the acts or the order that had brought to the Afghan Council. Uniformity in political system without foreign influence was probably the most desirable idea of a despotic leader like Daoud but it was also incompatible with the Afghan reality.

The 1977 Constitution declared Mohammed Daoud as the unofficial monarch of the Afghan state, so to say, for an ordinary Afghan citizen another member of the royal family seized the power and dictated his system. His lust for controlling the power made him the single man even "no minister was allowed to authorize the expenditure of monies above £70 (5,000 *Afghanis*)"²⁵³ in Afghan state. Nevertheless, his nationalist and anti-capitalist policies were design to preserve the neutrality in a Cold War environment; his autocratic implementations against all opposition parties frustrated the masses; yet the fear that Daoud injected into his people prevented to raise their voice.

²⁵² The 1977 Constitution of Afghanistan, <http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1976.html>

²⁵³ Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," p. 28.

The Afghan reality bitterly showed that Soviet economic and technical assistance made possible to build many industrial facilities, energy stations, mine pits, infrastructure works, roads, schools, dams, tunnels, and airports until 1977. Dependency on the Soviets could be seen also in the foreign politics: “In the United Nations, Afghanistan voted regularly either with the Soviet bloc or with the group of nonaligned countries.”²⁵⁴ For the sake of détente and Vietnam Syndrome the US government did not intend interfering the Soviet-Afghanistan relations. In fact, the US foreign department downgraded the mission in Kabul from Class 3 to Class 4, which was the lowest category in the State Department’s internal ranking system, usually accredited to countries of least importance to the United States.²⁵⁵ It was publicly announced by the US officials that whether the Soviets had a secret agenda or just pursuing a peaceful co-existence, Afghanistan was on the periphery of the US foreign politics.

Having stayed with Afghanistan alone in international arena, the USSR had words to say about the position of the PDPA and Daoud’s *bitarafi* politics. The time had come with President Daoud’s Moscow visit in April 1977. Mohammed Daoud wanted to express his disturbance about the Soviet subversive activities in Afghanistan to Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev.²⁵⁶ During the talks, Daoud stressed on nonalignment of Afghanistan whereas, Soviet delegation praised the collective security. It was clear that both sides had different concerns; still a middle way was

²⁵⁴ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 41.

²⁵⁵ Amstutz, *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 29.

²⁵⁶ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 179.

searching. However, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev brought many critics to the Afghan foreign policy: establishing warm relations with Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim nations were the first issue of contradiction. More important than that Brezhnev urged that employing foreign experts in Afghanistan, some from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, did not comport with cordial friendship. Since the activities of foreign experts were evaluated by the Soviets as subversive activities against Soviet existence. Those experts were the spies of the Capitalist West who were undermining the Soviet regime therefore they must immediately be deported from Afghan lands.

President Daoud's reply to Brezhnev was equally tough and straightforward: "we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in acts and decisions."²⁵⁷ As soon as Daoud finished his statement, he rose from his chair, and the Afghan delegation followed him; in fact he refused a private talk with Brezhnev before he flew to Kabul.²⁵⁸ The unfinished meeting convinced the Soviets that a dream of an obedient Afghanistan might not take root unless an alternative leader found instead of President Mohammed Daoud.

In such circumstances, the Soviets did intensify the efforts to reunify the PDPA. According to the Soviets, Mohammed Daoud's close relation with oil-rich

²⁵⁷ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 179.

²⁵⁸ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 179.

Arab countries could not be explained in terms of good neighboring because those states had the interests clashing with Kremlin. Still, Mohammed Daoud's attitude could be tolerated if the Leftists had been allowed to be a part of political life. Mohammed Daoud became merciless not only to the radical Leftists but also to the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions, Soviet-Afghan relations entered into an irreversible phase.

Despite the fact that *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions had not fundamental differences, uniting them needed more effort than the expected. Kremlin had already prepared her plan-b for the fate of the PDPA. One year before the reunification, Iraqi Communist newspaper *Tariq Al-Shaab* had published the goodness of the Communist unity in Afghanistan then the other Moscow-led elements ponder on the same propaganda.²⁵⁹ On the one hand, *Khalq* accused *Parcham* of having cooperation with non-Communist but opportunist Mohammed Daoud; on the other hand *Parchamis* allegation was gathered around that Taraki was taking bribes, having suspiciously a high private bank account; moreover, he was accused by being a CIA agent due to his close ties with the US embassy.²⁶⁰

Besides, the allegation on Taraki, being a US agent, Mitrokhin claimed that Nur Mohammad Taraki had been recruited in 1951 by the Soviet Secret Service, the

²⁵⁹ Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 17.

²⁶⁰ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, p. 57.

KGB, as an agent with the codename NUR.²⁶¹ After Taraki was elected as the first secretary of the PDPA in 1965, he was formally removed from the Soviet agent network but he maintained to provide intelligence to KGB about the US and Chinese activities in Afghanistan.²⁶² Intelligence Services do wish to promote their agents' position. Thereto, the agents will occupy more critical position; so the information that is collected become more qualified as well as the credibility of the source becomes more persuasive.

Although there are many handicaps of collecting information from a “strategically infiltrated” agent like Taraki, the most important element is to hide the relation between an agent and a case officer.²⁶³ If the relation is spotted, no matter how formidable, none of the secret services could escape from being at the center of an international crisis. Once an agent is chosen for a prominent position, the intelligence services tend to either cut the relation abruptly or just erase the records of the agent and continue the relation via illegal canals which is more dangerous if the returns worth for that.

The interesting side of the reciprocal accusations between *Parcham* and *Khalq* was that leader of *Parcham*, Babrak Karmal was also recruited as a KGB

²⁶¹ Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 386.

²⁶² Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, p. 386.

²⁶³ A case officer is responsible to establish an intelligence network by recruiting agents. The case officer leads the agents to collect specific information that cannot be reached by legal or open sources.

agent and with the codename MARID.²⁶⁴ Having recruited from both wings the Soviets provided a perfect flow of information where the intelligence was double checked by different sources. In regards of intelligence, sources from different organizations increase the value and reliability of the information. Furthermore, Karmal and Taraki were the strongest nominees of presidency for the post-Daoud era scenarios. So to say, the Soviets guaranteed that whoever would gain the power would no chance but to be an obedient to the Soviets.

Although the moods of the party leaders were too far away from the reconciliation, the world-wide Soviet efforts bore fruit, finally in May 1977 *Parcham* and *Khalq* fractions were united. Nur Mohammed Taraki was elected as the party leader and Babrak Karmal as the secretary of the Central Committee. When the *Parcham* and *Khalq* wings merged under PDPA, intensive efforts were spent by both sides for recruiting men from the armed forces. However, Dupree estimated that in those days *Khalq* had some 2,500 followers, *Parcham* 1,500-2000, and the Maoists and Islamists around the same number of followers each.²⁶⁵ On the face of it, *Parcham* and *Khalq* were working together, but each fraction picked military adherents separately.

The situation was predictable where the change in the administration was imminent; the problem was who would succeed. At first glance, the priority of the

²⁶⁴ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, p. 386.

²⁶⁵ http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_9674_2.pdf p. 9: In Louis Dupree, "Red Flag over the Hindu-Kush," Part V, *AUFS report* no. 28, 1980, p. 3.

Soviet Union was just to remove Mohammed Daoud from his post at any cost; otherwise *Parcham* or *Khalqi* ruling was nothing more than a simple detail. That was why both fractions of the PDPA were supported by the Soviet legal and illegal instruments even if they were working independently. By July 1977, the KGB residency reported that a struggle for leadership was envisaged “where the PDPA cabinet was almost equally divided between the two factions and democratic methods had been abandoned.”²⁶⁶

The second era of Daoud was not nurtured in line with the Soviet interests, even though the Soviet aid which amounted to 1.5 billion rubles for almost in the last two decades,²⁶⁷ so to speak, rescued the Afghan economy from bankruptcy. For that reason, the Soviets treated the Afghans as if they had own the country; thus they thought that all acts and political decisions must be consulted with the Soviet advisers. Whereas, many times Daoud claimed that he was not departed from his nonalignment policy, to make his effort meaningful he achieved to diversify trade and economic sources of money. For instance, Japan came as the Afghanistan’s second trade partner just after the USSR in 1978.²⁶⁸ As Mohammed Daoud became more conservative, more brutal to the Leftists, and struggled to put an end to the dependency on the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders hardened the tone of their discourses. How much effort Mohammed Daoud spent in establishing close relations

²⁶⁶ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 191.

²⁶⁷ Artemy Kalinovsky, “The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisers, Counter-Insurgency and Nation Building in Afghanistan,” *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, No.60. (2010), p. 19.

²⁶⁸ Amstutz, *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 29.

with the states other than the Soviet Union, he could not escape to be second largest non-communist recipient of Soviet aid during the 1973-1978.²⁶⁹

4.4 The Saur Revolution 1978

Rivalry between *Parcham* and *Khalq* became complicated after prominent Parchamist intellectual Mir Akhber Khyber was assassinated on 17 April 1978. The murder of Mir Akhber Khyber, fire from an automatic gun, was the third political assassination in the last nine months.²⁷⁰ The assassins remained unclear “like the killing of a strike leader in August and of the minister of planning in November 1977”²⁷¹ still Daoud’s secret police and *Khalq* fraction the most likely suspects. Louis Dupree concluded that the murder was directly or indirectly arranged by Interior Minister Nuristani who was well-known an anti-Communist statesman told before about eradication of the communists before they got too strong.²⁷²

On 19 April 1978, Mir Akhber Khyber’s funeral brought thousands of demonstrators together, the estimated crowd ranged from 10.000 to 30.000.²⁷³ In their speech, both Taraki and Karmal addressed the government was responsible in Khyber’s assassination. They asserted that the murder was another step of an organized conspiracy which planned by Mohammed Daoud to silence gradually the

²⁶⁹ Amstutz, *Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, p. 29.

²⁷⁰ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 72.

²⁷¹ Nyrop and Seekins. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 73.

²⁷² Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 23.

²⁷³ Nyrop and Seekins, *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 73.

PDPA.²⁷⁴ Afterwards, Daoud took strict measures to prevent the demonstration went beyond his control. Thus, On 26 April 1978 a number of leading PDPA figures, including Taraki and Karmal were arrested and thrown into prison.²⁷⁵

On the following day, on 27 April 1978 a coup took place in the lunar month of Saur, therefore, the coup was also called “Saur Revolution.” Abdel Samad Ghaus claimed that the officers who made the coup were not more than 800; however, neither the Liberals nor the Islamic Fundamentalists were well organized to challenge the Leftists in having the power.²⁷⁶ At the beginning of the coup, an Afghan army unit was sent to Mohammed Daoud’s palace to topple him down. A fierce conflict almost took one full night between the insurgents and the guards of Daoud (approximately 1.800 men).²⁷⁷ At the end of the night, Mohammed Daoud and his family were killed after that Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was proclaimed and ultimately red flag was hoisted. Nur Mohammed Taraki assumed the position of President of DRA, Hafizullah Amin appointed to the Secretary of the PDPA, and Babrak Karmal was made Deputy Prime Minister.

The coup was conducted through the coalition between the Leftist army officers who mostly educated in Soviet War Academies and the PDPA. Sixty out of sixty-two generals removed from the army and replaced by PDPA members

²⁷⁴ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 160.

²⁷⁵ Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, p. 94.

²⁷⁶ Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account*, p. 187.

²⁷⁷ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from the Alexander the Great to the fall of the Taliban*, p. 231.

promoted from the ranks of colonel or major. Plus nearly quarter of the surviving former ministers of the old regime were killed or arrested who were against the new regime.²⁷⁸ Regarding from the ruling elite, other political groups (Islamists, Parchamis, Maoists, members of Afghan Millat)²⁷⁹, religious leaders, ethnic groups especially the Shi'a Hazaras and Nuristanis (those ethnic groups actively revolted against the new regime) and tribal leaders were the victims of the new regime, many of them killed, or lost under scrutiny.²⁸⁰ The advent of DRA was emerged as a regime where a small portion of population with a Communist understanding prevailed over the whole country. The old regime possessed the remnants of the monarchy but the revolutionary forces of Afghanistan abolished the dynasty and initiated a non-elite administration. According to the consideration of PDPA, the feudal Afghan society was divided by two: the peasants as the exploited and the feudalists as the exploiters. Religion was used to alienate the peasants from pursuing their actual interests. Therefore, the revolution would give lands to the peasants who were the real owners and with a sophisticated education people of Afghanistan would wake up from imperialist coma.

As soon as the *Khalqi* and the *Parcham* coalition consolidated power, the radical *Khalqi* group began to dominate the government and *Parchamis* were removed from the critical government positions. In July 1978 Babrak Karmal sent

²⁷⁸ Rubin, R. Barnett, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 112.

²⁷⁹ Barnett, *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, p. 112.

²⁸⁰ Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," p. 9.

into exile as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, later in August 1978, the some *Parchamis* were arrested for plotting a coup and expelled from all *Parchami* leaders from the party and government.²⁸¹ As a result of the recent developments, Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin became the two prominent actors in the Afghan politics.

Downgraded Soviet-Afghan relations prior to the Saur Revolution began to develop in 1978 through the channels of the Defense Ministry, the KGB, the foreign ministry, and ministries dealing with economy, trade, construction, and education.²⁸² The Soviet Union was the first country who recognized the new regime in Afghanistan. The intention of the Soviets was to establish close relations beyond a non-aligned and a super power relation. That was why, Vladimir Kryuchkov as the head of the KGB intelligence directorate visited Kabul in 1978 to sign an agreement on sharing intelligence and cooperation.²⁸³ Hundreds of Soviet military and political advisers dispatched to Afghan cities to organize secret police networks, army and militia units, small factories, and coeducational schools.²⁸⁴ Kremlin envisaged a slowly revolution progress in Afghanistan where still the class conscious and the rest requirements for a socialist state did not exist.

²⁸¹ Barnett, *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, p. 111.

²⁸² Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: 2007), p. 259.

²⁸³ Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, p. 260.

²⁸⁴ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (The USA: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 39.

The Afghan leaders implemented a quick revolution program which brought a set of radical changes in the country; included “redistribution of land, cancellation of peasant debts, and the establishment of a large-scale literacy program.”²⁸⁵ Khalqis decreed a limit on private property up to six hectares but they could not furnish enough seeds, machines credits, or water rights.²⁸⁶ What was more important than that the gender relations was reorganized by granting equality to women, freedom of choice in marriage, and banning child marriages adding that schooling for girls was made mandatory.²⁸⁷ Larry Goodson has commented “these reforms struck at the very heart of the socio-economic structure of Afghanistan’s rural society; indeed their sudden nationwide introduction, with no preliminary pilot programs, suggests that this was their real purpose.”²⁸⁸

Nur Mohammed Taraki had no intention of tolerating any crack voice against the reforms as he said: “Lenin taught us to be merciless towards the enemies of the revolution and millions of people had to be eliminated in order to secure the victory of the October Revolution.”²⁸⁹ Especially, the uncompromised tactics on the religious and tribal leaders which was underestimated by the DRA united the most integrated class of the country: the rural people. The Afghan government to stop the

²⁸⁵ H.Sidky, “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 41, no. 4 (2007), p. 857.

²⁸⁶ Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, p. 112.

²⁸⁷ Sidky, “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” p. 857.

²⁸⁸ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from the Alexander the Great to the fall of the Taliban*, p. 231.

²⁸⁹ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, p. 389.

exploration of the popular uprising bombed the rebel zones especially in rural areas where many crops were destroyed in order to starve them.²⁹⁰

Naturally, the reforms could not find sufficient support from the majority of the population; Afghan government exercised coercive methods even worse than Mohammed Daoud had done during 1973-1978. As the situation was going bad to worse in Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin gained more important position where he was looking for full loyalty to him instead of full loyalty to the system. He then fired four cabinet members, Asadollah Sarwari, Aslam Watanjar, Said Mohammed Gulabzoi, and Shairjan Mazduryar, who were loyal to Taraki.²⁹¹ Amin spoke in an interview about “unity of all Afghans from Oxus to the Indus”²⁹² and further he said “We cannot abandon our persecuted brother Pashtuns on the other side of the Khyber”²⁹³ Since Hafizullah Amin was neither a man who could abandon his opinions about nonalignment and independence, nor was he easily be influenced that was why, rise of Hafizullah Amin was a serious threat against the Soviets. The KGB residency also sent a note to Premier Leonid Brezhnev about Hafizullah Amin in November 1978 that Afghan policies were slipping through the USA.²⁹⁴ Amin had

²⁹⁰ Alexandre Dastarac and M. Levant, “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 89, (Jul.-Aug.,-1980), p. 5.

²⁹¹ Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, “The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, no. 8, (1998), p. 1362.

²⁹² Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 29.

²⁹³ Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 29.

²⁹⁴ Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, p. 47.

contacts with the US diplomats but did not give any hint to the Soviet comrades what had been talked with them.²⁹⁵

For the time being, Amin succeeded to eliminate his opponents from the army and the cabinet, there was no considerable opposition to his will. Nur Mohammed Taraki was aware of Hafizullah Amin was running for the leadership thus, a plan was made to overthrow him. Taraki invited Amin to the People's Palace to talk about the current politics, he refused to meet with Taraki fearing of being executed; soon he was persuaded by Soviet ambassador, Alexander Puzanov.²⁹⁶ As Amin came to the palace, an attempt of murder was directed at him; somehow he escaped without taking any injury. In return, controlling the army and the other state bodies Hafizullah Amin ordered killing of Taraki on October 1979.²⁹⁷ The Soviet sponsored plan did not work, so Moscow had to agree with a leader who had suspicious about the Soviets and willing to establish good relations with the USA.

A terrible event occurred on February 1979. The Soviet expert US ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped by Setam-i Milli members (Maoist group) and taken as hostage at Hotel Kabul.²⁹⁸ The aim of the kidnap was to provide freedom for the Setam-i Milli members who were in Afghan prisons. Instead of negotiating or consulting with the US embassy, President Hafizullah Amin sent a

²⁹⁵ Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, p. 47.

²⁹⁶ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 85.

²⁹⁷ Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan*, p. 85.

²⁹⁸ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, p. 390.

special force unit to rescue the ambassador. The plan was unsuccessful as the ambassador, Adolph Dubs, and two of his old kidnapers were accidentally shot to death during the operation.²⁹⁹ The KGB finger behind the operation was a well known fact so to avoid from having any diplomatic crisis between the USA and the USSR; the KGB quickly erased their marks in the operation.³⁰⁰ Naturally, the US outraged to the useless effort to save the ambassador who was a senior diplomat as well as an expert on Asian politics. Moreover, the failed operation initiated without US consultation. US displeasure came out with the suspending of almost all aid programs to Afghanistan.³⁰¹

As the tension was rising in Afghanistan, the massacre at Herat was the turning point for the infant DRA regime. None of the Soviet intelligence services or the other policy making bodies envisaged the seriousness of the situation while the Soviet advisers were still staying with their families as the insurgents were gaining more power. In March 1979, Ismail Khan an Afghan army captain called for jihad against the Communists and started a rebellion in heavily armed Herat garrison.³⁰² Up to fifty Soviet advisers with their families were killed and the corpses were exhibited on the streets.³⁰³ In the name of taking the revenge, Soviet pilots annihilated the historical city of Herat with the massive bombardments Yuri

²⁹⁹ Steve Coll, Feb, 24 2002. "Spies, Lies And The Distortion Of History," *Washington Post*, p. B1.

³⁰⁰ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, p. 390.

³⁰¹ Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 190.

³⁰² Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, p. 40.

³⁰³ Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: the Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, p. 35; Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, p. 40.

Andropov the chief of the KGB explained the Soviet assault with the words: “Bearing in mind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but in spite of that, under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.”³⁰⁴

No matter how Hafizullah Amin was crying for Soviet military back up, his oppressive policies and brutal social reforms endangered the revolution process; in fact the DRA became marginal which failed to accumulate the popular support. Without substantial background and visible development program Hafizullah Amin sink into a quagmire that no one could save him except the Soviet Union. People who saw no future in Afghanistan began fleeing abroad, some to Western Europe and Northern America, others to Pakistan to join the Islamic resistance.³⁰⁵ The Soviets understood that without Soviet military help the Afghan state was on the way of fragmentation and to let them being fragmented was equal to permit the installation of imperialist states on Soviet borders. The unfinished revolution in Afghanistan needed additional force which brought the possibility of intervention on the table.

On December 8, 1979, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev arranged a meeting with his inner circle: chief of the KGB Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, and the chief ideologue of the CPSU

³⁰⁴ Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, p. 40.

³⁰⁵ Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, p. 112.

Mikhail Suslov.³⁰⁶ After long time discussions the cadre reached a decision that Afghanistan was valuable enough not to be left alone where the hostile states were progressing. The first option was to remove Amin with the help of the KGB and brought Babrak Karmal to the presidency, second plan was based on sending Soviet troops on the territory of Afghanistan for the same purposes.³⁰⁷ It was assumed that

stationing the US missiles (Pershing Type) in Afghanistan would threaten many vital Soviet objects, including the space center Baikonur the danger that the Afghan uranium deposits could be used by Pakistan and Iraq for building nuclear weapons; possible establishment of opposition regimes in the Northern areas of Afghanistan and annexation of that region by Pakistan, and so on.³⁰⁸

On December 10, 1979, the Defense Minister, Ustinov, informed Chief of General Staff, Nikolai Orgakov that a decision was taken to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and ordered him to prepare approximately 75 to 80 thousand people.³⁰⁹ The Chief of General Staff insisted on that the solution of the Afghan problem passed through the political and diplomatic efforts rather than military force.³¹⁰ Orgakov was unsuccessful to convince the Politburo about the traditional intolerance of the Afghan people against the foreign intruders. While the health problems of Soviet Premier Brezhnev were so explicit in 1979, the troika (Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko) was so decisive in sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan.

³⁰⁶ Alexander Lyakhovsky, *The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan* (GPI Iskon: Moscow, 1995): Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive, p.109.

³⁰⁷ Lyakhovsky, *The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan*, p.109.

³⁰⁸ Lyakhovsky, *The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan*, p.109.

³⁰⁹ Lyakhovsky, *The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan*, p.109

³¹⁰ Lyakhovsky, *The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan*, p.109

On December 23, 1979, the Kabul residency reported that Amin's suspicions had been aroused both by Western reports of Soviet troop movements and by the frequent flights into the Soviet airbase at Bagram.

On Christmas Day, 1979, as the Soviet 40th Army crossed the Afghan border, Soviet invasion had officially started. On 27 December 1979, 700 members of the KGB Alpha and Zenith Special Forces dressed in Afghan uniforms and travelling in military vehicles with Afghan markings³¹¹ first stormed President Hafizullah Amin's palace killed him in the shootout then strategic points were seized. In the following day, two Soviet motorized divisions crossed the Amu Darya and captured the Salang Pass, headed towards Herat, Farah, and Kandahar.³¹²

On December 28, 1979 Babrak Karmal was declared as the new prime minister of Afghanistan. The dreadful Soviet army did not have any difficulties since the armor units of the Afghan army were demilitarized on the condition of "winterization" prior to the invasion so no serious resistance was occurred. However such a small invasion for the Soviet Union was not the vital war for them but the question must be why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

³¹¹ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World*, p. 402.

³¹² Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, p. 203.

4.5 Why Did the Soviets invade Afghanistan?

The main argument of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan mostly demonstrated by the Western authors was the aggression of the Soviet Union. This argument was fortified by Soviet hostile policy towards Hungary and Czechoslovakia, so, Afghanistan was represented as the last victim. Here one makes a distinction between the reasons of the invasion: the events that invited the Soviet Union and the events that caused the Soviet invasion. "Invitation" is not used as a word to purify the Soviets; it is rather a word to suggest that some political decisions have unbearable consequences and must be revised before it is too late.

To clarify the "invitation" issue one might assert that no official appeal was made for the Soviet troops by the Afghan administration. In some respect, article IV of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Agreement (On December 5, 1978) was illustrated as an official right to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. Article IV stipulated that "In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them."³¹³ However, the article was so open to interpretations. Firstly, "cooperation in the military field" generally considered exchanging military personnel, exercising war games, sharing technological developments and equipments. No tangible evidence of inviting Soviet troops existed in this article; so to speak, this agreement did not justify sending

³¹³ Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, p. 79.

Soviet troops. Many defense agreements had signed during the Cold War and none of them clear the guiltiness of the aggressor either for cynical or peaceful means. Perhaps, these kinds of agreements persuade the domestic public but one believes there is no room for that in international community.

Hafizullah Amin requested Soviet weapons in contrast the Soviets preferred to send military personnel because the high-tech machines needed Soviet expertise and instructions.³¹⁴ Soviet troops were called in order to put down the insurgencies; otherwise none of the president of a country, either independent or client, could accept the foreign troops to murder his own people. Sending Soviet weapons also a risky act, if the arsenal had been captured by the opposing forces, a greater trouble would have been faced. Thence, sending Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet generals was probably the best option to stop any further rebellion instead of dispatching Soviet weapons. By the way, experiences gained from East European invasions (Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) the operation was calculated a short term one as long as Hafizullah Amin was replaced with a loyal person, then the Afghan government would work in line with Soviet interests again.

First sign of the invitation was the acceptance of Soviet aids more than any other country's aids. Until the invasion the Soviets invested millions of dollars to the Afghan infrastructure, education, and industry. Building dams, mine pits, roads,

³¹⁴ M.Hasan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982*, (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1995)

tunnels, highways, factories, and many facilities became a kind of life belt for Afghan economy. Afghan students were accepted at Soviet colleges and universities in the USSR by taking unreturned scholarships. Not only in economic terms but also in political decisions whenever Afghanistan twisted with the international pressure, the Soviet Union appeared as the bystander. In returning the Soviet favor, Afghanistan received Soviet advisers who held critical positions in the Afghan state cadres. Soviet-Afghan relations were evolving from two equal independent states to a manager-client relation.

Traditional balancing policy was not working where the United States lost her enthusiasm, towards Afghanistan, especially after the death of venerable ambassador Adolph Dubs in a rescue operation in 1979. No rival power left to object the Soviet Union, in a relaxed environment Kremlin could impose its plans without considerable international pressure. No significant power left in front of the Soviet Union to dictate her will to Afghan state. Having excessively close relation with one super power without any balancing policy was a great mistake that a state could do.

Installation of Communist regime in Afghanistan facilitated “use of Soviet force” according to Brezhnev Doctrine, which allowed the intervention if a socialist state was threatened. Actually, Brezhnev did not mention any military solution, he just stated “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the

country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.”³¹⁵

However, interpretation of his words legitimated Soviet invasions that made the Soviet Union as the ultimate protectorate of the socialist regimes. Soviet perspective clarified that once a country chose Socialism it would always had to be a socialist regime.

Although Saur Revolution in April 1978 was the triumph of the Afghan Communists with collaboration of Moscow, the radical reforms and personal conflicts made DRA a short term republic. Radical reforms including confiscation and redistribution of lands, and freedom to women in social life aroused indignation among the rural people. Hafizullah Amin called the Saur revolution a “prolongation of the Great October Revolution of 1917.”³¹⁶ Due to the obsessiveness about making a quick reform program in a country where 87 percent of the population was rural, the DRA regime faced with strong opposition.

In 1979 almost % 80 people were living out of urban areas with a high rate of illiteracy, so to say, the Afghans were too far away from understanding the very basics of a revolution. In such circumstances, the PDPA wanted an abrupt change in society but individual ambitions within the party were above socialism. Finally, Hafizullah Amin seized the power after having many adventures he then began to eliminate Taraki and prominent the party members who he had doubts on their

³¹⁵Brezhnev Doctrine Speech by First Secretary of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/polsciwb/brianl/docs/1968BrezhnevDoctrine.pdf>

³¹⁶Dastarac and Levant, “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan,” p. 4.

loyalty. Anyhow, Khalqi-Parcham conflict engendered a mass purges, arrests, and execution in the country; Amin's policy left no fundamental adherents to DRA. Weakening DRA regime was incapable of settling down the nationwide demonstrations, in order to save the infant socialist state, Soviet Union was invited by the inaptitude leaders of Afghanistan.

Indoctrination of the Afghan army was another reason of invitation. Merely relying on Soviet military resources, Afghan army gained a technological process and a better fire power; however Soviet Union via KGB and GRU obtained the opportunity to recruit Afghan officers. Those officers were ideologically motivated hence the best nominees for high ranks in the Afghan army. Controlling the army in third world states like Afghanistan meant controlling the state apparatus; therefore the Soviet Union held Afghanistan's most strategic institution to nurture the seeds of socialism. The failure of the Soviet policy was to limit its influence only with Afghan military elites, the rest of the people were ignored, and as a result, they joined the dissidents' side during the counter-revolution process.

Third reason as an invitation was the US foreign policy which encouraged the Soviets about Afghanistan was under their sphere of influence. The US had never been truly interested in Afghanistan; the US, instead of supporting Pakistan in international arena, might have stood somewhere in between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Together with, Watergate Scandal, Vietnam Syndrome, murder of ambassador to Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran dragged the US attention

from Afghan affairs. Only in late 1979, US administration focused on Afghanistan prior to the invasion, afterwards, the President of the USA, Jimmy Carter approved U.S. covert action on July 3, 1979, named “Operation Cyclone” giving aid to the Afghan rebels in Pakistan.³¹⁷

Islam presented as the starkest reason of the invasion. In southern borders of the USSR, Islam was a sleeping threat to the Soviet existence. It was the most binding element for the people regardless of their nationalities or other affiliations. Albeit, most diversities were melted down in an ideological spot swarm of nationalities and ethnic groups required tight control. Neighbors of Afghanistan, except India, shared the same Islamic backgrounds which meant that the Soviet Muslims had many opportunities to interact with co-nationals in the Afghan population.³¹⁸

A small rebellion, motivated with Islamic notion, within the Soviet Union or among the borders, would trigger a domino effect that could eventually bring about an unpredictable damage to the Soviet territorial integrity. Soviets perceived that their apprehension was not rootless since the US, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Kuwait, and Egypt had been supplying substantial aid to Afghan radicals. Actually, the Islamic resistance movement in Afghanistan became noteworthy in

³¹⁷ Sidky, “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” p. 858.

³¹⁸ Jiri Valenta, “From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion,” *International Security*, Vol. 5, no. 2 (1980), p. 118.

1978 when Afghan refugees outnumbered more than 385,000 in Pakistan.³¹⁹ On the face of it, Pakistan accepted the refugees who escaped from cruelty of DRA; by giving help, Pakistan aimed to distract the Afghans from Pashtunistan issue, pacified them in international arena with Islamist guerillas or in other words *mujahedeen*,³²⁰ and halted the incursions of Balushi separatists at Afghan border. Pakistan succeeded to turn the Afghan people, via paramilitary training, as a kind of weapon for fraternal fight.

Fear of the Islamic insurgency came into existence when Herat witnessed a bloody radical uprising against the Soviet advisers and their families. Brutal massacre of in Herat outraged the USSR, another reason for invasion, an immediate retaliation occurred as the Afghan army destroyed the city. Jalalabad, Asmar, Ghazni, Nahrin, and Bala Hisar... one by one Afghan cities jolted with revolts.³²¹ To put down the insurgencies, Afghan government became more and more ruthless to its people which grew hatred among the Afghan people for DRA.

Further, Soviet disturbance of Islamic radicals, third reason for the invasion, was intensified with the 1979 Revolution in Iran. The fall of pro-US regime in Iran did not cheer the Politburo at all. The US lost a staunch ally as well as lost a gate opening to deep of Central Asia. On the other hand, the Soviets gained a neighbor ruled by Islamic laws; what was important that the new regime in Iran was extremely

³¹⁹ Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future", p. 381.

³²⁰ A fighter who struggles for an Islamic way of life.

³²¹ Halliday and Tanin, "The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts," p. 1361.

radical and compromise was out of question. Soviet concern to the Iranian Revolution could be analyzed in two categories.

First, the Islamic structure in Iran flared up the worsening situation in Afghanistan via calling upon Shiites for rebellion against infidels in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had never been a Shiite oriented state, still a considerable amount of Shiites were living in the country. Second, strategic location of Iran allowed access to warm water ports in Persian Gulf, was a matter of security issue for the USSR; the Soviets had no open-sea ports except Murmansk on the Arctic Sea and Vladivostok on the east coast, both had to be cleared by icebreakers throughout the winter.³²²

The Soviets might perceived the US decision to dispatch twenty-one ships including two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea³²³ after the Iranian revolution as an intimidation to Iranians and a quick US military built up in the Mediterranean Sea. The US lost a strategic ally in the Middle East where the Soviets had good connections with Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Next move of the US could be the assault on Iran which would reshape the Afghan borders since the US-led infiltrations could able to devastate the incapable DRA regime. Afghanistan, by herself was not ready for such spy game confrontations.

In sum, Islamist radicals in Afghanistan exposed the deep fear of a dreadful empire, to erase the upcoming threat. First the Soviet Union waited as though the

³²² Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, p. 27.

³²³ Minton Goldman, "Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan: Roots & Causes," *Polity*, Vol. 16, no. 3 (1984), p. 396.

Afghan army could cope with the insurgencies, next to their failure the Soviet invasion came to restore the order in Afghanistan. A short term planned invasion would endure until another pro-Soviet leader began to float the state. It is quite unfair to blame the Soviets that they were purely motivated with territorial ambition; their aggression was not more than any other super power. The Soviet Union endeavored to enlarge the socialist states around the neighborhood. The bilateral relations initiated with mutual understanding at first; later the events which invited the Soviets and propelled them to a military solution together precipitated the Soviet invasion.

Above all, the Soviet Union was a super power which could not tolerate any loss of such a small size of war in the heydays of the Cold War. The prestige of the USSR could not be tested, if it was questioned, a short term military intervention would be inevitable to bring the Afghans to their heels as those kinds of interventions worked in the Eastern Europe. Soviets tried to teach a lesson to Afghanistan and to intimidate hostile states not to play with their red lines, at the end they were taught the lesson that the rest of the great powers learned.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Some states do not lose their strategical importance according to the conjuncture; Afghanistan has never been that kind of state whose importance is determined by the confrontation of great powers. Instead of having constructed for geographic or demographic concerns, borders of Afghanistan shaped as the Great Game attributed a special mission to Afghanistan: being a buffer state to fill the zone between Russia and Great Britain. While the Russians were slowly advancing towards India by digesting Central Asian Khanates, Britain followed the pre-emptive war strategy to halt them before they had been a threat to Indian trade routes. Due to the Russian-British rivalry in Asia, Afghanistan turned into a highway of invasions and incessant armed conflicts. Sometimes being at the center of the international politics, sometimes being at the corner; Afghanistan deprived of utilizing the industrial and technological developments.

Independence was assumed not because of erupting nationalistic feelings; in fact it was obtained by series of opportunities. The Russian Revolution and exhaustion of Britain from fighting allowed Afghanistan to conduct free foreign policy as well as establish relations with third states without British permission. Declaration of independence did not erase the buffer state status of Afghanistan,

adding that lack of having a well built economic structure and trained manpower being independent had only a symbolic meaning. Liberated from the British asylum in foreign affairs, Afghan domestic resources were insufficient to maintain independent policies.

To break the backwardness, quick modernization programs were introduced by the dictation of Afghan kings and presidents who were willing to carry out them simultaneously. Instead of gradual innovative programs, accelerated forms of development were chosen even if those reforms were highly contradictory to some part of the ruling mechanism especially, tribal and religious groups. Those interest groups were not eager to lose their influence for the sake of a stronger Afghanistan. Admittedly, leaders like King Zahir Shah who was the architect of the first constitution, Mohammed Daoud, an idealist in building a modern Afghanistan, also perceived that sharing power was a sign of weakness. The 1964 constitution gave the authority to the King to assign prime ministers, judges, and high-rank civil and military officials. Mohammed Daoud inserted in 1977 Constitution that all political parties either to join his party or they would be banned. Whenever a serious opposition emerged by demanding more political rights, strict precautions were taken by the rulers which culminated in unlawful implementations. None of the reforms were able to sink to the level of a standard Afghan citizen where their basic demands and traditional sensibilities were ignored.

Finally, after the Saur Revolution in 1978, Nur Mohammed Taraki followed the same oppressing methods in imposing socialist reforms. In particular, segregation of women and religious priorities were the vital spots that should not be questioned

even by the hegemonic power. Although changes like redistribution of lands could be beneficial to the rural people, it was conceived as usurping, *khayanat*, which was against Pashtunwali rules, still regulated the life of Afghan people in 1970s.

What make the Afghan case interesting is the events after the “Saur Revolution.” From 1919 to 1978, Afghanistan was governed by non-communists leaders, prior to the coup there was no sign of Soviet aggression. If the Soviet expansionism was steady why did they wait for almost sixty years? The Soviet Union could not able to consolidate power in the first years of the revolution, but in the 1950s and later Soviet Union was one of two superpowers of the Cold War. One can assume that the Soviet aggression was as equal as the aggression of the USA towards third world countries. Superpowers of the Cold War era were codified to spread their influence and resist any physical or ideological threat. At first Soviet Union was born as a reaction to the existing order of the nation states and their ruling elite, later the system created its own elite through politburo, still the Soviet propaganda on regime exporting was quite understandable.

In regards of Afghanistan, Soviet Union did not plan for an immediate socialist revolution. Without proper industry, labor class, and ideological conscious, no revolution could be sustainable. Detailed intelligence reports and first person observations, shared with the Soviet policy makers, made it clear that Afghanistan needed progress. On the contrary, Afghan communists applied brutal methods to convince the rural people that the best system was the socialist system as if they were aware of the different type of administrations. Saur Revolution was the victory of minority over majority; therefore it accumulated a coalition consisted of peasants,

radical Islamists, conservatives, liberals and even the Leftists. Alienated people were motivated by foreign forces like Iran, Pakistan, China, the USA, and Arab countries and Islam was used as an antidote of the DRA.

Rebellious movement blessed with Islam was the heel of Achilles of the USSR. It was the strongest incentive for the Soviets to decide a military operation. A successful radical Islamic uprising could be contagious for the rest of Central Asia where most of their nationalities had organic affiliations with the people of Afghanistan. Arabic countries' blatant financial and emotional support together with Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran increased the tone of the counter revolutionary movements in Afghanistan. Soviet Union invested a considerable amount of aid just to drag the Afghans in their side and it seemed that the country was slipping out of their orbit.

Besides Islamic anxiety, strategic concerns and regional balances impelled the Soviets to act before it was too late. The invasion was an attempt to rescue Afghanistan from falling to the capitalist hands. Applying to military force was the last resort of the Soviet Union, but the situation was going out of control from Kremlin. Soviet Union had penetrated Afghanistan slowly for more than thirty years, which could be assessed a long time, to bring the Afghans on their side at least they did it but the internal conflict thwarted a smooth progress. The international reaction was relatively insufficient to discourage the Soviet Union to initiative an operation. Additionally, the US who did not present noteworthy significance to Afghanistan, had to deal with her own foreign policy disputes. Thinking all the events together Soviet invasion came as an inevitable consequence.

Soviet Afghan rapprochement was nothing more than the relation of the isolated states. Both pursued hostile policies to their neighbors and eventually they were forced to embrace each other, it was not a willing but reluctant partnership. Afghanistan is a story of prolonged conflicts, and an unsuccessful case of a country who struggled hard to make a progress towards somewhere. The Afghans preferred to live in a country where their old rules were in current rather than to be dictated a set of rules by the foreigners or local rulers.

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A


THE BARAKZAI RULERS OF AFGHANISTAN



(Source: Heathcote, T., A. 1983. *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*. New York: Hippocrene Books)

APPENDIX B

THE SADOZAI RULERS OF AFGHANISTAN



(Source: Heathcote, T., A. 1983. *The Afghan Wars 1839-1919*. New York: Hippocrene Books)

APPENDIX C

SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, 1964

Article 1: Afghanistan is a Constitutional Monarchy; an independent, unitary and indivisible state.

Sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation. The Afghan nation is composed of all those individuals who possess the citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The word Afghan shall apply to each such individual.

Article 8: The King shall be an Afghan national, a Muslim and a follower of the Hanafi doctrine.

Article 9: The King has the following rights and duties:

1. Holds Supreme Command of the armed forces of Afghanistan.
2. Declares war and armistice.
3. Summons and inaugurates the Loya Jirgah (Great Council).
4. Inaugurates the ordinary session of the Shura (Parliament).
5. Summons and inaugurates the extraordinary sessions of the Shura (Parliament).

6. Dissolves the Shura (Parliament) and decrees new elections, which shall be held with three months from the date of the dissolution of the Shura (Parliament).

7. Signs laws and proclaims their enforcement.

8. Issues ordinances.

9. Grants credentials for conclusion of international treaties, in accordance with the provisions of the law.

10. Signs international treaties

11. Appoints the Prime Minister and accepts his resignation. Appoint ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and accepts their resignations.

12. Appoints the non-elected members of the Meshrano Jirgah (House of the Elders) and appoints its President from amongst its members.

13. Appoints the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court.

14. Appoints Judges and high ranking civil and military officials and grant them retirement in accordance with the provisions of the law.

15. Accredits the Heads of Afghanistan's diplomatic missions to foreign states appoints permanent Representatives of Afghanistan to international organizations and accepts the credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives.

(Source:

<http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=afghanenglish>)

APPENDIX D

SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, 1977

Article 5: To respect human liberty and dignity and to eliminate all forms of torture and discrimination.

Article 10: To ensure and to generalize compulsory primary education, to expand and develop general and vocational secondary education and higher education, free of charge, in order to train and form academic and technical cadres to serve the people.

Article 12: To respect the principles of the charter of the United Nations, the universal declaration of human rights and to support just peace. Ultimately, the formation of a prosperous and progressive society on the basis of brotherhood, equality, cooperation, and the preservation of human dignity.

Article 15: Private property and enterprises, based on the principles of non exploitation shall be regulated by law.

Article 20: Afghanistan is a republican, democratic, independent, unitary, and indivisible state.

Article 21: National sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the people. The nation of Afghanistan consists of all those individuals who hold the citizenship of the

state of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The Word Afghan shall apply to each and every individual of the Nation of Afghanistan.

Article 22: The religion of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. Those citizens who are not followers of Islam shall be free to perform their religious rites within the limits determined by the laws relating to public decency and public peace.

Article 38: Freedom of thought and expression are inviolable. Every afghan has the right to express his through speech, writing, pictures, or similar means, in accordance with the provisions of the law. Permission and the right to establish printing houses, and issue publications, shall be granted only to citizens of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The establishment of large Printing houses and the establishment and operation of public Radio and television transmitters are the exclusive right of the State.

Article 40: For the reflection of social demands and for the political education of the people of Afghanistan, until such time as this aspiration is realized and attains its natural maturity, the one party system led by the hezb-e-enqelab-e-meli national revolution party), which is the founder and vanguard of the popular and progressive revolution of saratan 26, of the Year 1352 of the people of Afghanistan, will prevail in the Country.

(Source: <http://www.afghangovernment.com/Constitution1976.htm>)

APPENDIX E

**TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
ALEXEI KOSIGIN AND NUR MOHAMMED TARAHI (17 or 18 MARCH
1979)**

**Transcript of Telephone Conversation
Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin
and Afghan Prime Minister Nur
Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979**

Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

Taraki: The situation is bad and getting worse.

Kosygin: Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, the petty bourgeoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?

Taraki: There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans - follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by this.

Kosygin: Are there many workers there?

Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

Kosygin: What are the prospects?

Taraki: We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

Kosygin: Do you not have the forces to rout them?

Taraki: I wish it were the case.

Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-

als on this issue?

Taraki: We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

Kosygin: It is a very complex matter.

Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working against us, according to the same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the revolution.

Kosygin: The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance.

Kosygin: We must hold consultations on this issue. Do you not have connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

Taraki: Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kushka and from the direction of Kabul. In our view, no one will be any the wiser. They will think these are Government troops.

Kosygin: I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

Taraki: I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

Taraki: Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

Kosygin: Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

Taraki: The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students,

and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

Kosygin: We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. We have also decided to deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from \$21 per cubic meter to \$37.

Taraki: That is very good, but let us talk of Herat. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is anything to go by, it is clear that it is easy to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

Kosygin: You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but, irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you.

Taraki: Send us infantry fighting vehicles by air.

Kosygin: Do you have anyone to drive them?

Taraki: We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles.

Kosygin: Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the language.

Taraki: Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language—Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Kosygin: I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

[The first page has a hand-written footnote: At the Central Committee Politburo's sitting on 19 March, Comrade Kosygin read the transcript of these conversations in the presence of Central Committee secretaries.]

[Source: Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian, "Special File" program,

(Source: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html>)