

Party Discipline Problem
In The Social Democratic Populist Party

A Thesis
Submitted to the Department of
Political Science and Public Administration

Of
Sakant University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master Of Arts

By Haldun Çancı

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tarafından bağışlanmıştır.

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
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Prof. Dr. Metin Heper




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ABSTRACT

The performance of a political party mainly depends on its party organization, ideology and electoral support. In this connection, party discipline can be counted as an independent variable of party performance. However, party discipline may be affected by various factors, such as party structure, political culture, governmental structure.

This study examines the anti-disciplinary behaviors and attitudes in the SDPP in 1988-1992 period by giving emphasis to the party structure.

In the light of the content analysis of the party discipline cases in the SDPP as appeared in Turkish daily press between 1988-1992, we can classify main sources of violations of party discipline as follows:

- (a) The leadership struggle;
- (b) The ideological/factional differentiations;
- (c) The Kurdish problem.

OZET

Bir siyasal partinin basarisini esas olarak partinin orgut yapisi, ideolojisi ve secmen destegi ile ilgilidir. Bu baglamda, parti disiplini parti basarisini olcmeye bagimsiz bir degisken olarak kabul edilebilir. Bununla birlikte parti disiplini parti yapisi, siyasal kultur, hukumet yapisi gibi bircok faktor tarafından etkilenebilir.

Bu calisma 1988-1992 doneminde SHP'de disiplin disidavranis ve tavirlari parti yapisini esas alarak incelemektedir.

1988-1992 doneminde basina yansiyan disiplin disidavranislara iliskin olaylari muhteva analizi isiginda, SHP'deki disiplin ihlallerinin baslica sebeplerini su sekilde siralayabiliriz:

- (a) Liderlik mucadelesi;
- (b) Ideoloji/hizip farklilasmalari; ve
- (c) Kurt sorunu.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Political parties, as indispensable elements of a democratic political system, perform several important functions that help the political system survive. These include linkage with other institutions, aggregation of interest, political socialization and so on.¹

The importance of political parties becomes clearer in developing countries. In the absence of other associations/institutions, political parties play a critical role in the modernization process of these countries. Thus, political parties and their performance have become a popular area of interest for social scientists.

The performance of a political party mainly depends on its party organization, ideology and electoral support.

In this connection, party discipline can be counted as an independent variable of party performance. The concept of party discipline, many times, has been confused with the terms party cohesion and party unity.² According to Ranney and Kendall, party cohesion (or party unity) can be described as "the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group's goals in one and the same way"³

On the other hand, the concept of party discipline may denote two meanings: (a) the cohesion which is structured and maintained by the obedience of group members to leader and to his decisions, and (b) the existence of some forceful

mechanisms and methods in the hands of the leader in order to provide the obedience of the group members vis-a-vis his decisions.⁴

In other words, party discipline can be regarded as a special type of cohesion. But party cohesion, in general, may be achieved by many other mechanisms, in the absence of discipline, such as by ideological unity, intra-party solidarity and consensus.⁵ Therefore, the aim of party discipline is to achieve the intra-party cohesion. But the existence of party cohesion in a party does not necessarily require the existence of party discipline. In the absence of cohesion within a party, we can not mention about the existence of party discipline. Contrary to this, in the absence of party discipline we may still speak of party cohesion.⁶

Given the fact that the discipline and the solidarity are the two main sources of party cohesion, we must evaluate them from different perspectives.

Obviously, definition of party discipline by Ranney and Kendall stresses the concept of leadership and the obedience to the leader. Those who may not be satisfied with this definition may raise the following argument: In most parties, the party discipline is identified with the obedience to the group decisions or to the strictly defined party rules and regulations, but not to the leader himself. However, since the group decisions and the party rules and regulations are applied by the leader or by the leadership cadre, in the last analysis the obedience to the group

decisions and the party rules can be understood as obeying⁷ the leadership position. Therefore in this study the concept of party discipline, in general, refers to the obedience to the decisions of the leadership cadre within a party organization.

On the other hand, in terms of the intra-party democracy, one can claim that, the existence of the strong disciplinary arrangements do not necessarily lead to the absence of intra-party democracy within a political party. Moreover, the presence of the intra-party democracy does not create a contradiction with party discipline. Furthermore,⁸ both of them can be present within a party coincidentally. Besides, it can be argued that intra-party democracy strengthens the party discipline in some respects. According to this argumentation, for example, the election of the leader in a democratic way makes his authority legitimate in the eyes of the party members. And this helps⁹ the establishment of the party discipline.

According to the party discipline variable, we can classify the political parties into two categories: (a) highly disciplined; and, (b) not so highly disciplined¹⁰ political parties. If a political party creates a strictly defined controlling mechanisms over some actions of its members, either through the domination of the leader or the suppression of certain commissions and the whips of the party within the limits of commonly legitimized and clearly defined disciplinary regulations, it can be identified within the

former category. Whereas if a party leaves their members free of their actions, it can be defined within the latter. As it was noted by Ozbudun, European socialist parties can be given as an example to the former category while the American political parties are the best examples of the latter.¹¹

But of course, such a general classification is not sufficient to understand why there are so much different perceptions and practices of discipline within various parties of the democratic world. In order to explain this phenomenon, it will be better to search for the different formations and their impacts on party discipline.

1. STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PARTY DISCIPLINE

Various factors which surround a political party may influence the degree of party discipline. According to Ozbudun those factors can be classified into four main headings:

- (1) Party Structure;
- (2) Governmental Structure;
- (3) Social Structure;
- (4) Political Culture.¹²

(1) PARTY STRUCTURE: Party structure is one of the most important factors of party discipline and was generally advanced by Maurice Duverger.¹³ According to this argument, the party structure and its effects on the party discipline can be identified by analysing two main aspects of party structure; first, the power of the party organization, and second the typology of the party organizations.¹⁴ We will

discuss those aspects of party structure and their impact on party discipline below (p.6)

(2) GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE: Governmental structure affects the party discipline by its various dimensions. Firstly, election systems are essential for party discipline. Since the proportional representation and party list methods make the party members (or candidates) depend on the party administration, they lead to strong party discipline. However the single name method causes a weak disciplinary structure, because in this method the party candidates are more autonomous from party organizations.¹⁵

Moreover, the system of government, federal or unitary, may also influence the degree of party discipline. In federal system weak party discipline is expectable because of the creation of local interest groups conflicting with each other both within the parliament and within mass parties. However, this does not mean that the unitary systems always favour strong party discipline, and federal system inevitably causes weak party discipline.¹⁶

Furthermore, political system is also essential for party discipline. In parliamentary system, vote of confidence is a necessary condition for coming to and preserving power. Therefore, each party should have a strong party discipline in order to come to power. However, in a presidential system the election of the president does not depend on the parliament, the deputies are freer in their actions. This leads to less party discipline within both the

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parliament and the parties in the system.

(3) SOCIAL STRUCTURE: The most important aspect of social structure, which is effective on the party discipline, is the stratification of the social classes and the existence of the parties of working class. And it is the reality that, in the parties of working class there is a strong party discipline throughout the world.¹⁸

The existence of the stratification among the social classes may cause an extreme party system in which political parties may have strong party discipline. However, if there is a less stratified party system, there may be a tendency towards the weaker discipline in political parties.

(4) POLITICAL CULTURE: According to Dowse and Hughes, "political culture is the product of the history of both political system and the individual members of the system, and, thus, is rooted in public events and private experience."¹⁹ Whereas Ozbudun states that political culture is a component of the general culture, and it is concerned with those parts of the general culture such as state administration and the goals of the state. On the other hand the main components of political culture are values, believes and the emotional tendencies within the general culture.²⁰

a. PARTY STRUCTURE AND PARTY DISCIPLINE

Party structure is the only internal factor affecting the party discipline. In this regard, power of party organization and the type of party can be counted as the main

determining factors.

(a) The Power of the Party Organization: According to Duverger's 'organization pressure theory', the powerful party organizations (which are the party organizations out of parliament, that is "caucus", local party organizations) create a controlling mechanism on the deputies and therefore cause a high party discipline.²¹ But according to Ozbudun, as it was proved by many examples, powerful local party organizations may not necessarily cause a high discipline. It may even be just the opposite. Referring Ranney's argument, Ozbudun states that, deputies' loyalty to a local-level party organization, does not necessarily strengthen his or her loyalty to the national-level party leadership. On the contrary, sometimes this local-level party loyalty may necessitate a disloyalty at the national level. As a matter of fact, in some countries party leaders have suffered from the pressures of the local party organizations over the deputies, as a source of intra-party disunity, for example in the Australian Labour Party. But in European context there are many examples which prove that in the absence of 'caucus' pressures a party can establish a strong party discipline. For example, British Labour and Conservative Parties, French MRP, Italian Christian Democrat Party, German Social Democratic Party can be given as the best examples of this phenomenon.²²

(b) The Typology of Party Organizations: According to Duverger's classification, party discipline in totalitarian

parties is very strong; in the parties of social and democratic integration it is strong; and in the parties of individual representation it is weak. But again Ozbudun argues that those generalizations can not contain all of the circumstances. For example, in Britain, in Commonwealth countries, and in Scandinavia, although political parties are the typical individual representation parties, they have a very strong party discipline. Consequently, it is obvious that, the presence of an integrative organization and ideology within a party strenghtens the party discipline, but this is neither an absolute nor the only condition of it.²³

b. TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM AND THE PARTY DISCIPLINE

Multi-party period in Turkish politics began in 1946, and developed in the 1950s. In the 1960s there was the two-party system where the RPP and the JP were the two major parties.²⁴ It is argued that, although their organizational characteristics had a tendency to create a weak disciplinary formation, because of their organization as a cadre party, Turkish political parties fall into the category of disciplined parties for the period between 1946-1970.²⁵

According to Ozbudun, the reason for this situation is the existence in the Turkish context, of, (1) a parliamentary regime (although it is sometimes partially) dominated by a two-party system; (2) competition among the parties; and, (3) some features of Turkish political culture. As we have noted above in the parliamentary regime the strong party discipline is very important. Because, if you lose the

discipline in your party during the roll-calls in a parliament, you will lose your power there too. The same situation is valid in the Turkish case. Under the domination of two major parties for many years, the Turkish parliamentary regime led to a strong party discipline.

Moreover, the existence of an intense competition among the parties has been another aspect of the Turkish context. Despite the weakness of the ideological polarization, there has been a very strong inter-party competition. In such circumstance, obedience to the party decisions becomes very important and discipline violations are not tolerated.

Finally some features of Turkish political culture such as, the Islamic tradition of obedience to the legitimate authority, which is inherited from the pre-republican period, became another reason of strong party discipline in Turkish political parties.²⁶

In the 1970s a multi-party system was the key feature of Turkish politics. In this period although many other small parties were established by the 1973 elections, still the RPP and the JP dominated the system. However, the existence of the small parties caused the fractionalization of the electorate, since each party tried to maximize the ideological distance between itself and others.²⁷

During this period, three important destabilising factors affected the Turkish party system. They were the volatility; fragmentation; and polarization.²⁸

This structural features affected all party organizations. Fractionalization and polarization processes

took place even within the political parties. For example, the RPP, after the leadership of Ecevit, began to move to the center-left side of the political spectrum. This transformation process was not achieved without intra-party strife. Considerable number of deputies left the RPP in order to establish a new party, by critisizing the RPP moving "too far to the left".²⁹ This was the first appeareance of the factional divisions within Turkish social democracy.

Another important feature of the Turkish party system, which led to the formation of factions within the political parties , was the tendency of the leaders to stay in their position regardless of his political performance. This caused the challenge to the leadership position by variuos party members creating a source for the existence of various intra-party factions.³⁰

Following the third military intervention of September 12, 1980 the Turkish party system changed to a greater extent. Although the party system structure of the 1970s greatly influenced the party system in the 1980s, the parties that were opened in this period were organized under the control and great pressure of the military regime.³¹ Since the NSC used its veto power against unwanted persons in the establishment process of the political parties, Social Democratic Party (SODEP) under the leadership of Erdal Inonu, was one of the principal victims of this procedure. It could not participate in the 1983 national elections with many other new parties as a result of these vetoes. This situation

also affected the organizational structure of the political parties. Loose party organizations, affecting the issues of party cohesion and party discipline, were the common characteristics of the Turkish party system in this period under the absence of strong leadership and organizational authority.³²

But there were some exceptional cases within this context. For example, The Motherland Party appeared as a cohesive party organization, because the MP was an "important beneficiary from the demise of the military-sponsored parties, so that Ozal did not enforce the law."³³ This helped the organizational process of the MP, under the strong leadership of Ozal.

But the SDPP, as a successor of the RPP, which was a political party of the pre-1980 period, had to leave its RPP originned founders and members in order to stay as a party organization. This was another dimension of the fragmentation in Turkish social democracy. Since it tried to cover all parts of the Turkish left, from the extreme leftist groups to the Kurdish origin cliques, new cliques and factions became inevitable for the SDPP.

Since the political context that has presented a fertile ground for the emergence of the SDPP was really a product of special conditions structured by the 1980 military coup,³⁴ it can be claimed that the SDPP is a sui-generis political party which does not reflect the same structural features with that of the RPP and with the other parties of Turkish political tradition, especially in terms

of its intra-party unity.

2. PARTY DISCIPLINE AND THE SDPP

The SDPP appeared on the Turkish political scene through the merger in 1985 of two political parties; The Social Democratic Party (SODEP) and the Populist Party (PP). The first SDPP congress was held at the end of May 1986 and Erdal Inonu was elected as party leader.³⁵

Although the merger created a positive impact on the public as a serious threat to the ruling Motherland Party, the turmoil which was a characteristic of the PP continued to erode the parliamentary strength of the SDPP. Even on controversial issues, the SDPP deputies failed to block or even stall the Motherland Party.

Splits in the SDPP continued and the Democratic Left Party (DLP) was able to establish a parliamentary group with deputies who resigned from the SDPP. This caused the split in the votes of the center-left in the 1987 general elections.

In addition to its struggle with the DLP, the party had its own internal problems. Its new deputies, elected in primaries, had different approaches to Turkey's problem and how to go about implementing social democratic principles.

Although the inner turmoil in the SDPP led Inonu to resign from his office as well as from the parliament on February 28, 1988, he was convinced that he should stay.

The final event that had brought about Inonu's resignation was the dispute on the Kurdish issue within the party. Mehmet Ali Eren, Istanbul deputy, in an off the

agenda parliamentary address on February 25, 1988 said that the law of the land was applied differently in the west and in the east of Turkey and that the existence of Turks of Kurdish origin had always been rejected. In other words, the SDPP has consistently presented the image of a party driven by factions.

It is argued that those intra-party oppositions, conflicts and divisions help the creation of a negative image of the party as being a problematic organization. And, therefore those problems are probably the fundamental reasons for the loss of the party's credit and supportance in the eyes of the Turkish voters, which was the case in the last general elections of 1991.³⁶

Through this feature of the party, it is interesting to design a reseach project on the topic of 'party discipline' in the SDPP. What are the reasons for the anti-disciplinary behavior in the SDPP ? Is it caused by weak leadership structure?, or is it related with the intra-party struggle to come to power among the intra-party factions? Whether or not the organizational misformations cause this situation? Is it really related with the existence of "extensive" intra-party democracy in the SDPP?³⁷ Or, is the definition of the concept of party discipline different in the SDPP than the traditionally leader-dominated political parties of Turkish politics? And can it be the combination of all those factors which cause the problem of discipline in the SDPP?.

As we have mentioned above, the SDPP is a successor of

the RPP in terms of its political tradition, and the SDPP is being governed by nearly the same regulations like the RPP.³⁸ Moreover, some parts of the factional divisions within the SDPP are inherited from the RPP structure. But the party discipline and the intra-party democracy issues were not so much problematic in the RPP as it is the case now in the SDPP, at least in terms of their negative effects on the image of the party.

In order to make this argument clear, firstly we must look at the RPP case. As Bektas noted, although the RPP tried to provide a democratic outlook in the last decades of its life, both the effects of the single-party period and strong leader authority made it difficult to develop intra-party democracy within the party.³⁹ She also claims that, "after 1970, the party's inner structure was modified by taking the Western mass parties as model. So, the only effective body in determining party politics and making day-to-day decisions turned out to be the central executive office. RPP realised intra-party democracy only from time to time. Intra-party democracy has not become an enduring characteristics of the RPP."⁴⁰

On the other hand, in terms of party discipline, although there were some marginal violations of discipline in various times, this strong leadership authority and the effects of the single-party period traditions created a disciplinary structure within the party. Therefore when we compare it with the present SDPP, even

though the party discipline would be stronger in the RPP in comparison to its successor, the SDPP has inherited at least the factional structure in the absence of strong leadership. It is just an output of a trend which took place in the transformation process of Turkish social democracy.⁴¹

According to our initial observation from the written sources, the structural variables such as leadership; party ideology and programme; and policy issues and ethnical groups are seen to be the main factors of discipline violations within the SDPP. Because when we search for the establishment period of the SDPP from the media, the structural variables, especially party ideology and the structure of party organization were very influential, despite the vetoes, on the determination of leader. Therefore it will be more explanatory to examine the impact of the leadership struggle on the party discipline within the party's structural context. In other words, what kinds of features of the structure of party organization influence the party discipline? Are they the norms, that are present within the party programme and party by-law, which are structured by eclectic and contraversial world views,⁴² cause a loose disciplinary structure in the party? Or, does the ideology of the party causes this situation?⁴³

In order to give answer to those questions we should elaborate those 'structural variables' for the SDPP context.

(1) Content of the party programme (ideology) and by-law: In the SDPP party programme and by-law there are a lot of contradictory arguments. At least, for example, in various

parts of party programme both pro-etatist arguments and the views supporting the free market mechanisms are mentioned, simultaneously, as the ideology of the party.⁴⁴ This situation reflects the eclectic aspect of the SDPP ideology. Moreover, there is also a contradiction between the party ideology, which is presented in party programme and by-law, and the party's daily practices. This contradictory and eclectic structure of the party ideology may contribute to the emergence of factions and therefore the weak party discipline in the SDPP. For example, in the party by-law, concepts such as, 'freedom', 'pluralism', and 'participatory democracy'⁴⁵ are announced as the aims of the SDPP.

In Turkish political culture, where the leader's domination and the obedience to the leader's decisions are the leading tradition in the structure of the Turkish political parties throughout the republican period, those kinds of themes may lead to anti-disciplinary behaviours in a political party.

Although intra-party democracy and party discipline concepts are not contrary to each other, in Turkish political context those kinds of notions of intra-party democracy such as, 'freedom', 'pluralism', and 'participatory democracy', may be perceived as polyphony and as signs of the lack of intra-party unity. And then this may cause anti-disciplinary behaviours.

(2) Impact of the Factions and Cliques: To what extent the ideological structure of the party reflects itself in the

creation of factions within the party? And then, of course, what are the roles of those factions in the existence of intra-party disunity and then the party discipline problems?

As we mentioned earlier, the turmoil was the common characteristics of the social democratic parties. In this context, the SDPP presented the image of the party divided into factions. Following the lifting of the political bans on former politicians, Deniz Baykal and his colleagues from the RPP joined forces against the party's Populist Party flank. They began to advocate the need for the SDPP to become RPP, while a group of deputies, mainly from the eastern parts of Turkey as well as those with trade unionist background rejected this inclination. They formed a Kurdish clique within the party as being one of the most important factors of discipline violations. They said that the SDPP should strive to become a social democratic party in the most contemporary sense. And as a consequence of their radical attitudes they decided to leave the SDPP and form another party organization, namely, the People's Labor Party (PLP) in the 1991.

The other group is known as the "left wing" of the SDPP. They have been charged of allowing the "far left" and "separatist" views to infiltrate the party. On these accounts we can classify the intra-party factions in the SDPP since its establishment as follows:

(a) Inonu Group (the majority of the Central Executive Committee);

(b) Baykal Group (the new-left group);

- (c) People's Labour Party Group (PLP);
- (d) Renewal Social Democrats;
- (e) Some Other Marginals;

Each of these groups has its own whips, but in general, they are not very much successful in preventing the violations of discipline. The administrative power struggle of Baykal group and the separationist movements of the PLP group create special crucial discipline problems, within and outside the party.

3. METHODOLOGY

As Ergun Ozbudun mentions there are various methods to measure the party discipline. One of the most important indicators of the party discipline, the party cohesion, can be measured by (a) the concept of 'party vote', (b) the index of party cohesion,⁴⁷ (c) the index of party loyalty.

According to Ozbudun, especially the third method; the index of party loyalty, is also helpful in studying the party discipline. Because we can use this method as a roll-call analysis in order to describe the behaviour of an individual representative on a large number of roll-calls. So, this index may indicate the presence or the absence of party discipline⁴⁸ within a party.

Moreover Ozbudun states that in order to measure the "issue consensus" among the party members, the opinion surveys are also useful. Besides, the concept of "negative causation" can be used in order to measure the party cohesion.⁴⁹

In this study, our purpose is to describe the causes of the anti-disciplinary behaviours and attitudes in the SDPP.

In doing this, we intend to shed light on the relationship between the ideological distinctions, which are motivated by the leadership and the power struggles, affecting some of the structural variables, such as, the establishment of the party organization, and contributing to the emergence of the factions and cliques within the party, and the party discipline in the SDPP.

In describing the causes of the anti-disciplinary

behavior and attitudes in the SDPP , we will rest our analysis on the following propositions:

- (1) The more the number of ideological factions in a party the more violation of party discipline occurs.
- (2) Issue dissension may create divisions and eventually anti-disciplinary behaviour.

To test these propositions, we will use historically available data based on the Turkish daily newspapers namely Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Hurriyet, Gunes, Tercuman, Turkiye. We will try to analyze and classify the content of those written materials which refer to the anti-disciplinary behaviours and attitudes in the SDPP 1988 (after the 1987 general elections) and the spring 1992 (before the significant local elections).

Naturally using secondary data , such as news in mass media may mislead the researcher. Here we may face with the "subjectivity problem" which creates validity and reliability issues. To overcome these issues , we cross-checked the content of news from different newspapers.

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- (30)Turan, Party System in Post-1983, p.65.
- (31)O.Faruk Genckaya, 'The Impact of Organizational Attributes on Legislative Performance A Structural-Functional Analysis of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 1983-1987', Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Bogazici Univ., Istanbul, Turkey, 1990. pp.32-38.
- (32)Ibid., pp.47-49.
- (33)Ibid., p.49.
- (34)Ibid., pp.39-52.
- (35)See for a unique analysis of the social and economic background of the SDPP, Andrew Mango, "The Social Democratic Populist Party," in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau eds., Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988)
- (36)Cevdet Selvi, Milliyet, 24 Ekim 1991.
- (37)But as we have argued above, the existence of intra-party democracy is not an obstacle to the existence of party discipline.
- (38)The party by-laws of both parties contain the similar norms , especially in terms of the construction of party discipline organization and rules.

- (39) Bektas, Organizational Characteristics.. :RPP and JP, p.139.
- (40) Ibid., pp.139-140.
- (41) Genckaya, ...the Grand National Assembly of Turkey..., pp.32-55.
- (42) In order to see those contradictions please look at my presented term paper; 'An Analysis of Party Programme and Regulation: SDPP', (Spring 1992), for POLS 537, Dr.Genckaya, pp.2-10.
- (43) That is, whether or not being a social democratic party requires such a weak disciplinary structure?. But when we look at the European social democratic parties, having a loose disciplinary structure is not a general tendency throughout the Europe. So here it can be asked that, to what extent the SDPP is a social democratic party in European sense? Is it a "class" oriented social democratic party (as it was the case in European context) or is it a catch-all party that tries to cover all parts of the society? etc.
- Those kinds of questions are important for identifying the ideological background of the SDPP. So it will be easy to measure whether or not there is a relationship between the loose disciplinary structure and the party ideology in the SDPP. (For more detailed discussion, see conclusion chapter).
- (44) Canci, An Analysis of Party Programme and Regulation: SDPP, pp. 2-10.

(45)The Regulation (By-law) of the SDPP, Ankara, 1990.
p.3-4.

(46)Some of those the PLP origin deputies, because of their different views about the Southeast policies of the party, have re-signed from the SDPP in April 1992. Another small group have presented their resignation in May 1992. But some of the PLP origined deputies are still remaining within the party. So this means that in the SDPP, the PLP clique still exists, though it is weaker than before.

(47)Ergun Ozbudun , 'Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis',Comparative Politics Series, 1 (1970): 303-381, p.306

(48)Ibid., p.307

(49)Ibid., p.308

CHAPTER II

FINDINGS

1. CAUSES OF VIOLATION OF PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE SDPP

The SDPP, as a product of the transition period following the September 12, 1980 coup, has been living with some organizational and/or structural problems, such as leadership, factional divisions, and ideological unclarity. Also, the SDPP became a less-disciplined parliamentary party, in terms of the distribution of roll-calls in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in recent Turkish politics.¹ Anti-disciplinary tendencies were also observed in the behaviors and attitudes of the SDPP's members outside the parliament. In order to describe the causes of anti-disciplinary behavior in the SDPP, we will present our findings under two sub-headings. Under the first heading, the causes and effects of the struggle among various intra-party factions, which were also the supporters of the different ideological formations will be analysed. Then, the causes and effects of the struggles about the various issues will be our major concern. In the discussion of the latter, the Kurdish issue and the anti-disciplinary behaviors of the Kurdish clique within the SDPP will be emphasized because of its currency and its importance both within the party and at the national level.

a. STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP: DIVISIONS AND UNITIES IN THE SDPP

In the SDPP the anti-disciplinary behaviours are mainly motivated by the intra-party competitions over coming to power among the factions within the party. Each clique and their members generally have a tendency to violate the party unity, when they are in the opposition within the party. And this conflict among the intra-party factions is generally concretized as a struggle between the Baykal group and the others.

Before describing the power struggle within the party we will briefly describe the intra-party factions of the SDPP.

At the very beginning, the Baykal clique, which is relatively towards the right within the SDPP, generally competed with the left wing clique which consisted of some famous names within the party, such as Aydin Guven Gurban, Fikri Saglar, Ercan Karakas, Kemal Anadol, Abdullah Basturk, I. Hakki Onal, Cuneyt Canver and some Kurdish-originated members of the party (later those members resigned from the party and established the People's Labor Party.)

In 1988, besides the Inonu group, Baykal clique and the left-wing, there were some other marginal factions within the party. For example Ismail Cem group and the 'renewal' group under the leadership of Ertugrul Gunay were² the political groups challenging the party administration. As the leading member of the new-left social democratic ideology,³ Ismail Cem tried to secure a base within the party organization. But he failed in the second general

party congress.⁴ In this congress there were three lists by three fundamental cliques: Inonu, Baykal and the left-wing lists. In this congress Inonu took 710 votes, whereas the votes that Ismail Cem took, was only 151. While Inonu was preserving his leadership position,⁵ the Baykal group secured the majority in the party assembly and the other administrative organs of the party. Deniz Baykal was also elected as the general secretary of the party.⁶

On the other hand, the renewal group of Ertugrul Gunay supported various groups involved, in various times, in the power struggle within the SDPP. And they chose the way of making some revisions and innovations in the social democratic ideology of the party in accordance with the requirements of the recent global transformations in the world.

By the end of 1988, the left-wing faction within the party was divided into two,⁷ the Kurdish originned members,⁸ and the others, and remained in opposition.

After this division, the Kurdish origin party members began to emerge as another intra-party faction and as an important cause of violation of party discipline. Since we will examine the party discipline crisis which was led by this clique, in the next session of this chapter, now, we will briefly mention about the ideological formation and the important members of this faction.

The Kurdish clique within the SDPP generally consisted of South-eastern originned deputies and the party members. The cultural autonomy, the welfare of the region, the

official or unofficial pressures over the Kurdish language and the people of the region were the main issues of their political discourse. By the end of the 1988 the leading names of this clique were Ibrahim Aksoy, Ahmet Turk, Adnan Ekmen, M. Ali Eren, Kenan Sonmez, I. Hakki Onal, Mahmut Alinak, Fehmi Isiklar, Salih Sumer, and Arif Sag.

The struggle between these intra-party factions and anti-disciplinary attitudes continued increasingly and the number of dismissals and resignments intensified in 1989.⁹

Dismissals of some of the local party organizations, which belonged to one clique by the other clique when it was in power was a usual phenomenon in the SDPP. For example, in January 12, 1988 the party organization of Icel province which belonged to the Baykal group, was dismissed by the party's general secretary Fikri Saglar.¹⁰ The fundamental reasons for the Saglar's decision were the active support by Icel organization for Baykal and their rejection of the present party administration.

But nearly two months later, after the resignation of Saglar from the party and the end of the influence of the left-wing in the administrative cadres, the party organization of Adana province, which was under the domination of the left-wing, was dismissed from their office by the new party administration, because of the same reasons that were valid in the dismissal of Icel organization.¹¹

Upon these developments, the main conflict occurred between the dominant Baykal group and the left-wing group in

the early months of the year 1989.¹² This period was, more or less, the beginning of the unavoidable dismissals and the resignations of the members of the left-wing by virtue of the pressure of Baykal group and their disharmony with the party center.¹³

At this point, it is interesting to note that each dismissed and resigned party member declared his critical views about the administrative staff of the party in the press.¹⁴ Those critical speeches appeared as one of the most important dimensions of the party discipline issue in the SDPP.

Even in the European democracies, writing critical letters and articles in the press and making critical speeches outside the parliaments are two of the main breaches of party discipline.¹⁵ Those kinds of breaches were usual phenomena for the SDPP. For example, on May 24, 1988, the left-wing presented a declaration to the press by accusing the administrative staff of the central executive, for their factious tendencies.¹⁶

As response to this declaration, the Baykal group and the Inonu group presented another declaration by claiming that the party was suffering from the extreme Marxist and socialist attitudes of some of the left-wing members. Afterwards Inonu warned the intra-party factions to stop their extreme behaviours.¹⁷

Especially the speeches of the left-wing leader, Aydin Guven Gurkan, to press, were the main sources of the breaches of the party discipline. In his speeches which

directly accused the party leader, he argued that the party leader allowed Baykal to reshape the SDPP and party administrative organizations as a center right party. On the other, Baykal established the domination of only one clique¹⁸ in those organizations.

In Spring 1989, due to the increasing oppositional statements appeared in the press, the party center tried to use the Central Disciplinary Committee(CDC) as a threat for the rebellious party members and organizations. Inonu and Baykal stated that they would not hesitate to use the CDC in¹⁹ order to repress the anti-disciplinary approaches.

The selection of the candidates for the 1989 local elections by the pre-election method in the SDPP became another problem between the left-wing members and the party center. The left-wing members of the party protested the determination of their candidacy by this method and made a critical speech to the press, by claiming that the aim of the new party organization was to eliminate the leftist candidates by virtue of the pre-election method in the county and province party organizations where the Baykal clique²⁰ members were dominant.

In April 1989, Baykal group decided to change the party by-law. Their aim was to adopt and reshape the party by-law in accordance with their initiatives. This caused a very big reaction of the leftists and some other members of Inonu group. Later those groups called for an extra-ordinary²¹ party congress.

Moreover, 28 of the left-wing deputies while rejecting Baykal's suggestions over the change of the party by-law, gave an ultimatum to the party leader, Inonu.²² In this ultimatum they tried to make Inonu secure the party from the factious tendencies of Baykal and prevent the adoption of the new by-law through the initiative of Baykal clique. But they were not successful in preventing the adoption of the by-law by Baykal group. On April 10, 1989 despite the opposite votes of the left-wing party members, the adoption of by-law²³ was approved by the party organization. But the debates on the new by-law of the party continued as an important discipline issue within the party throughout the year.²⁴ For example, some of the local party organizations such as Icel-Tarsus, Kucukcekmece, Sisli, Batman, Sirnak, and Eruh party organizations were dismissed from the party because of their opposing attitudes towards the newly made party by-law.²⁵

In May 1989, these developments led the left-wing members to force the party center to organize an extraordinary party congress in order to let the delegates discuss the last by-law adoption and the increasing domination of Baykal clique.²⁶

This demand of the left-wing members was accepted by the party center, and the SDPP's fourth extra-ordinary party congress was gathered on June 4, 1989 in order to discuss the by-law adoption.²⁷ In this congress the left-wing members tried to abolish the new by-law by virtue of the delegates' votes. However, the delegates also approved the new by-law

initiated by Baykal. This was a reflection of the continuing support of the party members to the present party administration. And this was another victory of Baykal clique against the left-wing.²⁸

Just after the fourth extra-ordinary congress, the defeated left-wing divided into various groups. And even some of the left-wing deputies tried to make their relations better with the Baykal clique, too.²⁹ But another group of 10 deputies chose the way of resignation from the party by criticising the center, on the grounds that the present initiatives on the whole party organization amounted to violating the party discipline.³⁰ Other left wing members decided to preserve their position within the party and continue their struggle with Baykal clique within the party.³¹

Although general secretary Baykal, just after the fourth extra-ordinary congress, has secured the future of the left-wing members within the party, he changed his mind because of the changing attitudes of those people. Initially he forced the vice general secretary Cevdet Selvi to resign from his office.³² Meanwhile Baykal group was trying to make their domination stronger in the province party organizations one by one. These developments faced an overwhelming opposition from the remaining left-wing.³³

Even some of the left-wing party members claimed the idea that the SDPP transformed into a faction party by the domination of Baykal group, and this would lead the party to

become smaller than before, and that the resignation of the members of opposing factions would continue as long as the Baykal dominated.³⁴ Even some of the pro-left-wing province party organizations adopted those arguments by giving advertisements to the daily newspapers.³⁵

As a response, on September 11, 1989, Baykal group dismissed 7 of the province party organizations, and replaced them with the pro-Baykal party members. According to them those kinds of attitudes of the left-wing members were harmful for the party discipline and giving advertisement to the newspapers was a breach of party discipline.³⁶

This caused a very big reaction of the left-wing clique. Some of the clique members chose a refractory action by accusing Baykal and the party center, for their decision, and by resigning from their offices.³⁷ Faced with these reactions, on October 1989, Baykal clique became more radical and continued to dismiss some of the province party organizations, such as Adana and Tokat.³⁸

b. EMERGENCE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE

Until now we have tried to show the reflections of the struggle among the intra-party factions in the SDPP. But the most important party discipline crisis in the SDPP was the dismissals and/or the resignations of the Kurdish originated party members from the party.

The first concrete manifestation of this party discipline issue took place in January 1989. Mr. Ibrahim Aksoy, Malatya deputy, while critisizing the anti-

democratic attitudes in the SDPP, stressed the idea of cultural autonomy of the Kurdish people in the Strasbourg joint parliamentary commission meeting of the European Council. His speech in Strasbourg was considered as a serious breach of party discipline by the party center. And he was sent to the disciplinary committee for dismissal from the party.³⁹ On February 7, 1989 the SDPP's CDC decided to dismiss him temporarily from the party for 2 years. But he, by protesting the decision of the disciplinary committee,⁴⁰ appealed to the administrative court. But this application did not change the SDPP CDC's decision.

Meanwhile a more serious party discipline issue erupted in the SDPP. A group of the Kurdish originned left-wing deputies joined the Kurdish Congress which was held in Paris on October 14-15, 1989. Before their departure to Paris Inonu warned those Kurdish deputies by calling their attention to the potential reactions of the Turkish public for such a kind of action.⁴¹ As a matter of fact, responsible party organs forbid the joining of the Kurdish deputies to the Paris Kurdish Congress.⁴² Although some of the Kurdish deputies asked for permission for joining to the Kurdish Congress, their demand was rejected by Inonu himself.⁴³

Contrary to the SDPP's prohibition, a group of Kurdish originned deputies, Ahmet Turk, Adnan Ekmen, M. Ali Eren, Kenan Sonmez, I. Hakki Onal, Mahmut Alinak and Salih Sumer went to Paris in order to join the conference which was named⁴⁴, "Kurds, human rights and cultural identity." This

attitude caused a very big reaction both within the party and throughout the country.

Soon after, Inonu immediately called the central executive committee for a meeting about the last discipline crisis.⁴⁵ In the meeting of central executive committee on October 17, 1989, those Kurdish deputies were sent to the central disciplinary committee with the request of dismissal by the majority of the committee members.⁴⁶ Inonu was asked, by the so called left-wing party members, for a pardon of those Kurdish originned deputies, but he rejected this demand⁴⁷ decisively.

However, those seven Kurdish deputies declared that they were not penitent for their actions and they did not make a mistake and that the emergence of such a discipline crisis was the sin of the party center.⁴⁸ They claimed that the party center made a wrong decision by forbidding them to join the congress.

Besides those individual declarations, those 7 Kurdish deputies made a statement to the press on October 18, 1989, in which they claimed the idea that their action was not offensive and therefore there was no need to give them any punishment. However, some of the discipline committee members, for example, Mehmet Mirza Dogan, stated that, opposition to the decisions of the party leader was a disciplinary offense, and that therefore, sending them to the disciplinary committee was the correct⁴⁹ decision. However, some of the left-wing clique members such

as, Fuat Atalay, Omer Ciftci, Mehmet Mogultay, Fikri Saglar, Tevfik Kocak, Esref Erdem, Erdogan Yetenc, Hikmet Cetin, Abdulkadir Ates and Mehmet Kahraman still asked⁵⁰ Inonu for a lighter punishment. But this demand was also rejected by the party leader.

Meanwhile State Security Court (SSC) also began to investigate into those deputies who went to the Kurdish Congress in Paris.⁵¹ Those Kurdish originned deputies, M. Ali Eren, I. Hakki Onal, Salih Sumer, and Ibrahim Aksoy critisized the SDPP administration, on the grounds that it led to the SSC's investigation . They claimed that the party center unnecessarily increased the tension throughout the country and this issue was overemphasized by the Baykal⁵² clique especially.

Later, on November 5, seven accused Kurdish deputies gave their joint plea to the Central Executive Committee (CEC).⁵³ In this plea, they claimed that if the party disciplinary committee would dismiss any of them, this would damage not only the party unity but also the national⁵⁴ unity.

Even some of the Eastern-province party organizations threatened the party center that voter's support would decline, if the party disciplinary committee dismissed the seven Kurdish deputies from the party.⁵⁵ Moreover, those seven Kurdish deputies also decided to resign from the party⁵⁶ as another threat to the party center.

But those kinds of threats and anti-disciplinary behaviours were not welcomed by all of the left-wing party

members. The left wing divided into two groups, on November 13, 1989, as the supporters of the accused deputies and as the neutral ones.⁵⁷ Among these groups the-Progressive Patriotic Union- of the left-wing clique, which consisted of the radical leftist and Kurdish originned deputies was the leading one in the violation of the party discipline. They demonstrated their reaction by giving speeches to press, by cross-voting within the party organizations, and by not participating in the party's parliamentary group meetings.⁵⁸ On the other hand, some of the other left-wing clique members such as Vedat Altun, Erdal Kalkan, decided to join the Baykal group.⁵⁹

In the meantime, Inonu stated that, although these Kurdish originned deputies were valuable members of the party, in order to establish the discipline within the party they should be given a punishment. Because they not only spoiled the rules of the party discipline, but also gave rise to a national crisis. Therefore giving a disciplinary punishment to those deputies was closely related to the future of the party in Turkish politics.⁶⁰

Following these events, upon the meeting of the CDC on November 17, 1989,⁶¹ seven Kurdish origin deputies were dismissed, in accordance with the articles 79/a and 79/c of the party by-law. In the statement of reason, it was mentioned that those deputies infracted the rules and the decisions of the party programme and the by-law, and they violated the suggestions that were presented in the party

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congress.

These temporary dismissals of the Kurdish originated deputies from the SDPP led to boil up the main conflict between the Baykal clique and the left-wing. The left wing members accused the Baykal clique and the CEC of being undemocratic, unlike social democrats and of creating of 63 fragmentations between the Kurdish and the Turkish people.

Similarly, Ibrahim Aksoy , Malatya deputy , who was dismissed from the SDPP, compared the decisions of September 12,1980, and the SDPP party disciplinary committees' with regard to the similarity they showed in their 64 repressiveness.

Ertugrul Gunay , the leader of the 'renewal' clique, on the other hand, by critisizing the Baykal and Inonu groups, claimed that the SDPP under the domination of those groups and cliques, helped to continue the repressive 65 depolitization policies of the 1980 military coup.

In response, Inonu argued that those intra-party struggles negatively affected the image of the party in the eyes of the people. Therefore he warned the party members about the rules of the party discipline which were written in the party by-law. Inonu also claimed that the CDC had taken 66 the decision freely and it was right. And this decision of the CDC was not directed to the Kurdish people and the Kurdish issue. It was only a matter of intra-party 67 discipline.

The dismissals case led to some other crises too. For example, on November 22, 1989, seventeen deputies decided to

resign from the party, because of their distress within the party. Although their decision of resignation did not directly relate to the dismissal of the seven deputies, it played some role in this decision.⁶⁸

Soon, party organization of the 12 eastern provinces resigned from the party in order to protest the dismissals.⁶⁹ Besides, four deputies, Abdullah Basturk, Istanbul deputy, Fehmi Isiklar, Bursa deputy, Cuneyt Canver, Adana deputy and Ilhami Binici, Bingol deputy, resigned from the party by criticising the party administration, for its anti-democratic decisions.⁷⁰

Towards the end of November, the debate about the dismissals crisis slowed down. But the struggle among the cliques, through critical declarations made about each other, continued throughout the year.⁷¹

From another point of view, the left-wing leader, A. Guven Gurkan, stated that the reason of the intra-party divisions was the anti-democratic and the illegal attitudes of Inonu and Baykal cliques. This attitude of the party administration broke the dialogue within the party and this caused the intra-party polarization which led to the violation of party discipline.⁷²

Moreover, the chairman of the Istanbul province party organization, Ercan Karakas, claimed that the SDPP under the administration of Baykal and Inonu groups, weakened the confidence of the voters which would be the end of the Party.⁷³

Furthermore Kemal Anadol, Izmir deputy, argued that the present party discipline problem was as a consequence of the move of the Party from a social democratic stand to a rightist one. Therefore, according to him, those problems were not only related with the Kurdish problem but with the ideological transformations in the SDPP.⁷⁴

The struggle among the intra-party cliques continued also on the other platforms. For example, in the SDPP Adana meeting, on December 4, 1989, some party members hooted Inonu, and Baykal, and then those members were sent to the provincial disciplinary committees for dismissal. And finally they were dismissed at the end of December.⁷⁵

In order to prevent those violations of discipline, resignations, and dismissals, Inonu decided to use the authority of the CEC all over the party organizations. His aim was to achieve and maintain a cohesive party organization. He claimed that the discipline problems within the party would only be solved by using the legitimate authority of the CEC. For this reason he called for the support of the pro-center party members.⁷⁶

Soon, some party organizations reflected their confidence and support towards the party center. For example, Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan mayors and some members of the county party organizations declared their loyalty to Inonu and the present party administration.⁷⁷ Similarly, pro-center party members were attacking the extreme-leftists in the SDPP. For example, Eskisehir Mayor Selami Vardar criticized the existence of the extreme leftist party members

within the SDPP. Upon this, the left-wing members asked for an interim party congress in order to discuss these kinds of ideological divisions within the party. They claimed that the present problem of the SDPP could be solved only by the discussions of the party members in a civilized and democratic platform.⁷⁸

Inonu did not reject this demand of the leftists, and in this atmosphere, the SDPP fifth interim Party Congress was assembled. In this interim congress, the left-wing clique made a declaration about calling for an extra-ordinary party congress. Their aim was to replace the present party administration with their own group members. Or, at least they aimed to show their opposition to Baykal and to his factious administration.⁷⁹

In the congress, however, the main discussion theme between the opposing factions was again the dismissals of the seven Kurdish deputies and the Kurdish issue in general. On this issue Inonu claimed that this crisis was very much against the party interests and weakened its public image and party cohesion, causing many discipline violations.⁸⁰

At the end of this fifth interim congress, Baykal group strengthened its domination in the central administration. This was very much criticized by the left-wing clique which expressed its distress in various ways.⁸¹ For example, the leader of the left-wing clique A. Guven Gurkan resigned from the party, on December 12, 1989.⁸² He also said that Baykal did not want to maintain a social

democratic party.⁸³ Aydin Guven Gurkan was one of the founders and the first leader of the SDPP. Therefore his resignation created a very big echo within the party and especially in the left-wing clique.⁸⁴

Upon these continuous heavy criticisms and resignations, Baykal argued that after all the SDPP became more limpid and clear since the dismissed members made some mistakes. By dismissing them, the party would become bigger and stronger and come to power.⁸⁵

2. A NEW VERSION OF THE COMPETITION FOR LEADERSHIP

While the conflictual relation between the intra-party factions were negatively affecting the performance and the harmony of the Baykal-Inonu alliance, the increasing power of Baykal clique within the party began to threaten Inonu's leadership. Moreover the factious tendencies of Baykal relatively provoked intra-party oppositions and created new discipline and administrative crisis. In order to solve these problems and to get the support of the intra-party forces Inonu decided to consider the general tendencies within the party. At the same time, he considered establishing an alliance with the left-wing, as an alternative to the Baykal clique. He stated that when he could get the support of those cliques, he would change the present administrative cadre at that moment. This was a signal for the end of the domination of Baykal group within the party administration.⁸⁶

This was also the beginning of the continuing power struggle between Baykal and Inonu. And finally, to settle

accounts with each other, they decided to make a general party congress towards the end of January 1990.⁸⁷

At the beginning of 1990, one opposing faction, the 'social democrats for renewal' did not choose the way of resigning from the party. The leader of this group, Ertugrul Gunay, said that they would try to explain their views in the party caucus and look forward for the support of the party members.⁸⁸

Similarly another opposition leader, Ismail Cem, supporting the renewal group, mentioned that their aim was to unite the party and abolish the factions and oppositions.⁸⁹

In the by-law congress, in January 30, 1990, Inonu was reelected as the leader. Also Baykal group gained 39 seats out of 44 in the party assembly. The other 5 seats were shared by the other two cliques. These cliques' members were Ertugrul Gunay and Ismail Cem, from the innovationist group, and Ahmet Isvan, Seyfi Oktay, and Cevdet Selvi from the left-wing.⁹⁰

The results of the congress were protested by various left-wing party members.⁹¹ Besides, party assembly member, Ismail Cem, claimed that the division of the party into three main cliques was the main obstacle for the SDPP to come to power.⁹²

Reestablishment of the Baykal domination over the party after the by-law congress discomposed the party leader. After that Inonu decided to assume an attitude towards Baykal's domination. And he threatened that if Baykal group did not obey the party by-law he would resign from the party

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leadership.

After the regulation congress the struggle between the Baykal group and the innovationist clique increased steadily. In various province congresses they opposed each other.⁹⁴

Meanwhile the resignations and dismissals from the party continued unceasingly. For example, Arslan Baser Kafaoglu resigned from the party claiming that the party center acted in accordance with the wishes of the dominant external powers which tried to steer the party ideology towards right.⁹⁵

Moreover Inonu, in his trips to the south-eastern provinces, was hooted by the party members of those province party organizations, because of the party administration's kurkish policy.⁹⁶ Upon these developments, he declared that if the seven dismissed deputies gave guarantees to obey the party rules and regulations concerning the party discipline, they could be able to return to the Party.⁹⁷ But, the seven dismissed deputies rejected this invitation of Inonu. According to them their dismissals was the mistake of the SDPP and they could do nothing any more.⁹⁸

In this atmosphere the SDPP participated in the 26 March 1989 elections. In this election the party was unsuccessful and it lost the support of the voters relatively. In this failure the lack of the party discipline within the SDPP was very influential. Intra-party power struggle between the Baykal and the Inonu groups which was very much emphasized by the press, and the disunity within the party destroyed the image of the party among the voters. Before the elections

other parties also continuously emphasized this problematic of the SDPP. It lost the image of being an alternative party to come to power. The election results amounted to a warning⁹⁹ for the party to put its house in order.

The March 26 1990 election results were also criticized by the intra-party opposition members. For example, Cevdet Selvi, Fikri Saglar, and Ertugrul Gunay stated that the party administration was responsible for this failure. And the result was a warning of the voters for the party center.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, some of the opposing party members wanted Baykal to resign from the office of the secretary general by claiming that his cadre and faction was harmful¹⁰¹ for the future of the party.

Upon these critical developments, the Baykal clique and¹⁰² finally Baykal decided to leave the party administration.

Baykal and his friends who were in the execution committee of the party submitted their resignations to Inonu. Then the leadership struggle between Baykal and Inonu¹⁰³ started publicly. In this struggle the left-wing and innovationist party members began to support Inonu against¹⁰⁴ Baykal.

Meanwhile, a merciless competition was fired between Inonu and Baykal by virtue of the press. For example, while Inonu accused Baykal of being irresponsible, Baykal¹⁰⁵ criticized Inonu for his effort to fight a duel with him. In another speech to the press Inonu said that they would¹⁰⁶ not leave the party administration to the Baykal faction.

Later on, the sides of the leadership race became

clearer. The innovationists supported Inonu, whereas 41 chairmen of the provincial party organizations espoused Baykal as their candidate for leadership.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile Ismail Cem began to support the leadership of Baykal,¹⁰⁸ but he met with the opposition of some party members, among them Ercan Karakas, Ertugrul Gunay, Onur Kumbaracibasi. Moreover some important names within the party such as Ali Topuz and Aytekin Kotil also supported Baykal.¹⁰⁹

While the metropolitan mayors were in support of Inonu, the majority of the county mayors within those provinces generally supported Baykal.¹¹⁰

Both sides determined their candidate cadres before the party congress. For example Inonu's candidates for the general secretary were Fikri Saglar, Hikmet Cetin, and Onur Kumbaracibasi. On the other hand Baykal's candidates were Ismail Cem and Cumhur Keskin.¹¹¹

Additionally some of the resigned party members, for example Aydin Guven Gurkan also joined the debate between Baykal and Inonu. According to Gurkan the SDPP would show its prudence towards a minority faction.¹¹²

Upon the general failure in the local elections, Mr. Vahit Calin, candidate for Bayrampasa mayor, was dismissed because the DLP candidate won the election.¹¹³

And finally, the Party congress was convened on September 29, 1990. At the end of this general party congress Inonu was reelected as the leader of the SDPP by taking the votes of 504 delegate, while Baykal took 405 of them. Meanwhile

both Inonu and Baykal accused each other of being responsible
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for the dismissal decision.

Some pro-Baykal party members, such as Fuat Atalay,
Guler Tanyolac, Onder Kirli, Tayfur Un opposed the results
115
of the party congress.

In response to these critiques, Inonu mentioned that the
116
results of the congress show a positive sign. In the
Party assembly 40 seats out of 44 were elected from Inonu's
list and only 4 members from the Baykal list. In the
meantime the ex-left-wing leader A. Guven Gurkan, began to
117
support the new party administration.

On the other hand, new administration of the party
decided to proclaim a pardon for the dismissed and resigned
party members, especially the seven Kurdish origin
118
deputies.

However, new dismissal cases occurred spontaneously. For
example Adana province, and Seyhan and Tarsus county party
organizations dismissed from the party by the central
disciplinary committee because of their irregularity in their
119
disposal in the membership issues. Many other pro-Baykal
province and county party organizations were also dismissed
from the party by the new administration. This caused a
120
strong reaction of Baykal clique.

Those dismissals created other kinds of disciplinary
problems. For example, a group of Adana-Seyhan county
organization members beat the central executive committee
member Hasan Zengin who was assigned to investigate the
irregularities in the Seyhan party organization. Those party

members were sent to the disciplinary committee for dismissal.¹²¹ Similarly Istanbul province disciplinary committee dismissed Kucukcekmece, and Gaziosmanpasa mayors and many other party members because of their irregularities.¹²² Meanwhile the Baykal group called themselves with the name of "New-left".¹²³

3. NEW SEPARATIONS AND UNITIES

The year 1991 also witnessed struggles between Baykal and Inonu. And, of course, the breaches of discipline were the usual phenomenon in this period, too.

The second round of the conflict between Baykal and Inonu emerged on July 27-28, 1991 (Third General Party Congress). Before the third party congress, there were two general centers in the SDPP. The first one was the party general center, the second the Baykal's general center. This caused a division of the party into two main camps.¹²⁴

In the third party congress, the struggle was very hard between Baykal and Inonu. Finally Inonu was reelected as the leader of the party by taking the 534 votes out of 985 delegates, while Baykal took the 451 of the votes.¹²⁵ This result was the proof of dividedness of the SDPP into two strictly defined different camps. And it also showed that although Baykal failed for the second time in the leadership race, he attracted the support of nearly half of the party delegations.¹²⁶ This support made Baykal continue his leadership struggle within the Party. And he began to wait for a more appropriate time in order to come to power within

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the party.

The year 1991 was also the year of early general elections. Before the October 20, 1991 general elections, the SDPP, under the leadership of Inonu, established an alliance with the pro-Kurdish People's Labour Party (HEP). The PLP was not allowed to participate in the general elections by the Higher Council of Election due to fact that it did not complete its nation wide party organization.¹²⁸ The SDPP deputy candidates in eastern provinces were¹²⁹ generally from the PLP.

This attitudes of Inonu attracted the reactions of the Baykal clique members within the Party. And outside the Party there were also the critical arguments of various paradigms about the PLP and the SDPP alliance for the elections. This propaganda had an affect over the SDPP voters, especially in the western provinces of the country, excluding only Antalya province. And in the elections the SDPP failed especially in those provinces and it became the third party while it was the second biggest party of the country in the previous elections. Just after the general elections. Baykal critised the present administration because of their permission to let the PLP originned candidates to participate in the election in the SDPP lists. The PLP, performing as a Kurdish nationalist party by rejecting some of the fundamental principles of the state ideology in a radical manner in Turkey, attracted the reactions of the non-Kurdish masses who were loyal to their state and to its

ideology. Consequently the PLP originated SDPP candidates, especially in the eastern provinces, won the elections. But the Turkish social democratic voters in the west reflected their reactions to this alliance by supporting the other parties in the general elections. But since the SDPP was relatively more successful in the eastern provinces, a considerable number of the SDPP deputies who were elected in the last general elections, were the Kurdish originated PLP members. Approximately 22 PLP originated deputies entered into the parliament as a consequence of this alliance.¹³⁰

Of course, it was not only the alliance with the PLP but many other fundamental factors which were responsible for this failure. For example, the division of the party among the factions, and the struggle among them was again a problematic for the party. Some argued that those divisions even negatively influenced the well functioning of the party organizations in the election regions. The struggles among the cliques was so dramatic that party members in some of the provinces either refused to campaign for the party or made a negative propaganda of the party, because of their hostility to the party center which was under the domination of the opposite faction. The failure of the SDPP in the municipalities of the metropolitan areas¹³¹ was also a negative factor for the SDPP before the elections. The voters in those areas tended to support the center right parties of the political spectrum. Finally the SDPP participated in the last general elections without achieving some innovations in the party programme and ideology. The party was still

supporting the old-fashioned social democratic policies which were structured by a strong etatist tendencies. More liberal solutions to the economic problems were on the rise throughout the world and the Turkish society could not be excluded from those tendencies. Socio-economic transformation of the Turkish society, which had begun after 1980, very much affected the world views and philosophy of life of the Turkish voters. In this context the etatist policies of the SDPP were no longer attractive for the Turkish citizens.¹³²

The separationist policies of those PLP originated deputies created probably the most important party discipline crisis in the SDPP history. In the ceremony of taking an oath in the first meeting of the new parliament just after the last elections, those deputies, especially Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle, created a very serious discipline problem by making the propaganda of a Kurdish terrorist network (PKK). This attitude of those deputies caused a national reaction in the Turkish public opinion, too. And the reaction of the leader Inonu was also very hard. Just after the behaviours of Zana and Dicle, he decided to call for the dismissal of those deputies from the party.¹³³

But this did not stop the reactions to the PLP originated deputies, within and outside the party. Both the anti-disciplinary behaviours of those Kurdish deputies and the reactions towards them continued until the establishment of the coalition government.¹³⁴

Furthermore, both the failure of the Party in the last

general elections under the leadership of Inonu, and the problem that was created by the Kurdish originned PLP deputies caused increasing criticisms towards the Inonu leadership especially by the Baykal clique.

They claimed that in the failure of the Party in the last general elections, the responsibility belonged to Inonu's leadership. He destroyed the image of the party by establishing an alliance with the PLP members, and his passive administration was another factor in this failure.¹³⁵

These criticisms increased the degree of the struggle between Baykal and Inonu groups. Baykal's group declared their desire for calling an extra-ordinary party congress, in order to renew the administrative staff and to resolve the present problems within the party.¹³⁶

Finally Inonu decided to call for an extra-ordinary congress which would be the first congress after the last general elections. And it would be the ninth party congress throughout the five-years-old SDPP history.¹³⁷

Before the party congress, the SDPP established a coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP). This coalition was an opportunity for Inonu to maintain his leadership, since it gave the party the advantage of being in power under the leadership of Inonu.¹³⁸ The leader, in turn claimed the idea that a change in the Party administrative staff would cause the abolition of the coalition government. And he indirectly threatened the party delegations by such a danger.¹³⁹

In the Party congress the main subject was the failure of

the SDPP in the general elections. Both sides criticized¹⁴⁰ each other for being responsible for this fact.

At this time, the innovationist clique, under the leadership of Ertugrul Gunay, decided to support the Inonu group as¹⁴¹ against the factitious approaches of the Baykal clique.

In the Congress, Inonu was reelected as the Party leader by taking the 516 votes, against the 486 votes of¹⁴² Baykal, from the party delegations.

After losing the party congress, Baykal remained in opposition. But the 486 votes from the Party delegations was the highest score that Baykal took in the leadership race within the party. This shows that Baykal clique has an¹⁴³ ossified potential within the Party.

In the last nine months of the coalition period, it can be seen that the SDPP relatively solved the party discipline problems within and outside the party. This was facilitated by the resignation of the majority of the Kurdish originned PLP deputies from the Party, by critisizing the attitudes of both the SDPP and the new coalition government towards the Kurdish people and the Kurdish problem. Only a few members of this clique remained within the party , most notably , Fehmi Isiklar. But since they have got some duties within the Party and in the parliament, they became too marginal¹⁴⁴ and passive to violate the Party discipline.

On the other hand, the Baykal clique turned back to its opposing position. And they again began to wait for a more

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appropriate situation for the leadership struggle.

In the meantime the innovationists supported the Inonu administration because they shared some of the administrative positions with the Inonu group.

All the opposing cliques and groups were deactivated within the coalition government process. But the most important factor in this passivization was some interest expectations of those groups from the coalition government. They tried to share some of the favours of being in power.

Therefore, this relative decline in the volume and the quality of the party discipline problems seems to be just a temporary situation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (1) Naturally, organization and structure of a party will determine the degree of discipline in a political party. This relation between the party organization and party discipline is expected to be greater in the SDPP, because of its internal structural problems.
- (2) Cumhuriyet, 4 June 1988.
- (3) For details, see Ismail Cem and Deniz Baykal, Yeni Sol, (Istanbul:Cem yayinlari,1990.)
- (4) Cumhuriyet, 27 June 1988.
- (5) Cumhuriyet, 27 June 1988.
- (6) Cumhuriyet, 30 June 1988.
- (7) Milliyet, 17 November 1988.
- (8) Cumhuriyet, 18 November 1988; Milliyet 21,22,23,24,26,27 November 1988;Tercuman, 27 November 1988; Cumhuriyet, 28 November 1988; and Hurriyet, 29 November 1988.
- (9) Hurriyet, 7 January 1989. During this period the party's Sisli and Beyoglu county town organizations were dismissed by Istanbul province organization.
- (10) Cumhuriyet, 12 January 1988
- (11) Cumhuriyet, 7 April 1988; Hurriyet, 29-30 February 1988.
- (12) Cumhuriyet, 30 June 1988.
- (13) Gunes, 20 January 1989. For example Izmir Kusadasi mayor and the municipality assembly members resigned from the party in order to protest the attitude of the party center.

- (14) Milliyet, 4 October 1988; and Tercuman , 2 October 1988, Cumhuriyet, 5 October 1988.
- (15) Edward Crowe, 'Consensus and Structure in Legislative Norms: Party Discipline in the House of Commons ', The Journal of Politics , 45 (1983) : 907 - 931, p. 911.
- (16) Cumhuriyet, 24 May 1988.
- (17) Hurriyet, 27 May 1988.
- (18) Milliyet, 14 April; Tercuman, 15 April; Cumhuriyet, 15 April; Gunes 15 April 1989.
- (19) Cumhuriyet, 19 April; Tercuman 20 April 1989.
- (20) Tercuman, 16 February 1989.
- (21) Milliyet, 10 April 1989.
- (22) Turkiye , 11 April 1989.
- (23) Cumhuriyet , 11 April 1989.
- (24) Milliyet, 12 April; Gunes, 12 April; Turkiye, 14 April; Milliyet, 14 April 1989.
- (25) Milliyet 18 April 1989.
- (26) Milliyet, 31 May 1989.
- (27) Turkiye, 5 June 1989.
- (28) Hurriyet, 7 June 1989.
- (29) Turkiye, 7 June 1989.
- (30) Tercuman, 12 June 1989.
- (31) Turkiye, 14 June 1989.
- (32) Turkiye, 28 June 1989.
- (33) Cumhuriyet, 28 June 1989.
- (34) Cumhuriyet, 8 August 1989.
- (35) Gunes, 7 September 1989.

- (36) Cumhuriyet, 12 September 1989.
- (37) Turkiye, 24 September 1989.
- (38) Milliyet, 1 October 1989.
- (39) Cumhuriyet, 25 January 1989.
- (40) Milliyet, 9 February 1989. Nearly 8 months later Ibrahim Aksoy, Malatya deputy, was certainly dismissed from the Party by the Central Disciplinary Committee, because of his Kurdish propaganda. (Milliyet, 7 October 1989.)
- (41) Milliyet, 5 October 1989.
- (42) Milliyet, 7 October 1989.
- (43) Gunes, 7 October 1989.
- (44) Hurriyet, 14 October 1989.
- (45) Hurriyet, 14 October 1989.
- (46) Hurriyet, 18 October 1989.
- (47) Hurriyet, 19 October 1989.
- (48) Hurriyet, 19 October 1989. For example Mardin deputy Ahmet Turk critisized the SDPP as not being a social democratic party. Similarly Adnan Ekmen stated that he did not care about the decisions and actions of the party center. And Kars deputy Mahmut Alinak, by critisizing the party center, stressed that he was pleased for their joining to the Kurdish congress in Paris. On the other hand, Salih Sumer claimed that the decision of the party executive was very heavy and anti-democratic punishment.
- (49) Gunes, 19 October 1989.
- (50) Gunes, 20 October 1989.
- (51) Tercuman, 20 October 1989.

- (52) Tercuman, 20 October 1989. Also some of the Eastern province party organizations mainly Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Kars, Mardin , critisized the party administration and opposed the dismissals. (Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1989.)
- (53) Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1989.
- (54) Gunes, 6 November 1989.
- (55) Gunes, 9 November 1989.
- (56) Cumhuriyet, 11 November 1989. The left-wing members were very much frustrated by these developments. For example, members of the party assembly, Mehmet Mogultay and Kemal Anadol, by critisizing the domination of Baykal group in Central Executive Committee (MKYK), stressed that the left-wing wishes for the resignation of Baykal and of the Central Executive Committee. (Cumhuriyet, 21 November 1989.)

But in the meeting of the party assembly, despite the opposing votes of the left-wing members, Baykal and his group were elected to the CEC by the majority. This was another victory for the Baykal clique within the party. (Milliyet, 3 November 1989.)

- (57) Tercuman, 14 November 1989. Cuneyt Canver, Sedat Dogan, Arif Sag, Ilhami Binici, Riza Iliman, Mehmet Kahraman, Salih Sumer, Ali Uyar, M. Ali Eren, I. Hakki Onal, Kenan Sonmez, Mahmut Alinak, Adnan Ekmen, Ahmet Turk, Veli Yildirim established the group of the progressive patriotic union, as the supporter of the movements of the Kurdish deputies. Another left-wing

group consisting of Fehmi Isiklar, Ekin Dikmen, Fikri Saglar, Abdullah Basturk, Mehmet Mogultay, Husnu Okcuoglu, Omer Turkcakal, Kemal Anadol, Ahmet Ersin, Halil Culhaoglu, Kamil Atesogullari, Tefvik Kocak and Omer Ciftci, took a more neutral manner in this Kurdish crisis within the left-wing clique.

- (58) Tercuman, 14 November 1989. The provincial party organizations which supported this radical side of the left-wing dismissed from the party with the assertion of their anti-disciplinary behaviours. (Cumhuriyet, 15 November 1989.)
- (59) Tercuman, 14 November 1989.
- (60) Gunes, 15 November; Turkiye, 17 November 1989.
- (61) Gunes, 17 November 1989.
- (62) Cumhuriyet, 18 November 1989. According to the SDPP party regulation those seven dismissed deputies had the right to appeal to the administrative court or to the central disciplinary committee for their excuse. But in spite of doing this they tried to establish another political party organization later on. (Gunes, 30 October 1989.)
- (63) Cumhuriyet, 18 November 1989; Cumhuriyet, 19 Kasim 1989; Gunes, 19 Kasim 1989; Cumhuriyet, 19 Kasim 1989. For example Diyarbakir deputy Salih Sumer defined their dismissal as a "mincing operation" within the party. Similarly, left-wing member Fehmi Isiklar regarded the decision as an anti-democratic one. On the other hand Fikri Saglar, ex-vice secretary general, critisizing the

present administrative staff, stressed that this was the product of the inadequate, covetous, and problematic Baykal clique who tried to conduct the party as a small family company. Besides he mentioned that this punishment was not given to those seven deputies only, rather it was given to the Kurdish people. By dismissing the Kurdish deputies from the party, the SDPP tried to exclude the Kurdish problem from the party. This decision would motivate the divisions and fragmentations between the Kurdish and the Turkish people. And this was the sin of the SDPP. Meanwhile the SDPP Eskisehir province party organization, Hikmet Cetin, Diyarbakir deputy, and Kamer Genc, Tunceli deputy, claimed that this was a very heavy and wrong decision which was taken under the great pressure of the Baykal Clique.

Later on, 6 left-wing deputies, including Abdullah Basturk and Fikri Saglar, protesting the dismissals of the seven deputies and the attitudes of Inonu, did not join the group meetings in the parliament. (Tercuman, 22 November 1989.)

- (64) Milliyet, 21 November 1989.
- (65) Cumhuriyet, 20 November 1989.
- (66) Cumhuriyet, 20 November 1989.
- (67) Gunes, 20 November 1989.
- (68) Milliyet, 23 November 1989.
- (69) Hurriyet, 23 November 1989.

- (70) Cumhuriyet, 24 November 1989. As a more radical protest against the dismissals, in Diyarbakir province organization, 19 municipal assembly members, 13 province general assembly members, 10 county administration committee members and approximately 3 thousand party members resigned from the party. Even those persons set on fire the posters of Inonu and Baykal in order to show their reactions. (Cumhuriyet, 26 November 1989.)
- (71) Cumhuriyet, Turkiye, Milliyet, 25 November 1989.
- (72) Milliyet, 25 November 1989.
- (73) Milliyet, 27 November 1989. Similar critique were done, by virtue of the press in various newspapers, such as Cuneyt Canver (Hurriyet 27 Kasim), Tekirdag deputy Gunes Gurseler (Cumhuriyet 28 Kasim), Tuses administrative committee member Tuncay Artun (Cumhuriyet 28 Kasim), Party assembly member Ayla Akbal (Cumhuriyet 28 Kasim).
- (74) Milliyet, 28 November 1989.
- (75) Milliyet, 5 December 1989.
- (76) Gunes, 5 December 1989.
- (77) Milliyet, 7 December 1989.
- (78) Cumhuriyet, 12 December 1989.
- (79) Milliyet, 10 December 1989.
- (80) Tercuman, 11 December 1989.
- (81) Tercuman, 11 december 1989.
- (82) Turkiye, 13 December 1989.
- (83) Tercuman, 15 December 1989.

- (84) Hurriyet, 15 December 1989.
- (85) Milliyet, 20 December 1989.
- (86) Milliyet, 25 December 1989.
- (87) Milliyet, 27 December 1989.
- (88) Milliyet, 5 January 1990.
- (89) Cumhuriyet, 6 January 1990.
- (90) Tercuman, 31 January 1990.
- (91) Cumhuriyet, 30 January 1990.
- (92) Milliyet, 7 February 1990.
- (93) Hurriyet, 16 February 1990.
- (94) Turkiye, 17 February 1990.
- (95) Milliyet, 1 March 1990. Sincan mayor Aziz Gursoy dismissed by the province disciplinary committy, because of his anti-disciplinary attitudes.
- (96) Milliyet, 8 May 1990.
- (97) Hurriyet, 9 May 1990.
- (98) Gunes, 10 May 1990. Meanwhile the dismissed Kurdish deputies established the People's Labor Party, and called for all of the Kurdish originned party members to join their new party organization.(Gunes, 13 June 1990.)
- (99) Turkiye, 6 June 1990.
- (100) Tercuman, 6 July 1990.
- (101) Turkiye, 24 August 1990.
- (102) Gunes, 8 September 1990.
- (103) Hurriyet, 9 September 1990. Meanwhile the innovationist clique had a meeting including the names such as Ismail Cem, Cevdet Selvi, Omer Ciftci, Mehmet Mogultay, in

order to determine their strategy. (Turkiye, 26 August 1990.)

- (104) Hurriyet, 9 September 1990.
- (105) Milliyet, 12 September 1990.
- (106) Milliyet, 13 September 1990.
- (107) Gunes, 20 September, 1990.
- (108) Milliyet, 22 September 1990.
- (109) Tercuman, 22 September 1990.
- (110) Hurriyet, 22 September 1990. For example, in Ankara, the mayors of Kecioren, Yenimahalle, Sincan towns supported Baykal clique.
- (111) Hurriyet, 23 September 1990.
- (112) Cumhuriyet, 24 September 1990.
- (113) Gunes, 26 September 1990.
- (114) Hurriyet, 30 September 1990.
- (115) Cumhuriyet, 1 October 1990.
- (116) Gunes, 1 October 1990.
- (117) Cumhuriyet, 5 October 1990.
- (118) Gunes, 23 October 1990.
- (119) Cumhuriyet, 1;2;10;11; November 1990.
- (120) Hurriyet, 13 November 1990.
- (121) Cumhuriyet, 4 December 1990.
- (122) Cumhuriyet, 25 December 1990.
- (123) Milliyet, 26 December 1990.
- (124) Milliyet, 25 July 1991.
- (125) Milliyet, 29 July 1991.
- (126) Milliyet, 30 July 1991.
- (127) Milliyet, 31 July 1991.

- (128) Milliyet, 1 October 1991.
- (129) Milliyet, 2 October 1991.
- (130) Milliyet, 25 October 1991.
- (131) Ankara might be exceptional.
- (132) Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Turkiye, Gunes, October 1991.
- (133) Milliyet, 31 October 1991.
- (134) Milliyet, 30 November 1991.
- (135) Milliyet, 30 November 1991.
- (136) Milliyet, 15 November 1991.
- (137) Milliyet, 23 January 1992.
- (138) Milliyet, 23 January 1992.
- (139) Milliyet, 26 January 1992.
- (140) Milliyet, 26 January 1992.
- (141) Milliyet, 20 January 1992.
- (142) Hurriyet, 27 January 1992.
- (143) Milliyet, 22 January 1992.
- (144) Milliyet, 20 April 1992.
- (145) Milliyet, 30 January 1992.

CHAPTER III

A GENERAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

In the light of the content analysis of the party discipline cases in the SDPP as appeared in Turkish daily press between 1988-1992 (until spring), we can classify main sources of violations of party discipline as follows:

- (a) The leadership struggle;
- (b) The ideological/factional differentiation;
- (c) The Kurdish problem.

In the following paragraphs, we will evaluate the findings concerning these general categories of the party discipline violations.

1. THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION

It can be said that the existence of factional differentiation in the party is generally motivated by power struggle among the candidates of the leadership position. It can also be argued that the ideological distinctions within the party are generally the consequence of the weak party ideology. Ideological differentiation, therefore, becomes a cover for the power struggle.

As a very striking interpretation concerning the discipline violations, Cezmi Kartay, the chairman of the SDPP's public administration and executive committee, stated that the party discipline problem within the SDPP was related with the fact that the party has not come to power for many

years. In other words, according to Kartay, what causes breaches in the party unity is not the ideological divisions, but the desire to control the party organization. So, he claimed that the discipline problems within the SDPP were not directly related with the party ideology but with the intra-party struggle to come to power.¹

Similarly, faced with the discipline problems and the resignations within the SDPP, Inonu argued that these were not the results of the ideological differentiations within the SDPP, rather, they were meaningless developments harmful for the interest of the party.²

Therefore it may be stated that this factional differentiation usually manifests itself as the leadership struggle within the party. With this reasoning, one supporting idea appeared in the press:

"Inonu may be said to represent a synthesis between the views existing within the party, from the pro-Kurdish to the nationalists, from the neo-socialist to the outspokenly free market advocates and to the xenophobic and views more typically associated with President Ozal. Baykal, for his part, as head of the self-styled "New-Left" movement, adopts more openly the stance that it is time to bury anything smacking of traditional left-wing idealism and act pragmatically. But there is lack of clarity as to who represents what, and in practice on what specific issues. The struggle for the control of the party has over-shadowed the urgent need recognised by all observers for the party to

reach a consensus on its own identity."³

This also shows us that lack of ideological clarity in the SDPP has been an important factor in anti-disciplinary behaviour within the party.

As another interesting approach to the intra-party factions within the SDPP A. Guven Gurkan has suggested in one of his speeches to the press that the intra-party struggle among the cliques helped Inonu since he used each clique towards the others to serve his interests within the party.⁴ This argument reinforces the view that the divisions among the factions within the party was motivated by interest struggle rather than ideological distinctions.

Meanwhile a report, published in Gunes daily claimed that those factions in the SDPP were inherited from the RPP as the most important pathological feature of the Turkish social democracy since the period of transition to democracy. These interest struggles were also present in the RPP among different groups in order to gain power within the party. The struggles between Ismet Inonu and Bulent Ecevit, and then between Ecevit and Deniz Baykal can be given as examples of the intra-party power struggles, which took the shape of ideological distinctions in the RPP.⁵

In concluding this section on the intra-party conflict and violation of party discipline cases, the arguments made by the above sources support our primary propositions concerning the reasons of anti-disciplinary behavior in the SDPP.

On the other hand, if we try to analyze the consequences of those anti-disciplinary behaviours in the SDPP we can arrive at the following conclusions: firstly, there were the problems of dismissals of the some party members because of their anti-disciplinary behaviours and irregularities. Secondly, the resignations from the party as a result of factional struggles became the usual phenomena. Thirdly, the continuous power struggle between Inonu and Baykal existed throughout the period affecting the well-functioning of the party. And finally, the distortion of the party image in the eyes of the voters appeared as the main consequence of all those negative aspects of the party. This last point appears to be the most problematic dimension of the party discipline problem in the SDPP since it can be regarded as the main factor responsible for the failure of the SDPP in the last October 20, 1991 general elections.

This issue was very much emphasized by various intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and writers on the social democratic ideology, just after the failure of the SDPP in the last general elections. For example, Altan Oymen, in one of his articles in Milliyet daily categorized the weak aspects of the party under four headings: (a) the universal decline of socialist and social democratic ideologies; (b) the failure of the SDPP originned municipalities in some of the major provinces of the country; (c) the reaction of the voters to the PLP and the SDPP alliance; (d) the intra-party disunity problem.

Oymen stated that, this last point created a chaotic

vision about the SDPP in the minds of the voters. The continuous struggle among many groups and persons -Baykal, Inonu, Gunay, Sozen, persons from South-Eastern Anatolia, persons from Middle Anatolia- caused a disharmony and disunity within the party. Therefore, it is obvious that such a disunited and chaotic political party could not give the image of being a good alternative to the government administration.

Other arguments raised about this issue were also similar to that of Altan Oymen. If we make a brief summary of those views, we can state that, although there were other factors in this failure such as "the failings of the SDPP-controlled local authorities, the influence of the media, the international end-of-ideology atmosphere, poor publicity, lack of dynamic leadership, over confidence"⁶, "the approach adopted towards the Democratic Left party of Bulent Ecevit, the nature of the election propaganda"⁷, the anti-disciplinary behaviours were the most influential factor in the distortion of the party image in the eyes of the voters and then in the failure of the party in the general elections. Of course, it is obvious that this argument does not depend on a scientific research, however, the debate in the media about the failure of the SDPP, in this period, was focused generally on the above argument.

On the other hand, when we look at the main actors involved in the breaches of the party discipline in the SDPP, they were generally the active members of various

opposing factions. The persons who played a role in the development of the ideology of their own cliques violated the party discipline regulations by making critical speeches towards the party administration or other cliques. For example, Aydin Guven Gurkan within the 'left-wing', Ertugrul Gunay within the 'renewal social democrats', Ismail Cem within the 'new-left' factions can be considered in this category.

2. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KURDISH ORIGINNED MPs

Like the issues of 'leadership struggle' and the 'factional differentiation', the Kurdish issue is also motivated by the loose ideological base and the loose structure of the party organization.

"The Kurdish originned MPs were one-time members of the People's Labour Party (HEP)- itself a splinter from the SDPP- and owed their parliamentary seats representing Southestern constituencies partly to the electoral alliance⁸ between HEP and the SDPP at last years elections."

This Kurdish clique was not oriented towards power struggle that was aimed at capturing the party administration and which was created by the power gap in the administrative authority of the party. This clique, however, is an ethnic oriented faction rather than a power oriented one.

Moreover its ideological formation also did not develop as a cover for its leadership struggle as it was the case in other cliques of the party. Their ethnic oriented ideological formation developed as a completely different

paradigm from the ideological formations of the other present cliques within the SDPP. Therefore, the most serious party discipline violations came from this clique as a result of its ideological misformation distinct from the other components of the party.

3. CONCLUSION:

In order to identify the modes of anti-disciplinary behaviours that were commonly committed by the members of various opposing factions within the SDPP, let's firstly look at the Edward Crowe's list of the seven breaches of discipline. According to this list the types of discipline violations can be presented as follows;

- Privately expressing dissent to whips;
- Making a critical speech in Parliament;
- Cross-voting;
- Abstaining;
- Signing critical letters and articles in the press;
- Making critical speeches outside the parliament.

From the perspective of Crowe's analysis, in the SDPP, however, the modes of the anti-disciplinary behaviour can be listed in terms of their frequency within the party as follows;

- (a) Making critical speeches outside the parliament;
- (b) Writing critical letters and articles in the press;
- (c) Privately expressing dissent to whips.

Since it is the unclear party ideology which creates an ideological gap, the members of the various cliques can

easily support different approaches within the same party. And this prevents the production of a coherent and effective party organization in which all party members share the same general view.

However, we can not explain this disunity within the party as a consequence of intra-party democracy in the SDPP, because, as we have noted in the earlier chapters of this study, in the theoretical sense, the existence of intra-party democracy and/or opposition in a political organization does not necessarily rule out the presence of intra-party unity, intra-party cohesion, and intra-party discipline. In a mass party, it is expected that various paradigms, even extreme world views must establish a consensus among themselves, towards the general politics of the party.

In a mass party like the SDPP, those kinds of anti-disciplinary behaviours, therefore, can not be explained by the existence of the intra-party democracy in this political organization.

On the other hand, if all the different paradigms try to make dominant their own extreme views in the party, as it was the case in the SDPP, the anti-disciplinary behaviours and the chaotic conditions are inevitable.

As a final statement it can be claimed that the party discipline is the most important problem for the past, the present, and the future of the SDPP.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (1) Cumhuriyet, 25 November 1989.
- (2) Hurriyet, 23 November 1989. Despite the affords of the party center, however, the resignations from the party organization continued increasingly. For example, Tatvan (Bitlis) county organization, Izmir province party organization, Altindag , Ankara, county organization, Diyarbakir mayor and province organization, Silvan mayor and 1054 party members resigned from the SDPP. (Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1989.)

Meanwhile three party deputies resigned from the Party in order to join to the previously dismissed or resigned deputies (Milliyet, 2 December 1989). And many of the province party organizations and county party organizations decided to resign from the Party too. (Cumhuriyet, 5 December 1989.)

- (3) Briefing, Jan. 27, 1992, Issue 873. p.3.
- (4) Milliyet, 25 December 1989.
- (5) Gunes, 14 September 1990.
- (6) Briefing, Jan. 27, 1992, Issue 873. p.3.
- (7) Briefing, Jan. 13, 1992, Issue 871. p.7.
- (8) Briefing, Apr. 6, 1992, Issue 883. p.5.
- (9) Edward Crowe, 'Consensus and Structure in Legislative Norms: Party Discipline in the House of Commons,' Journal of Politics, 45 (1983):907-931, p.911.

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Gunes	(Istanbul daily)
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Tercuman	(Istanbul daily)
Briefing	(weekly journal)