

**OPERATION: PROVIDE COMFORT:
TURKISH PERSPECTIVES**

Ergin YILDIZ

**A Thesis Presented To
The Institute Of
Economics and Social Sciences
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements
for the Degree of M.Sc.
in the subject of International Relations**

Bilkent University

December 1994

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
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis of the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation Operation Provide Comfort is evaluated from the Turkish perspective. The Operation has created much controversy in Turkish foreign affairs yet little information about has been accessible. Successive governments between 1991 and 1994 have failed to dissolve doubts concerning the Operation and this has led to speculation over "foreign forces" in Turkey, their "real" aims, deployment, operational principles and even "relations with the PKK".

Trying to find answers to these questions has proven extremely difficult because the Turkish political parties failed to record their proceedings. Also, many documents being held by the Ministries and the Turkish General Staff are classified and therefore inaccessible. For this reason, I had to rely on personal contacts as well as materials gathered from the Turkish Grand National Assembly Library, the American Embassy, Bilkent University Library, the Middle East Technical University Library, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of United Nations in Turkey.

The main objective of this dissertation is to present the different views prevailing on the Turkish side and to trace their origins. To achieve this, Turkish perceptions and responses to OPC from its inception to the present day are chronologically listed.

The thesis consists of three parts: developments leading to the creation of OPC and the evolution of OPC's force posture; the debates pertaining to OPC and the views of successive governments, as well as political parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish General Staff. The thesis concludes with a critical evaluation of the arguments and debates concerning the OPC. Ultimately, the objective of this thesis is to present the views of the involved parties in Turkey so that it would be useful to those wishing to understand the issue.

ÖNSÖZ

Bu tezde Operation Provide Comfort (Çekiç Güç), Türk bakış açısından incelendi. Bu konu hakkında o kadar az bilgi dışarıya verildi ki, OPC, Türk Dış Politikasında çok fazla zıt görüşe yol açtı. 1991 ve 1994 arasındaki iktidarlar da bu tavrı devam ettirince şüphelerin dağıtılması mümkün olmadı. Bu da sonuçta "yabancı güçler", bunların "gerçek amaçları", "operasyon prensipleri" ve hatta "PKK ile ilişkilerine" varıncaya dek birçok spekülasyona yol açtı.

Bu sorulara yanıt aramak da oldukça zordu. Zira Türk partileri hiçbir tutanak tutmuyordu. Bakanlıklardaki ve Genelkurmay Başkanlığı'ndaki bilgiler de gizli tutuluyordu. Bu nedenlerle kişisel ilişkilerime dayanarak T.B.M.M., O.D.T.Ü. ve Bilkent Üniversitesi Kütüphaneleri ile Amerikan Büyükelçiliği, Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Ankara'daki BM Temsilciliği'nden dökümanlar toplayarak tezimi tamamladım.

Bu tezin temel amacı OPC hakkındaki Türk tezlerini ve bunların arkasındaki nedenleri araştırmaktır. Bunu yaparken Türk görüşleri ve tepkileri başlangıcından günümüze dek tarihsel sıralama ile incelenmiştir.

Tez üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde OPC'nin oluşturulmasına yol açan sebeplere ve OPC'nin güç yapısındaki değişimlere değinilmekte; ikinci bölümde, bu dönemdeki

iktidarlar ve partilerin görüşleri ile Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın ve Genelkurmay Başkanlığı'nın görüşleri verilmekte ve son bölümde de tartışmaların ve yanıtların arandığı genel bir değerlendirme bulunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu tezle, bu konuyu daha yakından tanımak isteyenlere bir bütün olarak Türk tarafında OPC ile ilgili tarafların düşünceleri verilmek istenmiştir.

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I would like thank to everybody who helped me during different phases, in particular Prof.Ali KARAOSMANOGLU (chairman of the department), Dr.Ali Fuat BOROVALI , Ercan DURDULAR of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Esin ALBAYRAK of the Middle East Technical University, my lecturers at Bilkent University, Gülnur ERTEMLİ and my family.

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CHAPTER I

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT - A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

1.1. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE CREATION OF OPERATION

PROVIDE COMFORT

In order to evaluate the pertinent aspects of Operation Provide Comfort, it is necessary to study the developments which led to the undertaking of this operation. The Gulf Crisis began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 (See Appendix), a clear violation of the international law principle - "respect for the territorial integrity of nations". Therefore, in defence of international law and this principle, the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) decided to force Iraq to act in line with international law under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII states that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breakdown of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security .

The UNSC passed 24 resolutions related to the Gulf crisis. Resolution 660 concerned the invasion and demanded that Iraq should immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces.

On 6 August 1990 the UNSC voted to impose economic sanctions against Iraq but excluded medical supplies, humanitarian aid and foodstuffs.

Between 2 August and 29 November 1990, the UNSC passed 12 resolutions related to the situation (See Appendix). Resolution 678, adopted on 29 November 1990 by 12 members of the Security Council- Canada, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland and Malaysia - specified that if Iraq does not fully implement UNSC Resolutions relating to the occupation of Kuwait by January 1990, Member States, cooperating with Kuwait's legitimate Government, would be authorized to use all necessary means to compel Iraq to do so and restore international peace and security in the area. The necessary means, as stated in Articles 41 and 42, would be "partial or complete" interruption of economic relations and means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. Should these measures prove inadequate, the UNSC would take such action by air, sea and land forces as would be necessary to restore international peace and security.

On 16 January 1991, one day after the deadline, the United States, in coordination with the Government of Kuwait, began military operations. After heavy bombardment of the Iraqi forces, Kuwait City was retaken on 27 February. On 2 March 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 686, demanding Iraq to declare its acceptance of the 12 resolutions. On 3 March 1991, Iraq informed the Secretary General and the President

of the Security Council that it agreed to fulfill all obligations specified in Resolution 686. On 6 April 1991, Iraq officially notified the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council that it agreed to the provisions of Resolution 687.

However, especially after the actual cease-fire on 22 February 1991, internal rebellion broke out in southern and northern Iraq. The unrest during March and April in northern Iraq marked the beginning of the Kurdish rebellion and from then onwards the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq became a real concern for world public opinion and the UNSC, being recognised as a fresh threat to international peace and security.

1.1.1 Rebellion in Northern Iraq in the Aftermath of the Gulf War

Following the cease-fire, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein offered his Shi'i and Kurdish opponents separate deals giving them a share in the central government in exchange for loyalty but leaders from both groups rejected the proposals.¹ After that rejection, Saddam Hussein threatened his opponents with harsh measures including the dropping of napalm bombs. More rioting erupted in northern Iraq and, during demonstrations in Baghdad, demands were made for the resignation Saddam Hussein.

For some time, the Kurdish rebels were successful. According to analysts, Kurdish fighters took control of a large portion of northern Iraq² while Hussein was preoccupied with the southern regions of the country. On 26 March, Iraqi and international sources agreed that the uprising in the south had been quelled.³ In the north, Kurdish forces held most of Iraqi Kurdistan and were moving to Kirkuk.⁴ The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish leaders returned from exile to join the Kurdish guerilla forces fighting in the north.⁵

However, from these successes was born catastrophe for the Kurds as the Iraqi forces, having suppressed the rebellion in the south, switched their attention to the north. On 28 March 1991, Iraqi government forces launched a massive attack against Kurdish forces holding Kirkuk and Kurdish leader Talabani issued an urgent request to the Allied Countries to send food aid to Kurdish held northern Iraq through Iran and Turkey as Iraqi troops had blocked food shipments from the south.⁶ On 31 March, Iraqi Prime Minister Sadun Hammadi asserted that the uprising in the north had been suppressed and loyalist forces retaken Kirkuk, Dohuk and Erbil.⁷ On 1 April 1991, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iraq, Massud Barzani, reported that millions of Iraqi Kurds were fleeing into the mountains of northern Iraq to escape attacks by government forces.⁸ On 2 April 1991, it was reported that the Iraqi government used fixed-wing jets in defiance of the American ceasefire terms and employed chemical bombs and phosphorous shells to kill many Kurds.⁹ On

the same day, a Democratic Party of Kurdistan spokesman said that the Kurds were "facing a worse genocide than the one in Halabja". This was a reference to an attack by the Iraqi army in 1988 when poison gas was dropped on the town of Halabja and an estimated 5,000-6,000 people were killed.¹⁰ Fearing a similar attack, many civilian Kurds began to flee towards Turkish and Iranian borders and, on just 9 April, at least 150 people reportedly died trying to cross the mined Turkish-Iraqi border.¹¹

The Turkish Government were in no position to handle a sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of people. Therefore, on 2 April it closed its borders ¹² citing the fact that there was a lack of both infra-structure and resources to cope with such a massive flood of refugees.¹³ It was at this point that the Turkish president, Turgut Özal, requested for international aid to provide shelter for these people, by way of a letter to UNSC. The letter stated that owing to the action taken by Iraqi army against the local population of northern Iraq, approximately 220,000 Iraqi citizens, many of them women and children, had massed along the Turkish border. It was obvious that the Iraqi Government forces were deliberately pressing these people towards the Turkish border in order to drive them out of the country. These actions violated all norms of international behaviour towards civilian populations and constituted a threat to regional peace and security.¹⁴ The letter went on to say that, "Turkey was taking appropriate action to bring urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected Iraqi civilians and it was

expected that the heavy burden of caring for those victims of repression would be shared by international organisations as well as by those countries in a position to assist. Moreover, Turkey requested that a meeting of the Security Council be held immediately to consider this alarming situation and to adopt the necessary measures to put an end to this inhuman repression being carried out on such a massive scale".¹⁵

Following this appeal, many countries such as France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and United States began to share the burden. This resulted in Turkey reopening its southern borders on 4 April 1991.¹⁶ UNDRO and UNHCR began to operate in the region in corporation with the International Red Cross and the Turkish Red Crescent. Offers of assistance also came from Czechoslovakia, Greece, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Austria, Australia, Romania and Soviet Union. Apart from Turkey, France also wanted the UN Security Council to convene in order to provide measures "against the brutality of the Iraqi Government against Kurds". However, until 5 April, the Bush Administration rejected the proposal citing the United States' "non-intervention policy" regarding Iraq's internal affairs. But the reports of fleeing Kurds changed the attitude of the United States and Resolution 688 was adopted by the UNSC on 5 April 1991.

1.1.2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 688

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 688) was an emergency resolution and stated that a "grave concern

existed concerning the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently the Kurdish populated areas, which had led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers. Furthermore, these crossborder incursions were a threat to international peace and security in the region". The Resolution expressed "extreme [disquiet] at the magnitude of the human suffering involved". Quoting UNSCR 688, the UN Security Council firstly condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilians in the region and secondly, demanded Iraq that It should remove this threat to international peace and security in the region by immediately ending this repression". The UNSC also expressed "the hope in the same context that an open dialogue [would] take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens would be respected".

UNSCR 688 [insisted] that Iraq should allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations. The UN Secretary-General, was instructed through UNSCR 688 "to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities" He was requested to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant

United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population. At the end of Resolution 688, an appeal was made "to all member states and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts" and a demand that Iraq should cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends.

All these statements showed that UNSC wanted to stop the repression against Iraqi Kurdish population and revealed its determination to solve this humanitarian problem, using all appropriate means. UNSCR 688 also stated that all these efforts should be performed under the accepted "commitment of all member states to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all states in the area."

1.1.3. From Operation Provide Comfort I To Operation Provide Comfort II


UNSCR 688 led to the initiation of an international humanitarian aid campaign, mostly overseen by the UNHCR in northern Iraq. The aim was to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the Kurds but it became quickly evident that some kind of protective umbrella was needed to achieve this mission. From this time onwards the conditions for a "humanitarian intervention" arose. Because "the purpose of the humanitarian intervention was not the creation of a new state ¹⁷ [in northern Iraq] but only the protection of human rights [in that region] keeping the international law

principle of-respect to the territories of the sovereign states by the threat or the use of international force.¹⁸ This was also the reasoning behind the Resolution 688.


Within those lines, to prevent the unimpeded flow of international aid to northern Iraq, firstly the United States, initiated the humanitarian intervention and within the framework of UNSCR 688, warned Iraq on 6 April 1991 not to undertake any military action in northern Iraq.¹⁹

Over the following days, Turkey and the EC-especially the United Kingdom-suggested the creation of "safe havens" in northern Iraq. In support of this suggestion the United States, on 10 April 1991, "issued an injunction against Iraq to cease all military activity north of the 36th parallel, encompassing an area bordered by a line to the north of the oil producing area around Kirkuk, reaching up to the border with Turkey. A White House spokesman indicated that the US had also warned Iraq that any military interference would be met with force".²⁰

The United States, for some time, had wanted a firm threat to be issued by the United Nations but, Perez De Cuellar, Secretary General at the time, rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would be against the principle of the Charter regarding non-intervention in the internal affairs of the independent states, favouring an "agreement of the Security Council".²¹ On 11 April 1991, President Bush announced the establishment of "informal safe havens" in northern Iraq from



Map 1: Safe Havens in Northern Iraq, Keesing's p. 38127



Map 2: No fly-zones in Iraq, Keesing's p. 38127

where aid would be disbursed to refugees. Bush warned Iraqi President against interfering with humanitarian aid efforts in any part of Iraq.²² On 7 April 1991, the US military initiated "Operation Provide Comfort "(OPC), a relief aid campaign in northern Iraq intended to provide food and temporary shelter for 700,000 refugees until other relief groups were able to take over the efforts.²³

Within 36 hours, in the first phase of OPC, US Air Force planes flew from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, dropping the first urgently needed supplies. On that first day OPC forces flew six air-drop missions, sending 32,000 pounds of food, water, clothing, tents, and blankets to the refugees. By day seven, this figure had grown to 1,707,000 pounds. Over the next few weeks, US Army, Navy, Marine and allied aircraft and personnel joined the relief efforts.²⁴ The Allied forces moved into northern Iraq on 17 April, following an announcement by Bush on 16 April reversing his administration's policy regarding non-intervention, committing American troops to set up encampments in northern Iraq to ensure the safety of Kurdish refugees and coordinate relief supplies.²⁵

This announcement by President Bush also contained a reassurance to the Kurds that adequate security would be provided at the temporary sites by American, British, and French air and ground forces, consistent with Resolution 688.²⁶ The coalition forces established a security zone in northern Iraq, barring entry to Iraqi military and security forces and allowing the vast majority of refugees to return

to their homes. The security zone, which still exists, measures approximately 160 miles wide by 50 miles deep.²⁷

Simultaneously, on 19 April, on the Turco-Iraqi border, the establishment of safe havens was negotiated with Iraqi officials. Following these developments, Iraq announced on 25 April that it was withdrawing all but 50 of its security personnel from the allied safe haven around Zakho. The announcement followed an ultimatum issued by France, the United Kingdom and the United States threatening the use of force.²⁸ On 16 April 1991, Bush stressed his intention to turn over the administration and security of these sites as soon as possible to the UN.²⁹ To this end, in late April 1991, a Military Coordination Center Team (MCC) was established to monitor conditions in northern Iraq, to confer with local authorities, and to ensure Iraqi military forces' adherence to the coalition's conditions to guarantee non-interference with humanitarian operations.

Today, the MCC is stationed in Zakho, Iraq, where coalition military officers continue to coordinate with Iraqi military authorities, the efforts of the people of northern Iraq, the United Nations Agencies and private humanitarian agencies.³⁰ On 13 May 1991, the United Nations took over the first temporary community near Zakho, and refugees began moving into this and other camps. By early June, virtually all the refugees had left Turkey and returned to Iraq.³¹ The United Nations High Commission for Refugees assumed responsibility for relief efforts in the security zone in

northern Iraq on 7 June 1991.³² However, the installation of UNHCR units in northern Iraq led to a fear of an Iraqi attack following the departure of the multinational forces that had participated in Operation Provide Comfort as only 236 UN soldiers replaced nearly 21,000 allied forces from 15 July onwards.

1.2. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT II

In July 1991, with the completion of withdrawal of UN forces from Iraq approaching, a deterrent force was needed for the protection of the civilians in the region. It was to be a small unit composed of 5,000 men with aircraft support, but its function was to be a "tripwire," meaning that any aggressive intentions by the Iraqi army would be answered with a bigger response with American aircraft stationed on American aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea or the Gulf. It was to be a clear message to Saddam to stop at the 36th parallel. Thus, Operation Provide Comfort II was conceived to replace OPC I. As its name suggests, it was still to be a humanitarian operation but a brigade-size rapid reaction force in southern Turkey would be on hand to quell the fears of the Kurds. But, still the plan had to be approved by the Turkish Government.³³

With OPC II, the mission officially changed from providing just relief to a deterrent against Iraqi encroachment into the security zone and a means to promote the stability and security of the people in northern Iraq.³⁴ Until the fall of

1991, as the situation stabilized, a Combined Battalion Task Force made up of ground forces from six nations was held in readiness in Silopi, Turkey, just across the border from Iraq. Four nations were involved in the Combined Task Force whose mission was to deter possible Iraqi aggression by monitoring its compliance with the Security Council resolutions and the 36th parallel no-fly zone.³⁵

OPC II was a multinational force and revealed the serious intentions of the participating states and reminded Iraq of "what might happen if it acted against the Kurds."³⁶ Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary of the time, commenting on the message given by OPC, listed the four conditions of OPC II as,

- The Iraqis must be made to understand clearly that they risk military reprisals if they do not respect the rights of the Kurds,

- UN sanctions must be kept in place for the foreseeable future,

- The build up of UN guards to replace western-forces in Northern Iraq must continue at a faster pace,

- A satisfactory agreement between Baghdad and the Kurds guaranteeing Kurdish rights and security must be concluded.³⁷

OPC II was designed to be a long-term deterrent force. Although American air power in Turkey would remain the most potent deterrent ground force, possibly consisting of rotating American, British, French, Italian, and Dutch troops

stationed in southern Turkey, would be an additional deterrent.³⁸ It was also stated by Paul Wolfowitz, the Assistant Secretary of Defence of the United States, that it would not be a "police force" to protect Western interests in the region.³⁹

Following negotiations with participating states that took place from mid-June to mid-July, OPC II's deterrent nature was approved by the Turkish Government as well. In a government press release, dated 24 July 1991, it was stated that the operation was named Operation Provide Comfort II. It was also stated that the action was based on Resolution 688 (5 July 1994) and on the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly granting the Government to decide on the deployment of foreign forces in Turkey dated 17 January 1991 (Numbered 126), however, it was stressed that the presence in Turkey of the multinational force participating in the Operation Provide Comfort II would be temporary. The time limit was set as 30 September 1991 unless an extension was granted by the Turkish government.⁴⁰

The explanations concerning the force's posture and aims of Operation Provide Comfort were stated as:

- To deter Iraqis from using force north of 36th parallel so that humanitarian aid could continue to be provided,
- Its co-commanders will be one Turkish and one American General,
- Its total force will be 5,000 , 2,000 of whom would be support personnel,

-Its ground forces will be stationed in Silopi and Batman and numbering 3,000 soldiers from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey,

- Its air forces will be stationed in Incirlik and would be composed of F-16, A-10, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft totalling 48,

- Its support forces will be stationed on the [American] aircraft carrier Forrestal, patrolling in East Mediterranean,

-Its operational forces will be provided with personnel not numbering more than 1,500 to deal with helicopters and the maintenance of existing equipment.⁴¹

1.3. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT IN EVOLUTION

Operation Provide Comfort II was successful in the period between July and September 1991 in deterring the Iraqi forces but the general situation in northern Iraq had still not become settled by the September deadline. Therefore, on 22 September 1991, the Turkish Council of Ministers decided to extend the period of OPC II from 30 September 1991 to 30 December 1991. The decision was basically identical to the one passed on 12 July 1991 but this time it included the proviso that -all allied ground troops and helicopters based on the Turkish border with Iraq were to be withdrawn within 30 days. Only the air-strike force in Incirlik would continue to deter Iraqi aggression against the Kurds. Simultaneously, American officials confirmed that additional F-111 fighter and EF-111 reconnaissance aircraft would be deployed,

replacing the much slower A-10 warthog tank-busters. The total air-strike force would remain at 48 aircraft.⁴²

On 24 September 1991, the spokesman of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that "deterrence would be provided through air power instead of ground forces."⁴³ On 20 December 1991, the Council of Ministers for a second time, extended the period of Operation Provide Comfort II from the 30 December 1991 to the 30 June 1992. On this occasion the Council of Ministers returned the grant of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to the Council of Ministers the right to decide on the deployment of foreign forces in Turkey. This decision, dated 17th January 1991 (Numbered 126), gave the prerogative to make such decisions back to the Turkish Grand National Assembly and is an indication of Turkish sensitivity towards the presence of "foreign forces" on Turkish soil. In fact, the government did not want to take the responsibility of extending Operation Provide Comfort II for a third time. Thus, when it came to a third extension, it was the Turkish Grand National Assembly instead of Council of Ministers who extended the period from the 30 June 1992 to the 30 December 1992.

This decision repeated that Operation Provide Comfort II would be used for deterrent purposes against Iraqi Government's use of force against Kurds as well as for the prevention of another refugee crisis and humanitarian catastrophe in northern Iraq. Decision 126, was taken with

reference to Resolution 688 and the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) dated 17 January 1991.⁴⁴

With this decision, it was stressed that ground forces were not to be deployed in Turkey anymore. In a press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was stated that there were only 1831 personnel responsible for the support and maintenance services of the 48 allied aircraft (32 American, 8 French, 8 British) and 4 Turkish aircraft based in Incirlik. There were also 56 personnel stationed in Piriñlik (Diyarbakir) and Zakho (Iraq) in order to monitor the daily developments in northern Iraq for the Military Coordination Committee. For transportation between Diyarbakir and Zakho there were 6 helicopters with at least one Turkish personnel aboard every flight.⁴⁵

The success of Operation Provide Comfort II in deterring Iraqis and continuing humanitarian aid to the Kurds led to the extension of the period by the TGNA an additional four times so far. The first extension was voted on 24 December 1992 and lasted until 30 June 1993. The second was approved on 24 June 1993 and its validation was until 31 December 1993. The third extension for another six months starting from 30 December 1993 was accepted by the TGNA on 28 December 1991. The most recent extension was approved by the TGNA on 16 June 1994. (The decisions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly regarding the Gulf crisis and Operation Provide Comfort II are available in the Appendix)

The last four extensions did not change the force posture of Operation Provide Comfort II. At present, the principal forces of deterrence are aircraft totalling 48 (F-111, Mirage, Jaguar and EF-111s). The main strategic defense force is still the American aircraft carrier Forrestal in Eastern Mediterranean.

When one examines the evolution of the OPC, it is clear that the ground forces occupied an important place in providing deterrence during the first phase of the operation but after October 1991 the main deterring factor was the flights over the safety zone to the north of the 36th parallel. From the beginning of OPC II, despite the change in its force posture, its humanitarian goal, as stipulated by UNSC Resolution 688, remained the prime objective.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Washington Post, 8 March 1991
2. Ibid., 15 March 1991
3. New York Times , 27 March 1991
4. Washington Post, 28 March 1991
5. Ibid., 27 March 1991
6. New York Times , 29 March 1991
7. Washington Post, 1 April 1991
8. Ibid., 2 April 1991
9. The Independent , 2 April 1991
10. Financial Times , 2 April 1991
11. Keesing's Record of World Events , p.38126
12. New York Times, 3 April 1991
13. Keesing's , p.38128
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CHAPTER II

POINTS ON OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

There are different views and debates concerning OPC but they can be categorised according to two groups - those belonging to the government and those espoused by the opposition. The views of the former are evident from the decisions of the Council of Ministers and the decisions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The perspectives of the opposition were spelled out during the debates prior to the TGNA decisions. Thus, to fully understand the range of views it is first necessary to study the texts of the Council of Ministers and TGNA decisions in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

2.1. POINTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE DEBATES FOR THE OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

2.1.1. Decision of the TGNA on 17 January 1991

As would be expected, the views of the Government, formulated by the governing Motherland Party, centered on the points raised during the first TGNA debate on the stationing of "foreign forces" in Turkey. On 17 January 1991, the Motherland Party engineered the decision of the TGNA to permit the foreign troops to stay in Turkey under the grounds

of Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution and in accordance with UNSCR resolution 678. The principal aim was to protect the vital interests of Turkey, which were being threatened by the crisis, and pursue "an active foreign policy".¹

During the debate prior to the approval of the Governmental decree, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, summarised the developments that had led to the crisis and tried to explain the reasons for the deployment of the 48 aircraft in Turkey. He insisted that these forces were not to be used immediately but to be on hand as a precautionary measure.² Minister of State, Kamran İnan repeated the views of his Government and insisted that Turkey's aim was not to open a Second Front in the north. He re-iterated that all these steps had been taken to restore the rule of international law in the region.³ That same day, Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut reported that the decision represented a last resort to avoid war in the region. The TGNA, by this decision, authorized the Council of Ministers to implement its power and initiate the application phases of Operation Provide Comfort.

2.1.2. Decision of the Council Of Ministers on 24 July 1991

On 24 July 1991, the Decision of the Council of Ministers regarding OPC was released to the press. It repeated the views of the TGNA that had led to the decision being approved on 17 January 1991. The Council of Ministers' decision opened the way to Operation Provide Comfort II or "Poised Hammer" as

it was dubbed by the Turkish press. The decision stressed that the aim was merely to provide humanitarian aid to northern Iraq, in fulfillment of the TGNA's 17 January 1991 decision taken to accord with UNSCR 688. The press release repeated that the forces taking part in the operation would only stay in Turkey until 30 September.⁴

2.1.3. Decision of the Council Of Ministers on 24 September

1991

The Council of Ministers' 24 July decision was based on the assumption that OPC II's humanitarian mission would have been accomplished by 30 September deadline. However, by the time the deadline was reached the situation still had not changed so the 24 September decision was only different from its predecessor in as much as it mentioned the incompleting humanitarian aid operation's development.⁵

2.1.4. Decision of the Council Of Ministers on 20 December

1991

The following Council of Ministers decision was taken on 20 December 1991 and once again extended the stay of foreign forces in Turkey. However it was amended by the addition of a condition stating that the right to authorize any further extension of operations by foreign forces in Turkey would pass from the Council of Ministers back to the TGNA. Thus, although the content of the decision was basically the same as the previous one, the new deadline was set as 30 June and

transferred any other extension right to the TGNA.⁶ This difference reflected pressures from opposition groups and parties who questioned the stated aims of Operation Provide Comfort.

2.1.5. Decision of the TGNA on 26 June 1992

It was the first decision passed by the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Demirel's True Path Party and İnönü's Social Democratic Populist Party. The declared aim of the coalition was to correct mistakes, including those concerning Operation Provide Comfort, made by the previous government. Yet in fact they acted in line with previous policies in contradiction to their program.

During the TGNA debate of 26 June 1992 regarding a six month extension of Operation Provide Comfort, the Coalition Government upheld the policies of the previous government. The Governmental proposal submitted to the TGNA for approval reiterated that the aim of the Operation Provide Comfort was to prevent and to deter the threats that emerged just after the Gulf War. The possible dangers that could threaten Turkey's physical, economic and social security were pointed out and cited as a reason why it was necessary permit a further six month extension. The same government proposal also declared the status of the deterrent forces and the contribution of the Turkish Armed Forces would be decided by the Council of Ministers and kept strictly secret. The decision was based on the same grounds as previous ones: UNSCR 688 and Article 92 of the Constitution of Turkey.⁷

During the debate, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin recounted the history of Operation Provide Comfort and gave information about the force's posture and its aims. He also stressed that these forces were only to be stationed in Turkey temporarily. Therefore, they were not to be looked upon as foreign forces providing Western support for a de-facto Kurdish state. Hikmet Çetin, in his address to the TGNA, added that the extraordinary situation in northern Iraq was continuing and there remained a threat of an attack by the 170,000 Iraqi soldiers (about 18 brigades) just below the 36th parallel. He also refuted the accusation that the action represented an incursion against "the integrity of Iraq" saying that not only Turkey but also the United States and other allies had repeatedly confirmed that the principles of law relating to respect for the integrity of independent states still applied and related also to Iraq. He said that the elections in Iraq could not be considered as an indication of a normal democratic process but as the sole means to prevent chaos in a region where all authority had been temporarily lost. He did not forget to mention that Operation Provide Comfort II was taking place under the scrutiny of a Turkish co-commander, thus eliminating the suspicion that the OPC was not controlled by the Turkish side.⁸

On the question as "to what extent these small forces would deter 18 brigades of Iraqi Army and replace the Turkish Armed Forces stationed in the region", Ali Dinçer, from the

Social Democratic Populist Party emphasized that the actual extent of deterrence implied was unrelated to the size of the military force as its multinational nature was an additional deterring factor on its own.⁹ After the debate, the Government decree was approved by the TGNA and thus Operation Provide Comfort II was extended for another six months, ending 30 December 1992.

2.1.6. Decision of the TGNA on 24 December 1992

The final proposal brought before the TGNA for voting was exactly the same as its predecessor approved on 26 June 1992 in as much as it requested a further six month extension. Even the wording of the proposal was the same and during the debate Minister Çetin found himself answering the same questions as he had answered six months before. He added that Turkey had no desire to become an enemy of Iraq and that sharing the responsibility with a multinational force negated the "image of Turkey as an enemy" in the eyes of Iraqi public opinion.

On the point whether the Operation Provide Comfort forces known as the Combined Task Force were helping the PKK, he emphasized that all the flights in the region were controlled by Turkish staff who would immediately detect such a situation if it should arise. Çetin also reported that the deterrence force would be given a six months extension but if the situation should normalize there would be no further extension. But, he continued, as the situation in northern

Iraq had so far remained critical, there was a necessity for the deployment of the forces in Turkey for the immediate future.¹⁰

Aydin Güven Gürkan, speaking for the Social Democratic Populist Party Group, supported the government's views and added that Syria, Iran and other regional states had, like Turkey, declared their respect for the integrity of Iraq. He said that Operation Provide Comfort, as its name implied, was a humanitarian mission performed in accordance with UNSCR 688 and represented the optimum choice. He supported the view that, if Turkey played its cards right, support for the motion would be in Turkey's national interests.¹¹

2.1.7. Decision of the TGNA on 24 June 1993

The government's decree extended Operation Provide Comfort an additional six months until 30 December 1993 and was identical to the previous one. The related questions from the TGNA members were also very similar but this time the government was less forthcoming with its answers. A point made was that, despite all intentions to the contrary, the forces were still stationed in Turkey and the Iraqi forces were still poised just below the 36th parallel and threatening a massacre. Therefore, although the situation was very different from that which had existed in 1991, there was still a clear need for a deterrent force to prevent a catastrophe.¹² Cemal Şahin, speaking for the Social Democratic Populist Party, made little effort to allay the suspicions

concerning OPC II, dwelling more on the effectiveness of the operation, providing peace and stability in the region and in deterring Iraqi forces.¹³

2.1.8. Decision of the TGNA on 28 December 1993 and on 14
June 1994

Hikmet Çetin, as Foreign Minister, repeated the views of his government as he had in previous parliamentary debates on OPC II. The Turkish government of the day continued to perceive a need for OPC II and submitted proposals that were voted upon and legislated on 28 December 1993 and again on 14 June 1994.¹⁴

2.2. POINTS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE DEBATES ON
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

The following section of this thesis contrasts the views of the opposition parties aired in the TGNA between 1991 and 1994. In particular, it examines the views of the Motherland Party, the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party both in and out of office. This section of the thesis also attempts to explain why certain suspicions arose concerning the true of Operation Provide Comfort and the re-alignment of allegiances in Turkish politics.

2.2.1. Motherland Party

It was the Motherland Party, the ruling party in 1991, that first accepted the stationing of foreign forces within the framework of UNSCR 688 and on the basis of Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution. In time, their perspective evolved to the point where they began to stress that the aims of the Operation Provide Comfort had greatly changed. According to the Motherland Party, the aim of the Operation had been transformed from being solely humanitarian to the establishment of a puppet regime in northern Iraq by Western states. This, it was claimed, revealed that there had also been a strategic aim - to protect oil areas from Saddam.¹⁵ Thus, the Motherland Party, the main opposition grouping, insisted, as a prerequisite for their support, that more controls on the Operation should be imposed and that the government should take a more active stance in foreign affairs. During the parliamentary debate on the government's proposal brought before the TGNA on 24 December 1992, Safa Giray, speaking for the Motherland Party Group, reminded the Coalition Government of their previous views on "expelling the foreign force" from Turkey. He said that the True Path Party and Social Democratic Populist Party had, whilst in opposition, had rejected the views of the Motherland Party because they had perceived them as a threat to Turkey's national interests, dragging Turkey into the Gulf War and creating a second front. Giray also reminded them of their changing views regarding the operation's humanitarian aims. He said that only three states, United Kingdom, France and

the United States - the mandate states of the past in the region , instead of the original 13 nations of the humanitarian aid operation, were still participating, which demonstrated their unchanged ambitions for the region. On that occasion the proposal was passed but included the provision that if the operation continued it would have to be under strict Turkish control.¹⁶

During the parliamentary debate on the extension of the period of Operation Provide Comfort that took place on 24 June 1993, Kamran İnan, addressing the TGNA on behalf of the Motherland Party Group, repeated the previous views of his party but went on to say that new factors had emerged concerning the status of the Operation Provide Comfort. One of these factors was the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the changing structure of international politics in the region. Another factor was the use of the Operation Provide Comfort to pursue aims outside its original brief such as the bombing of Iraq. He added that the actions of the Operation Provide Comfort participants could not be controlled effectively by the Government. Therefore a dynamic foreign policy would have to be applied in relation to Operation Provide Comfort to pursue the best national interests of Turkey. He concluded by emphasizing that all measures should be taken to ensure that Operation Provide Comfort followed strictly legal guidelines.¹⁷

In the parliamentary debate on 28 December 1993, Engin Güner speaking for his party group repeated the previous

views of his party and added that OPC II has become a source of suspicion as it had been used in the past as a tool for the creation of a Kurdish state in the region. Therefore, the developments had to be communicated to the public by the government. He also wanted an extension of only three months instead of six.¹⁸

2.2.2. True Path Party

Before coming to power as the major partner of a coalition government, the True Path Party had been absolutely opposed the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey, perceiving them to as a means by which a second front might be opened against Iraq during the Gulf War. During the Parliamentary debate on 17 January 1991, Süleyman Demirel, speaking for his party group, asked for the real reason for the stationing of 48 aircraft in Turkey.¹⁹ But later on, when the True Path Party came to power, they began to support the Operation Provide Comfort.

2.2.3. Social Democratic Populist Party

Just like its coalition partner, the Social Democratic Populist Party had also been firmly against the deployment of foreign forces in Turkey before coming to the power. They had seen Operation Provide Comfort as a violation of the national interests of Turkey. Erdal İnönü, speaking to the TGNA on the behalf of his party group on 17 January 1991, said that they were against these forces because they regarded them as a

means by which Turkey would be drawn into the Gulf War.²⁰ But their views also changed dramatically when they became a coalition partner of the government.

2.2.4. Welfare Party

The islamic fundamentalist Welfare Party had criticized the idea of deploying foreign forces in Turkey for any reason right from the very beginning of Operation Provide Comfort. In the parliamentary debate on 26 June 1992, the Welfare Party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, addressing the TGNA for his party group, described Operation Provide Comfort forces as an occupying army. He went even further, claiming that these forces were actively assisting the PKK. He also condemned Demirel and İnönü for changing their views after coming to power. He said that the Americans had deliberately forced the Kurds to flee from northern Iraq in order to create a reason for the revival of the Treaty of Sevres is signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied States of the First World War in 1919. He totally rejected the deterrent character of Operation Provide Comfort.²¹ In his speech criticizing Operation Provide Comfort, Erbakan, in accordance with his pro-Islamic views, suggested the replacement of American personnel with an islamic force.²²

On 24 December 1992, Adbullah Gül, speaking for his Party Group in the TGNA, repeated his Party's understanding of the Treaty of Sevres and insisted that Operation Provide Comfort was helping not only the PKK but also the Armenians. He said

that the forces involved in this Operation were being used to create a de-facto Kurdish state on the borders of Turkey.²³

During the TGNA debate on 24 June 1993 Şevket Kazan took a more pragmatic stance. He summarized the conditions and reasons for the deployment of Operation Provide Comfort and criticized the changing views of the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party. He claimed that the Operation was without any legal basis as, in his opinion, there was no threat coming from northern Iraq. On the contrary, it was his belief that if there was a threat it was from the Americans towards the territorial integrity of Turkey.²⁴ On 28 December 1993, Abdullah Gül repeated his party's views and continued to say that OPC II was a "strange development" in Turkish Politics.²⁵

2.2.5. Democratic Left Party

As the second biggest leftist party, Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party consistently opposed OPC, not only criticizing the Operation but also putting forward policy recommendations. Bülent Ecevit had from the earliest debates concerning Operation Provide Comfort, pointed out that the countries who had contributed the foreign forces in the region were the same as those who had once ruled the region by mandate after World War I and their true aim was to create the conditions that would lead to the renewal of the Treaty of Sevres. He claimed that, as a result, a new Kurdish State would be established in northern Iraq in the near future.²⁶ He

also cited the strategic importance of Iraq and its oil reserves saying this was the main reason for the deployment of foreign forces in Turkey. Therefore he considered the forces stationed in Turkey as contrary to Turkey's national interests and would amount to suicide should a Kurdish state be established. In his opinion, the loss of authority in Northern Iraq caused by Operation Provide Comfort was the major reason for the increasing frequency of clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Armed forces. Ecevit also suggested the expulsion of these forces from Turkey to be replaced with a control mechanism established by Turkey. He concluded by requesting that Turkey should re-establish diplomatic contacts with Iraq.²⁷

In the parliamentary debate of 26 June 1992, he again supported the view that the authority void in northern Iraq was the main reason for the increasing number of PKK attacks over the past years. He added that Turkish foreign policy was so tied to American foreign policy that Turkey could not do anything to further its own national interests. Therefore, for Ecevit, Turkey was being used to help create a Kurdish state in the region. He also warned the Government to protect the Turkmens in the region along with the Kurds and to re-establish diplomatic links with Iraq immediately.²⁸

On 24 December 1992, Ecevit repeated his Party's views to the TGNA and added that all the events leading up to Operation Provide Comfort were part of a greater scenario designed by the Americans, the British and the French in

accordance with their national interests. He rejected the excuse of the Government that the aim of the Western powers was to guarantee the territorial integrity of Iraq on the grounds that in effect a de-facto Kurdish state had been established in the region.²⁹

On 24 June 1993, during a parliamentary debate, Ecevit reported that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had confirmed that the existing situation in northern Iraq had helped them expand and grow. Therefore, he insisted that for Turkey's foreign policy should accord with the country's best interests and that Turkey had to expel the foreign forces and reestablish diplomatic ties with Iraq.³⁰ On 28 December 1993, Ecevit repeated his known views on OPC II and added that Turkey was committing suicide by letting these forces be stationed on its soil.³¹

2.2.6. Republican People's Party

Another leftist party which had remained consistent and realistic in its views, was the Republican People's Party (RPP). Deniz Baykal, the leader of the RPP, stated that another deterrence mechanism was required to take the place of Operation Provide Comfort. He said that, except for Turkey, the existing forces were just being used to further the national interests of the participating states. He proposed the establishment of a mechanism that would combine with the internal mechanisms of the states of the region and added that Turkey's forces were sufficient to control the

situation.³² On 24 December 1992, Uluç Gürkan, speaking on the behalf of his party, evaluated in an address to the TGNA the changing conditions in the region. He said that initially the motive of the operation had just been humanitarian and thus the deterrent effect of the operation was justifiable but this situation no longer existed. Thus, he continued, the main question to be answered was what was the true aim of Operation Provide Comfort and why just the forces from the former mandate powers of the region were involved instead of the 13 nations that had originally participated. He emphasized that Operation Provide Comfort II rather than OPC I had served the interests of the three major states influential in the region with the creation of a Kurdish state. He added that since there was a clear authority void in northern Iraq, Turkey was not in a position to handle all the problems existing in the region and with each development the situation was slipping further out of Turkey's control. Gürkan, also repeated that the stationing of these forces had not only fostered the climate that had led to the creation of a Kurdish state but had also encouraged a situation whereby the frequency of PKK attacks had increased. He criticized the existence of these forces saying they were an obstacle between Turkey and Iraq. Gürkan added that since the presence of these forces was illegal, their expulsion would serve Turkey's best national interests.³³

On 24 June 1993, Uluç Gürkan spoke again on the behalf of his party, repeating these views and giving an evaluation of Turkish foreign policy. With regard to this issue, he

emphasized that the dependence of Turkish foreign policy on Western powers was an indication of the weak and powerless situation of Turkey. For him, in order to establish an independent Turkish foreign policy, Turkey had to step forward in accordance with its own national interests, not only with regard to northern Iraq but also in relation to the Caucasus and Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁴

2.2.7. Nationalist Movement Party

Alpaslan Türkeş's Nationalist Movement Party was one of the opposition groups usually considered to possess more realistic views. But contrary to Erbakan, Türkeş supported the views for OPC. But he also added the view that the events which had taken place in the aftermath of the Gulf War were just parts of a scenario. In his opinion, Turkey could not defend its own interests against the major powers of the world. Turkey, firstly had to construct its own foreign policy and later on should take back Kirkuk, an oil rich region stolen from Turkey in the aftermath of the First World War.³⁵

2.2.8. People's Labour Party

The predominantly Kurdish ,People's Labour Party, once banned by the court, remained neutral to Operation Provide Comfort but implicitly supported the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey. However, they generally accepted the view that these forces were in reality pursuing their own national

interests. On the other hand, Ahmet Türk, the leader of the People's Labour Party, maintained that the existence of these forces in the region did not automatically mean the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. He added that the underlying issue was not Operation Provide Comfort but the establishment of friendship between the Kurds and the Turks who had been living peacefully together in the Middle East for hundreds of years.³⁶

2.3. POINTS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Following the initiation of Operation Provide Comfort, on 24 July 1991, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared its official views on OPC. As can be seen, the views reflect the Government's opinions and parliamentary debates on OPC. The first official declaration was worded as

"the principal aim of OPC will be to prevent the inflow of refugees into Turkey again and to force Iraq to obey the UN Resolutions on this matter."

The main points concerning OPC were listed as below:

- An international force consisting of land and air forces would be deployed in Turkey temporarily,

- Turkey will participate with this force which will be co-commanded by an American and a Turkish commander. The two commanders will have the same status, consult each other and act in coordination.³⁷

In the same declaration "the principles of implementation" were noted as

"- The Force can not use Turkish land and airspace for any aggressive attack against Iraq without prior permission from the Turkish Government. This rule will be valid for the US naval force in the Mediterranean Sea, held as a support force for OPC,

- The numbers and locations of the participating forces will be decided in coordination with the Turkish General Staff,

- The decrees and regulations for the transport, implementation and stationing of OPC forces will be determined by the Turkish General Staff in line with Turkish regulations and laws,

- All claims to immunity of OPC personnel would be dependent upon prior permission from the Turkish Government,

- The stay of OPC forces in Turkey will be temporary and the extent of the limit would be dependent on the wishes of the Turkish Government."³⁸

This declaration reveals that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was "for" the stationing of OPC as long as the circumstances in Iraq remained critical. The declaration stated that "the Turkish authorities dealing with this matter via the Foreign Ministry consider that the principal aims are to provide defence against prospective Iraqi aggression and to continue the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to northern Iraq."

It was perceived by the Turkish Foreign Ministry that an international force was both necessary and acceptance of such a force showed Turkey in a positive light in the eyes of world public opinion. Despite the fact that Turkey was manifestly unable to cope with the problems of the region on its own, because of the clear humanitarian nature of the OPC mission, Turkey's compliance created a favourable impression all over the world.

The said declaration pointed out that since the force was to be controlled by the Turkish General Staff, there was no problem in their being stationed in Turkey. The authorities did not deny that the presence of the foreign forces could possibly be against the interests of Turkey but felt that such a situation was acceptable as long as long as Turkey kept control. During the debate on 'Mandatory Powers in the region', the Ministry officials stated that it was necessary to involve Turkey in such an international operation to match the spirit of the emerging New World Order. It was felt that without co-operation with the major states, no single country could deal alone with inter-territorial problems.

In short, as long as Allied forces acted within the framework of Resolution 688 and was under the control of the Turkish General Staff, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not oppose OPC. These views are repeated in various forms in all the reports of the Ministry and were explicitly spelled out by the government prior to the extension of the duration of Operation Provide Comfort.

Generally repeating the same views expressed earlier, the declaration concluded that "as long as the current circumstances continue in Iraq, the OPC should stay in Turkey."³⁹

Regarding the question as to whether such a small multinational force could provide sufficient deterrence in the region, the view of the Ministry was that it was the message of implicit international support rather than the number of personnel that offered the best deterrence against Iraq. It was considered that the fact that behind the small forces involved in OPC II stood the whole Turkish army, the USA, the UK and France, all ready to punish any violation of UNSCR 688 by Iraq, would be an added deterrence. The Gulf War had revealed that the technology of the OPC forces was so superior to that of Iraq that the Iraqis would desist from trying to take advantage of their numerical supremacy. It was further understood that the aim of OPC II was not to replace the Turkish Armed Forces stationed in the south-eastern region of Turkey. The number of Iraqi's just below the 36th parallel was approximately the same as the Turkish troops in the region but through OPC II, Turkey was able to secure the region without actual fighting and at the least cost. The participating states shared this view, considering the absence of actual warfare as the most suitable situation to achieve the humanitarian goals of OPC II. The Turkish Foreign Ministry also expressed the view that OPC II not only contributed to Turkish security but also was the best means for Turkey to co-operate with the participating states. It

was clear that such an alliance greatly increased strategic cooperation between Turkey and the United States.

2.4. POINTS OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF

From 1991 onwards, the Turkish General Staff always perceived OPC as a political issue and one to be decided by politicians rather than by soldiers. Especially during the first days of the OPC, when the status and the functions of the force were undetermined, there were some suspicions amongst the Turkish General Staff but, as the "principles of implementation" became clear, these suspicions disappeared.

On 26 July 1991, the Turkish General Staff stated in press release that the Turkish Government and the Turkish General Staff would retain full control of OPC. Thus, when the controversy over whether the OPC forces were helping the PKK erupted on 28 October 1991, the Turkish General Staff announced that such a situation was out of question as every action of OPC was monitored and controlled by Turkish officials.⁴⁰

Despite this, there was much speculation in the Turkish press that the Turkish General Staff resented the failure of the United States to provide reconnaissance reports and intelligence to the Turkish Army concerning the PKK in the region.⁴¹ In fact, the Turkish General Staff considered the whole operation as a political matter and had declared that their job was to implement political decisions, not to

criticize them. It can be said that the Turkish General Staff preferred to express its views in the National Security Council and thus effected Governmental views which are supporture of the OPC.

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CHAPTER III

AN EVALUATION OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

The events that took place in northern Iraq between 1991 and 1994 and their relationship with the OPC forced the implementation of this humanitarian operation to be split into two phases. The first aim of OPC I was to provide emergency aid to the people fleeing from northern Iraq to Turkey; OPC II was to provide security in northern Iraq in order that these people could later return to their homes. Such an operation was deemed necessary because the flow of hundreds of thousands of people endangered the security of Turkey in terms of strategic, sociological and economic considerations.

To sum up, the refugee crisis was so severe that it was impossible for Turkey to cope with the problem alone and therefore UNSCR 688 was adopted and implemented by the UN, its agencies and the Allied forces. When the necessity for an organized operation became clear, Operation Provide Comfort was planned and an appeal was issued to the world community to participate in the operation. Following this, 13 nations responded and volunteered to realise this humanitarian mission. Once the security of northern Iraq had been re-established and the refugees had returned to their homes, the mission came to an end but then the possibility arose of

"another refugee crisis" if Iraq was left without control. Therefore the second phase of the Operation was initiated. Operation Provide Comfort II aimed at the continuation of humanitarian aid to the region and at deterring the Iraqi forces from repeating earlier aggresions. This changed the profile of OPC II from being primarily humanitarian to deterrence. It is obvious that the changing international circumstances in the region changed the objectives of the participating states and that these changes caused controversy against OPC within the field of Turkish politics. In fact, from the very beginning, the legal status of OPC and its "hidden purpose" had aroused much suspicion in Turkey.

Was OPC a scenario created by the ex-mandatory powers of the region in order to create a semi-independent Kurdish state to be used for the protection of Gulf oil by the major powers? Was it in the interests of Turkey to let these forces stay on its land or was it suicidal for Turkey especially considering the PKK and the Armenian relationship-an illusion put forward by the Welfare Party? Was there a real threat to Turkey from Iraq and to what extent did Turkey need an international force to cope with such a threat?

There exist numerous questions of this nature but in this dissertation only the data and references have been given to help in understanding and act as a guide towards analytic thinking. In general, it can be stated that the deployment of OPC was in Turkey's best interests as the aim of these forces was not to create a Kurdish state in the region but to

provide stability in the region and deter Iraq from forcing Kurdish civilians from flooding into Turkey. This was vital because the demographic and economic structure of the region meant that Turkey could not cope with such a massive crisis alone.

Thus, the intention of Turkey right from beginning was to protect its interests by retaining control of OPC. During the July 1991 negotiations that led to the creation of the OPC, the "principles of implementation" adopted by the Turkish Government had been carefully prepared to fit with UNSC Resolution 688 which had been originally a Turkish initiative anyway. Being permanent members of UNSC and of NATO, the inclusion of the United States, France and United Kingdom as participants in OPC was to be expected and unrelated to their one time role as mandatory powers.

The Turkish government was well aware that many question would arise during the creation phase of OPC and, in particular, that there would be great controversy surrounding the idea of stationing foreign forces in Turkey. It had been obvious that they would face difficulty in obtaining extension decrees from the TGNA. In fact, every political party in Turkey was aware that OPC under the "principles of implementation", applied by the Turkish General Staff and that these forces could not act without permission of Turkey. Nonetheless, the opposition groupings exploited the situation to extract maximum political advantage. Examples of this were the questions raised by the Welfare Party and Democratic Left

Party relating to the renewal of the Treaty of Sevres. The politicians of these parties knew well that Turkey was not on the verge of being partitioned yet still they used the situation to play their political cards. This also explains why the SDPP and TPP changed their views on OPC immediately after assuming power and why the Motherland Party performed a similar volte face. For the latter parties especially, the lack of information when they are in opposition caused in their being against the OPC together with popular policies that can exploit the feelings of the Turks. But when they came to power they quickly changed their views under as they get better informed.

Following the deployment of OPC forces, elections held in northern Iraq gave birth to possibility of an independent Kurdish state. Even then, it was thought that such an election might help reduce chaos in the region. Without elected leaders there would have been no one to deal with when it came to dividing up the supplies and aid brought to the region. To some extent it was true that for a while PKK guerillas were able to act freely amidst such chaos. But, following the elections, and after authority had been restored, the PKK were forced to live in camps that were targeted by Turkish armed forces in 1993 and in 1994 several times.

Looking from the perspective of power politics, the creation of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq and the deployment of OPC increased Turkey's geo-strategic influence in the

region. Especially the United States, the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, looking for stability not only in this region but globally, realized the geo-strategic importance of Turkey, said to have disappeared after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Bipolar political structure.

At present, the rift between the United States and Britain and France is another factor that may boost the importance of Turkey in the region as the only stable democratic country. The wars of the future are likely to be local, based mostly on ethnic problems. The Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East having become the most sensitive regions in the new era Turkey as an important actor involved in such newly emerged problems e.g. Karabakh, Bosnia and northern Iraq seems to offer cooperation with the major states, especially with the United States so as to handle the burden jointly. Therefore OPC has been a good experience for Turkey in the humanitarian-strategic cooperation with the United States in particular.

Dependent on Turkey in many respects, the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders have had to act in line with Turkey's overall interests. It was the Turkish army, whose power increased in the region to the extent that, particularly in 1994, that were able to circumscribe and limit the activities of the PKK in northern Iraq. By allowing the OPC forces to be stationed in the country and by cooperating with the participating states, Turkey's strategic power clearly grew. Also, the professed humanitarian aim of OPC cast Turkey in a positive

light in the eyes of world public opinion. The Kurdish leaders repeatedly expressed their gratitude to Turkey for providing a wide range of supplies ranging from energy and chemicals which was an invaluable source of positive propaganda for Turkey.

To sum up, it can be said that OPC was and remains in the general interest of Turkey and the pros derived from this position far outweigh the cons. Under the New World Order, that emerged following the liberation of the oppressed nations of the Eastern Bloc, Operation Provide Comfort II provides an excellent example of nations coordinating their policies to fight against repression and cruelty. It is in this light that Turkey's initiation of such an operation should be appraised and appreciated.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
RELATING TO THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT

RESOLUTION 660 **2 August 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the Council's condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Adopted by a vote of 14 in favour and 0 against. One member, Yemen, did not participate in the vote.

Sponsors: Canada, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 661 **6 August 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the imposition of mandatory sanctions and to the establishment of a Committee to undertake certain tasks regarding the implementation of the resolution.

Adopted by a vote of 13 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).

Sponsors: Canada, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 662 **9 August 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the non-validity of the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

RESOLUTION 664 **18 August 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the nationals of third countries in Iraq and Kuwait and to diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

RESOLUTION 665 **25 August 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to measures to ensure implementation of resolution 661.

Adopted by a vote of 13 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).

Sponsors: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Finland, France, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 666 **13 September 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the determination of humanitarian circumstances.

Adopted by a vote of 13 in favour and 2 against (Cuba and Yemen).

Sponsors: Canada, Finland, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 667 **16 September 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to diplomatic and consular personnel and premises.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Sponsors: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 669 **24 September 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

RESOLUTION 670 **25 September 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the applicability of sanctions to all means of transport, including aircraft. Thirteen of the 15 members of the Council were represented by their Foreign Ministers at the meeting during which this resolution was adopted.

Adopted by a vote of 14 in favour and 1 against (Cuba).

Sponsors: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Finland, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 674 **29 October 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the situation of Kuwaiti and third-State nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, to further measures in the event of non-compliance by Iraq with Security Council resolutions and to the good offices of the Secretary-General.

Adopted by a vote of 13 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).

Sponsors: Canada, Finland, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 677 **28 November 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Sponsors: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, Kuwait, Romania, United Kingdom, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 678 **29 November 1990**

Relating, inter alia, to the use by Member States of "all necessary means to uphold and implement [Security Council] resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area". Thirteen of the 15 members of the Council were represented by their Foreign Ministers at the meeting during which this resolution was adopted.

Adopted by a vote of 12 in favour, 2 against (Cuba and Yemen) and 1 abstention (China).

Sponsors: Canada, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 686 **2 March 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the suspension of offensive combat operations and to the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities.

Adopted by a vote of 11 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 3 abstentions (China, India, Yemen).

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 687 **3 April 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate government, to the status of sanctions and to the setting of specific conditions for a formal cease-fire.

Adopted by a vote of 12 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Ecuador, Yemen).

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 689 **9 April 1991**

Relating to the establishment of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations

RESOLUTION 692 **20 May 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the establishment of the United Nations Compensation Fund and the Commission to administer the Fund.

Adopted by a vote of 14 in favour, 0 against and 1 abstention (Cuba).

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

RESOLUTION 699 **17 June 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the disposal of weapons, facilities and all other items specified in section C of resolution 687 (1991).

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Sponsors: France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 700 **17 June 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the approval of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of the arms embargo against Iraq.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 705 **15 August 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the Council's decision that compensation to be paid by Iraq (as arising from section E of resolution 687) shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of its exports of petroleum and petroleum products.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

RESOLUTION 706 **15 August 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the terms for the limited sale of Iraqi oil and oil products, for the purpose, *inter alia,* of meeting essential civilian needs under strict and close United Nations monitoring, and to the establishment by the United Nations of an escrow account to be administered by the Secretary-General.

Adopted by a vote of 13 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 1 abstention (Yemen).

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 707 **15 August 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the Council's condemnation of Iraq's "serious violation" of a number of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 and of its undertakings to cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA, and containing a list of nine demands to Iraq.

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Sponsors: France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 712 **19 September 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the confirmation of the ceiling of \$1.6 billion in limited Iraqi oil sale, established by the Council in resolution 706, and to the immediate release by the Secretary-General of one third of that amount from an escrow account established by the United Nations, subject to the availability of funds in that account, to meet Iraq's essential civilian needs.

Adopted by a vote of 13 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 1 abstention (Yemen).

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

RESOLUTION 715 **11 October 1991**

Relating, inter alia, to the Security Council's demand that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under two plans approved by the Council for the future monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.

APPENDIX II

LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL

UNEP COLLECTION



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22435
3 April 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that owing to the action taken by the Iraqi army against the local population in Northern Iraq, approximately 220,000 Iraqi citizens, many of them women and children, are currently massed along the Turkish border.

It is apparent that the Iraqi Government forces are deliberately pressing these people towards the Turkish border in order to drive them out of their country. These actions violate all norms of behaviour towards civilian populations and constitute an excessive use of force and a threat to the region's peace and security. In the course of the Iraqi operations, which are being carried out with the support of helicopters and artillery, many mortar shells have actually landed on Turkish territory.

Turkey is taking appropriate action to bring urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected Iraqi civilians. It is expected that the heavy burden of caring for these victims of repression will be shared by international organizations as well as by those countries in a position to assist.

I request that a meeting of the Security Council be convened immediately to consider this alarming situation and to adopt the necessary measures to put an end to this inhuman repression being carried out on a massive scale.

(Signed) Mustafa AKŞIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

APPENDIX III

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688

resolution 688 (1991)

adopted by the security council at its 2982nd meeting,
on 5 april 1991

the security council,
mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the
charter of the united nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security;

recalling article 2, paragraph 7, of the charter of the
united nations;

gravely concerned by the repression of the iraqi civilian
population in many parts of iraq, including most recently in
kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees
towards and across international frontiers and to cross border
incursions, which threaten international peace and security in
the region;

deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering
involved;

taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of
turkey and france to the united nations dated 2 april 1991 and
4 april 1991, respectively (s/22435 and s/22442),

taking note also of the letters sent by the permanent
representative of the islamic republic of iran to the united
nations dated 3 and 4 april 1991, respectively (s/22436 and
s/22447);

reaffirming the commitment of all member states to the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of iraq and of all states in the area,

bearing in mind the secretary-general's report of 20 march
1991 (s/22366),

1. condemns the repression of the iraqi civilian
population in many parts of iraq, including most recently in
kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten
international peace and security in the region semicolon

2. demands that iraq, as a contribution to removing the
threat to international peace and security in the region,
immediately end this repression and expresses the hope in the
same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure
that the human and political rights of all iraqi citizens are
respected semicolon

3. insists that iraq allow immediate access by
international humanitarian organizations to all those in need
of assistance in all parts of iraq and to make available all
necessary facilities for their operations semicolon

4. requests the secretary general to pursue his
humanitarian efforts in iraq and to report forthwith, if
appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on
the plight of the iraqi civilian population, and in particular
the kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all
its forms inflicted by the iraqi authorities semicolon

5. requests further the secretary-general to use all the
resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant
united nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs
of the refugees and displaced iraqi population semicolon

6. appeals to all member states and to all humanitarian
organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief
efforts semicolon

7. demands that iraq cooperate with the
secretary-general to these ends semicolon

8. decides to remain seized of the matter.
end of resolution

wonq

APPENDIX IV

THE DECISIONS OF THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
CONCERNING OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

Anayasanın 92 nci Maddesi Uyarınca Hükümete İzin Verilmesine Dair

(Resmî Gazete ile yayımı : 14.8.1990 Sayı : 20605)

Karar No.
107

Karar Tarihi
12.8.1990

Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgali ve sonrasında meydana gelen ve ülkemizi yakından ilgilendiren olaylar sebebiyle, Türk Devletinin ve Cumhuriyetinin varlığını tehlikeye düşürmesi muhtemel gelişmeler karşısında, Anayasanın 117 nci maddesine göre millî güvenliğin sağlanmasından ve Silahlı Kuvvetlerin yurt savunmasına hazırlanmasından Yüce Meclise karşı sorumlu bulunan Hükümet; Ülkemize bir tecavüz vukuu halinde derhal mukabele edilmesi maksadına münhasır olarak, savaş hali ilanı, Silahlı Kuvvetlerin kullanılması, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesi veya yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin Türkiye'de bulunması konularında Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 12.8.1990 tarihli 126 ncı Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

Körfez Krizi Sebebiyle, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Yabancı Ülkelere Gönderilmesine ve Yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetlerin Türkiye'de Bulunmasına, Anayasanın 92 nci Maddesi Uyarınca İzin Verilmesine Dair

(Resmî Gazete ile yayımı : 7.9.1990 Sayı : 20628)

Karar No.
108

Karar Tarihi
5 . 9 . 1990

Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgal ve ilhak etmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan Körfez Krizi sebebiyle, öncelikle Ortadoğu'da barışın ve istikrarın yeniden tesisini ve ülkemizin muhtemel tehlikelere karşı güvenliğinin idame ettirilmesini sağlamak; kriz süresince ve sonrasında hasıl olabilecek gelişmeler istikametinde Türkiye'nin yüksek menfaatlerini etkili bir şekilde kollamak, hadiselerin seyrine göre ileride telafîsi güç bir durumla karşılaşmamaya yönelik süratli ve dinamik bir politika izlenmesine yardımcı olmak üzere; lüzum, hudut ve şumulü Hükümetçe takdir ve tayin olunacak şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin Türkiye'de bulunmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 5.9.1990 tarihli 3 üncü Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Yabancı Ülkelere Gönderilmesine ve Yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetlerin Türkiye’de Bulunmasına, Bu Kuvvetlerin Kullanılmalarına İzin Verilmesine Dair

(Resmî Gazete ile yayımı : 17.1.1991 Sayı : 20758 Mükerrer)

Karar No.
126

Karar Tarihi
17 . 1 . 1991

Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgal ve ilhak etmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan Körfez krizi sebebiyle öncelikle Ortadoğu'da barışın ve istikrarın yeniden tesisi için 678 sayılı Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Kararını desteklemek ve ülkemizin muhtemel tehlikelere karşı güvenliğinin idame ettirilmesini sağlamak, kriz süresince ve sonrasında hasıl olabilecek gelişmeler istikametinde Türkiye'nin yüksek menfaatlerini etkili bir şekilde korumak ve kollamak, hadiselerin seyrine göre ileride telafisi güç bir durumla karşılaşmamaya yönelik süratli ve dinamik bir politika izlenmesine yardımcı olmak üzere; lüzum, hudut, şümül ve zamanı Hükümetçe takdir ve tayin olunacak şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetlerin Türkiye’de bulunmasına, bu kuvvetlerin kullanılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 17.1.1991 tarihli 66 ncı Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin

(Resmî Gazete ile yayımı : 28.6.1992 Sayı : 21268)

Karar No.
180

Karar Tarihi
26.6.1992

Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak'da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yönelen ve sınırlarımızın fizikî güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına müncer olabilecek gelişmeleri, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünü mutlaka koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere mani olmak, Kuzey Irak'da sağlanmış bulunan nisbi sükûnetin ve bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 17.1.1991 tarih ve 126 sayılı kararına dayanılarak başlatılan "Provide Comfort II" hareketi çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 30 Haziran 1992 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay süreyle uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye'nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya Bakanlar Kurulunun yetkili kılınmasına; Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Genel Kurulun 26.6.1992 tarihli 89 uncu Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

TBMM Kararı

Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin

Karar No. 206

Karar Tarihi : 24.12.1992

Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak'da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yönelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini tehdit etmekte kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabilecek gelişmeleri, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere mani olmak, Kuzey Irak'da bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 17/1/1991 tarih ve 126 sayılı Kararı'na dayanılarak başlatılan "Provide Comfort II" harekâtı çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 31 Aralık 1992 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay süre ile uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısının, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye'nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve mevzuatı çıkarmaya ve gerektiğinde harekâtı sona erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulunun yetkili kılınmasına; Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Genel Kurulun 24.12.1992 tarihli 51 inci Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin

Karar No. : 245

Karar Tarihi : 24.6.1993

Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak'da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yönelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini tehdit etmekte kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabilecek gelişmeleri, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere mani olmak, Kuzey Irak'da sağlanmış bulunan nisbi sükunetin ve bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 17/1/1991 tarih ve 126 sayılı Kararı'na dayanılarak başlatılan "Provide Comfort II" huzur harekâtı çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 24/12/1992 tarihli ve 206 sayılı kararı ile görev süresi uzatılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 1 Temmuz 1993 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay daha uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye'nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve gerektiğinde harekâtı sona erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulu'nun yetkili kılınması için; Anayasa'nın 92 nci maddesine göre izin verilmesi, Genel Kurulun 24.6.1993 tarihli 117 nci Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

TBMM Kararı

Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin

Karar No : 279

Karar Tarihi : 28.12.1993

Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak'da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yönelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabilecek gelişmeleri, Irak'ın bütünlüğünün korunması, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin dış politikasının temel ilkelerinden biri olduğundan, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere mani olmak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin, Kuzey Irak ahalisini vahim insan hakları ihlallerine karşı korumayı öncelikli bir insani görev olarak gördüğünü dikkate alarak Kuzey Irak'da bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 17.1.1991 tarih ve 126 sayılı Kararı'na dayanılarak başlatılan "Provide Comfort II" huzur hareketi çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 24.6.1993 tarihli ve 245 sayılı kararı ile görev süresi uzatılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 31 Aralık 1993 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay süreyle uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye'nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve gerektiğinde hareketi sona erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulu'nun yetkili kılınması için Anayasanın 92 nci maddesine göre izin verilmesi, Genel Kurulun 28.12.1993 tarihli 58 inci Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

TBMM Kararı

Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin

Karar No : 325

Karar Tarihi : 14.6.1994

Körfez Savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak'da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yönelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabilecek gelişmeleri, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere mani olmak, Kuzey Irak'da bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 17.1.1991 tarih ve 126 sayılı Kararı'na dayanılarak başlatılan "provide Comfort II" huzur hareketi çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisininin 28.12.1993 tarihli ve 279 sayılı kararı ile görev süresi uzatılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 30 Haziran 1994 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay süreyle uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye'nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve gerektiğinde hareketi sona erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulu'nun yetkili kılınması için Anayasanın 92 nci maddesine göre izin verilmesi, Genel Kurulun 14.6.1994 tarihli 116 ncı Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

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