HOUSING EXPERIENCE OF FORCED MIGRANTS: A
COMPARISON OF SWEDEN AND TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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To homeless people

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
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by

MERVE AKDEMİR KURFALI

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By Merve Akdemir Kurfalı

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

HOUSING EXPERIENCE OF FORCED MIGRANTS: A COMPARISON OF
SWEDEN AND TURKEY

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This dissertation examines the housing experiences of forced migrants and how they are affected by different housing policies through a comparison between Turkey and Sweden. The concept of forced migrants, increasingly utilized in the field, was adopted based on the daily challenges faced by individuals with similar experiences, despite having different legal statuses. Beginning from this point, it addresses the situation of forced migrants amidst multi-layered urban complexity by embracing the super-diversity approach, which allows for the exploration of diverse experiences. The empirical section of the dissertation is built upon semi-structured interviews with three distinct groups: forced migrants, local people, and local experts in Gaziantep, Turkey, and Stockholm, Sweden. Initially, housing studies related to immigration are categorized based on their focus scales, linked to various aspects of the right to housing. Subsequently, legal documents pertaining to asylum and housing policies in Turkey and Sweden are examined, followed by a discussion of the fieldwork findings. The dissertation concludes that forced migrants encounter challenges across all dimensions of the right to housing whereas in Turkey, issues related to accessing

affordable housing are prominent, while segregation is a more prevailing concern in Sweden. With a more intrusive housing policy in Sweden, forced migrants engage at an institutional level, while in Turkey, forced immigrants seek solutions within the social sphere. The study asserts that the subject of forced migrants does not exhibit uniform patterns as often depicted in the Global North or the Global South; numerous distinct forms are observable, particularly in the case of Turkey.

ÖZET

ZORUNLU GÖÇMENLERİN KONUT DENEYİMİ: İSVEÇ VE TÜRKİYE
KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

Akdemir Kurfalı, Merve

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

Ağustos 2023

Bu tez zorunlu göçmenlerin konut deneyimlerini ve bu deneyimlerin farklı konut politikalarına göre aldığı biçimleri Türkiye ve İsveç karşılaştırması üzerinden incelemektedir. Günümüzde çok farklı hukuki statülere sahip göçmenlerin kentsel alanlarda benzer deneyimlere sahip olduğu tezinden yola çıkarak, göç literatüründe giderek artan zorunlu göçmen kavramını tartışıp benimsemektedir. BurdZorunlu göçmenlerin kentlerdeki çok katmanlı karmaşıklık karşısındaki durumlarını incelemeye fırsat veren super-diversity yaklaşımını üzerinden incelemektedir Tezin empirik kısmı ise Gaziantep, Türkiye ve Stockholm, İsveç'te gözlem ve zorunlu göçmen, yerel halk ve yerel uzmanlarda oluşan 3 farklı grup ile yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlara dayanan saha çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Tezde öncelikli olarak göçle ilgili konut çalışmalarına dair inceledikleri ölçeklere göre bir sınıflandırmaya tabi tutulmakta ve bunların konut hakkının farklı noktaları ile ilişkilendirilmektedir. Daha sonra İsveç ve Türkiye'nin göçmen ve konut politikaları hukuki metinleri de polika belgeleri üzerinden analiz edilip, sınıflandırılmıştır. Daha sonra ise saha çalışmaları

bulguları tartışılmıştır. Konut hakkının her unsuruna dair zorunlu göçmenler sıkıntılar yaşasa da, Türkiye'deki zorunlu göçmenlerin ödenebilir konuta erişime dair sorunları öne çıkarken, İsveç'te mahalleler arasındaki ayrışma daha öne çıkan bir sorun olduğu ortaya konulmaktadır. Konut politikasında daha müdahaleci olan İsveç'te zorunlu göçmenlerin taktiksel yaklaşımı kurumsal düzeyde olduğu, konut politikası alanına müdahale etmeyen Türkiye'de ise zorunlu göçmenlerin sosyal alanda sorunlarını çözmeye çalıştıkları empirik verilerle gösterilmiştir. Zorunlu göçmenlerin öznesinin Küresel Kuzey ya da Küresel Güney ülkeleri üzerinde betimlendiği gibi belli noktalarda ortaya çıkmadığı, özellikle Türkiye örneği üzerinde birçok özgün biçiminin görülebileceği iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: çok-çeşitlilik, konut, İsveç, Türkiye, zorunlu göç.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

exaggerating if I said that this dissertation is your work as well as mine.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABO   Anläggningsbostäder (social house system)

DGMM   Directorate General of Migration Management

EBO   Eget boende (own house system)

EU   European Union

GBB   Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyesi (Gaziantep Metropolitan

               Municipality)

HAD   Housing Development Agency

LFIP   Law on Foreigners and International Protection

INGO   International non-govermental organization

NGO   Non-governmental organization

PoMM   Presidency of Migration Management

SDG   Sustainable Development Goal

SFI   Swedish for Immigrants

TAC   Temporary Accommodation Centre

TÜİK   Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu

TPR   Temporary Protection Regulation

UCLG-MEWA United Cities and Local Governments-Middle East and West Asia

               Section

UN   United Nation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Puzzle and Significance of the Study

The topic, housing experience of forced migrants, that led me to write this dissertation began with the realization of the change I experienced in the cities and found both interesting and important within my own agenda were being discussed in the literature as I delved deeper into reading. Urban life and urbanization literature have always captured my interest since my undergraduate studies. Therefore, I focused on this area in my master's thesis. While writing my master's thesis, during fieldwork conducted in Ankara, I frequently encountered new urban actors, especially Syrians, who were becoming more visible in the cities. This situation prompted me to raise questions about how these new urban residents are integrating into the city, and about the experiences they have.

While reading to find answers to these questions, and simultaneously navigating within the housing market myself, I began to think about how forced migrants manage to become get into the market without having knowledge of the market or having social networks. As Ager and Strang have proven, housing is one of the four crucial domains for immigrant integration. The questions what Turkey's position towards this topic is, what kind of policies it was implementing, and how the relation between the socio-legal structure and the agency within it enabled to occur of this dissertation.

Since I aim to understand the situation in Turkey regarding this topic, I started reading about how it was handled in different countries. Later, I wanted to compare Turkey with other countries. While I was wondering if the differences in legal statuses and the differences between temporality and permanence could make this comparison possible, different theories made it possible for me to understand this multidimensional complexity and conduct this research, and the concept of forced migration is the first of these.

The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented level of international forced migration because of international or civil wars (Rosenblum & Tichenor, 2012: 3). A significant portion of this migration is forced migrants due to political, social, or ecological reasons. The concept of the forced migrant is an umbrella term that covers a great number of people with different legal status such as asylum-seeker, refugee, and those under temporal or international protection. Its number has amounted to 108.4 million people by the year 2022. UNHCR (2023) alleges that a person is displaced every two seconds. The numbers show that forced migration is a growing phenomenon in the current world (Watters, 2013: 100) and will be growing increasingly as seen in the 2023 estimation. The importance of this topic is also substantially reflected in scientific research. Yet, the area of migration studies generally focuses on refugees, but this chart shows that other status than refugees are also should be studied since they are growing in size which increases their significance in the literature.

Figure 1. People forced to flee worldwide

People forced to flee worldwide (2012 - 2022)

Legend: IDPs ■ Refugees under UNHCR's mandate ■ Refugees under UNRWA's mandate ■ Asylum seekers ■ Venezuelans displaced abroad ■ Latest available estimates

Note: 2022 figures are estimated using data available as of 9 June 2022
Source: UNHCR Refugee Data Finder

Source: UNHCR (2022), Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2021, p. 7.

Additionally, even though the people who are exposed to it have different legal status, they face the same experience. Refugee as a legal status refers to "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." in 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee. However, this status does not fit the situation of most people from outside of Europe like those in Turkey. For instance, due to the Syrian Civil War, Turkey is one of the leading countries in terms of the number of forced migrants it hosts but most of these people do not have refugee status; yet; their conditions in the cities need to be understood deeply. Therefore, different concepts such as forced migrants or displaced persons are suggested as analytical tools both to overcome the differences caused by the different legal status

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and to understand these people's needs beyond refugees (Zetter, 2018: 38). Despite their different legal status, their experiences in urban life are similar to a great extent. This dissertation prefers to adopt the concept of forced migrants and aims to contribute to the concept by understanding the general similarities among people having different legal status.

There is still a big gap in the literature focusing on forced migrants in urban studies (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Erdal & Oepen, 2018). The need for further research on this very concept has been voiced in the literature (Özçürümez et al., 2021) so this research addresses this shortcoming through an investigation of forced migrants' housing experience by focusing on those living in cities.

Housing is an important sociological and public policy topic and urbanization phenomenon and has a big impact on immigrants' everyday lives. International forced migration has been rising since the 2000s as seen in the chart above and many of them prefer to settle in urban areas, which makes housing policies a useful policy area to understand the everyday lives of forced migrants. Policy-makers, NGOs, and international organizations have been interested in studying this problem, which ended up in many international policy documents like the Principle on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced People established in 2005 by United Nations (Economic and Social Council). Since housing is one of the most important parts of everyday lives; especially for the forced migrants, the most vulnerable groups in the cities, this important policy area should be further analysed in order to how socio-spatial mechanisms are actualized in the everyday lives of forced migrants in a very dynamic urban life.

The housing experience of forced migrants Is also quite different from that of other immigrants due to being forced to leave their homelands all of a sudden, they do not have any accommodation in receiving cities. "Unlike settled populations, refugees and displaced persons arrive in camps or urban areas without ready access to housing. Decisions about shelter and camp location and layout, more generally, greatly affect the physical security of refugees and displaced persons." (Martin, 2012: 69). In short, housing area provides us an important field in which forced migrants' agencies and their socio-spatial tactics can be observed (Martinez, 2020) because shelter is the most urgent and important need of these people.

Many forced migrants most probably are supposed to live in the camps but the rising number of them in the receiving countries forces them to live in urban areas, which makes them more vulnerable in the urban context. The settlement choice depends on the limited accommodation options available to them because they do not have a chance to arrange a place before they migrate. If the receiving state does not provide an accommodation area, they are on their own to find it themselves. Their decisions about settlement affect every part of their lives and local people and, thereby, the social cohesion process. Their housing pathways and tactics that are taken to be in their pathway are much more complicated since they lack the economic and social power in the receiving countries. Most of them are forced to establish new houses in the receiving cities while still suffering from the demolition of their houses in their homelands. Therefore, the meaning of home is quite diverse for them and quite related to their settling down process. This complexity of urbanity in migration studies has recently been tried to understand thanks to the super-diversity approach, which keeps spatial perspective while keeping the heterogeneity

of urban life as well. This dissertation aims to contribute to this area by filling the gap in Global South with a novel empirical case by showing its differences with their experience in Global Northern countries.

This research analyses the housing experience of forced migrants in different housing contexts by referring to the super-diversity approach which provides different tools to inquire rising complexity in immigrant-receiving societies. The research questions of the dissertation are:

1.	How is the housing experience of forced migrants in different migration and housing policy contexts?

2.	Under what conditions do forced migrants have different tactics which causes different pathways in the cities?

3.	To what extent and how do socio-spatial practices at the local level within the housing market contribute to the social cohesion of immigrants into the society?

To investigate these questions, the right to housing will be classified based on their scales. This classification allows us to understand which component of the right to housing is more challenging for forced migrants. Secondly, the state of art of such a broad housing literature will be shown in a way their unit of analysis while connecting them to the components of the right to housing. This complexity of the topic will be reflected in the migration studies by adopting super-diversity framework. Super-diversity exhibits the complex features of the forced migrants' conditions in the urban areas by both putting the structure and presenting the effects of actors within that structure. Since this dissertation aims to reveal to the

relationship between socio-legal structure and the power of agency in a specific area, the super-diversity approach puts the theoretical value. Thanks to this framework, I can investigate the dimensions of the difference among forced migrants while not underestimating them.

The research, firstly, investigates how forced migrants survive in the housing area, what kinds of socio-spatial tactics they have adopted in this area, and to what extent the housing area affects the social cohesion in the cities. The dissertation will demonstrate the institutional limitation towards forced migrants, their socio-spatial tactics, and their micro relations with local people in the housing sector in which they have to interact mandatorily in the lack of institutional support. Third, recognizing that debates in inter-ethnic relations will be shown by using the super-diversity framework has been applied in the dissertation in the case of Turkey only once focusing on Istanbul as a heterogeneous urban structure and has not been applied to Sweden, yet. However, studies utilizing this theoretical framework in empirical research are largely lacking. Therefore, this study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

1.2 Methodological Preferences and Justification of the Cases

1.2.1 Case selection

This study aims to analyze the change in migration and housing policies by examining the housing experience of forced migrants at the individual level in two different cities. Qualitative methods will be utilized in the scope of the current study.

Investigation of the housing experience of forced migrants through a comparative perspective between Sweden and Turkey could be a contribution to the field by investigating the question of how social diversity is practically experienced in different social contexts, particularly on the local scale. Therefore, I selected two cases Sweden and Turkey in terms of housing policies for forced migrants. I used purposive case selection for the comparison. In order to provide empirical evidence, following the definition of a case study as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" (Gerring 2004: 342), the case I selected "might contribute to the construction and validation of theoretical propositions" (Levy 2008: 2). This is why I have done purposive case selection (Seawright & Gerring 2008), which allowed me to make a case that "is relevant to my research strategy for reaching the objectives of the study" (George & Bennett 2005: 83). Addition to this contribution, this case selection enables to show the impact of housing policies on the housing experience of forced migrants.

The case studies under investigation are Stockholm (Sweden) and Gaziantep (Turkey). On the one hand, at the national level, both countries experience a high level of migration after the Syrian Civil War. Since the aim of the study is to understand the housing experience, I prefer to choose two different countries experiencing high levels of migration flow, especially from Syria. Sweden has the highest migration/population ratio in the entire Europe and the migration waves they have been experiencing in recent years and has taken the highest percentage of Syrians in total population compared to other European countries closely resembles the those of Turkey's. Additionally, both countries have a high immigrant population which affects the housing market. However, the importance to be taken Sweden is

for comparison to understand Turkey's condition better since Sweden has comprehensive housing policies for newcomers whereas Turkey has not. Comparing both countries lets the reader clarify how the housing experience of forced migrants is and to what extent housing policies affect this experience and thereby social cohesion in the cities. Clux (2016) claims that institutional conditions have a big impact on newcomers i.e. Turkish immigrant in Stockholm is more positive than the other cities in Europe by investigating education policies (3% higher education in Germany whereas 40% in Sweden and France). Therefore, investigating housing policies may provide the impact of institutional differences on immigrants' everyday lives in different countries. This tiny contribution of the study may open a road to understanding the uniqueness or "particularities" of Turkish housing conditions and its role in forced migrants' everyday lives thereby all residents in the cities. A comparative study may reveal insights about Turkey that would be, otherwise, hidden.

The rise of forced migration processes can clearly be observed in Turkey in the last decade. The high number of forced migrants' population in urban areas requires them to be thoroughly examined from all aspects. Syrian forced migrants' population has skyrocketed to more than 4 million people in a very short period due to the Syrian civil war, incomparable to migration experiences of other countries. Temporary accommodation centres were immediately built for Syrians, but they could not meet the demand due to the rising number of Syrians. Therefore, they flew into urban areas and more than 98% of Syrians under temporary protection legal status have been living in the cities (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2020). Also, the forced migrants coming from other countries did not have any chance for temporary

accommodation centres and they had to live, mostly, in urban areas once they arrived in Turkey. Secondly, despite developed policies being implemented under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the lack of settlement policies for forced migrants complicated their situation once they came to the country. Therefore, they all started to self-settle in the cities. Especially, the influx of Syrians has led to a sudden change in the demography of certain cities and generated new dynamics in certain neighbourhoods.

Stockholm and Gaziantep are the units of analysis for the comparison because both of the cities have a heterogeneous population. Even though Kilis (95,15%), Şanlıurfa (21,67%), and Hatay (24,69%) have higher immigrant populations than Gaziantep in Turkey, Gaziantep can be thought of as more relevant for the study (goc.gov.tr, 2018). This is because Kilis has more immigrant population than natives, it is a distinct case to compare any other city in Europe. Since immigrants and natives have the same ethnic background and most of the immigrants have relatives as Turkish citizens in Şanlıurfa and Hatay, immigrants' problems are different in both cities. For instance, the Mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality has said that there are not many conflicts between natives and immigrants in Hatay because they are relatives and have close relationships with each other before the Syrian crisis. However, Gaziantep is different from the abovementioned cities and more suitable case depicted in immigration literature. In this context, Gaziantep has a quite unique position because it received a substantial number of forced migrants. In terms of their population, Gaziantep is second to Istanbul with 435.691 Syrians under temporary protection (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2023) with different displaced communities in Gaziantep. After their entry to the city, housing -their first and urgent

need- became the leading source of conflict. It became the primary problem in Gaziantep, unlike Hatay and Şanlıurfa which makes it applicable for comparing with Stockholm. Ethnic diversity leads the native people to move to gated communities in both Gaziantep and Stockholm. For these reasons, this research compares these two cities in terms of housing policies in the immigration context. The immigrant population in the total population is high in both cities. On the one hand, the foreigner-born population is 31% of the population of Stockholm. This rate is 20% in inner-city districts while the rate increases 38,5% in outer-city districts, which shows that spatial segregation is visible in Stockholm (Rokem & Vaughan, 2018) as seen in the table:

Table 1. Population Statistics from Stockholm

Neighbourhoods	Population at 2011	Population of Foreign-born people at 2011[1]	Foreigner population at 2011	Distribution of foreing-born people and foreigners in total population
Banlieu in the Western part of the City	**218 724**	**68 511**	**31 041**	**45%**
Rinkeby-Kista	46 792	26 399	12 094	82%
Spånga-Tensta	38 115	14 829	6 482	55%
Hässelby-Vällingby	66 721	17 745	7 978	38%
Bromma	67 096	9 538	4 487	20%
City-Centre	**320 796**	**48 660**	**23 358**	**22%**
Kungsholmen	63 120	9 293	4 186	19%
Norrmalm	67 687	10 793	5 050	23%
Östermalm	66 521	11 357	6 332	26%
Södermalm	123 468	17 217	7 790	20%
Benlieus in the Southern part of the City	**324 804**	**77 868**	**33 758**	**34%**

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[1] They have Swedish citizenship while the next foreigner box do not have Swedish citizenship yet.

Enskede-Årsta-Vantör	92 071	23 317	10 279	36%
Skarpnäck	43 961	9 098	4 179	30%
Farsta	51 987	12 009	5 005	32%
Älvsjö	25 660	3 987	1 664	22%
Hägersten-Liljeholmen	76 710	12 966	5 940	24%
Skärholmen	34 415	16 491	6 691	67%
	864 324	**195 039**	**88 157**	

Resource: produced from Stockholm Municipality statistics (statistic.stockholm.se, 2018).

Almost one in five people (22%) in Gaziantep is an immigrant (TÜİK, 2022). On the other hand, Stockholm and Gaziantep are suitable for the super-diversity framework. It is clear for Stockholm due to having different immigrant groups. Since super-diversity enables to analyze the differences in terms of cultural values, legal status, and cultural and religious values within the same ethnicity or nation, Gaziantep can be examined within this framework as Syrian immigrants consist of many subgroups such as Alevi Syrians, Sunni Syrians, Dom immigrants, Turkmens, those with a legal residence permit and those do not in Gaziantep.

Sweden serves as an ideal candidate for comparison with Turkey since it has the highest immigrant proportion compared to its own population among the European countries. Additionally, Sweden had a lower percentage of immigration compared to the UK and Southern countries until the 1980s (Rokem & Vaughan, 2018) but for two decades, the immigrant population has been rising and unlike most of the other European countries, Sweden has a problem with the ethnic segregation in addition to socio-economic one, which makes it impossible to analyze housing policies without not referring to immigration (Andersson & Brama, 2004; Magnusson Turner & Hedman, 2014). The immigration issue is relatively new,

which constitutes the first common point with Turkey. Secondly, both states are unitary states with service provision of local governments being standardized by the national parliament even though local governments in Sweden are way stronger than the ones in Turkey. Thirdly, local governments started to take more responsibilities while they started to receive a high number of forced migrants and are very active in the housing market unlike Turkey. It could be interpreted that housing should be related to local governments because local taxes, housing right in a healthy environment, neighborhood activities (Magnusson & Turner, 2008: 278) and one of the most essential parts of sustainable city policies among international organizations are within the scope of local government competences. The Council of Legislation in Sweden gives an implementation of housing policies to the local government, there is not any act so the local government cannot be involved (Popescu, 2013: 620). There are three types of tenure forms in Sweden, which are private home ownership, cooperative ownership, and rental housing including public houses (Magnusson-Turner & Hedman, 2014: 275). Municipal houses can be counted in the third type of these forms so local governments in Sweden are directly embedded in housing policies. Since Sweden has been experiencing immigration intensively since 2015, accommodation is getting a bigger problem there. Therefore, municipalities have taken responsibility for accommodation since 1st March 2016 for those who get the residence permit for refugee or refugee-like reasons (sweden.se). The other example is that Gaziantep City Council has suggested that municipalities should play an important role in implementing housing policies. Their suggestions are as follows: to act as a link between tenure and Syrians, to impose a fine if a place is non-registered as a house, to demolish derelict buildings; and most importantly, to construct public

houses for Syrians (ECGCC, 2014: 11-12). However, it is clear that there is not a comprehensive housing policy in Turkey or implementing tools in the market like social houses. The suggestion of the City Council demonstrates that even though local governments in Turkey do not have much authority in housing policies, the conditions force them to act in this particular area. Therefore, even though local governments in Turkey try to act in this field, they cannot have sufficient policy tools to interfere in the housing experience of their residents, unlike Sweden. This difference between two countries potentially shows the effect of housing policies on the housing experience of forced migrants.

As these immigrants need to shelter in the city, the rapid case of the immigrant population causes the distortion of the housing market in Gaziantep. There are various distressed neighbourhoods in Gaziantep whose ethnic makeup matches that of Stockholm. Unlike Stockholm, immigrants in Gaziantep do not have a chance to rent a social house with low prices compared to the market rental price. The data shows that 97,8% of Syrians rent their houses, which is comparatively a high amount when the fact that only 1,7% of Syrians have their own houses is considered. Almost half of them (49,3%) are settled in squatter areas while 44,3% are settled in flats. The remaining 4,8% have to live in workplaces. Even though 12,5% settle in houses having four rooms, the researchers emphasize that these people share the house with other families. The prices of monthly rent in Gaziantep show that they can afford low houses because 54,05% of Syrians pay between 250 and 499 TL for settlement even though 67,3% of Syrians can earn 0-1499 TL in a month (Gültekin et. al. 2018). They try to find low-priced houses which causes the concentration of immigrants in certain neighbourhoods. As there are lots of

immigrants, the housing market has changed negatively, poor people have been facing trouble hiring a house because of high prices. As Syrians have to share the houses with other families, landlords raise the prices. Turkish citizens are affected by this raise, which causes a conflict with Syrians (ECGCC, 2014). The neighbourhoods in Stockholm with the high level of public houses have the most immigrants so the cause of segregation in terms of ethnicity may be the low rent prices in both cities. In short, although socio-economic factors seem to be important for settlement for an individual in both cities, ethnicity is the most prominent feature of distressed neighbourhoods in both countries so comparing these two countries is meaningful. Thus, a comparison between these two cities has the potential to reveal how and to what extent housing policies affect the cohesion of forced migrants and under what conditions they take different tactics.

1.2.2 Methodological framework

This study recognizes the relations between the structure and the actors to understand the housing experience deeply. Therefore, policy analysis and interview methods are used to reveal this relationship. The aim of a qualitative research method is to deeply understand the interviewee's position and thoughts, which is vital for the integration of the findings into the literature. In order to understand the agency of the forced migrants and to establish a bottom-up narrative, the semi-structured method is highly required. Therefore, I conducted semi-structured interviews in Stockholm and Gaziantep with forced migrants, local people, and local experts consisting of local bureaucrats, street-level bureaucrats, mukhtars, real estate agencies, NGOs, and INGOs staff.

In order to conduct a thorough analysis, I based my analysis on empirical evidence derived from semi-structured interviews with forty-one forced migrants, who moved to Gaziantep, twenty local people, and twenty local experts in the last ten years along with participant observation in March, July, August, and September 2020. To perceive the differences in housing usage between forced migrants and the local people, twenty local community members formed the second part of the interview process. Thirdly, I interviewed twenty local experts working in both the public, private, and voluntary sectors. Then, during Spring, Summer, and a part of Autumn 2021 in Stockholm, I interviewed with twenty local expert, twenty local people, and twenty forced migrants. Qualitative methods can reveal the forced migrants' housing experience which is the only approach to reveal the subjective dimension of the housing area (Ronald, 2011). While contacting my interviewees, I relied on both random and purposeful sampling supported by snowball sampling in particular situations and stopped when I began to encounter repetitive patterns in people's responses as my aim was to seek and investigate diverse opinions and perceptions of the topic of interest rather than achieving an interview count (O'Reilly & Parker 2012). I was able to talk to people with different backgrounds, different age groups, and genders, and to have a diverse group of interviewees following the theoretical interest (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 296). Last but not least, since many forced migrants cannot speak in Turkish/ English or even if they knew, they would have failed to fully express themselves in both languages, I hired an Arabic translator in Turkey or a Swedish translator in Sweden.

I started my field researches after confirming the feasibility of the research , taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Firstly, the opinion of the

public authorities and NGO workers were taken. They indicated that a large-scale survey had been done face to face with 4000 individuals after the termination of lockdown and, thankfully, there had not been any problem as long as the public authorities' recommendations followed. Since the weather condition was also convenient, I decided to start the field research in Gaziantep. In order to not cause any infection, firstly, I did not force interviewees to meet me in person. Online interviews were always offered as an option during the arrangement of the interviews. Forced migrants generally tended to meet face to face but local people generally avoided personal meetings. Since the weather condition allowed, I preferred to conduct interviews outdoors or at the balcony, if there was. I provided a new mask for everybody- me, the translator, and the interviewee- for each interview. I and the translator renewed the masks in each interview. Also, the field areas had the lowest level of covid-19 infection in Gaziantep according to the "Hayat Eve Sığar" application provided by Republic of Turkey Ministry of Health. I always checked that application before going somewhere and I went there only if the place was identified as "low risk" in the application. Moreover, during the field research, I did not use public transportation but preferred taxis in order to reduce contact with people.

For Stockholm fieldwork, the state does not put strict rules in place, but I was extremely careful about the well-being of the interviewees. Therefore, if possible, I conducted online interviews, if I need to talk in person, I always prefer to be outside. Therefore, due to the cold weather in Stockholm, I conducted my fieldwork during the Spring and Summer, 2021.

I have paid special attention to the confidentiality and data protection of the interviewees. First, data from every interviewee was anonymized. The demographic profile was coded and kept in a separate file covering the entries on gender, age, and educational background. Therefore, a coding system- including the interviewee's number, age, hometown, gender, and educational level (etc. IM18-27-SR-M-PS) was used for every interview with forced migrants and local people- except for their hometown-. This coding system secures anonymity for every interviewee while maintaining his/her particular characteristics that are essential for the analysis stage of the project. In the text, quotations are provided along with these codes to indicate the demographic information of the interviewees. IM refers to forced migrants, IC to citizens whereas IE signifies experts.

Alongside this coding system, interviewees' consent was secured. The participants had the option of providing oral or written consent to ensure the willingness of the interview and built trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. The interviews were only recorded with the consent of the interviewee. Otherwise, verbatim notes were taken. In this situation, only the exact sentences of the interviewee were utilised in order not to jeopardise the straightforward data collection for the research. During the research, forced migrants generally tended to give permission for written consent and voice recording while local people preferred to give oral consent and not permit the voice recording. Only oral consent was asked in online interviews. After the field research part, I solely transcribe all the voice records into the text in order to ensure the confidentiality of the research. This transcription part requires a long time and effort.

Every interview lasted between one hour and an hour and a half. In these interviews, the questions began with a demographic profile including time spent in host cities since their first arrival as well as legal status; covering the themes of how forced migrants access housing, challenges faced during that process, the differences in the use of their houses in host cities and previous houses in their homelands, how the house usage affect their daily lives thereby their use of the urban public spaces in their neighbourhoods the experience of social interaction as impacted by their housing experience and their needs and preferences for the housing experience were investigated. I coded the interview in order to analyze it. This categorization allows me to organize data. In the below, you can find my codes and the central categories with some data from the field study.

-        Physical Dimension (Living Place and Housing Policies): housing market conditions, problems, and limitations, social housing, affordable housing, accessible housing, house addition, household composition, homeownership, housing career, housing tenureship.

-        Spatial Dimension (Urban Life and Mobility): settlement choice, spatial segregation, mobility, mixed neighbourhood, urban public place

-        Socio-psychological Dimension: home, home-making, sense of belonging, gender, age, ethnicity, identity.

Not only interviewee but also the interviewer takes the position in the construction of meaning (Mishler, 1986) as much as how s/he figures the situation of the interviewee out and links it and the theory. Therefore, my position in the research is an essential part as much as describing the interviewees. I am a young, female

researcher doing my PhD. I was born and raised in the capital city of Turkey, Ankara, but I am acquainted with Gaziantep thanks to my previous trips; I had no prior connection to Sweden before my PhD research.

I was allowed to access female forced migrants thanks to my gender (as they expressed a lot). Since they have strong religious sensibility, female forced migrants, especially Syrians, did not prefer to talk to a male. Secondly, my marital status was generally questioned in almost every face-to-face interview. Some male interviewees called me "yenge[aunt-in-law]" in Turkish- even though they cannot speak Turkish- which shows that they accepted me as one of their relatives-in-law. Namely, even though I talked to them about my research and they accepted me as a researcher, they still wanted to establish an informal dialogue rather than a professional one. Third, I realized that many interviewees were familiar with this kind of research because they still preferred to make eye contact with me instead of the translator while speaking in Arabic with the translator. Last but not least, interviewees were generally biased toward me during the fieldwork due to my nationality. Many forced migrants declared that there were good and bad Turks in Turkey. Even though they did not know me, they immediately placed me in the "good Turk" position. Also, while interviewing Turkmen Syrians, they generally used the expression "like you" by pointing to me in order to emphasize their ethnicity. While doing so, they emphasized my nationality, as well. On the other hand, my nationality was a bigger problem in the local people part of the fieldwork because as an insider, it was hard to catch local people's ideas. Many of them did not want to talk about forced migrants- mostly Syrians- anymore. They just pointed out the issue and continued by saying "you know" instead of explaining their own experiences and thoughts. In Stockholm

fieldwork, it was more difficult to reach forced migrants. I meet some NGO workers who helped me a lot to access the field. However, it was still pretty hard to be accepted by especially Syrians. While some of them rejected my interview request after they learned that I am a Turkish citizen. Interestingly, Afghan refugees in Sweden are pretty willing to talk to me. Even though local people accepted my interview, they do not have much information or experience on this issue, which could be proof that there is a very low level of interaction between locals and newcomers.

Conducting fieldwork in a foreign country, especially during the pandemic turned out to be more difficult than I thought. I had trouble finding interviewees even though I had gatekeepers. Syrians mostly rejected my interview request when they heard that I came from Turkey. I definitely did not expect this when I was writing my proposal. Establishing rapport with forced migrant interviewees was quite difficult. Many of them could speak neither English nor Turkish so I offered to come with a translator. Yet, even though they accepted me when they heard that there would be a translator, they tended to cancel the interviews. Besides, Foreign Law changed on the 20th of July 2020. The requirements for a permanent residence permit were changed and made difficult, which complicated my fieldwork. For instance, even though I booked interviews for forced migrants, they cancelled it to see how the law would be implemented saying that this new law may affect their current conditions. So, they wanted to wait for the details. Since I depended on the snowball method for finding more interviewees, it prolonged my fieldwork duration. On the other side, as I stated above Afghan refugees were willing to interview me more than I expected. Initially, I interviewed Afghans a lot but when the political situation in Afghanistan got worse,

they were less willing to participate in the fieldwork. They may have had concerns about their friends or families in Afghanistan. Therefore, I stopped to ask them whether they want to participate not to revoke their traumatic feelings and ideas. It is an ethical position and also it was indicated in my Ethnical Committee Permission.

1.2.3   Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation consists of five chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter constitutes the literature review and theoretical framework of the dissertation. The importance of the right to housing, how migration studies approach the topic and super-diversity debates are examined. The third chapter is about the Turkish migration regime and accommodation policies, and the fourth chapter provides the empirical results of Gaziantep fieldwork. The fifth chapter is about Swedish migration and accommodation policies, and the sixth chapter presents the findings of the Stockholm case. The last chapter is a discussion of the fieldwork and the theoretical and empirical contribution of the dissertation.

The second chapter first focuses on the right to housing debates and its importance for forced migrants in the urban context. In order to show the state of the art of the housing studies, a new three-dimensional classification is suggested based on the unit of analysis which are individual, household, and neighbourhood scales. Then, the super-diversity approach is examined. Lastly, in order to put the agency of forced migrants in the host cities, how they acquire different tactics with a division of Global North and Global South is discussed.

The third chapter analyses the Turkish migration regime and accommodation preferences for forced migrants with a focus on legal documents and a public policy perspective. It, first, investigates the Turkish migration regime retrospectively and how the whole system has evolved. Then, sheltering regulations for forced migrants are analysed. Then, how Syrian migration flow affects this system will be described and the division for their stay in Turkey in terms of accommodation policies is alleged. Migration flow from temporary accommodation centres (TACs) to cities is periodized and a new classification is put into the dissertation. The fourth chapter presents the empirical findings from Gaziantep's fieldwork. The demographic profile of the interviewees, the field area, first, summarizes then access to houses and their relation in the neighbourhood scale is discussed by reference to fieldwork.

The fifth chapter investigates Swedish migration and housing policy by focusing on Syrian migration flow which caused a U-turn in the field. Accommodation policies during asylum application and then the refugee period are summarized. Guest houses or accommodation centres and forced migrants' own arrangement of the settlement are described as two pathways to access to the house. The sixth chapter presents the profile of interviewees and the field in Stockholm, Sweden. Then the empirical finding is discussed by presenting different pathways in Sweden. Finally, the conclusion presents the theoretical and empirical contributions of the dissertation is shortly summarized. Then, the limitation of the dissertation and the future research topics are mentioned.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RIGHT TO HOUSING IN THE SUPER-DIVERSE CONTEXTS

2.1 The Importance of Housing and Its Practices in Different Regions

House is described and mostly romanticized as a space of private relations above all capitalist relations or the opposite of public areas as the core of the private area by referring to 'home' (Mallet, 2004). However, it is at the centre of political issues and mostly affected by the public authorities' decisions or public opinion (Ansell, 2019). Even though the housing market is claimed to be open to everybody, it has important accessibility or affordability challenges for the vulnerable groups in the cities, for especially forced migrants in the urban context. Decent housing is one of the crucial steps for refugee integration (Anderssen et al., 2013; Phillips, 2006) but forced migrants face numerous challenges in the housing area such as the exclusion due to their ethnicity or legal status (Acolin et al., 2016; Carlsson & Eriksson, 2014; Landau, 2006) or lack of social, economic, and information sources (Andersen et al., 2013). Namely, ethnicity, the legal status of foreigners in the city, the population of foreigners affect their housing market conditions which proves how politicized the area of housing is. They face exclusion in the cities or struggle for getting into the housing market.

Different regions experience these common problems variously which can be observed roughly between Global North and Global South. In the Global North,

refugees are mainly living in urban houses with housing aid since the camps are designed as temporary accommodation while Global South countries either make refugee camps permanent due to the prolonged situation of refugees, implement non-camping policies or provide informal housing as the only alternative for refugees who are living in limbo (Hyndman & Giles, 2011; Sanyal, 2012). In the European context, the designated spaces for refugees sheltering transcends being a means of housing but reflects the state's perception of them:

> when the state imagines refugees as members of the labor force, architecture for refugees is oriented toward cities; when [..] as members of its citizenry, architecture is oriented towards housing; and when the state cannot imagine refugees as either citizens or workers, architecture is oriented towards camps (Hershcher, 2017).

The camps are seen as temporary entity in Global North unlike to Global South countries (Hyndman & Giles, 2011). Therefore, housing context is crucial to understand vulnerable groups' experiences.

Many countries especially in the European context have housing policies including providing houses to refugees in order to mitigate their influence on society or the market mainly in order to prevent segregation (Landau, 2006; Ondrich et al., 1999; Pred, 1997; Teixira, 2008; Van Kemper & Özüekren, 1998). Especially, Nordic countries follow comprehensive policies to fight against segregation in the cities (Andersen, et al., 2013; Andersson et al, 2010). Accordingly, state-run refugee camps often become sites of oppression, making access to urban housing a terrain of struggle for which solidarity movements can even go as far as occupying buildings are established (Montagna & Grazioli, 2019; Tsavdaroglou, 2018). Such movements are often regarded as multi-layered struggles which aim to fight against the

dichotomies institution of citizenship brings about as well as reaching humanitarian housing conditions (Dalal, 2022; Mitrovic & Vilenica, 2019; Montagna &Grazioli, 2019; Raimondi, 2019). It can be said that these activities have their own agenda and lead by a political or sociological targets.

Non-European countries, mainly in Global South, either keep refugees in camps by force or let them self-settle in the cities. The former way is adopted by many Sub-Saharan refugee-hosting African countries. The refugee camps in Africa are one of the biggest camps around the world and much bigger than the camps in Europe due to hosting millions of forced migrants (Khan & Sackeyfio, 2021). Some countries want to keep refugees in certain segregated areas outside urban areas like Eritreans in Sudan (Kibreab, 2007). Under these conditions, forced migrants cannot benefit from even basic human rights including their residence and settlement in the urban areas even though they stay in a long time. This policy elicits camps' permanency unlike Global North (Hynman & Giles, 2011). The other policy in the Global South is that forced migrants are generally allowed to self-settle in the cities in the Middle Eastern and Northern African (MENA) countries where the defining characteristic of the forced migrant sheltering is informality such as Cairo (Grabska, 2006), Johannesburg (Belvedere, 2007), Nairobi (Campbell, 2006). For example, the majority of the forced migrants live in informal or public housing in Egypt, just like the majority of the local people (Grabska, 2006). Similarly, Beirut's success in hosting a large number of Syrians is often attributed to the flexibility and responsiveness of its informal housing (Fawaz, 2017: 102) when the central government were reluctant to establish a camp for Syrians (Mencütek, 2019: 146). Informality specifically dominant in the rental market since the agreements are made

oral and lack the rights of tenants (Fawaz, 2014). Like Lebanon, forced migrants stay in informal tents in Jordan where there was an ongoing affordable houses problem (Mencütek, 2019). Non-governmental organizations rather than the national government try to deal with forced migrants' housing allocation in these countries. Access to houses and living in a decent house not only essential for well-beings of forced migrants but also facilitate their participation in the city live which can be found in the concept of right to the city.

In this context, refugees adopt different tactics than those in Global North to present their agency. They mainly depend on their ethnic and social networks rather than housing aid to access to houses which are mostly informal. The current literature studies perceive informality with a focus on settlement as a spatial category despite acknowledging that the artificial distinction between the formal and informal dichotomy (Darling, 2017; Diken, 2005; McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2005). However, it is quite rare to see pure formal or informal housing market particularly in the Global South since all forced migrants there are not residing in the informal houses. Formal houses are pretty common among the forced migrants who manage to access it. However, the literature focusing on forced migrants' formal settlement in global south is quite scarce. However, all residents have right to access urban infrastructure and transform the city.

Lefebvre's the right to the city concept- which is "like a cry and a demand" to transform the city (Lefebvre, 1996: 158)- has been very popular since 2000s. "(T)he right to the city can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life.... by all those who inhabit." (Lefebvre, 1996). It has an abstract and a concrete

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dimension. Abstract dimension of this right is to be a part of the transformation of the city. It means that no residents can be alienated in the spaces of everyday life (Mitchell & Villanueva, 2010: 667). Concrete dimension is shown itself in the human rights such as having right to health, education, access to affordable housing etc. (Aalbers & Gibb: 2014: 208). The forces in the cites who alienates certain groups- working class in Lefebvre's works- should always be contested in the cities. The right to the city is a never-ending process and demand which should always be on the table.

The right to the city does not imply only in the urban public space. It envisions the whole parts of city more than urban public spaces. It is a right to having rights. This is a right to participate all urban related issues in the city for reproduced it in a novel way. It means that the right to the city is not only accessing certain rights but also transform it, a process of inhabiting. Every resident regardless of citizenship status creates the alternative urban life by their alternative socio-spatial strategies, by home-making practices (Daducs et al., 2019). However, the forced migrants' usage of urban areas is mostly affected by their private areas. Therefore, the right to the city should embraces all power relations in the city including the private areas like houses.

The right to city is used by international and transnational organizations through reformulating it in a human right perspective which is one of the underlying reasons of its popularity in public policy documents. UN agencies - UN-HABITAT, UNDP, and UNESCO- embraces of the concept and reformulate it by delineating. In 2002, UN-HABITAT was held the World Urban Forum in Nairobi where the right to

the city was re-formulated the right in a restrictive sense which was cut from its political essence. These agencies promoted the participation of all the partners-public, private sectors, and civil society- in the city as a practice of the right to the city but their practice does not include any resistance to the exchange value that is crucial Lefebvre's writing. Namely, the essence of transformation urban life must still be according to exchange value, but the only difference is to broaden the decision-makers. It is criticized of being a completely different sense of Lefebvre's definition as not giving special importance on use value (Kuymulu, 2013: 933- 934). Housing can embrace all this debate in itself in a way that it has value of use while keeping value of change in the current system.

In conclusion, the housing experience of forced migrants shows that the right to housing more than a property right (Rolnik, 2014: 294- 295). All residents in the cities should not be alienated (Mitchell & Villanueva, 2010: 667). However, all residents are seen as a participant in an exclusionary environment only if they have concrete rights like the right to housing, which is the case for vulnerable groups including forced migrants. However, their positions in the cities mostly studied under the right to the city in the scope of urban public spaces in migration studies (i.e. Bolzoni et al., 2015; Buhr 2018; Cancelleri & Ostanel 2015; Glick Schiller & Caglar 2009; Nicholls & Uitermark 2016) and the impact of houses are scarce in the literature. Yet, the forced migrants' usage of these urban public areas is mostly affected by their private areas. Housing is the core of their everyday lives and a prominent factor of their relations to urban lives. Therefore, the right to housing including its relations to the urban area provides security especially for those who lack power (Aalbers & Gibb: 2014: 208).

2.2 The Right to Housing for Forced Migrants

The right to the city is not only a legislative concept but a moral principle promoting social and spatial equalities (Soja, 2010). It consists of different rights in itself, so some scholars define it as umbrella concept (Benford & Snow, 2010). It is a right to demand rights including the right to housing (Bayet et al., 2009; Kuymulu, 2013). The latter cannot be achieved without the former because the main contradiction of the exchange value and use value can be found in the housing area, which is crucial for the right to the city. While current capitalist accumulation is materialized though real estate speculation and construction sector, many people especially forced migrants are struggling to shelter. Therefore, the challenge to housing is an integral part of the right to the city. Accordingly, international organizations scrutinize the right to affordable housing in human right perspective.

Firstly, the right to housing is one of the human rights stated in 1948 Declaration on Human Right. 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination emphasizes the right to housing and the state should treat the citizens equally. Even though the words immigrant, refugee, and asylum-seeker are not explicitly mentioned in the text, it has been made clear that the government units at the national, provincial, and municipal level should work in close cooperation with actors from the private and community sectors in order to facilitate housing access for the disadvantaged groups, including the poor and the displaced populations. In addition, the policy framework originates from the principle of Sustainable Cities and Communities, which is one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2015) envisioned by UN for 2030. The adoption of this

goal is expected to ensure "adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services" for all in the cities.

Among these initiatives, the New York Proposal for Inclusive Growth in Cities (2015) and The Paris Action Plan for Inclusive Growth in Cities (2016), consider housing to be one of the main policy domains that needs to be developed further. Other important agreements that the UN's focus specifically on housing Habitat III or the 3rd United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (2016). This meeting was organised according to 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). HABITAT III is the first HABITAT Conference where the first time the house needs of immigrants were mentioned in the urban context. The countries were declared that they would give particular importance to immigrants and pursued a good migration policy. New Urban Agenda and Bogota Commitment (2016) published by the UCLG-MEWA (United Cities and Local Governments-Middle East and West Asia Section) was committed in the 34th article they would pursued "…equitable and affordable access to sustainable basic physical and social infrastructure for all, without discrimination, including affordable serviced land, housing…" to vulnerable groups in the cities like immigrants (UCLG-MEWA, 2016). In addition, Council of Europe considers states as responsible of providing housing services to immigrants without discrimination in From Reception to Integration: The role of Local Authorities Facing Migration Report in 2016. These initiatives proves that immigrants thereby housing issue is one of the prominent policy areas in the eye of international organizations. The balance between market rationality on the land and sheltering for urban poor was emphasized in the UN meetings. These organizations force national states to broaden their rights to the

people having not citizenship. Therefore, their interpretation on the right to the housing is quite important for urban refugees.

The UN defines the right to affordable house more than the property rights. The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights defined seven components of the right to affordable housing which are (UN E/1992/23, Annex III at 114):

- legal security of tenure,

- availability of services, materials, and infrastructure,

- affordability,

- habitability,

- accessibility,

- location,

- cultural adequacy

All these components show different aspects of the right to housing. In the scholarly literature, these components are investigated be referring to different scale. I classify the literature by focusing on these components of the right and scale of the research.

2.3 Different Dimensions of Housing

Even though international migration is one of the hot topics in the world, forced migration settlement has not been studied to the extent it deserves (Phillimore, 2011). As human mobility processes become more complex and mixed mobilities increase, understanding the housing experience of forced migrants, a constantly and

rapidly growing population group in the cities, becomes vital for understanding their displacement experiences as well as their social integration after settlement in urban areas. The field of housing studies constitutes an interdisciplinary, multi-actor and multi-level area of research which provides multiple approaches to understanding the processes of immigrants' integration into the society (Mendez et al., 2006). It can be better understood in tandem with spatial, social and psychological elements of the settlement experience. When an immigrant leaves his or her home country, s/he leaves his house, neighbourhood, social relations, and so on. While they are establishing their new houses, they put their daily habits thereby changing built environment, physically and socially. Lately, how forced migrants design their houses and its effect on built environment is an emerging topic in migration studies because these research topics are used as a kind of proxy variable to understand immigrants' identity and place attachment feelings.

Moreover, studying housing based on cultural aspect is insufficient in the field (Mensah & Williams, 2014) although it is a chance to open new windows in political issues. Especially its relation to social structure or culture still needs to be explored through the different dimensions (Boccagni & Brighenti, 2017, Cancellieri, 2017) because dwelling spaces are cultural item showing family value, and the centre of daily lives (Boccagni, 2014, Levin, 2016: 203). Namely, housing design is a cultural issue inevitably. For instance, the size of the houses is determined according to 'cultural' family types. Understanding of the culture needs to be perceived to evaluate social cohesion.

Migrants' housing experiences are studied in different aspects. In this part, how housing studies has been studied up until now, especially after the 2000s is

classified into three dimensions in terms of their unit of analysis: individual, household, and neighbourhood levels.

This part suggests a new classification approach to present the state of art of the housing studies by focusing on the different level of analysis in terms of forced migrant accommodation (ie. Özçürümez et. al., 2021). Firstly, housing is scrutinized in terms of its physical form or the housing market conditions on the **household level** mostly by policy-makers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organization (IOs) alongside academic publications. There is a rich body of literature, which makes this aspect *mainstream* in housing studies. A wide range of scholarly work focuses on issues related to access to affordable and adequate housing for immigrants. Legal status of tenants, affordability, and accessibility components of the right to housing are mainly the main topic of the studies focusing on this dimension in the housing studies. Within this framework, researchers focus on indicators such as housing market conditions and problems, household composition, housing tenure, homeownership (i.e. Bunting et al., 2004; Mendez, et al., 2006; Painter et al., 2001; Painter & Yu, 2014). Also, IOs and NGOs have focused on the solutions to the housing problem because it is a building block for sustainable cities and communities, one of the sustainable development goals (UN, 2019).

The field of urban studies mostly conducts research on the housing experience at the **neighbourhood level** focusing on spatial/ residential segregation, mobility, ethnic diversity- all of which are connected to migration. Segregation is correlated with socio-economic conditions of the migrants as well as cultural and social reasons behind the behaviours of both migrants and local people as they interact in the housing market. The housing market is affected by housing policies

and urban planning interfere in segregation (Allen, 2004; Musterd, 2012). Dual and unitary housing policy systems receive considerable attention in these studies (Allen, 2004; Kemendy, 1995). In most of the cases, scholars identify many challenges that forced migrants face when moving into new neighbourhoods that are not considered to be traditional immigrant gateways, including lack of well-developed institutions, insufficient public services, and lack of ethnic networks, growing hostility and anti-immigrant sentiments (Massey & Capoferro, 2008; Painter & Yu, 2014). Others have highlighted the complexities of ethnic mixing as a clear policy goal that prevails in many European countries without clear tools for policy implementation at the local level (Dhalmann & Vilkama, 2009); whereas, some housing policies like subsidized housing reduces neighbourhood social cohesion (Brisson et al., 2018). According to another position, moderate levels of segregation are healthy when coupled with strong welfare states like the Netherlands (Musterd, 2003). Overall, there is no agreement in the literature on the degree of ethnic mixing/diversity in the cities and the effect it has on social integration processes. Yet, if I need to describe a commonality among these research, availability of services, materials, and infrastructure, location, and habitability are the common features of the studies investigating the component of the right to housing in the research.

The last aspect focuses on migration studies is analysing the topics at the **individual level.** This approach tries to understand the housing needs, choices and preferences of the individuals and communities, including both the immigrants and local people. This debate has been spurred by the super-diversity debates which focus on the individualized needs and preferences of the immigrants and the degree that these needs and preferences are reflected into concrete policies and programs. In

this context, the tendency has been to put more emphasis on issues like civic

engagement, according to which immigrants themselves should be consulted on

housing policies and their opinions/aspirations should be taken into account (Phillips

et al., 2010). The new research has focused on the individual needs of the residents

taking into account not only the housing needs defined in terms of having a physical

shelter but also individual perceptions of what consists home and home-making in

general (Levin, 2016; Mallett 2004; Phillimore, 2013; Robinson & Pearce, 2009;

Wiles 2008). The underlying assumption here is that housing is, above all, an issue of

identity and attachment – namely, "feeling connected" to the area and the people

dwelling in that area – hence, it is important to understand housing beyond policy

level by taking immigrant perceptions and feelings into account (Phillimore, 2013).

Following this line of thinking, a home can be a street, a site of social interactions,

the sense of belonging or a source of identity together with many other

understandings (Phillimore, 2013). Individual immigrant perceptions can also be

studied to understand the value of housing as a function of different factors such as

the period of immigration and length of residence (Semyonov et al., 2003).

> Design of housing, as of all built environments, can be understood in terms of
> series of choices among the alternatives available within more or less severe
> constraints. These choices express ideals, values, norms, and worldviews and
> may communicate identity and express status. (Rapoport, 1998: 103)

Thus, immigrants' perception of home helps to understand their attachment and

integration into society, as well. The cultural adequacy part of the right to housing

could be investigated under this dimension.

2.3.1 Physical dimension: A household scale

The components of physical dimension are broad range from the shape of the house to ownership. The most common issue in this dimension is the quality of houses which is examined referring to construction materials, accessing electricity and water alongside the size and shape of the houses. The architects, geographers, technological studies, engineers are studying on quality of the houses while political scientist, public administrators, economists and sociologists are studying on housing policy and homeownership.

International migration causes of eliciting the scarcity of houses. Therefore, the countries having long-term migration experience regulate their housing policies and plan their housing investment according to the expectation of future immigrant population. Homeownership means a lot for immigrants because it helps immigrants feel stable. Therefore, it is one of the most important 'achievements' in their lives in the new land (Levin, 2016: 175) because they have different problems than local people such as discrimination in the housing market. In this policy-making processes, immigrants cannot be thought as a homogenous group in terms of their homeownership attitude because the length of residence, ethnicity and culture, household formation, and immigrants' socio-economic status affect homeownership. Immigrants firstly tend to hire a house rather than buying so the prices of rent increase at first place. Then, immigrants start to think about investment in the housing market in case that they expect a higher level of income or a better employment process (Nygaard, 2011: 2213, Andersen, 2017). On the other hand, some immigrants may not prefer to buy a house so homeownership is important for both the immigrants who want to settle down and displaced persons. Language

barrier, their preferences to live with extended family, trust on socio-ethnic networks rather than formal institutions in terms of financial supports or loans are the main factor of the limited homeownership among immigrants (Pfeiffer et al., 2017). Therefore, finding a good house and homeownership is evaluated as one of the indicators of social integration (Iglesias- Pascual, 2019).

Another indicator of social integration in the scope of this dimension is housing career. This concept defines the repairment in the dwellings or the mobility to better neighbourhoods. Housing career is quite related to other dimensions because it shows the reasons for or consequences of residential segregation or immigrants' preferences. Yet, I prefer to put it in this dimension due to its close connection to homeownership. The mainstream approach on housing career claims that socio economic condition of an individual determines mobility. Yet, Michal Lyons and John Simister (2000) conducted a long-term research and found out that positive housing career is depended not only on individual choices or the income level of them but also on immigrants' parental housing conditions. Housing career is such a complicating indicator in immigrant lives that cannot be reduced into one single reason. There can be various push factors that make immigrants move to other places.

All of the important topics abovementioned are affected by housing policies because housing market conditions or the housing traditions in the countries determine the house ownership. Kemendy (1981) is the leading scholar who shows the close linkage between housing and welfare state. He claims that house ownership and the welfare benefits substitute each other. Ansell (2019: 171) confirms his claim because the countries serve high level welfare benefit such as Sweden, Denmark, the

Netherlands are low level ownership rate compared to the high-level house

ownership countries such as Romania, Macedonia, Bulgaria. Yet, Turkey does not

comfort to this explanation so it needs to be explained deeper.

The reception and integration policies of the countries directly affect the

immigrants' lives in the receiving countries. Legal status is the pivotal criteria in

these policies because of being determinant on an individual access to certain

benefits. Asylum seekers benefit some subsidiaries in some countries. For instance,

the UK settles down the asylum-seekers in the evaluation process in the reception

period. When an asylum seeker gains a refugee status in the UK, housing problems

get bigger. Once they get refugee status, they are forced to find a new house. The

refugees lose their benefits thereby becoming homeless in some cases (Phillimore,

2011: 583). Maja Korac (2003) investigates the importance of different integration

policies though the former Yugoslavs moving to either the Netherland or Italy.

Although both communities have almost the same social capital, the Yugoslavs in the

Netherlands show a more integrated society than the ones in Italy thanks to the

successful integration policy of the Netherlands. Another research shows that

Scandinavian countries give a major role to municipalities for refugee settlement, but

they have different institutional models. Denmark has a central allocation of

refugees. In Norway, refugees are settled through a voluntary agreement between

central and local governments while Sweden permits refugees to self- settle. In case

of refugees not finding a dwelling, the government assistance works. These policies

are mostly related to welfare positions in the countries. For instance, left-wing parties

support central settlement whereas right-wing oppose to this idea, and conservative

and liberal parties are sceptical about the force to the municipality for mandatory

acceptance of refugees. Because they approach this issue in terms of central-local relations and local authority. (Hernes, 2017).

Even though the housing area is started to be studied in political science, the field still does not emphasize the culture. However, the place of culture in housing studies is rising. The culture is so important that is mostly credit in household formation and the perception of family, which determines the house size and the functions of the rooms. For instance, nuclear family, just parents and children, is used for house design as an ideal type (Mensah & Williams, 2014: 439). Since there is a diversity of culture, the dwellings space should reflect this diversity. Yet, the housing market cannot answer this demand due to different reasons mostly related to financial concerns. Also, the high prices of rent sometimes move ahead of culture. Since the high amount of prices, overcrowdedness is common among immigrants. Some young immigrants prefer to live with their families in order to enhance their house condition in the future (Mensah & Williams, 2014).

The host countries' housing conditions sometimes are limited by culture. They associate their culture to the concrete conditions. Immigrants do not replicate their former dwellings in the new country. On the contrary, they respect the local market and local building conditions (Levin, 2016: 200). Thus, culture is studied more and more in the physical dimension of housing studies.

2.3.2 Spatial dimension: A neighborhood scale

Urban studies can be understood better when the migration history is considered because migrants were the actors establishing the cities as we know them

today in the industrialization era. This section is an attempt to understand how immigrants' housing experience makes built environment, why neighbourhood level is important in immigrant urban experience, why it has more meaning rather than just a place where people live. The presence of immigrants in the cities changes the city culture and landscapes because the place is dynamic, it is reproducing. While individuals try to make their homes- domestic places-, they transform or built the environment -public- spaces (Boccagni & Brighenti, 2017).

Identity of immigrants can be observed in built environment because the expression of identities in urban spaces is more than the identity itself. When immigrants and local people encounter, they negotiate and then, urban spaces are transformed. For instance, Turkish labour workers in Germany changed the urban environment by building mosques, houses, satellites, and opening tea shops and kebab restaurants. Immigrant neighbourhoods attract other immigrants (Ehrkamp, 2005). This transformation can be traced through immigrant entrepreneurship, which can be said that they are important in the gentrification process or the representation of cultural diversity such as Brick Lane in Britain or Oranienstrasse in Berlin (Parzer & Huber, 2015).

The garden is one of the ways to express immigrants' identity or their capability of transformation. Garden does not only make the environment more familiar to refugees but also is a way of coping with depression and trauma (Armstrong, 1999). Similarly, Head, Muir, and Hampel (2004) investigate the relationship between immigrants' urban-rural background and their garden preferences in Australia by comparing different contemporary immigrant groups. Another research shows that Latino immigrants in Los Angeles use urban community

gardens as an extension of their dwellings and domestic places. These gardens are 'home-like' spaces for these immigrants, especially for the female immigrants who are lack of urban spaces, unlike male immigrants. Therefore, urban community gardens provide a ground where female immigrants have a support. If they do not work, they spend most of their times in these gardens thereby making friends for themselves and their children. Thus, these places help immigrant integration (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2017). These researches prove that immigrants have a significant role in built environment and an essential part of it.

The most controversial and studied topic of this dimension is residential segregation. The academic publications reveal every aspect of the segregation through empirical analysis in spite of their commonalities. Residential segregation is studied under four theories which are the spatial assimilation model, housing information theory, the place stratification, and ethnic enclave model. The spatial assimilation model focuses on the individual level. It claims that the mobility in the city is a result of immigrant's choice which is restricted by economic resources or the length of residence. Housing information theory examines the immigrant information about the housing market. It alleges that knowledge about both the housing market and neighbourhood determines where you live. The place stratification model emphasizes the macro structure and discusses the determinant role of housing market on residential segregation. Lastly, ethnic enclave model starts the same point with spatial assimilation model. It suggests that the improvement in economic resources do not necessarily lead to moving to a better neighbourhood due to community belonging (Andersen, 2010; Iglesias- Pascual, 2019).

The spatial assimilation model is dominant in the studies related to residential segregation. In settlement process, asylum-seekers are directed to certain public housing area or if they are allowed to settle down by themselves, they choose cheaper areas in the cities that causes segregation (Phillimore, 2011: 583). The local people in these kinds of neighbourhoods become minority there in some cases (Andersen, 2010). Some studies focus on ethnic enclave model. For instance, Dancygier (2010) proves that if the migration communities are intensified in certain regions and politically active, they access public houses more easily. This situation is led to migration-local people conflict. On the other hand, the countries in which immigrants have no access to public houses or less politically active, the conflict emerges between the immigrants and the state actors. These approaches handle residential segregation as if it must have been fought against.

The attitudes of local people towards these neighbourhoods are as important as immigrants' preferences for starting or empowering residential segregation. The tendency of local people move from immigrant intense neighbourhood to other areas is one of the causes of residential segregation. This approach points out the individual's preferences in the segregation process rather than financial or political reasons. The mobility choices are motivated by different reasons and reveal various patterns. 'White flight' is used for defining that move tendency of residents from immigrant neighbourhood to more homogenous neighbourhoods. 'White avoidance' is used when a local people prefers less immigrant neighbourhood to move in case of having two neighbourhood options that have similar features except for the immigrant population. These patterns can be observed in European cities in different level but this is not well-studied (Andersen, 2017). A well-designed research related

to this topic evaluated that immigrants sometimes have negative impacts on residents' lives in terms of socio-economic opportunities and livelihood. The latter diminishes social cohesion despite not having negative thoughts of residents about minorities. This negative attitude related to not only the structure of the economy but also the social life in the neighbourhood because acquaintanceship is an important factor for neighbourhood satisfaction (Havekes et al., 2014) because it may ease public trust between neighbours. In case of less public trust, local people tend to move out of the neighbourhood.

Neighbourhood affects local people and immigrants differently. In case of the exposure of negative behaviours from local people, immigrants prefer to live in the immigrant neighbourhood. For residents, ethnic concentration in their neighbourhood is a push factor to move to a new place whereas an immigrant may think that ethnic concentration could be a good factor to increase his social solidarity in the neighbourhood. Thus, ethnic minority prefer to stay in this neighbourhood. (Havekes et al., 2014).

2.3.3   Socio-Psychological dimension: An individual scale

Home and homemaking are essential topics to perceive immigrants' identity, their sense of place attachment. These processes have both sociological and psychological aspects because being an immigrant, especially being a refugee, contains displaced, unsettled feelings. This is so individual feeling based on political and sociological reasons. They have post-trauma so they cannot focus on establishing a new life in a new country (Phillimore, 2011: 581- 582). It is hard for them to settle

down in a place. They experience a different level of discrimination or unwillingness to establish rapport with host community. They sometimes re-live their traumatic reasons. Acculturation may not occur for different reasons. This generally occurs in migration settlement areas. "...(M)igrants' settlements problems often have a psychological dimension that is itself associated with social, material and cultural issues." (Phillimore, 2011: 590).

Home has plural meanings and ambivalence rather than a fixed or static concept. Thus, home-making is complex and dynamic (Sandu, 2013). The literature perceives home just related to its domesticity but how outside constitute home is always lacking. Home can have different meanings and should not be thought of a typical house. Home could be any dwelling space. Immigrants' sense of place attachment is sometimes towards to a certain neighbourhood (Blunt & Dowling, 2006: 27; Clayton, 2012; Lobo, 2009; Mee, 2009) and sometimes towards a physical house (Ralph & Staeheli, 2011; Walsh, 2006).

Home has material and emotional senses (Boccagni & Brighenti, 2017; Blunt & Dowling, 2006; Cancellieri, 2017; Levin, 2016). While immigrants make a dwelling their homes, they cultivating home. The feeling of place attachment express itself in home-making process. Domestication of everyday lives can be seen in their dwellings concretely. Home-building is a specific practice in which a house turns to a home (Levin, 2016). Therefore, home-making is discussed as having two-sided process one refers to physical dimension of housing and the other one is the emotional side of the housing.

Settlement process includes identity, place attachment, home-making. These are the never-ending process (Ilcan, 2002). Home-making shows how an individual defines himself/ herself in a newly arrived community. Bourdieu's habitus concept can be used to understand home-making better. Habitus is a set of activities shared in the same group. Home-making can be thought of as re-establishment of habitus, the familiarized places. This needs an ongoing process. Thus, home-making is a kind of reflexion in which immigrants express their identity and their identity is transformed. Bourdieu (1977) uses habitus through the telling of Kybele people, an ethnic group in Algeria, organize their houses in their daily lives. Their houses establish taken-for-granted practices. In the topic of this dissertation, immigrants try to establish their habitus consciously or unconsciously in host communities. They feel attached to the new places as long as they accomplish it. Therefore, their home perception and the usage of house are quite important for their identity. They start to transform urban areas, built environment through their usages of the houses.

Hage (1997: 102- 103) defines home-making "as the building of the feeling being at home". It includes security, familiarity, community and sense of possibility. All of these sub-categories contain spatial practices. The home-making process can be thought as re-territorialization of immigrants (Dearborn, 2008: 37) through decorating their dwellings the same sounds, languages, decors, images, paintings, smells, voices, and so on (Cancellieri, 2017: 54).

Decoration of the houses is the essential step for home-making process. They use artefacts and souvenirs from their homeland to represent their culture and identity in the new land. It keeps the continuity of immigrants' tradition. These staffs are a connection to immigrants' past lives and their homelands. Even though

furniture or decoration seems like an individual choice, it represents the identity of immigrants (Levin, 2016: 177). People represent themselves in cooking, providing urban spaces, socialising practices. Immigrants can present their performative subjectivity in the houses. They design their houses according to their habits in their home countries and use reminiscences a lot. Also, traditional meals are another important part of homemaking. The smells of traditional spices make houses 'home'. Alongside cooking practices, many immigrants keep their traditional babysitting, sleeping, healthcare practices in newly arrived countries. Yet, these traditional daily lives practices produce gender role in the family (Sandu, 2013).

Home-making process contains mandatory acculturation process because the immigrants try to hybridize their original culture and the new culture in the host land, which is reflected in their dwellings. However, as mentioned in physical dimension-houses are designed according to nuclear family formation so if your culture or social structure has another formation, immigrants have to tailor themselves to these dwellings. Or, the cooking preferences of immigrants determine the relationship with their neighbours. If they use spicy or other smelling ingredients, the neighbours do now want to live with these immigrants (Manseh & Williams, 2014). The structure and policies are essential mediators in the process. If the institutions promote diversity rather than assimilation, immigrants may ease their home-making experience (Phillimore, 2011).

All these dimensions of housing, firstly, show that how comprehensive housing studies is. It is considered as a cutting-edge point in all different topics. However, I claim with this classification that unit of analysis or the scale of the research could provide us to understand complexity of the topic. In addition to this

complexity in housing studies, migration studies brings another complex context to investigate the reality which is getting more and more popular in this field. Super-diversity approach may help us to capture this heterogeneity of the reality especially observed in the urban areas.

2.4 How to Understand the Complexity: Super-Diversity Approach

Super-diversity, introduced by Steven Vertovec (2006) to the migration studies, is a popular topic in order to examine the complexity of the immigrants' conditions in mostly urban life. It has been beginning to be replaced by assimilation (mostly in the US) and integration (mostly in Europe) after the 2000s. Both assimilation and integration theories draw a linear line to adopt majority's lifestyle and approach the ethnic groups as homogenous in itself. However, firstly, immigrants have caused such a big change in the demographics of large cities over the last decade that certain neighbourhoods do not have a major group anymore. "… (C)ities are no longer dominated by a small number of large immigrant groups but that characteristic of big cities, …, nowadays is the enormous diversity of ethnic groups—large and small." (Crul, 2016: 57). The interaction of people of different background in a specific space like a street, building, or neighbourhood attracted many scholars to understand the social boundaries of their interactions by focusing on their everyday life (Wessendorf, 2015). Since diversity is getting global and transnational phenomenon, the challenges raise in the local level with intersectionality of ethnicity, age, religion, gender, and new types of inequality (Gryzamala- Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2017). Secondly, the ethnic groups are more diverse than especially the policymakers think. There are not a majority group into

which immigrants are assimilated or integrated, so for these cases, super-diversity is used to explain this complexity. "Super-diversity concept might provide chance to envision a kind of street-level cosmopolitanism in which different cultures can be appreciated without making allegiance to one group mandatory. (Foner et al.,2019: 6)"

Super-diversity can be used for three different aspects. Its first contribution is towards descriptive studies. Since international migration has changed the population around the world, super-diversity theory can illustrate the composition of society as a summary term. It is not only related to the background of immigrants but also migration channels, legal status, socio-economic situation, and components of immigrants' human capital. "The experience of immigrants … are influenced by their education and job skills, relative wealth, gender, ethnic and racial identities, religion, language, culture, family, and social and transnational connections." (Rosenblum & Tichenor, 2012: 13).

To analyse everyday life, super-diversity is mostly used in the city or neighbourhood level, in the urban context (Crul, 2016: 55). As the immigrant population in the cities has grown over the last two decades, how they are experiencing the city life is an essential question. There are various studies investigating immigrants' positions in urban life by referring super-diversity literature in different cities like İstanbul (Biehl, 2020) through dwelling, Pustdam and Turin through religion (Becci et al., 2016), Britain (Phillimore, 2011; 2017) or even some group rather than spatial context like Roma (Tremlett, 2014). All these studies shows that super-diversity is a general approach that can be used in each field to

show the diverse nature of the cities (i.e. Hall, 2015; Mepschen, 2017; Padilla et al., 2015; Schiller, 2015).

Secondly, it is useful in methodology, putting forward that complex and new social formation needs to be analysed from a distinctive perspective. Super-diversity emphasizes the reformulation of "tools" in migration studies, and it has a potential to accomplish this aim. The multi-dimensional feature of super-diversity is suggested to be observed into four areas: ethnicity, socio-economic status, legal status, and socio-cultural diversity (Grillo, 2015). However, nationality is still prominent to investigate forced migrants' settlement (Gryzmala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2017). Super-diversity provides a multi-layered analytical framework to examine the impact of differences among forced migrants on their experiences in the urban areas. By listing and layering these differences, it allows for the investigation of many new phenomenon which are more diverse than before:

> differential legal statuses and their concomitant conditions, divergent labour market experiences, discrete configurations of gender and age, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents. The dynamic interaction of these variables is what is meant by "super-diversity". (Vertovec, 2007: 1025)

For instance, while nationality might be a primary layer influencing the migrant's legal status, it has been noted that factors like the channels of migration or the level of education, as secondary layers, have a significant impact on immigrants' experiences. This approach enables the analysis of various factors and suggests that a linear integration model can only be considered and expanded upon as only an ideal type because there is hardly seen homogeneity of the previous migrant groups in the current world. However, this diverse feature of new migration flow should not lead

the reader to think in a way that it is a pretty broad and abstract concept which could embrace everything (Vertovec, 2019). Or, this approach is not replaced old differences by old differences such as racial, national, or class. Rather, it provides a debate about how to be positioned additional layers for grasping of the immigrants' conditions (Vertovec, 2015). This approach is comparatively both new and popular in the field while in a way to improving itself. Therefore, more research on the examination of the complexity or diversity among migrants are still needed to make clear connection among the factors.

Finally, it may give a practical aspect to policymakers and public policy servants to understand new conditions in society (Meissner & Vertovec, 2014). These three aspects seem to make super-diversity more visible in the literature for complex situations as in the cities and the quantity of these studies focusing on urban setting is rising (Foner, et al., 2019). As social relations after international migration have become even more complex, they need to be examined by an approach which should contain all of the aspects of any given society especially the one composing of different immigrant groups. Super-diversity can be successful to investigate this complexity and may shed on the light the differences within same ethnic groups. Nina Glick Schniller and Ayşe Caglar (2003) claim that even though immigrants came from the same nationality or ethnicity, they should not be thought as a homogenous group because their values, identities, and skills may be different among each other. These diversities can reveal the interactions stemming from the inequalities causing from these differences (Foner et al., 2019). Thanks to this framework, the differences in the same ethnicity or nationality can be revealed which is crucial for the selection of the cases of this study. Also, super-diversity may go

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beyond examining such structural arrangements by focusing on everyday life.

This dissertation aims to contribute to this approach and this field by focusing on different features of forced migrants such as their nationality, ethnicity, social network and aims to find a connection how they are reshaped under different socio-political structures.

CHAPTER III

MIGRATION POLICY AND ACCOMMODATION POLICY FOR FORCED MIGRANTS IN TURKEY

3.1 Turkey's Immigrant Policy through the Legal Perspective Pre-Syrian Period

Turkey's migration policy has been mainly considered within the context of nation-state building project since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. While the establishment of the Republic period, there was not a comprehensive asylum policy, so the migration flows were attempted to be organized through scattered policies. Law on Settlements (no. 2510), Passport Law (no. 5682), and Law on Stay and Travel of Foreigners (no. 5683) constituted the backbone of the asylum regime in Turkey until 1994. These legislations consider Turkish migration regime as a part of the nation-state building process because the criteria to apply for refugee or immigrant status clearly required one's acceptance (or submission) to Turkish culture (İçduygu & Aksel, 2012: 40). However, this approach had to be abandoned with international regulations in 1960s and in the midst of 1980 when Turkey started to experience higher levels of mixed migration and became either transit or target country for the people on the move. Moreover, Syrian migration flow made Turkey the first refugee hosting country in the world and required a broader perspective (UNCHR, 2021).

The first crucial regulation in this period is Settlement Law number 2510, which defines all the legal status. The Settlement Law number 2510, enacted in

1934, defines the immigrant and refugee in Turkish legislation (Çağaptay, 2006; Kirişçi, 2000). This law makes an exception for the people who are of Turkish descent, accepting them as immigrants which is a legal status. This discrimination in favour of "Turkish-descendants" is articulated in the article 3 where "immigrant" is defined as people who want to settle down in Turkey and belong to Turkish descent and culture. At that time, the Cabinet Council decided who belonged to Turkish descent and who did not. People who did not plan to live but shelter in Turkey due to a state of necessity were called "refugees". Also, the law had a different status: "unengaged immigrant" who lived abroad but wanted to live in Turkey without demanding any settlement aid from the Turkish government. The main important of this Law reflects itself with its relation to settlement process of forced migrants, which will be evaluated in the accommodation policies below.

The biggest improvement in migration policy in the pre-Syrian period is Turkey's signatory to 1951 Refugee Convention written by the UN. The Convention determined the status of refugees and what kind of rights refugees should have in the receiving countries. According to this Convention refugee is "someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." (UNHCR, 2023). This Convention had restricted the refugee status to those who had to migrate due to events occurred before 1951. Besides this temporal limitation, the Convention provided the state parties an option to impose a further geographical restriction. Each state party was asked whether or not Non-European immigrants were to be accepted as refugees. The Article 1B of the 1951 Convention read:

For the purpose of this Convention, the words 'events occurring before 1 January 1951' in Article 1, Section A, shall be understood to mean either:

(a) 'events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951' or

(b) 'events occurring in Europe and elsewhere before 1 January 1951'

Later, the 1967 Protocol enacted to make an amendment of the Convention to remove these temporal and geographical limitations as was forced by the migration flows due to decolonization. Yet, 1967 protocol let those states which accepted the 1951 Convention a right to retain their original decision on the geographical limitation. Turkey has a distinctive place in 1967 Protocol as it is one of the only four countries which retained the geographical limitation along with Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, and Monaco. According to this geographical limitation that Turkey accepted, refugee status is awarded to only those who come from European countries. Namely, it does not accept the enlargement of the refugee status in 1967 Protocol. Yet, the non-refoulement principle, which is the core of the Protocol, was retained. Briefly, Turkey cannot send people who applied to shelter in Turkey back no matter their country of origin in line with the non-refoulement principle. The non-European forced migrants in Turkey cannot be granted as refugees so they have different legal status such as international/ temporary protection, conditional refugee status, which will be later discussed. However, people coming from non-European countries can still apply for refugee status for the re-settlement in the third country because Turkey cooperates with the UNHCR to operate the refugee determination process in Turkey. UNHCR works with Turkish Ministry of Interior for resettlement of the applicant to the third country. The applicant can stay in Turkey until the decision is made but cannot be granted as refugee by the Republic of Turkey.

The international asylum system seeks to protect those who are not recognized as refugees through putting them under temporary protection. Temporary protection becomes especially relevant in the event of mass migration when the receiving country is overwhelmed with individual applications and offers everyone temporary protection status. However, this status is not defined strictly and allows room for the receiving country to interpret its scope and provides less rights when compared to refugee status (Elçin, 2016). The temporary protection status entitles basic human rights for forced migrants which are nutrition, sheltering, access to health, non-refoulement etc. The receiving state must give residence permits to people under temporary protection. Since this status is not permanent, the countries should take action to terminate this temporary and uncertain position of the people (EC, 2001/55). In Europe, it was commonly used for the first time during the Bosnia war. Up until this event, people under temporary protection were generally offered equal rights to those of refugees by European countries. However, in the case of the Bosnia war, these settlement countries were not able to meet the requirements stemming from the refugee status due to the high number of Bosnians. In the end, the states, while offering protection to these displaced people, lowered the coverage of the temporary protection, taking less responsibility of meeting their needs.

Turkey used this temporary protection regime frequently to the extent that it can be said that this status established the mainstream asylum regime due to received mass migrations (Ihlamur-Öner, 2013) that is essential in determining the Turkish asylum regime. Turkey's becoming a transit or target country of international migration since 1980s compelled new legislations which led to regulation no:22127 in 1994. This regulation mainly follows the 1951 Geneva Convention principles, but

the geographical limitation on the refugee status was still effective. This regulation was also criticized for adopting a security perspective in the asylum process. After 2000, Turkey and the EU started a project of structural harmonization of Turkish legal framework with the EU's asylum governance which unfortunately failed at that time (Güleç, 2015). However, after almost a decade, the rising number of Syrians in Turkey forced Turkey to re-frame its legal ground just as intended before with this harmonization project.

3.2 The Effect of Syrian Forced Migrants Flow to Turkey

Turkey has experienced a high level of mass migration flow from Syria after 2011 due to Syria Civil War. The country followed the open-door policy in a humanitarian perspective. However, the migration flow from Syria was an unprecedented event in the history of Turkey which revealed the shortcomings in the asylum regime in Turkey. When Syrians migrated to Turkey in 2011, April, the Regulation in 1994 was the only legislation on migration regulation. Syrians elicited the status problem of internationally displaced people in Turkey. As Turkey has mostly received people from non-European countries including Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, the country shoulders international protection responsibility. When Turkey adopted open-door policy in 2011 for Syrians escaping from internal war in Syria, initially all the parties thought that Syrians' stay in Turkey would have been short. There was not a comprehensive asylum reception administration, so all Syrians stayed as "guest" in Turkey. This concept is not a legal status which does not provide any right or entitlement and its informality successfully reflected the situation of the

Turkish migration regime. After six months, this problem was solved with the recognition of Syrians as under temporary protection in October 2011 by enforcing article 10 in the Regulation (no.22127) (Orhan, 2014: 11). The temporary protection regime is related to open-door policy and non-refoulement principle in the event of mass migration. However, this regulation did not adequately meet the needs of the Syrians, so the Ministry of Interior published a new regulation in March 2012 but it was not made publicly accessible due to security reasons (Yazıcı & Düzyaka, 2017) which proves that Turkey prioritized the security concerns in handling Syrian migration.

However, Turkish asylum-regime was under to review to be changed for a long time. It was in the agenda with the EU, but Syrian migration flow forced parliament to put the law into force. The first regulation about Syrians was made in 2012. However, this guideline cannot answer the high-level migration influx. Additionally, European harmonization process and the inadequate regulations forced Turkey to establish a new comprehensive regulation about immigration (Balcı & Göcen, 2018) which is Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) no. 6458.

Turkish migration regime was weak institutionally when Syrians started to arrive in Turkey. The regulations caused a high level of administrative discretion in Turkey asylum regime at that time. The system completely neglected the concept of "refugee" (Özçürümez & Hamer, 2020) which complicated the situation of the non-Turkish forced migrants in Turkey, forcing them to live with uncertain status and to deal with scattered institutional structure. Therefore, there was an urgent call to be

institutionalized the asylum regime in Turkey with a support of international organizations. For instance, only a state minister was affiliated to govern the migration situation rather than a public institution as seen in the migration flow from Iraq to Turkey in 1988. The rising importance of migration issue in Turkish foreign policy and the high population of Syrian affected the establishment of a national scale public institution, Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM)[2], rather than a state minister. This change is a reflection of the important amendment on the institutions. In 2013, a new Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP, no. 6458) was enacted which currently constitutes the whole Turkish asylum-regime. This law regulates foreigners entering, staying, and departing process and constitutes the adopts the principle and procedures of international and temporary protection statutes. Due to the rising population of Syrians in Turkey and the pressing need for a new public institution focusing on migration management, LFIP no. 6458 established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and organized in the national scale. By 2021, it was organized under presidency (Presidency of Migration Management) which proves its growing importance and size. This institution determined the settlement conditions of forced migrants. Alongside this institutional change, this law defines the legal status of foreigners explicitly, so LFIP no. 6458 establishes the backbone of the current asylum-regime in Turkey.

LFIP regulates refugee, conditional refugee and subsidiary protection status which are defined under international protection while retaining the geographical

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[2] The presidential decree organized as a presidency in 2021. Its current name is Presidency of Migration Management (PoMM).

restrictions on becoming refugees. The people who enter Turkey from non-European

countries get conditional refugee status until they re-settle in the third country by

UNHCR. And finally, people who cannot get either of these statuses (refugee or

conditional refugee) can be granted subsidiary protection in those cases where they

may face physical violence or discrimination due to an armed condition in the

country of origin. Even though LFIP has a restrictive perspective on migration

management, it keeps the non-refoulement principle.

The main groups among foreigners in Turkey is the ones under temporary

protection. LFIP regulates mass migration with assigning different status which is

temporary protection:

> Temporary protection may be provided to foreigners who, having been forced
> to leave their country and cannot return to the country they left, have arrived
> at or crossed the borders of Turkey in masses seeking emergency and
> temporary protection.
>
> (2) Proceedings to be followed on reception into, stay in, rights and
> obligations in, exit from Turkey of such persons, along with measures to be
> taken against mass movements as well as cooperation and coordination
> among national and international institutions and organizations, designation
> of powers and duties of institutions and organizations that will function at the
> central or provincial level, shall be governed by a regulation to be issued by
> the Council of Ministers. (article 91).

This general article is just the tip of an iceberg, the regulation comes after it.

Temporary protection status is the main legal status in the case of mass

migrations where individual international protection requests cannot be evaluated.

Once an individual grants temporary protection status, they cannot apply for

international protection status. (LFIP, article 16). This status is not one of the

international protection statuses listed in the law (refugee, conditional refugee, and

subsidiary protection) (TPR, article 7/3).

This status was implemented to Syrians in Turkey for the first time under this new law. The high Syrian population under temporary protection and lack of a framework about the process required a regulation to be put on force to elaborate on the details of temporary protection which was the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR), made in 2014. The regulation accepts Syrians who came to Turkey individually or collectively since 2011 under temporary protection. (LFIP, article provisional article 1). Even if a Syrian had applied for an international protection, s/he would be considered as under temporary protection and any other individual application for international protection is not accepted (Elçin, 2016: 32).

Temporary Protection Regulation fills all the blanks the law has in terms of the details of the status as well as its implementation process. The status was given and terminated by the Presidential decision when the conditions arose (TPR, article 11). When temporary protection status of the people is suspended, the Council of Minister decides one of three alternative options (TPR, article 11/ 2):

1. to send people to their country of origins
2. To grant another status collectively that the conditions of people under temporary protection would meet or to asset every individual who apply for international protection,
3. To allow people to stay in Turkey subjected to the conditions determined by the law.

Acquiring Turkish citizenship is not an option for people who are under

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temporary protection. Turkish Citizenship Law enacts the acquisition of citizenship

into two main different ways: by birth or by the decision of the competent authority.

The latter has its own special conditions and the important condition for people under

temporary protection is to "…have been resident in Turkey without interruption for

five years preceding the date of his/her application" (Turkish Citizenship Law,

Article 11-b). It is interpreted that these five years residence condition refers to

residing with a proper "residence document" but Syrians under temporary protection

stay in Turkey without such a permit - with a temporary protection identification

document instead- so the duration of their stay in Turkey is not counted towards

filling this temporal restriction to Turkish citizenship. Moreover, like LFIP,

Temporary Protection Regulations explicitly closed the way of people under

temporary protection to fulfil these requirements:

> Temporary protection identification document shall grant the right to stay in Turkey. However, this document shall not be deemed to be equivalent to a residence permit or documents, which substitute residence permits, as regulated by the Law, shall not grant the right for transition to long term residence permit, its duration shall not be taken into consideration when calculating the total term of residence permit durations and shall not entitle its holder to apply for Turkish citizenship. (Temporary Protection Regulation-article 25).

It is seen that acquiring Turkish citizenship in a normal way is rendered

impossible for people under temporary protection. Except for acquiring citizenship

by decision of the competent authority, there are exceptional ways for acquisition of

Turkish citizenship which are,

A. Bringing industrial plants into Turkey or have rendered or are being

considered to render in future outstanding services in the scientific,

technological, economic, social, sporting, cultural and artistic fields and about

whom a reasoned offer has been made by the ministries relevant.

B. Having Turkuaz cards according to law number 6458.

C. Being regarded as necessary to be naturalised.

D. Being recognised as immigrants.

The last one refers to immigrant status applied for people belonging to Turkish culture and descent and want to live in Turkey. The first exceptional way is also critical for the topic of the dissertation because in 2018, the regulation about Turkish citizenship was amended. Any foreigner who buys a house in Turkey for more than 250.000 USD obtains a right to apply an exceptional naturalization process on the condition that the house will not be sold within the following three years after the purchase as buying a house is regarded as investment to Turkey in the scope of exceptional citizenship. This amount was increased to 400.000 USD by the amendment of relevant regulation in May, 2022. However, Syrians under temporary protection cannot utilize this exceptional citizenship application because there is a direct ban by the Turkish state on the Syrian homeownership in Turkey (Üçüncü, 2014).

3.2.1 Turkish administrative organization after Syrian migration

In the beginning (2011), Turkey's response to Syria migration could be evaluated under emergency and humanitarian perspectives but, in time, prolonged stay of Syrians in Turkey forced Turkey to implement more comprehensive policies towards the harmonization of the society (Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020). All legislation and policies are designed on the assumption that they will stay temporary

in Turkey and finally return to Syria, the duration of stay cannot be counted as temporary, and they began to root in Turkey. In short, the position of Syrians contains another ambiguity in institutional and policy perspective. Once Syrians' stay in Turkey would be longer than public authorities had thought, public institutions use social cohesion in order to govern this ambiguous situation in a humanitarian perspective. International organizations are partners and important actors in this process because Turkey implemented internationally promoted policy programmes. For instance, the legal amendments complying with the EU direction use harmonization as an express of social cohesion.

Harmonization refers to a process rather in which newcomers pursue their cultural identity while living with safely with host community in general (Hoffman & Samuk, 2016). Since this definition does not contain an integration perspective, its usage in legal documents reflects pursuing ambiguity in integration (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016) which does not necessarily lead to a concrete policy. It is commonly used in the policy document especially after the EU- Turkey Refugee Deal. Alongside the national legislations, the EU-Turkey Deal on Syrian immigrant is crucial to understand the conditions of Syrians. In 2015, the EU and Turkey signed an agreement to stop Syrian flew to Schengen area. In this agreement, the asylum-seeker enters in EU Schengen area through Turkey must return to Turkey in return that EU gave 3 billion Euro to Turkey to spend it for Syrians and Turkish citizens would have right to move freely in Schengen Area without having a visa. After this agreement, the refugee movement from Turkey to EU diminished.

With this Deal, the shift from emergency-oriented administration to social

cohesion usage in Turkish migration management can be observed. For instance, institutionally, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency was responsible for Syrians in Turkey until 2016. Yet, after the Deal, it was replaced by General Directorate of Migration Management which was established with LFIP in order to administrate migration and provide social cohesion at the national scale. This institutional change can be considered as a reflection of the shift from emergency approach to social cohesion approach in general (Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020).

The dilemmas in social cohesion policy can be observed well in the housing area which is one of the main indicators of the cohesion in a society and integration of immigrant (Ager & Strang, 2008). Even though the Deal with the EU funds different projects and national policy of migration is to promote social cohesion, there is almost nothing done in the housing area except for temporary accommodation centres which were decided to be closed officially in 2018. The effect of its on immigration will be evaluated below under the legal perspective.

3.3 Turkey's Accommodation Policy for Forced Migrants

In the European context, the designated spaces for refugees sheltering transcends being a means of housing but reflects the state's perception of them but this rationality (Hershcher, 2017). Refugee's residing either in camps or cities follow public institutions' perspective on housing policies mainly in the Global North as discussed in the Chapter 2. Countries in Global South keep forced migrants in the camps for a long period either not provide any services, especially in the housing area. Turkey, on the other hand, constitutes a novel case in the context of forced

migrant sheltering as it does not fit either of these practices for variety of reasons. Firstly, Turkish housing system depends on private homeownership and rental sector. Private rental houses control almost 40% of all housing tenures is the highest ratio among the EU countries (Aydın, 2019). Houses are regarded as an important investment instrument to deal with the unstable economic conditions of the country. The housing market is in the grip of a rentier economy where both local and national authorities turn a blind eye as the housing sector is the driving force of the economy and, also, any interference with the market may result in loss of political support (Kızıldağ-Özdemirli, 2019). Furthermore, the lack of social housing system in Turkey renders any building occupation attempt impossible as it would mean occupying someone else's building as seen in Greece, Spain. Also, the large-scale migration, economic conditions of Turkey, the poor condition of residents in Turkey bear the exclusion of Syrians in certain extent in the housing market (Gökarıksel & Secor, 2020). Thus, the dominant rent-seeking nature of the housing market and the exclusionary thoughts of local people hinder any mass solidarity practices between the local people and the refugees.

Secondly, the housing market experienced a sudden shift from informal to formal in the 2000s. In the text, the formalization is used as a straightforward conversion from illegal land occupation to acquisition property right for the housing area. Gecekondus -informal houses in Turkey- were inevitability formalized while the Turkish housing market financialized by the state through urban transformation projects (Erman, 2019; Karaçimen & Çelik, 2017). The state introduced new several legislation including the offer of housing amnesty for people living in informal houses as a kind of trade-off not to lose their support while pursuing its coercive

power against any informal activities in the market. Also, the speculations created by transformation projects raise the importance of land/ house property in the society, so they became stricter any informal activities in the market- which also another reason for the lack of occupation movement in Turkey unlike Greece (Tsavdaroglou, 2018). Namely, even though gecekondus were built illegally, they were registered later so housing sector in Turkey became formalized to an unprecedented extent in other middle eastern or northern Africa cities. Yet, it can be still said that informality is not external to Turkish state because it knows how to use informal relations as a political struggle domain to execute its own aims (Kızıldağ-Özdemirli, 2019: 30) Even though the housing market is formalized, informal relations as "the ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized" (Roy, 2011: 233) is mainly used for every actor in the market. While the power actors like landlords benefit from this grey zone to make more profit, Syrians suffer this grey zone to act in the border of the formal market.

Unlike other cities in MENA region, informality cannot explain the whole forced migrants' housing experience in Turkey when they figured out to stay in Turkey longer. Regulations oblige Syrians to have a formal residence through registration in muhktar's record depending on their residence proved with lease in the cities so that they can access free education or health services. Whereas Syrians' settling in the houses in Lebanon occurs without having any formal document since they make a verbal lease agreement to avoid municipal tax (Fawaz, 2014). Syrians in Turkey, also, face certain legal problems in the housing market, since they cannot get any housing aid and have very fragile legal status. On top of that, the rent-seeking landlords lead to numerous structural problems in the housing market. In short,

Syrians are left completely on their own in a housing market where informality, in its traditional sense, is not an option for housing. Therefore, in this context, the right to housing becomes extra relevant to define the right and responsibility of every actor in the market. Based on this background, a depiction of how Turkey has implemented housing policies for forced migrants since the establishment of the Republic will be provided below on the nexus of different status that are immigrant and forced migrants.

3.3.1 Settlement of immigrants (who belongs to Turkish culture)

The Settlement Law number 2510, enacted in 1934, is the first Law regulating the asylum process after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. As stated above it was not only identifying the legal status but also determined the settlement policies. The legal status granted by the law is closely related to the settlement policy. Once people registered as an immigrant, they immediately had a right to Turkish citizenship according to article 6, a right which was not given to the refugees. Having immigrant status in Turkey was quite essential in terms of law entitlement and accommodation issues as the immigrant status ensured receiving land and house by the government. This difference was quite important for people's potential rights and the decision of settlement.

The concept of settlement defined in the law which reads

> …a house or place to live according to its population and needs for each family; a shop or a shop or such a building or place that will provide a livelihood for craftsmen and merchants, and permanent capital; enough soil and double animals, equipment, seed, barn and hayloft or place for farmers. (17. Article).

To provide lands and houses for this aim, the state law was to re-settle the tribes in Turkey which the government achieved by confiscating the lands of these tribes to be distributed to immigrants, refugees, people who were forced to move domestically, and the farmers who do not have lands. The article 10 asserts that all lands either registered or unregistered which were given to the feudal landlords, sheikh etc. thanks to customs were taken back to be given to the immigrants, refugees, or local farmers. These lands were distributed based on the decisions of governorship (article 23). These allocated properties could not be given to other people in 10 years (article 30). In case of occupation of these lands by other people, the government was supposed to act in favour of the immigrants in order to evict the occupying people (article 22). These settlement policies let the state change the demography around the country and prevented tribes from living together. This law is used for nation-state building process in a very nationalist perspective (İçduydu et al., 2008; Jongerden, 2007).

While these people (immigrants, refugees, people who were forced to move, and the farmers who do not have lands or have a few land) were waiting for their new houses, they were settled temporarily in various decent houses belonging to either public authorities or individuals. These houses can be thought as the sheltering centres. For this purpose, the state could evict the existing residents for one year ensuring that the eviction did not cause former residents to become homeless by paying their one-year rents (article 24).

In time, some articles were introduced into the law to meet the demands of certain mass migration flows to Turkey such as the amendment implemented in 1992

to handle the migration from Bulgaria in the late 1980s. According to this added article, the state established a housing project for those people (annex 34). Housing Development Agency (HDA) was the main public institution in the housing sector. This institution was established to interfere in the housing market and support housing supply in case of earthquakes or improve the housing quality in the cities as a tool of social state principles. However, especially after the 1990s, HDA was re-organized according to neoliberal era and has been acting more like a "private" institution by creating rent or rent-seeking activities while it continued to build houses for lower-income citizens. However, the latter one was quite small in its activities. Moreover, all allocated houses were not public houses. Namely, these settled people had the full right about the houses by registration of the lands and houses on behalf of themselves. All these aids would be given for free which was stated clearly in the law.

In 2005, a new settlement law amendment was implemented by number 5543 and replaced the old No. 2510. It retains the backbone of the asylum regime which was constituted by 2510 law while maintaining the difference between immigrant and refugee status. The common ground about all immigrants is their belonging to Turkish descent and culture but it explicitly recognizes different types of immigrants which is quite important about settlement policy. The immigrants admitted to the country and allocated land with a special law are called settled immigrants. Those who do not demand any settlement aid are called free immigrants whereas Individual immigrants are those who came to Turkey as a family. Finally, there are mass immigrants who came to Turkey after the agreement between two countries. Once all these immigrants enter Turkey, they get an immigrant document like an ID and

obtain the right to apply to Turkish citizenship immediately.

3.3.2 Sheltering of forced migrants

After the 1980s, due to the rising number of people coming to Turkey, more detailed regulations were enacted. These regulations have a sheltering policy for the people demanding Turkey to protection. Therefore, it has a different way of the settlement of the immigrant.

In 1983, a regulation about Refugee Guesthouse numbers was enacted. It regulated the guesthouses in which every asylum-seeker should stay until their status decision is taken. It is a temporary residence until they get a visa to go to the third country or go to the city where they can reside. All the expenses of this stay are absorbed by the state. All this settlement arranges according to the people's family and social situations. Another and more comprehensive regulation about asylum seekers Reg. 94/6169 enacted in 1994 which became the main document of the asylum regime as being depicted above. In terms of accommodation, people who want to take sanctuary to Turkey and live in Turkey while waiting for defection to a third country can either shelter a guesthouse or reside in a place, city the Interior Ministry decides (article 6). Article 11 regulates the construction of camps which are expected to be located near the border. According to the regulation, refugees and asylum-seekers should stay in these camps and must take permission from local authorities before they leave the camps. Also, some of them can reside and travel in Turkey if they have permission to do so by the Ministry of Interior.

These regulations follow the temporary protection regime in Turkey which was applied for many different mass migration cases including the mass migration from Iraq in 1988, from Bulgaria 1989- 1995 period, from Iraq in 1991 due to Gulf War, from Bosnia 1992- 1995 period, and from Kosovo 1998- 1999. For instance, many Iraqis entered in Turkey after the Iran- Iraq war in 1988 due to Iran-Iran war. Firstly, almost 1 million Iraqis came to the Turkish border. Firstly, Turkey adopted a security perspective and closed its border due to the concern that pro-PKK Kurdish may have entered in Turkey with those people after being criticized national and international public. Then, Turkey decided to open its border with strict inspection and settled almost 100 thousand Iraqis into a temporary accommodation centres and different villages nearby the border under temporary protection regime. During the war, many Iraq Turkmen and Kurdish were staying in the Turkish border to escape from Iraq government. Their population reached 400 thousand in 1991. Even though Turkey did not implement open-door policy, the politicians declared to be willing to help in terms of nutrition and sheltering to those people in either Iraq or Turkey. 5 April 1991, Turkey opened its border de facto. At that time, the UN gathered and declared the number of those people could reach one million which was impossible to handle such a population in a country. Then the UN Security Council interfered in the situation, created safe zones in Iraq, these people re-settled, and finally returned to their country (Ihlamur-Öner, 2013). As seen even though many people sheltered in Turkey, they were still quite small compared to Syrian migration. Therefore, none of this mass migration to Turkey had an impact on Turkish legislation or accommodation policies as big as Syrian migration flow has.

3.3.3 Syrian's position in between settlement and sheltering

Sheltering is one of the services provided to Syrians. However, it must be noted that the state is supposed to provide this service only if it has adequate capacity/resources to do so, otherwise it is not compulsory for the state. In the beginning, Syrians were sheltered in Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) once they registered. After 2012, since the capacity of those centres exceeded and constructed new TACs was not a sustainable solution, they started to live in different cities with their own means which revealed a need for yet another regulation. The only restriction of this registration is that Syrians can access the public services in cities where they registered. Therefore, it could be said that Syrians's accommodation in Turkey is between sheltering and settlement. While they live in the cities de facto, they should live in TACs de jure, which will be evaluted below.

3.3.3.1 Syrians' Sheltering in the Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs)

TACs are designed as the main accommodation option for people under temporary protection in the legislation. All the laws and the regulations approach accommodation just by referring these centres. How and under what conditions a foreigner is settled in Turkey is written in LFIP no. 6458 and Temporary Protection Regulation. According to Temporary Protection Regulation, DGMM (currently PoMM) may establish reception and accommodation centres. People with special needs shall be prioritized in accommodation. Some public services such as health and education are provided in these centres and the applicant and people under international protection can use these services even though they do not live in the

centres. The steps how applicants settled in TACs are as follows:

1. Once foreigners enter Turkey, they are immediately contacted by the staff in the border.

2. They are led to **referral centres** in the borders where they are hosting for registration and other procedures until they settle in TACs or their residences places if they will reside on their own.

3. If foreigners reside in TACs, they will transfer to TAC according to their family and social condition and availability.

Upon registration to a TAC, the beneficiary should reside in the reception or accommodation centres, location, or province that they are directed to by the public authorities (LFIP, article 71). Then, all the applicants must register in the address registration system. Also, PoMM may oblige conditional refugees and people having subsidiary protection to reside in certain areas due to the public security/ order concerns (LFIP, article 82). Besides, people must have a travel document when they travel to another city from their residential city (LFIP, article 84). Accommodating in the cities is thought as subsidiarity to TACs. However, the current situation is quite different from the regulations. How this process has improved since 2011 is periodized and evaluated legally.

The settlement of Syrians in Turkey is classified roughly divided into three periods based on where the majority of Syrians was mostly accommodated, namely temporary accommodation centres (TACs) period, the transitional period between TACs to cities and the final city period.

Temporary accommodation centres were built for Syrians in the border cities. First term the period 2011- 2014 is **Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) intensive**. In this period, TACs were built in the scope of "emergency" and Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) and governorship administered these centres during this period. In that time, national and international authorities could not estimate the future number of Syrians who would be forced to leave the country. Turkish government thought that TACs would be sufficient to meet the sheltering demand of Syrians. However, TACs were quickly proved to be insufficient. Thus, Syrians had to live in the cities which had not been regulated.

During the period from 2015-2018 Syrians under temporary protection resided **both in TACs and in the cities**. However, the population of Syrians in the cities kept rising sharply. Last period from 2018 onwards constitutes the last **city-intensive period**. Also, the amendment in Temporary Protection Regulation was made in that year and the responsibility for TACs shifted to DGMM from DEMP. This can be interpreted, in the context of housing, as a shift from emergency to social cohesion policy which is quite late compared to other areas such as education, health, and employment where the same shift happened in 2016. Upon the decision to evacuate TACs in 2018, the final regulation about them was made on 28th November, 2020 which transferred their budget to the national budget. This regulation clearly communicates the state's intention to close all TACs.

DGMM (currently PoMM) decided to close all TACs in 2020. Currently, less than 1% of Syrians are living in TACs (DGMM, 2021). The current situation in a legal and public policy perspective is that all laws and regulations promote TACs to

provide accommodation for Syrians under temporary protection, but the state decided to close all of them which had become obsolete anyway as people under temporary protection had mostly moved to the cities rather than staying in the TACs. This creates a controversial situation in the area of housing. Almost 4 million people live in the cities with lots of restrictions without accessing any housing aids or ban on having o property. Legal situation and real conditions of these people are in total contradiction to each other. Since the housing sector is one of the rentier areas in Turkey and quite competitive even for Turkish citizens, solidarity cannot be formed. All the national/ international reports or scholarly articles emphasize the conditions of TACs but the housing experience of Syrians under temporary protection in the cities is not well-known or dismissed with generalization referring to insufficient or unhealthy conditions of houses. There is a lack of housing policy towards Syrians in Turkey which is written by some scholarly articles (i.e. Baban et al., 2017, Elicin, 2018: 92, Erdoğan, 2017: 78, Gültekin et al., 2018, Juahiainen, 2018: 45, Türk, 2016: 148) but a comprehensive study is still much needed. Syrians' current housing situation is much more complex. They are living in Turkey more than 10 years, so their housing patterns are more diverse. The aim of the fieldwork of this dissertation is to show up these patterns which are lack in the literature.

3.3.3.2 The Legal Restriction for Syrians to Obtain a Property in Turkey

Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey are living in limbo. Their situation is always thought as temporary but not having an exit way from this "temporariness". They cannot apply for Turkish citizenship since Turkish citizenship

is exclusive to those who belong to Turkish descent and culture. On top of that, Syrians are even deprived of gaining citizenship through buying houses which is open to everyone else. Even though some Syrians under temporary protection acquire Turkish citizenship in an exceptional way, it is criticized a lot because the condition of this "exceptional" naturalization is not open to the public.

The first regulation about the regulation of Turkish naturalization in an exceptional way was amended by a Presidential Decree in 2018 (Presidential Degree 418/ 2018). Any foreigner who buys a house in Turkey for its price of more than 250.000 USD obtains a right to apply an exceptional naturalization process with his/ her family on the condition that this house will not be sold within the following three years after the purchase as buying a house is regarded as an investment to Turkey in the scope of exceptional citizenship. By May, 2022 it was increased to 400.000 USD from 250.000 USD. However, every Syrians citizen in Turkey including those under temporary protection cannot utilize this exceptional citizenship application because there is a direct ban by the Turkish state on the Syrian homeownership in Turkey. This limitation causes discrimination of Syrians both in housing market and acquiring Turkish citizenship. To understand this limitation, the long history and the land regulations should be investigated:

In 1927, law 1062 authorize the council of ministers to restrain foreigners - whose country had limited Turkish citizens' right to the immovable property in its own territory before- from the same right in Turkey partially or wholly. This law no 1062 was an implementation of the principle of reciprocity in Turkish land administration. In 1938, Turkish citizens were deprived of their rights to own real

estates in Syria and their properties were even expropriated by Syrian state due to Hatay's emancipation to Turkey. Upon this act of the Syrian government, Turkish government decided to put the same ban into force for Syrian citizens in Turkey and prevented them from owning immovable properties in Turkey, following the principle of reciprocity according to the law no 1062. Later, the executive orders in 1939, 1942, 1957, and 1966 were entered into force- according to law number 1062- in Turkey to pursue this prohibition for Syrian citizens. This prohibition and expropriation were solved in 1972 as a result of the negotiations between the two states. This new Protocol was implemented after the approval by the Turkish Parliament with law no 1937 in 1976. However, the National Security Council took a decision to re-implement the prohibition of possessing properties for Syrian citizens in Turkey for security reasons in 1984 (Şığya, 2016).

On the other hand, more liberal law amendments were implemented in Law on Land Registry and Cadastre after the 2000s. The most important one was enacted in 2012, which is the law no 6302 amended Law on Land Registry and Cadastre no 2644 on the purpose that foreigners can acquire property rights without considering the principle of reciprocity in the countries that were determined by the President of the Republic. Yet, in any case, these properties cannot exceed the 10% of the district territory (article. 1). Also, the law terminated the previous limitation of foreigners' just having property for dwelling or working place. It means that a foreigner can buy a house in Turkey without living just for investment and still himself, his/ her partner and children gain a right to apply for Turkish citizenship thanks to 2018 amendment in Turkish Citizenship Regulation. However, countries of beneficiaries must be listed by the president according to the law no 6302 in 2012. This listing decision is not

limited by any objective norm but the president (the council of ministers before 2018) should take decision according to international relations and the Turkey's benefit. This list was determined in 25.06.2012 with decree no 724 but it was classified as "confidential document". Therefore, it is only known that 183 countries are in the list is- while 193 states are recognized as a state by the UN (Üçüncü, 2014: 104). The public authorities cannot explain the whole list but answer each foreigners' situation who wants to benefit from this regulation.

The General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre affiliated to The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization published a circular in 2012 about how to implement foreigners' homeownership regulations in Turkey to clarify the list. Since Syrians' homeownership status was restricted in Turkey, the circular ordered them to ask the central office. However, due to previous restrictions- summarized above- for Syrians' homeownership, there was confusion about this issue so when a Syrian asked whether s/he can but an immovable property, the duration of the answer was taking a long time. To solve this confusion, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization published another circular in 2014 which clearly indicated that Syrians could not be a homeowner in Turkey due to not be added Syria to the list determined by the council of ministers in 2012. Up until now, any further regulations have not enacted about this issue. Today, it means that despite the presence of almost 4 million Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey, none of them can have a house in Turkey and thereby are excluded from both the housing market as homeownership and acquiring Turkish citizenship in an exceptional way. Hence, Syrians are clearly discriminated against by being deprived of a right that is offered to anyone but them. Therefore, even though many Syrians under temporary

protection invest in Turkey, they cannot get citizenship.

The property right is secured for everybody in the 35th article in the Constitution of Turkey and which can be restricted by only the law on the purpose of common good. The 16th article of the constitution ordered that fundamental rights and freedoms of foreigners can be restricted in accordance with international law. In addition to this national legislation, 1951 Convention contains important articles about the property rights. Article 13 of the Convention is related to the right to housing because it is stated that this right provides movable and immovable property rights to refugees which should not be lower than a foreigner as far as possible. Article 21 is also directly related to housing rights. The states should account for the right to housing to refugees no lower than that accorded to aliens in normal circumstances within the scope of national law. Since Syrians' status are not refugees in Turkey, the restriction about homeownership cannot be evaluated as against the Convention. The Convention always indicates the possibility of the signatory state. Also, the national law authorizes public authorities to restrict the immovable property rights of Syrians. However, this restriction is not convenient to the soul of the regulations. Also, it causes discrimination of Syrians in the housing market in Turkey. Even though this kind of restriction does not violate both national and international law, it causes important sociological problems and make Syrians' lives harder in Turkey.

3.3.3.3 From Temporary Accommodation Centres to Cities

As stated above, PoMM may give permission to people under temporary

protection to live in the cities provided that there is not a potential risk to public order, public health, and public security according to Temporary Protection Regulation. Currently, all Syrians are residing in the cities rather than TACs according to this article (TPR, article 24); yet, in this case, these people must meet their housing needs on their own. Article 26 in the TPR assumes the public services to people under temporary protection which are health, education, access to labour market, social assistance, interpretation etc. Other services which are not counted in the first paragraph could only be provided by public services if their capacity allows. It can be interpreted that the listed services are mandatory public services which are essential for people under temporary protection while the rest, including accommodation is not: People under temporary protection with special needs can be accommodated by the governorship to the extent that public's capacity (article 24). This article clearly does not hold the public institutions responsible for providing housing to the people under temporary protections. Only if public authorities have the sufficient means, then they can provide certain public services to the people with special needs. In the case of Syrians, municipalities sometimes make rent allowance, give furniture or even, more importantly, shelter women and children in women shelters according to this provision.

However, it is depicted in the literature that especially Syrians along with other minority groups live in overcrowded and under quality houses in the cities. Based on this literature, the classification of forced migrants is based on three different categories: flats, gecekondus, and unsettled buildings. Forced migrants access these dwellings through private market conditions (Özçürümez et. al., 2021). However, even though mainly Syrians are living in Turkey for more than 10 years,

their current condition of housing is understudied. They constitute immigrant

neighbourhoods in the cities, white flight of Turkish citizens from these

neighbourhoods are observed, the rental market is specifically affected by this short-

them demographic change (Balkan et al., 2018), and more important forced migrants

adopted different housing pathways and tactics in the cities. They are not stable, they

are quite dynamic groups in urban lives, which can be observed their housing career

and housing patterns. They disperse around the cities, get more settled in the cities

but how and under what conditions are unexplored. One of aims of the dissertation is

to fulfil this gap. Thus, their current housing conditions, unreported problems

experiencing in the recent years will be discussed in the following chapter based on

my fieldwork.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS FROM THE FIELDWORD CONDUCTED IN GAZIANTEP/TURKEY

4.1 Gaziantep after the Syrian Migration Flow

Gaziantep is located in the South-eastern part of Turkey as a border city with Syria with a population of 2.130.432 inhabitants (TÜİK, 2022). It is one of the industrial centres of Turkey and the biggest city of the region which makes it a popular destination for both domestic and international migration. However, the Syrian influx brought Gaziantep into a different and more important position in the migration governance in Turkey. Currently, there are 435.691 Syrians under temporary protection in Gaziantep- which is the second to Istanbul- (DGMM, 2021) who constitute 22% of the city population.

Figure 2. Gaziantep in Turkey

Source: Produced by the author

Hosting such a large group of people would be a challenge for any city so Gaziantep was hit by a turmoil that affected every aspect of the city life.

> Because we are talking about a number like 500 thousand. The population of 2 million Gaziantep corresponds to 20, 25% almost. This is a very serious increase. Behold, I do not know whether there is any other city or country experiencing this kind of increase except for Turkey (IE3).

Especially Syrians' migration to urban areas was far from being a planned action but rather an act of survival and to find a resident once TACs got insufficient. Yet, arguably the housing crisis, which happened to the supply deficit to meet such a sudden demand, was the most severe and turned the market upside down. The immediate outcome was seen in rent prices, as also observed by a Metropolitan Municipality personnel:

> When they [Syrians] became permanent like 2013, there was a serious social transformation in Antep. At that time, perhaps the most important thing was rent prices. In Gaziantep, the rents tripled. (IE1)

This rise was due to two reasons: the shortage of available houses in the rent market and self-seeking activities of the homeowners. Inevitably, many disputes arose between the local people and forced migrant as local people were negatively affected by this rise as well seen in local expert's words: "And I think [the increase in the rents] was the main source of the reaction in the city against Syrians". (IE1)

4.1.1 Güneykent and Yeditepe neighbourhoods

The market conditions, as well as the frictions between the local people and Syrians, are analysed by the field study conducted in two neighbourhoods in the southwestern part of the city: *Güneykent* and *Yeditepe*.

Figure 3. Güneykent and Yeditepe in Gaziantep Urban Area

Source: Google Earth 2022.

Güneykent and Yeditepe neighbourhoods are located in the southwestern part
of the city, near the Gaziantep University. They host newly-appointed, single civil
servants generally. The neighbourhoods have different public transportation options
including bus and trolley car which renders access to city-centre easy. However,
these neighbourhoods are self-sufficient and one can meet his/her daily needs
without having to leave the neighbourhoods. However, this area has experienced a
rapid demographic and physical change following the influx of forced migrants.
Generally, the other neighbourhoods with high numbers of Syrians in Gaziantep are
divided according to the ethnicity, religious, or socio-economic status of the forced
migrants but these neighbourhoods are quite diverse compared to other
neighbourhoods in Gaziantep. Other neighbourhoods with dense Syrian population
like Karataş and Düztepe are segregated into sub-parts according to their ethnicity,
religious, or socio-economic status of the Syrians; yet, Güneykent and Yeditepe are

more heterogonous in this respect their relations with local people can be observed better:

> In the Güneykent region, mostly students, NGO workers or those who have their own business, or those who live in the same house with 3 or 4 families live in very very bad conditions. Güneykent is more diverse because of its closeness to the university... You can find more studio apartments and furnished houses because it is closer to the university as the middle-class segment, but as you move towards the South. Here are mostly single civil servants who are newly appointed to Gaziantep and mostly students. Syrian families also have furnished houses in those regions, for example, in very small rooms, 2 plus 1, two families can live, three families live in the same house. They can rent it more conveniently. At least, electricity and water are included in these expenses, so there are those who prefer to rent that way. (IE1)

Also, middle-class neighbourhoods' rent increased more than any other neighbourhoods in Turkey after Syrian flow (Balkan et al., 2018). These neighbourhoods are perfect fit to this information. Firstly, local people and expats in the city settled the area. Then forced migrants especially Syrians who do not want to live in "Syrian neighbourhood", preferred to live there no matter their economic conditions. Due to the fact that these areas offer both very luxury houses with very high rent and small houses with quite low rent. Therefore, a rapid demographic and physical change took place, making these neighbourhoods, most convenient to observe the housing experience of forced migrants.

Therefore, analysing super-diversity debate within these neighbourhoods will offer not only a novel, but also a unique empirical qualitative material because the differences in the same ethnicity and other factors, beyond race and class, determines an individual's position in the market can be investigated. Within these neighbourhoods, Gaziantep in general, a large refugee influx manifested itself in increased physical encounters between local people and forced migrants especially in

the housing area. First and foremost, these encounters happen in residential areas which cannot be avoided. Forced migrants have to find a place to stay, the real estate agents have to be the mediator, homeowners have to answer forced migrants' demands, and the local people experience living with a "yabancı [foreigner]" in their buildings. Therefore, housing is a great potential to understand the level of social cohesion. The ultimate aim of the field study is to understand how forced migrants cope with the novel political and housing market conditions that do not fit the experiences of either the European or global south.

4.1.2   Demographic profile of forced migrants

I interviewed 41 forced migrants, twenty of which were women while twenty-one of which were men. Extra attention was paid to equally represent women and men in the research. 41% of interviewees are between 18 and 29; 38,8% of them are between 30 and 50; and 18,4% are above 51. The latter category is relatively small compared to other age categories which may suggest that relatively elderly people tend not to migrate. The age average of women is 34.35 while it is 35,62 for men; and 35,65 in total. The average duration of their time in Gaziantep is 5.04 years in total. 5.42 years is for female interviewees while 4.69 is for male ones.

In terms of ethnicity, Syrian (Arabs) have the highest proportion among interviewees. I separate their nationalities into their ethnicities because ethnicity plays an important role in forced migrants' relations with local people in Turkey. For instance, especially among Syrian forced migrants, there are some Turkmens who can speak Turkish, which really affects their urban experiences. Therefore, emphasizing ethnicity is a mandatory step to understand their complex urban

experiences. It also further justifies the suitability of the super-diversity framework to understand forced migrants in urban context. Some forced migrants were also aware of the importance of ethnicity. Since I could not obtain the population statistics of forced migrants at the neighbourhood level, I could not arrange my sample so that each ethnicity would be represented accordingly. Especially, during the fieldwork, I tried to find an interviewee under international protection which are mostly Afghans, because of the rising population of Afghans in Turkey. However, both headmen and real estate agents indicated that there has been almost no Afghans in their areas but, maybe, in the city-centre.

Table 2. Ethnicity of the Forced Migrant Interviewees

Ethnicity	Frequency
Syrian (Arab)	28
Syrian (Turkmen)	4
Iraq (Kurdish)	2
Ethiopia	2
Egyptian	2
Palestinian	2
Egyptian (Copt)	1

Source: Produced by the author

In terms of marital status, seven female interviewees and nine males are single. Also, all widows and two divorced interviewees are female interviewees. Remaining interviewees are married and living with their families. Two widows are living alone while one of them is living with her children. Half of the single female interviewees are living with their families but none of single male interviewees are

living with their families. Single female interviewees living by herself are from

Egypt and Ethiopia. Although Syrians are inarguably dominant among forced

migrants, the women of them are not represented as much as it deserves. It means

that a single woman living by herself is not still common among Syrians. On the

other hand, single male interviewees prefer to live alone or with their friends. That is

because men have more freedom over their lives which includes where to reside in

forced migrant communities.

Table 3. Marital Status of Forced Migrant Interviewees

Marital Status	Frequency
married	19
single	16
divorced	3
widow	3

Source: Produced by the author

The descriptive analysis shows that forced migrants generally came from

Middle Eastern or North African countries to Gaziantep, mostly from Syria. Only

two of them came from Ethiopia. They generally had resided in the cities of their

own countries before migrating to Turkey, but Palestinians' place of residence does

not fit their nationalities because they had migrated to Syria before migrating to

Turkey. One of the Palestinians indicated that he had lived in a refugee camp in Syria

so he could compare two countries. Also, an Egyptian was living in Saudi Arabia,

and she never had not gone to Egypt before. Even though there was not any conflict

in Saudi Arabia, she indicated her reason to come to Turkey as forced but did not share more details.

Twenty-two of Syrian participants used to live in Aleppo before. Especially, elderly interviewees expressed the similarity of weather conditions of two cities that had affected their decision of living in Gaziantep.

4.2 The Importance of Legal Status and Nationality of Forced Migrants

The importance of the nationality is firstly shown itself by determining the legal status of the forced migrants. It creates the first division among forced migrants, so it is pretty crucial. For instance, forced migrants' nationality affects their right to have a property in Turkey as seen in Syrian case. Secondly, they have different kinds of legal status. Since many forced migrants in Turkey did not come from Europe, they still do not have a refugee status despite that they were forced to leave. Since Syrians are the majority of the interviewees, many of them are under temporary protection as seen in the table.

Table 4. Residence Status of Forced Migrant Interviewees

Legal Status	Frequency
Under Temporary Protection	24
permit for studies	6
Turkish citizen	6
permit for working	2
tourism visa	2
not having a formal ID	1

Source: Produced by the author

The striking point is that even though some of them gained Turkish citizenship, they still identify themselves as "yabancı" (foreigner). Even though those who cannot speak Turkish emphasized this word by uttering it in Turkish. Upon learning that they had Turkish citizenship, I offered each of them to finish the interview or to interview them as local people (instead of forced migrant) deliberately. Yet, none of them accepted my offer by saying that having Turkish citizenship did not have the slightest effect on their situation in the housing market so it was obvious that they did not feel like a Turkish citizen but still as a forced migrant. A male interviewee tells how he experienced this situation:

> I got my citizenship at the end of 2018. I had problems because I am Syrian and not a civil servant [while looking for a house]. I was calling them "I am a Turkish citizen", but he still did not accept them. After all, "You are originally Syrian. That's why we don't want to give it. " they said. (IM14- 39- SR- M- BD)

That is why there are Turkish citizens in forced migrant part of the research. I think that this is quite valuable finding to why the research should focus on forced migrants regardless of their legal status because they urban experience are not change a lot in the receiving cities.

The biggest effect of the nationality is about right to have a property in Turkey because, as being argued above, Syrian citizens are not allowed to buy a house in Turkey which directly affect their housing experience.

On the other side, ethnicity has a big effect on access to housing in the city. Local people generally welcome anybody in the city but Syrians. Non-Syrian interviewee generally experience positive dialogues. An Egyptian interviewee says:

Sometimes they don't give [house] to a foreigner. I'm from Egypt. "A-ha. You are not Syrian. Okay, you can get it." they say. But if you say Syrian, no, they don't give it to Syrian. (IM16- 24- EG- M- HS)

In short, even though forced migrants almost experience the same way the city, their nationalities are still important factor to determine their housing condition in Turkey. However, it should be kept in mind that this divergent issue stems from the density of Syrians in the city because only Syrians experience housing differently from other ethnic groups in the city.

Except for this nationality difference, the ethnicity does not play a crucial role to access to houses for Syrians in the eyes of Turkish. Turkmen Syrians expressed that they also faced pretty discriminatory attitude by Turks while they were in the housing market. However, since there is not a language barrier for Turkmen Syrians, the interaction with neighbours after their settlement is better compared to the other ethnic groups.

4.3 Access to Houses

Forced migrants have difficulties to access to houses in general but it is more prominent for Syrian forced migrant. However, the problems and the tactics they adopted to survive in the market are very diverse, which reflects the complexity of the cities. While I am describing the conditions of the housing market, I am also classifying the problems and the tactics to show the super-diverse nature of the topic.

4.3.1   High-Level demands of landlords in the market

Except for the differences between nationalities, tenants are exposed to

unacceptable demands from homeowners. Forced migrants' migration to receiving

cities was far from being a planned action but rather an act of survival. Most of them

had not even known that they were going to leave their houses in the morning of the

day they had to migrate. Therefore, they reached their receiving country completely

unprepared and upon their arrival, the very first problem they encountered was to

find a dwelling. As a foreigner in a new country, they tend to find solutions

informally due to both lack of information about the housing market and financial

and human resources.

Access to housing has quickly become the biggest problem in Gaziantep after

the sudden and mass influx. This migration led to not only change the city

demography but also disturb the supply and demand equilibrium in the housing

market in Gaziantep. Hosting a group of people which are as many as 22% of its own

population would be a huge challenge for any city so a housing crisis inevitably

occurred. In the beginning of the influx, it was quite hard to find a dwelling place for

forced migrants. Both forced migrants and local people are affected by this shortage

of house supply in the city, especially when it comes to the rental housing market.

Local experts express the shortage in the rental market:

> Supply does not meet the demand. Currently there is a shortage of rent. 50
> people ask for rent in a day, we do not have a house ... There is no house in
> other parts of the city. We work in every region as a real estate agent. There
> is trouble everywhere (IE11)

Once Syrians arrived in Turkey, as seen below they generally share the

apartment or live in informal dwellings (Gültekin et. al. 2018). However, when they

realized that they would stay longer than they thought, they rent small houses.

Landlords take advantage of this shortage. Not all forced migrants but Syrian forced

migrants are exposed to discrimination in the housing market. The rise in the rent is the leading conflict between local people and forced migrants and local people tend to accuse Syrians of this rise. Moreover, this accusation not only disturbs the social cohesion in the city but also reflects itself as a discriminatory attitude towards them. The first expression of this discriminatory attitude can be observed while Syrian forced migrants look for a rental house. The landlords often hesitate to give their houses to a Syrian no matter they are naturalized. Or, the landlords demand higher rent for the house when the tenant would be a Syrian. Moreover, some buildings decide not to accept Syrian neighbour even if it is illegal.

The regulations in Turkey stipulate only a lease between the tenant and the landlord and the payment of the rent through a bank account. Yet, landlords put extra unwarranted demands on every potential tenant including local people. Secondly, issuing the bill/deed is a popular measure of homeowners which is mostly applied to Turkish citizen tenants. A local person explains this situation:

> There is something here, landlords issue a deed in Antep. In fact, he is legally doing the rental contract. They also make a deed addition to it. When we rented the house, he issued a 12-months deed for us... So, at the end of this one year, the homeowner made a 12-months deed again with the lease agreement. After paying the rent on the 15th of each month, he delivers the bill to us and brings the bill of that month. (IC14- 30- F- MD)

However, Syrians are affected by these demands as well as local people do as some demands cannot be possibly fulfilled by them due to their legal status. Landlords often require civil-servant tenants to ensure their prospective rents. In Turkey, there is a wide perception that civil-servants their bills more regularly when compared to the private sector employees as their salaries are paid by the state. Therefore, landlords want real estate agencies to find a civil servant as a tenant

because there are many prospective tenant candidates. This constitutes the first housing accessibility problem for Syrians and even a Syrian said that he had to move to Gaziantep from another city-Kilis- just because he could not find an apartment in Kilis because of this very reason. Therefore, landlords demand higher rents, a guarantor, or downright payment of either three- or six-months' rent before the move.

Since people in Gaziantep cannot afford the prices and the city is experiencing the housing crisis deeply, the public authorities decided to directly interfere with the sector despite of not having enough tool for intervention. The collaboration between Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality, Housing Development Administration, and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization started a mass housing project called Kuzeyşehir Project. 50.000 houses are being built under this project "for Turkish citizens". The interesting point of Kuzeyşehir is that these dwellings are explicitly declared to be built for Turkish citizens rather than forced migrants. However, the public authorities are hoping to utilize the positive externality of the Project, rationalizing that the insertion of the new 50.000 houses to the market will eventually decrease the rents in the city (GBB, 2018). It is still taken into consideration that some local experts still have doubts about the Project whether will accomplish its aim at the end.

> Rents have increased a lot in Gaziantep. In order to prevent this, the municipality, Housing Development Administration and the ministry are currently managing a project of 50 thousand houses in Gaziantep, Kuzeykent. The first 5 thousand stages of this project have been completed. Here is a situation like this. It is out of the question that these houses will be sold to Syrians or built for Syrians. But we know that 50 thousand is an area, Kuzeysehir, close to the industrial zone. There is a serious population working in the industry in Gaziantep. When these people move there, the

traffic problem in the city will be a little more relieved. (IE1)

All these summarized problems prove that there is a big affordability problem in Gaziantep, which hurts the affordability component of the right to housing. In order to solve this problem, forced migrants use different tactics through their informal relations.

4.3.2 Depending on their informal network to meet landlords' demands

Informal networks are mainly used by Syrians more than other forced migrant groups. Even though many Syrians are living in formal houses, informal relations are still very important for both Syrians and landlords. On the one hand, landlords, relying on their powerful position in the rental market due to the housing shortage in Gaziantep, take advantage of informality to increase their profit and security. On the other hand, Syrians depend on informality just to gain access to the rental housing market. The existence of informality in the market causes problems accessibility to houses and strengthens unequal relations.

Landlords also require an evacuation contract to be signed in advance without specifying any evacuation date so that they can move the tenants out whenever they deem necessary without suffering from the obligations of the lease contract. Issuing a bill/deed is another popular measure of landlords demanding and gained more power in Gaziantep which is used to mostly Turkish citizens. Since Syrians do not have a regular income, issuing a bill is practically useless. Therefore, landlords also demand a Turkish guarantor or downright payment of either three or six months' rent from Syrians instead of issuing a bill. This accessibility problem is often dealt with

through a Syrian acquaintance with Turkish citizenship:

> Then it was difficult to find our Turkish guarantor or something… they [the guarantors] were my father's friends, originally Syrian but got Turkish citizenship. He made them guarantors. Then, when our relations with the Turks improved, we were able to show them.

Or sometimes the activists or the experts in the civil society helped Syrians to provide shelter for them, which is one of the examples of the limited solidarity in the city. A local expert says:

> Let me tell you something when Syrians first came, I had 16 lease contracts on me at that time. So when they first arrived in 2012 or something…. Here the man used to come, found a house in the neighbourhood. He was coming, saying, "He doesn't give me a house, the homeowner, you talk to the homeowner." I was going there and talking to him. He[landlord] said that I would not give it to him [Syrian], but if I made the lease with you, I would give it to you ... I was renting the house. The lease contract was directly on me. That is to say, the landlords did not give Syrians at that time as it was always thought that they were going to go temporarily, but the rents were already very high. I told the landlord that your house was worth 300 liras, but you gave 1200 liras to the man and even you did not trust the man. He said he [the tenant] knows. Because there were too many refugees (10. local expert)

As seen in the quoted story, the landlords not only benefit from the supply gap but also do their best to guarantee themselves in case, one day, Syrians moved to somewhere else without paying the rent. Especially in the beginning, when Syrians were thought to leave soon, they resorted to very temporary solutions like living in non-residential areas like parks, storehouses etc. in the beginning. Another adopted solution was to share an apartment with other families. It totally depends on if they have a relative or acquaintance in Gaziantep:

> When we came here, all our relatives, everyone from all over Syria stayed with us until we found a house first, until we arranged furniture because our house is big. After that, my father found a house for them, here he helped. After that, everyone moved to their own home. For example, my father's acquaintances came when they had acquaintances from work or something. For one month, 40 people stayed in this house... It is not easy for people. We

> understand them better because we come from the same ways. (IM37-F- BD-25)

This sharing the houses ends up overcrowdedness in the city, which caused problems with neighbours and made local people decide not to rent their houses to Syrian to protect their houses from being damaged. When I look at how forced migrants find dwelling areas, it is seen that informal networks are still the most common way to access a house among them. Despite spending time in this new country, they still find new houses in an informal way.

> My friend found a realtor, Syrian, who brought us to the landlord. The landlord here is a Syrian. He does not own the building but he rents it. And he asked for commission. Not so much 500 liras so it is small because they usually ask for one month rent. And the landlord asked for insurance, it was like 1000. (IM29- 34- SR- M- MD).

> However, it should be noted that gender is pretty important factors in both using this network and relationship with landlord or real estate agencies. For instance, male interviewees find their houses through both real estate agents and their acquaintances while females mostly asked their acquaintances or used the websites. Since the housing supply is so low in Gaziantep, generally no one could afford sticking to only one means to find houses. However, especially single female interviewees still did not trust real estate agents. They were afraid of being harassed.

> I was harassed over the phone in one of the difficulties I had while looking for a house. One of the real agents said bad words. I do not know if he behaved like this whether I was a Syrian or a woman, but he said words that would never be heard ... I just changed my phone number ... It took about 1 month. (IM23- 28- SR- F- BD)

Or after they rent the buildings, they prefer not to have close relations with the rest of the building:

> I do not meet with anyone and I prefer not to see anyone. I stay in a family

building because I stay alone with the neighbours. I do not want anyone to know that this girl is staying alone ... I cannot trust anyone anymore. I cannot establish an intimate relationship. (IM24- 26- SR- F- HS)

As seen in the quotation, especially for young female force migrants, social interactions within the building or neighbourhood are not preferred.

In short, problems with accessibility and affordability of the houses and the exclusionary environment in Gaziantep force Syrians to depend on their informal networks but still act in very formal areas. Depending on their informal networks or acting in the housing market through a Syrian mediator are their first tactics to survive in the market which cause dual housing system in the city, which will be investigated below.

4.3.3 Circumvention to the legal restriction

Circumvention is another tactic adopted by high-income level Syrians to deal with the legal restrictions in the housing area. As described above, Syrians cannot purchase a house in Turkey due to a legal restriction. Therefore, wealthy Syrians found different tactics one of which to bypass this restriction is to establish a company, through which they can purchase apartments. On paper, the house is bought on behalf of the company, but in practice belongs and used by its Syrian owners:

> We have a company that manufactures shoes abroad. Through it ... my father bought this house long ago. [an apartment] Can be purchased through that company (IM37, F, BD, 25)

> Despite that the name of the company is written in the house deed, it is used

for dwelling but as a working area. However, this tactic causes additional expenses that must be paid by the founder of the company like company taxes, insurance charges which makes this tactic unattractive for some:

> I am thinking of establishing a company and buying a house through the company. Again, if I establish a company and buy it from the company, I will remain as if I was paying the same rent. Because when I establish my company, my health insurance or taxes will be paid. So again, the company will be uneconomic. So, I will stay as if on a rental again. My opinion is that now it is easier for me to pay 1000 TL than to pay other expenses to stay on the rent. (IM21, M, HS, 37)

On the other side of the coin, a company can only be written on the deed if it is a limited company according to the Turkish legal system. Certain companies were established merely for commercial activities without any intention to be used as a medium to acquire real estates. However, even these companies abstain from upgrading to corporations even if they are legally required following their increase in their capital just not to lose their right to buy real estates. Hence, these companies unwarrantedly remain as limited companies which, further, proves the importance of being able to access houses.

Informal relations are, again, observed here as another way to obtain an apartment through a Turkish citizen. However, it requires too much trust in that person and informal networks like kinship are required for this tactic to work. It is preferred by a few Syrians:

> It is forbidden on our behalf because we are Syrians. That is why my relative registered on his behalf. There are 3%, 5% who buy a house like me. They always rent. (IM19, M, BD, 43)

That people resort to these not strictly legal strategies further highlights their vulnerable positions as tenants in the housing market of Gaziantep. Therefore, they

prefer to have their "own" house provided that they can afford it. It is, also, an expression of their longitudinal presence in Turkey despite their "temporariness" in the political discourse and legal status.

Other examples of circumventions can be observed in their usage of urban public areas. Public authorities introduced a number of new restrictions which considerably limited their usages of public areas. Yet, the usage of urban public places by forced migrants is directly related to coping with indecent housing conditions. Overcrowdedness and small houses led Syrians to spend most of their times in urban areas. They can gather in parks without for free which attracts those with low economic resources. Also, due to the very hot summers in Gaziantep, people prefer going out to get cool as most lack any air conditioning in the houses. This is especially crucial for families with children because children hardly find any playground in their small houses. A Syrian woman says:

> The house is a very narrow one with only one room and one hall. What did I do? I gave that room to the girls because they have stuff. For example, their belongings, books, school items. I gave it to them. Me and my husband stay in the living room… .. Sometimes I want to read… Everything is in the same room; food, television. And girls sometimes look for something on the internet. My husband, everything is in the same room. Sometimes it is doing my head in, if he's talking to a friend…For example, if I wanted to have fun in Aleppo, you had to pay. There are parks everywhere here. For example, you can do free things... I have to do something like an amusement park for my daughters ... Especially in summer, we go to the park every day for the health of the girls, to get sun and so on. (IM3, F, HS, 39)

Also, when they shared the houses, male generally went out and spent their time in the streets not to disturb women in the houses. Some interviewees point out this issue when they had just arrived in Turkey and lived with other families. However, it is not the case during the fieldwork because they mainly stop sharing

their apartments with other families. This finding also proves that the over-crowdedness or apartment sharing is not descriptive feature of forced migrants in Turkey. Currently, male forced migrants use urban public places mostly for rest. However, local people are haunted by the feeling of invasion due to the dominant presence of mostly male Syrians in the urban areas. Especially, that male forced migrants smoke hookah in the parks is perceived as a kind of symbol of this invasion of the city which caused a significant conflict between local people and Syrians. Hookah has a special place in Syrians' lives as it is a kind of bridge for them to connect their previous lives in Syria. Even they were hastily escaping from war, some of them still brought their own hookah as one of local expert indicated:

> One of them brought her hookah because they had a large kitchen in Syria and used to smoke hookah with her husband with their coffee. He liked hookah a lot. But her husband died in the war so she brough the hookah here but she says that she cannot smoke it here because the kitchen is small and no place to smoke it. (18. Local expert).

> This quotation shows that how hookah is important in their everyday lives.

Since they do not have enough space to continue smoking hookah in the houses, they do it outside. Then, Gaziantep Governorship in 2019 forbid the hookah in the parks to make parks more "inclusive" for women and children (NTV, 2019). However, then, Syrians started to place their hookahs on the sidewalks just next to the parks. The prohibition does not apply to sidewalks as they are not part of the parks; hence, the municipal police cannot fine smokers. Namely, by placing their hookahs several centimetres away from the park, Syrians circumvent the law. Also, the police force cannot be sufficient to make measure according to this restriction as seen a complaint of a local resident:

Whoever gets their hookah ends up in the parks, where they don't spend much money but still have fun. I report them to police whenever I see. But, they mostly finish their hookah by the time police arrives. (local resident, male, 26 age)

Again, these different socio-spatial strategies of Syrians are not a form of resistance, rather are just ways to pursue their habits without being exposed to a fine. Syrians try to survive the harsh housing market conditions, and the related problems, through their ways.

4.3.4 The importance of public houses for specific groups among forced migrants

There is not a social housing system in Turkey. However, certain groups can access the low-price accommodation options thanks to their special status like students. Dormitories can be evaluated as public housing for all student in Turkey. Therefore, student immigrants prefer to live there. There is not any discrimination to access to dormitories or during living there but all dormitories were closed due to Covid-19 pandemic. Some of them had to move to another apartment in the midst of pandemic. The government took measures to decrease the spread of the virus immediately in Turkey first of which closing the schools, the university, and the dormitories are. Yet, this caused another displacement process of student forced migrant. Many of them moved to an apartment from their dormitories which depended on their informal networks. These people had solved their accommodation thanks to the dormitory option once they got into the university. Yet, they lost this advantage and acted in the housing market as an individual without any privilege

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coming from their student status due to coronavirus measures. It should be kept in

mind that these students were in a more vulnerable position in the housing market

due to lack of enough financial resources.

> [I was living in] the state's dormitory, managed by General Directorate of
> Credit and Dormitories Agency. Yet, now it is closed due to corona so I am
> living with my friend… I will not return to the dormitory because many
> friends will come, from other countries. Everything will get worse. Namely, I
> am looking for a house now. (IM16- 24- EG- M- HS)

4.4 The Relationship between Forced Migrants and Local People in the Neighbourhood Level

Language barrier, noise, and overcrowded houses are the reasons why local

people complains about living especially Syrian immigrants in the same building.

Language barrier is the biggest problem for social interactions between forced

migrants and local people. The biggest reason for failure of good neighbour relations.

Many local people do not want to live with Syrian forced migrants in the

same buildings. They blame Syrians for making noise, even in the late hours outside.

This complain is indicated by many local people:

> I have visited Syria before. You get up there at 11am and go to work at 12.
> They wander the streets until 3 o'clock at night because the house is hot. They
> are doing the same here. (IC10- 54- M- BD)

This issue reveals the difference in how these two communities structure the

day. Unlike the local people, forced migrants stay awake until late hours which

directly affect how they use urban public places, as well. Therefore, some of the

Turkish local people decide not to accept Syrians in their buildings. Local people are

complaining about crowd, noise, even smell in the building not to accept Syrians into their buildings. As a result of this discrimination, Syrians started to establish their own housing network in the cities, which cause a dual housing system.

4.4.1 Syrian forced migrants' housing network: studio apartments

Studio apartments are popular among Syrian forced migrants to the extent that there are certain buildings which only accept Syrians. As seen below, some buildings (or sites) have taken board decisions against accepting Syrians as either tenants or homeowners which adds another layer of exclusionary Syrians experience in the housing market even though they can meet the high demands of landlords. Once Syrians realized that they were to stay in Turkey longer than they originally thought, they switched to more durable solutions in the formal areas against the exclusion and the ongoing affordability issues. Accordingly, they stopped sharing apartments which forced them to hire smaller apartments they could afford. This strategy caused self-segregation which is actualized through a special different building type where only Syrians can reside.

Syrian-only buildings are managed professionally in Turkey; yet, completely depend on informal networks. Syrian investors either buy a building using the methods defined below or hire the building from a local person to lease it to only Syrians. These buildings consist of only studio apartments as they are the cheapest accommodation type. It seems that studio apartments are becoming the new slum in Gaziantep due to their affordable prices in the lack of institutional support for accommodation to Syrians. Alongside their cheaper rents, these apartments have

different economic advantages for tenants. Many studio apartments are furnished so it is easy to move into them. The rent may also include some of the bills, e.g. electricity, internet and sometimes water, which is a further economic incentive. Yet, even accessing these Syrian-only buildings require informal networks.

Eight of twelve Syrian forced migrants living in the studio apartments indicated that they live in Syrian-only buildings. However, other displaced groups do not have such a "privilege" as there are no Egyptian-only buildings. A local expert indicates that there are ten buildings that let only Syrian reside in Gaziantep.

> Currently, ten buildings have been completely bought by Syrians. Syrians with Turkish citizenship do it. They buy 2+1, 3+1 flats and give them to Syrians. There are different buildings in the same neighbourhood. (IE15)

On the other side of the coin, some buildings (or sites) have taken board decisions against accepting Syrians as either tenants or apartment owners. Yet, these decisions are taken rather verbally; that is, they are not written down in the meeting minutes as, otherwise, they can be faced with allegations of discrimination. One of local interviewee explains how they take decision

> ... we do not accept them into our building. The biggest problem is cultural… [Decision not to take] is about the neighbourhood relations in the building… There was a situation of moving Syrians upstairs, we intervened as neighbours. Why did we intervene? Because our relationship is good. We requested [to the homeowner], "okay then" he said. Since we have that old culture in our apartment… .. That's why it was accepted. If relations are bad, the homeowner says, "I rent my own house, what to you" (IC11- 38- M-MD).

Local people just consider the ethnicity of the potential tenant no matter their legal, economic, or social status. For instance, even though a Syrian was naturalized, local people still refuse to accept these Syrians in their buildings. A forced migrant

interviewee experiences this discrimination "The buildings I wanted to move to before said "No, we don't take foreigners, no we don't take Syrians." I got Turkish citizenship although they still didn't want me." (IM24- 26- SR- F- HS)

This discrimination is another reason why Syrian forced migrants choose studio apartments as they generally accept everyone in the city. Since many studio apartments are rented furnished, the landlords prefer more vulnerable people because they tend to accept all the conditions the landlords present contrary to local people who tend to complain how worn out the furniture are and demand having the walls freshly painted before they move in. Even though forced migrants accept every condition of furnished houses, local people complain their situations:

> Apart houses [studio apartments] have such a problem, they are dirty. In order to find a decent home, you have to either go to a very luxurious place or have a very good acquaintance. Now I have been to a few places. Most of the houses were in ruins. The houses are furnished but the furniture probably contains more harmful viruses than the coronavirus. So they were used that much. I went to a few places, it was not easy, so I did not want to deal with real estate agents because they get more commission than necessary. I was able to find it after a few hours of searching. (IC18- 26- M- BD)

Another advantage of such buildings is the easiness to pursue the daily routines when compared to mixed buildings. For example, Syrians feel free to open their outdoors or use their spices without being anxious about causing smell or sitting on the corridor floors, which are, usually, the main complaints of their local neighbours.

Similarly, all the announcements in the buildings are written in Arabic so they can understand better.

In short, there are two parallel housing systems in Gaziantep. Segregated buildings can be observed rather than segregated neighbourhoods in the field area. Fifteen interviewees are living in studio apartments. Eight of them are living in Syrian building. This is a quite high portion and proves how they segregated themselves from local people.

4.5 Conclusion

The main finding from the fieldwork is to present dual housing types and the importance of the studio apartments in the settlement of forced migrants. Syrian forced migrants are self-segregated in the buildings which only accept Syrians. While this situation may not result in segregation at the neighbourhood scale in Gaziantep, it has led to segregation at the building scale. This system is a result and indicator of lack of social cohesion in the city. Since there was not any institutional support to forced migrants, they had to find their own accommodation solutions in the urban areas. Their mass migration flow to urban areas caused high and sudden rent increase stemming from both the gap between supply and demand equilibrium and self-seeking attitudes of landlords. To overcome these two problems, forced migrants -who are lack of economic networks and social resources initially- tend to live overcrowded houses. This household composition generated noise in the buildings and preferences of men to go out to mostly parks to make women and children in the house comfortable. These two issues are the reasons of local people to be improved negative attitudes towards Syrian forced migrants. Even though, when it was seen that forced migrants would stay in Gaziantep more than they considered,

they moved to smaller apartments with their nuclear families. However, the social cohesion in the city could not be supplied again and the parallel housing system for Syrians was established at the end of the day.

Due to the rentier housing market in Gaziantep and the rapid settlement of a large number of forced migrants in the city, there has been a scarcity of housing supply, leading to an increase in rental prices. This situation has put tenants at a significant disadvantage compared to landlords. The right to housing faces considerable challenges in terms of access to affordable houses. Access to affordable housing is a concrete problem especially for Syrian forced migrants in Turkey. Many of them depend on rental market in which landlords take advantage of their vulnerability.

In order to solve these problems, forced migrants adopted different solutions. Firstly, as seen in the fieldwork, other forced migrants but Syrians express of not being exposed discrimination. Although Syrians belong to the same ethnicity, they experience different realities, especially based on gender and age. Another crucial aspect in their interactions with the local population is whether they can speak Turkish or not. For those forced migrants who previously had connections with the local community, navigating the housing market is considerably easier in many aspects. The most fundamental distinction lies in their socio-economic status, which becomes evident in the realm of housing ownership.

Syrians with better socio-economic status are finding ways to enter the housing market as landlords, even though it may be prohibited. This means that despite coming from the same place and sharing the same ethnicity, the complexities

of the urban situation have introduced various factors, resulting in different housing experiences.

CHAPTER V

MIGRATION POLICY AND ACCOMMODATION POLICY FOR FORCED MIGRANTS IN SWEDEN

5.1 Sweden's Migration Policy

Sweden is one of the immigrant-receiving countries since the World War II. During war, Sweden took refugees. After that, labour immigrants came to the country during 1950s and 1960s. After 1980s, asylum-seekers constituted the main group among newcomers, especially those who came from Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the Syrians. The number of the former reached 84.000 people whereas the latter's application just in 2015 was 160.000 (Migrationsverket, 2020). Compared to Sweden's population, the asylum-seekers' application to Sweden from Syria is quite high which caused a significant change in Sweden's migration regime.

Even though Sweden is not a neighbour with the country having conflict, it recognizes everyone for asylum one they enter in Sweden because of being one of the signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. It had been always following the human rights perspective and being always a signatory of related documents written by international organization. In addition to the UN, The EU is another international organization which has impact on Sweden's migration policy through Dublin Regulation that implemented in 1997.

In 2013, the EU amended Dublin Regulation for the third time. According to it, an individual should apply in the first EU country where one enters (EU, 604/2013).

If an asylum-seeker entered in the EU through a different country than Sweden, the applicant can be sent to that country only if it is proved. Therefore, only those who can get a visa could be an asylum-seeker de facto. Castells (2004) claims that the application of national logic to a transnational issue must be ended up a failure in migration policy. Thus, many people in danger cannot travel without a visa, which restricts the right to asylum for the ones who need it most. This could be interpreted as the first restriction to receive asylum-seeking applications. Therefore, forced migrants try to access to the EU in general but also finding alternatives ways to go to the country without giving their personal data any other countries than their wishing destination like Sweden.

Sweden is always thought of as one of the most generous countries which offers plenty of opportunities for asylum-seekers, refugees, or immigrants. However, this policy has changed a lot recently which is called a U-turn (Scarpa and Schierup, 2018, Dahlstedt and Neergaard, 2019, Shakta et. al., 2018). In this paper, firstly, I will summarize these U-turn policies by focusing on the housing area.

5.1.1 Welcoming refugee policy until 2016

Sweden as a signatory of the Geneva Convention gives asylum-seeker status to everyone who applies for it once they enter the country by following the Dublin Regulation. The Convention was ratified by Sweden in 1954 and its refugee definition was incorporated in Swedish Law in 1980. Gender and sexual dimensions were added to the definition of refugee in 2005 (Government, 2005)

Sweden received too many asylum applications after 1990s. Many people could go to Sweden as a labour migrant before this decade. Once it was restricted, the number of the application for asylum started to rise. Especially after the Cold War, Sweden received many asylum applications and gave them "convention refugee" status which must have been renewed in two years (Abiri, 2000). However, the country still accepted the applications.

Until 1984, refugees and other immigrants took one year residence permit. Once the residence permits expired, they had a right to apply for a permanent residence permit. Many of them generally took permanent residence permit without a problem. To reduce the cost of the application, the government changed the Law and gave permanent residence permits once an asylum application was approved, which makes Sweden very generous country during this Law (Borevi & Shakra, 2019: 10). For instance, almost all European countries gave temporary protection for Bosnians due to Yugoslavia conflict in the 1990s, Sweden entitled forty thousand Bosnians to have a permanent residence permit. However, after giving permanent residence permits, Sweden changed the law immediately and took decision to offer only temporary residence permits mass flight cases (SOU 1995:75).

Later, Sweden amended the Law that enacted in 2005 provided permanent residence permit or at least three years temporary residence permit to refugees until 2016. Migration Agency decided whether gave permanent or temporary residence permit according to the nature of the conflict. If they estimated that the conflict would solved soon, they granted temporary residence permits those coming from that region. However, the migration wave in 2015 is the most important point to understand the U-turn policy. The application of asylum-seekers skyrocketed this

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year, which is 162.877 (Migrationsverket, 2021a). This record application made the Swedish reception system not work properly like before. Thus, Sweden, like any other European country, experienced this "refugee crisis" in 2015 and brought the integration or migration issue up for discussion because Sweden is one of the top European Union countries which accepted many Syrian refugees after 2011 compared to its whole population. To understand this debate and U-turn policy better, the permanent residence permit policy of the state could be traced.

Initially after Syrian Civil War, The Swedish Migration Agency decided to give permanent residence permits to all Syrian asylum seekers in 2013 since there was not a possibility for peace in Syria in the short term. Sweden attracted many refugees for giving permanent residence permits in addition to its reputation of being a rich country and providing welfare services. The country received too many Syrian refugees who became the first group among foreign-born than Finnish who were always the first foreign born group in migrants in Sweden. This sudden demographic change led migration debates from a security perspective popular and eventually caused a policy change. For instance, Stephen Löfven, the Prime Minister of Sweden, declared their commitment to helping refugees in 2014 (BBC, 2014) but the government changed their perception just a few months later in 2015 when they received too many asylum-seeker applications. Anti-immigration far-right party, the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) had seat in the parliament in 2014 for the first time and raised its votes since then (Shakra & Szalanska, 2019). As a consequence of this change, firstly the temporary residence permit became the principle in 2016.

5.1.2 New immigration policy: the effect of Syrian migration on Sweden asylum policy

After 2015 with U-turn in its migration regulation, Sweden is applying a more restricted migration policy to not only refugees but also every foreigner. Granting a permanent residence permit for all non-EU citizens including refugees is getting more and more difficult which is actually a reverse of its previous migration policy. For instance, Sweden was the only country in the EU which gave permanent residence permits to refugees from Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Yet, Sweden is going to be one of the strictest migration policy countries in the EU in near future. They want to keep refugees or other foreigners in limbo until they get sure that these people will not be a burden on society.

These restriction policies started with the amendments of Temporary Law in 2016. Sweden granted permanent residence permits for almost every refugee from 1984 to 2016. Yet, three years temporary residence permits became the principle with the change of the law in 2016. With this amendment, Sweden is tried to be less attractive country for asylum seekers, which is also the second restriction in addition to Dublin Regulation. The new Law (SFS 2016: 752) made temporary residence permit principle of Swedish asylum regime whereas permanent residence permit was the principle before. Conventional refugees can take three years temporary residence permit while subsidiary protection can take thirteen months residence permits. Refugees can renew their residence permit if they still need protection after their residence permit expires. Thus, the country can keep and trace if the person still needs international protection. It also prevents the acquiring Swedish citizenship more easily for refugees since it is impossible to apply for Swedish citizenship

without permanent residence permit. Also, this law terminated the others in need of protection status in Sweden so the only way is be under protection is through UNHCR's Resettlement Program (Migrationsverket, 2019). If the applicants support themselves through employment or self-employment, they could also apply for a permanent residence permit after 36 months. Also, the positive decisions for applicants are decreased in time (Migrationsverket, 2021b). Then, the Immigration Law changed again in July 2021 which made it harder for those holding temporary residence permits to take permanent ones. Not only living in certain times is enough, but the Swedish Migration Agency also demands at least an 18-month job contract when the case starts to be taken by the officer (Migrationsverket, 2021).

Another important change related to accommodation in the 2016 Law is that all municipalities are obliged to take new-commers who have chosen living in ABO system and arrange houses for them who are registered by Swedish Migration Agency. However, this law does not include the details such as how many asylum seekers they must accept or the conditions of the houses. Therefore, municipalities interpret this law differently while some of them follows very welcoming policies, some of them apply very limited policy. If they have previous migration experience, they tend to follow more welcoming policies (Holmqvist, ongoing study).

5.2 Sweden's Accommodation Policy for Forced Migrants

Housing has been a big importance on the city-dwellers in Sweden and even the most vital part of Keynesian welfare state. Social democrats developed public housing in the 1920s as an initial step of the Keynesian welfare state in Sweden (Przeworski & Wallerstein, 2006: 347-348, Magnusson Turner & Hedman, 2014: 270; Holmqvist & Magnusson Turner, 2014), which was the first example of the

Keynesian welfare state around the world. However, public housing policies have been affected by the privatization trend even though "'Good quality housing at affordable prices' has been a slogan for decades." (Andersson, 1999). Andersson has claimed that these social-oriented housing policies prevented segregation in the cities in Sweden until the 1990s. However, housing policies have been criticized by residents due to the fact that the economic crisis in the 1990s has reduced public expenses and resulted in a reduced number of public houses. Most people have been waiting a long time just for renting a room or house. Additionally, as interest rates are so low, house prices are very high (miun.se, 2018). When the system of public houses for everyone has started to be corrupted after the 1990s in Sweden as the result of privatization or marketization, then segregation in the cities became more visible. Even though public authorities have various control tools into Sweden housing system through social houses, rent-control housing, subsidies, and so on, deregulation and liberalization policies began to be implemented after 2008 have caused the tendency from public houses to private ownership houses (Holmqvist & Magnusson Turner, 2014: 239). This approach claims that segregation is mostly related to socio-economic conditions but Bolt et. al (2010) reject this idea by claiming that segregation is a much more complex issue which may be affected cultural or social issues. Transformation of public houses needs to be mentioned in the context of immigration settlement because this process has occurred and cultivated the immigrant neighbourhoods in Sweden. The professionals argue that it is not sustainable due to rising segregation in Swedish cities (miun.se, 2018). The abovementioned scholars often refer to ethnic segregation which is crucial to

understand immigrants' everyday lives. In order to understand these dynamics, what kind of housing aid offers to forced migrants should be understood:

Until the 1980s, asylum-seekers stayed where they first applied for asylum status. The Swedish National Labour Market Board was responsible of their resettlement process. These were generally settled in bigger cities. Municipalities were responsible for their living cost and also finding houses for asylum seekers. The Migration Agency placed asylum seekers in the reception centres for up to four weeks and then they were sent to certain municipalities. When large refugee groups prefer to live in certain areas, it is concerned not only local capacity and infrastructure are affected negatively but also socio-economic integration is hampered (Musterd et al., 2008). This brought a big debate in Swedish migration policy.

All these debates were concluded as adopting the dispersal strategy between 1985- 1994 which is known as Sweden-wide strategy (Hela Sverige Strategin). The aim was to prevent the concentration of refugees in certain big cities and create a balance among all municipalities around the country (Andersson et al., 2009). However, this dispersal policies mainly driven due to socio-economic inequalities rather than ethnic segregation (Holmqvist & Bergsten, 2009). This policy concerned the spatial dimension of sheltering of forced migrants. The main public institution of these dispersal strategy was municipalities so the economic, social, and political differences between municipalities affected the housing condition of forced migrants. For instance, organizationally different departments in each municipality took care of asylum seekers. Also, small municipalities could not provide enough welfare services as much as bigger municipalities.

In the dispersal policy, asylum-seekers were affiliated to a municipality where they had to live during their introduction period for 18 months (Andersson and Solid, 2003) and they cannot choose where to live. However, this dispersal strategy was also unsustainable economically, so they let asylum-seekers arrange his/her own accommodation where they want. Therefore, Sweden has provided two different systems since 1996: EBO (Eget boende) and ABO (Anläggnigsboende). Once asylum-seekers get their residence permit, then their introduction period starts (Borevi and Bengtsson, 2015: 2603). They can either be placed in a municipality by the Swedish Migration Agency or they can arrange their own accommodation.

5.2.1 Sheltering of asylum-seekers

The Current accommodation for asylum-seekers depends on two options. The Sweden Migration Agency places the asylum-seekers into guest houses or accommodation centres, which is called ABO system, whereas asylum-seekers arrange their own housing in the EBO system. However, the ongoing housing crisis affect the reception and asylum policy of Sweden no matter the differences between these systems. Moreover, the Head of Sweden's Syrians Association claims that Sweden integration policy has failed due to its housing problems and low-level social contact between refugees and locals (Euractiv, 2020). It is also a very top topic in Sweden politics. For instance, just before the Covid-19 outbreak, the leader of the Sweden Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson came to Turkey and hand out leaflets to the forced migrants in the Turkey-Greece border. It was written that Sweden was full of people and had no more houses for the refugees in the leaflets (Svt Nyheter, 2020a). However, this debate did not change not only migration issue but also domestic

politics in general due to the rising housing crisis. For instance, Stefan Löfven, former leader of Social Democrat Party and the Prime Minister of Sweden, has backed a no confidence vote in the parliament in July, 2020 due to his housing policy (svt Nyheter, 2020b).

Under these housing crisis circumstance, if we look at the accommodation policy of asylum-seekers, each system, EBO and ABO, has trade-offs. This is conceptualized as a tension between need and choice as a reflection of the conflict between state and market (Borevi & Bengtsson, 2015: 2600). Individuals in ABO are placed in generally smaller cities whereas individuals in EBO live with their families or friends in bigger cities. EBO is accused of ethnical and socio-economical segregation in the cities which also cause integration problems. ABO is thought to be better for integration, but it is very hard to find a house in the cities where has better job opportunities, so it generally used in rural areas where there are more affordable houses in the cities. Before the last migration move, EBO was highly criticized due to not being controlled. However, the last migration wave changed this perception, so EBO is preferred rather than the ABO system due to no cost to the public. There are 12,080 asylum-seekers living in ABO, 17,727 asylum-seekers in EBO, and 827 in other forms at the end of 2020 (Aida, 2021).

While EBO is being appreciated, new regulations are adopted in order to reduce segregation which is seen as a negative effect of the EBO system. Thus, the Migration Agency determines the segregated areas and if an asylum-seeker or a refugee prefers to live in one of these neighbourhoods, s/he lose their financial aids from January 2020. Even though ethnic segregation harms integration dispersal policies could be ineffective. Now, these systems will be evaluated below.

5.2.1.1 Living in Reception Units (ABO System)

ABO system provides sheltering for asylum-seekers under different building types. The Swedish Migration Agency has its own apartments for asylum-seekers where they can settle down independently and live. However, the record-level asylum applications in 2015 caused a big housing shortage in this system. Therefore, temporary accommodation centres were introduced by the Agency to handle this housing shortage as a complementary. The Migration Agency hired private companies to manage disused hotels as temporary accommodation centres (Migrationsverket, 2021b). The biggest difference between apartments and these centres is that even though the Migration Agency manages the apartment by itself, the subcontractors manage the hotels as temporary accommodation centres for asylum-seekers (Migrationsverket, 2021b). However, the temporary centres still cannot meet the demand, so the Migration Agency reduces the standards of these centres. The space per person was reduced from 5 m^2 to 3 m^2 and the maximum capacity of the room was raised from 4 to 6. However, the supply of the accommodation still did not meet the need, so the Migration Agency opened new accommodation centres in new locations as an emergency measure. The sport halls or urban places like halls were used as sheltering centres by giving sheets to the asylum-seekers. However, this emergency situation lasted more than they planned (Migrationsverket, 2021b).

ABO apartments are generally located in certain neighbourhoods. The Migration Agency hires the apartments and asylum-seekers are settled there.

However, the Agency prefers to not hire an entire building due to security and integration reasons. If all asylum-seekers live in the same buildings, they could be open to potential violent attacks. In some cases, an old resident could be a mediator to get along with asylum-seekers with old residents in the building because they are explaining the rules and other facilities about the building. While families generally reside by their own family, singles have to share the apartments with others. The housing quality of these apartments is described as not well. Many of them have not been renovated for decades.

These centres are dispersed around Sweden, even in the rural areas, so it is suggested that the settlement of forced migrants in rural areas can reverse the economic and demographic decline of these areas (Hedberg and Haandrikman, 2014). However, this policy does not work as the policymakers intended. Many asylum seekers do not prefer to live in rural areas due to a lack of opportunities for job and education provision and closed communities once they grant refugee status. Living in quite a different climate and moving from a large city to small rural areas cause the struggles of forced migrants to adopt their new lives. Also, the small population of these areas make it hard to meet new people. Therefore, new arrivals feel isolated in the town. They prefer to live in certain areas to surpass this closed community. In that case, they prefer EBO to live in metropolitan cities rather being placed by a municipality.

Individuals in the ABO system relocation to public houses took some time since it was quite hard to find an apartment, especially in metropolitan areas. Once they are placed, they have their own contract. In those cases, they have more secure

and affordable houses, but the trade-off is that they cannot choose where they live. Asylum seekers who have already settled in public facilities tend to ask for public assistance for their settlement process (Bevelander et al., 2019).

5.2.1.2 Arranging Own Accommodation (EBO System)

EBO is to let asylum seekers integrate themselves into society with their own resources. They arrange their housing conditions in this system and settle wherever they want. Individuals prefer to live with their others coming from the same country or high immigrant population (Åslund, 2005). Neither the municipality nor the Migration Agency has a responsibility to take care of the asylum-seekers or refugees in this system. Even though asylum-seekers could choose EBO before 1994, it mainly resulted in losing their financial support. However, the change in 1994 terminated these kinds of allowance restrictions. Previous regulations gave aid asylum-seekers, which was adopted under this regulation. An asylum seeker gave 500 SEK for a month and 1000 SEK for a month for families (Migrationsverket, 2008: 18). Then, this new type became suddenly popular among asylum-seekers. They preferred the EBO system to live in big cities independently. In 2018 almost 80% of refugees prefer to live in EBO to live in metropolitan areas (Vogiades & Mondani, 2021: 4). However, this choice deepened another problem in the cities which was segregation.

The EBO system has some problems in itself. Firstly, the houses are generally very crowded (Brekke, 2004). Also, not having privacy, black rental contracts, and the inevitable feeling of being a burden to the host are the other disadvantages of this

system. Therefore, those living in EBO try to have their own apartments and see this housing option as temporary. The EBO system is also criticized for not tracing minimum housing standards. The living conditions of the people in this system are hard to trace. The average living space of a person in Sweden is 42 m^2 while it is much less for a refugee. However, it should be kept in mind that the average living space for a refugee was estimated as 3m^2 in 2015 when Sweden took too may asylum seeking applications. The limited living space especially has a huge impact on children's social and education life (Karlsson, 2018). Except for these negative and positive sides of the system, since there were too many asylum applications in 2015, EBO was used highly due to the shortage of houses that belongs to the Migration Agency.

In the EBO system, sub-letting and registration in the false addresses are the most common solutions to start the integration process. For instance, taking a Swedish course at SFI depends on the new arrival's residency. Since the people moved a lot in time, they do not inform the Registration Agency about their new addresses to continue the ongoing language class. Therefore, they use the false address method to utilize different services from the municipalities they want. Also subletting is used mostly in the larger cities. Even though people live for years, they still do not have their own contract and depend on subletting. These methods were met a lot during the fieldwork which will be evaluated below.

Asylum-seekers prefer to live in EBO mainly with their families, acquaintances that had moved to Sweden before. Even though they have not experienced ABO system, many of them still prefer to EBO to escape ABO's prison-

like feeling. When new arrivals come to the neighbourhood that has already suffered from residential segregation which deepens the problems. The unemployment rate of these neighbourhoods rises because people live in generally high unemployment areas which cause their lack of labour integration. Immigrant neighbourhoods in Sweden are more diverse in terms of their background but they prefer to live with other immigrants. They actually prefer to live in these neighbourhoods since they have a few options (Molina, 1997). However, the popular idea is that immigrants want to live with people in the same ethnicity.

In short, the controversiality between ABO and EBO is that even though you can control the housing situation in ABO, there is not much liberty and vice versa in EBO. Especially camps are the worst case and seen as a prison-like accommodation option. Also, even though you can access freedom and privacy in EBO apartments, living with other people is quite hard. Yet at least people who prefer to EBO can stay with their relatives or people who they already know. Also, the EBO system may have privacy problems due to sharing the apartment with others. From now, I will analyse my fieldwork by tracing their housing career in Sweden. Therefore, neither EBO nor ABO is no longer the case for almost all participants of my research, but these systems cause different pathways for refugees. I took these systems as a field and analysed how these fields affect people's following housing conditions.

5.2.2 Settlement of refugees

Refugee settlement is a continuation of the sheltering of asylum-seekers. Once asylum seekers grant residence permits, they should choose either being replaced by a

municipality or arranging their houses without any financial help. It is a kind of continuum of EBO/ABO system. However, the Migration Agency has no responsibility of these replacement process, but municipalities must take care of the refugees. The actors forced migrants communicate with, and the structure is crucial to find out how they access to houses, what kind of mediators they have, and to what extent their previous relations affect their housing experiences. These questions will be tried to be answered in this chapter.

5.2.2.1 Under the Municipality Responsibility

Once Sweden received too many asylum-seeking applications, the ongoing housing crisis started to be thought under migration policy. A new Settlement law was implemented in March 2016 which obliges that every municipality must receive a certain number of refugees (SFU: 2016: 38) but this Law does not mention how many refugees each municipality should take or not put some principle to force municipalities accept the same amount of refugee compared to their economic resources or populations. Municipalities are mainly responsible for two main things for refugee integration: housing and language class (Vodiazides, 2021). The first two years of a refugee is seen as an introduction period.

Once beneficiaries get their refugee status, they have two options: either residing in a municipality somewhere in Sweden as a dispersal strategy or find a place by their own. All municipalities must ensure housing for the refugees they accept according to the law. Thus, this law aims at the dispersal of refugees around the country rather than concentration on certain municipal regions. Besides, the

waiting time for placement was thought to be reduced when newcomers gain their residence permits. The previous system also made new arrivals live in cheaper housing areas so they could not establish strong ties with the Swedish community due to residential segregation.

On the other hand, since the applicant cannot determine where s/he is sent, many applicants are hesitating to apply for this service (Borevi, 2019). Actually, one of the aims of this law is to open certain areas having high labour opportunities but experiencing housing shortage. Therefore, at least some refugees can stay these areas where they cannot afford the houses normally. However, the waiting list is still quite long. They have to stay in ABO units more than they think just to find a house.

This mandatory housing provision by municipalities is not working as good as the policymakers thought. First, half of the municipalities offer houses, and these are generally in rural areas. Also, still new arrivals prefer to live in these segregated areas even if they are not refugees. Therefore, the foreign-born population in these neighbourhoods are still high.

5.2.2.2 Continuing Own Accommodation

Unlike ABO, people experience almost a very small differences in terms of housing in EBO system. Since they do not get much thing from public authorities, one they get their residence permit, they continue to live how they lived before. Many of Syrian forced migrants reside in rental apartments (Cetrez et al., 2021) which makes this option is more common among them. They do not move to other houses in most cases. As described above in EBO system, subletting, overcrowded

houses, false address information, segregation are the main characteristics of this term. Especially segregation is always declared the biggest problem of this system. Therefore, public authorities try to reduce segregation problem in the cities by taking the decision of that the people who choose their own houses and residing in segregated areas have lost their financial allowance by the time of January 2020 as a fight for residential segregation and led people to live where having better job opportunities (Cetrez et al., 2020).

The Migration Agency determines these segregated areas and publishes it on its website as seen the example of Södertälje, a district in Stockholm region, at the map 1. If a refugee wants to reside in the red area in the map, they are faced to lose their financial aid, which they are depended after their arrival (Migrationsverket, 2021).

Figure 4. The socio-economic disadvantageous areas in Sweden determined by the Migration Agency

Source: Migrationsverket, 2021a

These systems are implemented for two years as an introduction period of a refugee. Then, all refugees need to find their own accommodations by themselves. How these housing policies affect their future is understudy. How ABO system works or EBO system problems referring a lot to segregation are visible in the field. However, those forced migrants' housing experience after their introduction period is still missing. I will try to provide empirical information thanks to my fieldwork in Stockholm about this issue in the following Chapter.

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS FROM THE FIELDWORK CONDUCTED IN STOCKHOLM/SWEDEN

6.1 Stockholm after the Syrian Migration Flow

Stockholm is the biggest and the capital city of Sweden, so it offers not only good jobs and education opportunities for everyone in Sweden but also a lively social live and cosmopolitan environment which attracts many immigrants. After Syrian War, many Syrians preferred to live in Stockholm because of these opportunities. With Settlement Law, many forced migrants think that now these attractive areas must provide social services to them due to the Settlement Law.

Stockholm Municipality and other municipalities in Stockholm region like Solna, Lidingö, Huddinge, Täby and so on must accept refugees due to 2016 Settlement Law. However, the houses presented by these municipalities to refugee are quite limited in the region due to housing scarce. Stockholm Municipality cannot provide many houses for asylum seekers in ABO system. This is an expectable result because Stockholm is the first city where many individuals in the EBO system prefer (Vogiazides & Mondani, 2021:6). However, various refugee groups take different decision in this regard in which age is essentially important. many refugees prefer to live in Stockholm due to its labour market and cosmopolitan environment even though they cannot access the housing aid. Younger individuals in ABO move to Stockholm

after their introduction period once they lose their houses provided by municipalities.

Yet, some refugees prefer to live where they had lived through the asylum-seeking

process in order to keep their ties. For instance, if they have children, some parents did

not want to change their location not to lose their children's peaceful school

environment. In short, Stockholm is an attractive city due to different main reason. The

city has a lot of foreigner population, especially it is higher in the suburb (Stockholm

Municipality, 2018). Also, the forced migrants in Stockholm consist of diverse groups

since some of them settle through municipal houses or ABO system while some of

them move after their introduction period ends. Therefore, Stockholm not only

provides a high forced migrant population but also very diverse population whom I

can use to compare Gaziantep.

6.1.1   Södertalje and northern areas in Stockholm

The fieldwork was started to focus on the northern Stockholm in order to

reach more refugee since they have much more foreigner population compared to

other part of the city. Yet, Södertälje in Southern Stockholm was included to reach

more Syrian participants and to investigate the refugees experience after EBO system

best. This is because Södertälje has a great number of Assyrian populations in

Sweden (Mack, 2014) so many Assyrians after 2011 prefer to live there to live with

their own community. The district is located in South Stockholm and has important

companies like Scandic and industrial areas. It provides a number of good

opportunities for immigrants to enter in labour market. Therefore, the districts attract

many refugees. Since the population is mostly foreign-born, the Migration Agency

decided lots of part of it as socio-economically disadvantageous areas as seen in the map:

Figure 5. Socio-economically disadvantageous areas in Södertälje

Source: Migrationsverket, 2021a

It means that the forced migrants moved to live in these red areas cannot take any housing aids but ones have already settled are not affected by this regulation so none of the interviewees expressed any potential loss of their financial aid. However, newly arrived asylum seekers who choose EBO and residing in segregated areas have lost their financial allowance by the time of January 2020 as a fight for

residential segregation. However, local experts during the fieldwork do not think that this hindered housing allowance from accomplishing its aim because

> refugees not only want to live in these areas for its cheaper prices. They just want to live with other people coming from their countries. They helped each other with everything. So, even though they cannot get money, they would still prefer to live there in my opinion. (IE6)

Another field areas are located in the northern part of Stockholm because the municipality placed refugees choosing ABO these areas and they continue to live these neighbourhoods as discussed below. Since they are stigmatized as being ghetto, local people prefer to not settle there. Addition to this, their cheaper rental options make it a popular destination among forced migrants whose prominent aim to find a accommodation until their economic positions gets better. Therefore, these neighbourhoods must be included in the fieldwork. However, since this research was conducted only in Stockholm, so the limit of the research is that those who decided to live where they are offered namely in the ABO system are underrepresented.

6.1.2   Demographic profile of forced migrants

This research was conducted in Stockholm from April to October, 2021. The semi-structured interviews were conducted on three different groups: local experts, members of the host community, and urban refugees. I conducted 20 interviews with local experts, 20 interviews with local people and finally, 20 forced migrants. I relied on snowball methods. The interviewees are from different countries from Syria, Bangladesh, Afghanistan. Besides, Syrians are diverse in themselves in terms of from different region, religion, and socio-cultural backgrounds. Many Assyrians are included in the research in addition to Muslim Syrians. Also, LGBTI refugees

preferred to live in Sweden who are also included in the research. Generally, local experts helped me find participants for forced migrants because they had already had connections with them in their introduction period. People from Afghanistan were more willing to participate in fieldwork. Their more precarious situations could make them talk about their problems more than any other groups in Stockholm. Also, people coming from Syria who preferred to live in the ABO system before were less willing to participate in my research. Even though we have common friends or acquaintances, some of them refuse to participate in the research. Therefore, I cannot expand the interviewees, which was not thought of before starting the fieldwork. However, the Afghans' willingness to research could be seen as compensation for their reluctance. Then, thanks to language cafes, I can access more people from Syrians. Also, another difference is that mostly Syrians prefer not to record our talk in the interviews. These signs can be interpreted in the way that they have much more concerns about their personal information or data compared to other groups. In short, the diverse nature of Stockholm is reflected in the research. This is the first research conducted by focusing on especially complexity of Syrians through the lens of super-diversity in Sweden.

6.2 The Importance of Legal Status and Nationality of Forced Migrants

The nationality of forced migrants is very important in terms of their legal status and the bureaucratic processes in Sweden. After 2015, the Migration Agency and other public institutions arranged everything in favour of Syrian citizens to handle their record applications. This created inequality especially among the

asylum-seekers. Syrians mostly took residence permits in a very short term once they entered Sweden, even some of them took Swedish citizenship easily. Yet, Afghan asylum-seekers who came to Sweden as unaccompanied minors lived undocumented for a while then they are granted their residence permit. Also, many of them lived undocumented for years in Sweden if their applications are rejected. Therefore, the non-Syrian participants felt disappointed when they realised that their cases were taken very slowly. This change affected a lot of non-Syrian living conditions in Sweden. One of the Afghan interviewees express this situation. Even though he was unaccompanied minor at that time, he thinks that he was unimportant as being Afghan:

> Back then, Syrians came to Sweden. They got their paper immediately. We suffered a lot. They always asked me for documents that I did not have. The police called me and put me in jail. I lived there for 3 months, in prison. I was seeing people's walk, their feet through the window. They are free and I am not because I do not have paper. I thought that no one want me. No one in Afghanistan, in Sweden. (IM3- 22- A- M- HS).

These unaccompanied minors from Afghanistan experience many difficulties to take their residence permits as stated before. Many civil society organizations in migration governance take care of them to solve their problems. They also helped them to send, mainly, to France which gives residence permits easier to Sweden as stated during local experts' interviews. Therefore, nationality is crucial to been recognized which affect their housing conditions directly. Even though many unaccompanied children applied for Swedish Migration Agency, they are not as visible as refugees in the media. "Many of Syrians became recognized. When you became recognized, all communities (municipalities) have to deal with them, their housing, their work." (IE1). Shortly, granting the refugee status or official

recognition or the settlement is the essential step in Sweden to access to other public services, which is affected a lot by the nationality and visibility in the public.

Some of forced migrants prefer to live in Sweden rather than going to other countries despite of their tough living conditions or problems about not being recognized. Actually, municipalities can help the undocumented people to reduce their problems. Municipalities' responsibility is about housing and language classes for refugees, but local experts expressed there is not any legal obstacle for municipalities to help undocumented immigrants in their territories. They can give houses or financial aid for undocumented immigrants under emergency aid. Yet, it is not a common practice among Swedish municipalities. Even though one of the local expert interviewees express this authority of municipality, there is almost no example of this. "Higher Court decided that municipalities can give housing or financial aid for undocumented people in Sweden. It is not mandatory; they are not under the responsibility of municipalities, but they can do it under emergency aid." (IE3). Since it is not mandatory for municipality, they prefer not to spend their resources on this issue. Therefore, unaccompanied minors had the right to stay neither camp nor ABO houses nor any other accommodation option provided by the state. They became homeless so civil society organizations took care of them. However, public authorities have duty to take care of the forced migrants in their regions who are either sent by the Migration Agency or self-settled.

The EBO or ABO systems are used for the forced migrants who are registered in Sweden. However, local experts point out the situation of unaccompanied minors in Sweden in terms of these systems, as well. If they became

above 18 while the waiting time for the decision from the Supreme Court in case of having a rejection decision,

> They have no right to go to camps. They cannot stay in ABO. You know you have to rely on yourself, but they have nothing here. Then, the Swedish Civil Society helped them. We opened our houses to them. They are not allowed to get aid. Swedish Church helped them a lot (IE1).

Civil Society has helped them a lot in those cases. However, they need to find a way to earn their lives in times. They live in limbo situations and have to solve almost all problems by themselves. In time, they learn where to go, where to stay. Their own communication let them know about this information. Their situations in Sweden are much more precarious. The rising application of Syrians to be a refugee in Sweden made other people invisible.

In addition to these differences stemming from nationalities, the differences in the legal status can be observed even in the same nations. The diversity of legal status due to the changing permanent residence permits regulations among Syrians is quite clear in the research. Their waiting time for the residence permits and how they are granted permanent residence varies a lot depending on their arrival time. Many Syrians taking permanent residence before the temporary law change in 2016. Almost all of them took Swedish citizenship whereas Syrians came to Sweden in 2017 afterwards have still temporary residence permit or waiting for their permanent residence permits which are almost four years later. For instance, an interviewee who came in 2011 said that "it took 15 days to take the permanent residence permit once I entered in Sweden" whereas the other Syrians who came in 2017 took his permanent residence permit just before one week from the interview. He concludes that "I am lucky because I am retired, and the Migration Agency did not want financial resource

like a salary from me. Otherwise, I could not take permanent." (IM16- 52-M-B).

Since retired people do not need to have a job contract to get the permanent resident permit. Yet, many people having temporary residence permit cannot meet the new demands for permanent residence permits because an applicant must have at least 18 months job contract when the case officer starts to handle their case. Considering that many employers make one year job contract and renew it annually, it is extremely difficult to provide this at least 18 months job contract for permanent resident permits for not only forced migrants but also all non-EU foreigners in Sweden.

Some Syrian participants came to Sweden through family reunification. They almost have a similar story. First, the man in the family comes and then, brings his family after he arranges a decent life. For instance, a young male interviewee came to Sweden in 2017 but his father came to Sweden in 2014. They all have permanent residence permits. Even though he complains about some problems, he describes his family house in Sweden as decent. They have four rooms and five people are living there.

Some of them also came to Sweden with work permits or tourist visas. Once they entered the country, they made asylum applications to the Migration Agency. Also, a few of refugees mostly Syrians and Afghans came through an illegal way to Sweden. They generally use Turkey, Greece, Denmark route to reach to country. However, even though they did not enter the legal way, they did not face almost any problems getting their residence permit.

Therefore, the differences between nations or legal status not only directly affect their future lives but also their current conditions. These problems are crucial

to understanding of forced migrants' housing conditions. All the processes to be settled in Sweden are very intertwined as expressed by the interview.

> I need to have a job to hire an apartment- Otherwise none of landlord give their houses to me. To get a job, I need to have my status, thankfully I have. Yet, it is very hard to find a job in Sweden so I should register to Employment Agency (Arbetsförmedlingen). When I call them, they ask me where I am living. They do not understand I cannot provide an address without getting a job. It is a mees, everything is related to each other. (IM13-42- F- SR).

Once you are registered to Sweden as a foreigner, the first step is to get a personal ID number (personnummer) which is used for everything in Sweden. Almost all forced migrants, and even local people, indicated that you are nothing without "personnummer" in Sweden.

6.3 Access to Houses

According to my fieldwork, there are three different pathways that forced migrants adopt to access houses after their introduction period in Sweden:

- Access a house through their families/ acquisitions like in the EBO period

- Access a house thanks to the help of either local people whom they met during the introduction period or public authorities

- Totally depending on local volunteers help

The first way is generally adopted by people who prefer the EBO system before. They are experiencing the same situation. Their housing experiences can be observed more in the housing career and integration debates. The second way is mainly adopted by the people who do not have any family or friend connection here. They meet local people during their stay in the ABO system or introduction period.

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Local volunteers come to their help, or they apply for social service. They find houses generally in the outskirts of Stockholm where houses are relatively cheaper. Even though some of them do not live in ABO houses, they still manage to get help from people working in migration governance. These urban refugees can be counted in this group. The last group mostly consists of undocumented people's housing experience. They lack any financial or social resources, they survived with the help of volunteers. They mostly lived with these volunteers' houses without being formally registered. They learnt Swedish with their help, depended on them in legal issues and so on.

6.3.1 The importance of ethnicity to access to houses

The asylum-seekers' social capital is the leading factor in their preferences either EBO or ABO. If they have any family or friend in Sweden who came to Sweden before, the newcomers tend to live with them instead of the Migration Agency's houses. Their previous connections and the dispersal strategy let them choose EBO system. First asylum seekers, then refugees do not want to be sent wherever public authorities want. Local experts say that the camps are quite far from city centres. Some volunteers helped the people in the camps, so they know the conditions quite well. Or the dispersal strategy places them where they do not get used to live. For instance, living in rural or very cold areas constitutes vert though conditions for refugees. A refugee lived in a camp in the Northern Sweden and described the situation as an isolation, and the effect of which on his preferences of moving to the city:

There is nothing to do. The climate is very cold. You cannot see anybody in the streets. No job, no friend. I am used to living in the cities. I did not want to live in village anymore. They put us in the camps. It is like big isolation. I moved to Stockholm for find a job, make friends. (IM-32- M- S- B).

Even though this complaint is very common among forced migrants, public authorities generally do not respect their wish or demand. They consider the economic and social condition of the country as pointed by local experts.

Due to domestic migration in Sweden, the state establishes the camps in the North. Forced migrants are more welcoming in the north. Many shop owners thought that these people could boost the economy. "Swedish countryside became lively thanks to refugees." (IE1).

Addition to camp and houses condition in ABO, their ethnic connection gave an advantage to them to find a house in the housing market. Their ethnicity can tell their location choice, but more important thing is that this ethnic identity can be practice as informal network in the housing market. Therefore, the EBO system is criticized for not providing integration or deepening the existing inequalities or problems caused segregation in those neighbourhoods. On the other hand, asylum-seekers' previous connections and knowledge could work in these neighbourhoods. For instance, individuals can increase their economic capital by working in their acquaintance's shop without speaking Swedish. Moreover, they have not any Swedish friends, but they do not feel isolated in these neighbourhoods thanks to their own communities. Even, they have a very active life, they sport together daily, play cards together, arrange weekly meetings and so on, yet their interactions with Swedish are quite limited. Some of them are aware of living in these neighbourhoods are not good for integration. An elderly Syrian refugee points out this issue, but his

words prove that this problem is not stemming from only forced migrants but also the host community. Even though he wanted to live with local people, he had no choice to live with other immigrants while he was looking for a house.

> I was living in Sundbybergs before. All residents there were elderly and very chic people. I wanted to stay there very much. My Swedish teacher there was a writer. She was a very well-groomed lady... I am a dentist. I wanted to work in Sundbybergs, for free. I have 40 years of experience in Syria. Yet, they did not let me work because I am very old. Then, I went to retired service there. Yet, if I worked here for a short while, I would take more money. Now, I took 4.800 kroner plus rent instead of 7.800 kroner plus rent. Then, the landlord terminated our contract. We had to move to another house, and we could find a house in Södertälje. Listen, integration is mutual. I wanted to be integrated very much but they did not let me. (IM19- 70- M- B).

However, as seen in the quotation, their social and cultural capitals only work in certain neighbourhoods but unfortunately, these areas are segregated and stigmatized. Even though they do not prefer to live in areas having high foreign population, they somehow move to these areas. Their social network to access housing in the city not only in segregated areas but also around the city. Even though they are proper tenants for any landlord, they still suffer the hiring a house without any help from their friends. It is obvious that the Stockholm housing market is quite exclusionary. It can be observed also in subletting.

If a forced migrant rent the flat through sublet, they seem themselves lucky because this market requires lots of trusts and if you do not have a proper job, subletting is almost impossible in Stockholm. Whereas local people never appreciate this sublet market. One of the Swedish women seeing being in the subletting market equal to being homeless: "I was homeless back then. I mean I have flat but in subletting market. I think it was a thief mechanism." (IL20- 51- F- DR). These two differences prove how access to a house through sublet market is perceived by two

different groups.

Another path of this system is to hire a flat from private companies which generally serves to professionals. Therefore, this type of flats is generally found in Solna Municipality territory which is the international work hub of Stockholm. There are many international companies and also universities like Karolinska University. Also, it is a popular neighbourhood due to its closeness to the city-centre. Therefore, private housing companies offer one room flat with a 'kitchenette'. Some single refugees prefer to live in this flat because it is easy to rent compared to other alternatives. These apartments are like the studio apartments in Gaziantep. However, it should be kept in mind that the rent prices are high for these flats so these refugees living in these flats are generally in a good position in the job market, which constitutes the difference from Gaziantep. For instance, one of them is a post-doc researcher at Karolinska University. Still, she could not hire the flat without her friends' help.

> It is not easy to find an apartment here. It is very expensive to find a flat in the city centre. I looked a lot. One of my friends is living in the building. He recommended me. I had a mediator, rentier. I feel it is more trusted compared to with rent by a landlord directly because I do not know the process very well. (IM1- 40- F-S- DR).

However, it was not easy for her to hire the apartment because she must declare a work contract, a bank statement, a salary, and a small description of herself. She continued that "I am single. I am a researcher and have no babies. They want tenant having no baby or pets. It is like selling yourself like making PR for a house." (IM1-40- F- S- DR). After the interview, she wanted to add "I do not know if I do not a good job, how I can find an apartment?". These expressions are quite important

in two different ways: either showing that housing condition is quite related to job condition of people in the housing market or refugees who has not a good job are the ones who experience the hardest condition in the market.

6.3.2 Depending on local volunteers

Some applicants who have no social bonds in the Swedish housing market mostly depend on what are suggested by the public authorities or Swedish civil society. After their introduction period, they mostly depend on their social networks that is acquired in Sweden for the housing market. There is a queue system for social houses in Sweden, but it is almost impossible for a refugee to find a house without waiting for years. Long waiting time in the queue is criticized by local people, as well. Many refugees do not have previous connection in Sweden so they preferred to live in ABO and then, in municipal houses. They can live in these houses for two years. Then, they must find a houses by themselves after their introduction period ends.

Some municipalities-built houses for refugees and then demolish it after introduction period. The demolishment of these municipal houses makes refugees' lives harder as local experts expressed. "They are very simple houses, generally built for families in the cities. They stayed two years and now, they are all demolished. Therefore, refugees have tougher living conditions now." (IE1). Once they lost their housing allowance, "they generally go to social services. I think they generally move outside of Stockholm. Stockholm Municipality forces them to go" (IE1). If they applied for a neighbourhood having less housing demand, they can rent a house through the housing queue. However, this is quite rare. Therefore, they mostly

depend on subletting and sharing the apartment. However, none of the respondents in the fieldwork are living in shared apartments nowadays. Subletting is still popular and ongoing situation for these people.

During their introduction period, if they attend some activities, meet local volunteers, and make friends. Then, they are generally offered help for accessing to house by locals. Their housing conditions are not as good as the first group, yet they are seen as more integrated since they get some capital after moving to Sweden.

In order to understand this pathway better, a family story is quite informative and descriptive about how they access houses through solidarity with local people. When the father came, he preferred to live in ABO system when he was an asylum-seeker. When he got his residence permit, he wanted to be placed by the municipality. During this time, his family came to Sweden through family reunification and lived in one of ABO houses. After two years, their introduction period ended up, and they needed to arrange their accommodation by themselves. They found their house thanks to a volunteer whom they met in their introduction period. Thus, they pay less rent, they can access any help whenever they need such as translation, repairing the house and so on. Yet, they still say that they cannot communicate with a lot of Swedish locals except for those who help them. Initially, their son thought that not speaking Swedish was the main problem but then "when I learnt the language, I think it is not the problem." (IM8- 22- M- S- HS). They feel much more isolated even though they can access the help of Swedish society. Even though the literature and the public authorities see their experience as a good example of integration, they do not think the same way. They always appreciate the

people who help them, but they also know that this situation cannot be pursued. They need to earn their lives to "be equal" with other residents.

Also, children of the families generally tend to complain about the location because it is very hard to find a house in city-centre, so the houses found by local people are mostly far from the centre. For instance, the young son of the abovementioned family wished to live close to the city centre to experience a more diverse and open community. Therefore, he wanted to move to the city-centre when they feel that they have enough capital to use in the housing market without any help. These are generally job or education opportunities as like the case for their son. Moving to the centre of Stockholm is quite a big thing in their lives because "there is nothing to do" (IM8- 22- M- S- HS) in his previous neighbourhood. Almost everybody in his neighbourhood is either older or younger than him. "I have no friends at SFI (Swedish language course). They are older than me. Or, for instance, my siblings have friends, they play football, but I could not join them. They are all much younger than me. So, I studied Swedish, my lessons." (IM8- 22- M- S- HS).

Lastly, some individuals had nothing when they arrived in Sweden. They almost have no economic capital and their other capitals do not work in Sweden. They were in very desperate conditions. They stayed in deportation centres, some of them tried to suicide. Since some of them were minors, some volunteers took care of them so they could create a new life in Sweden. They have the least symbolic capital in the Swedish housing market. It took years for them to acquire a residence permit, then they can act individually in the housing market. However, many of them acquire a family in Sweden who made their lives easier. They mostly depend on social

system, but they are younger than other groups. They are going to university so in time. Some of them also lost connections with their families in their hometowns. So, they embrace their new families in Sweden. Even, one of the forced migrant interviewees was adopted by one of these local volunteers: "They are my family. I had a family in Afghanistan but now, I have my real family. They did everything for me." (IM17-22-AF-M-HS). They have more sense of belonging to Sweden compared to any other group in case that their residence permit problems are solved.

6.3.3 The importance of social houses for specific groups among refugees

Public houses are crucial for vulnerable people. However, there is still a long waiting time for finding a public house, especially if you are waiting for bigger cities. It is also the case for local people even though they had already registered in the queue system before. One of the female local people points out "I am living with my mother. She has the house from the queue. I am planning to marry but we will live with my mother. We cannot afford a house, even here, in Rinkeby. We will be waiting from my turn in the queue." (IL9- 24- F- HS). You can reach these houses through queue system which is impossible for a newly arrived person. Also, some local people do not trust the public authorities. They think that the system is corrupted. A local expert says "If you know the right person, you can find a house. I do not know how but they arrange something and give you the priority." (IE43- M-M- PS). Interviewees themselves found different ways to take advantage of the queue system secretly. For instance, one of the local people told how he used this corruption system. He said that he changed his residence unproperly by giving three hundred thousand kroner in cash to a housing mafia thirty years ago to reside in

Södermalm, one of the fancy neighbourhoods in Stockholm. Then, he bought his apartment after the governments' privatization decision for the housing market in the 90s. The public housing companies sold the houses to one who was living in the houses if the resident preferred with a cheaper price. Even if we accept this illegal way to access the houses, it can be still said that forced migrants are lack of find these kind of "right" people to enter in the black market.

Therefore, participants of the fieldwork always found their own houses because only a few housing options were provided in Stockholm. Even though some of them lived in the ABO system or accommodation centres, they prefer to arrange their own accommodation just to live in a big city. Yet, if they cannot pay their rents, their application to social services is also seen. Especially elderly people in the research generally depend on public resources via housing aid. Some of them were placed in social houses or their rents are paid by social service. Even though they were very rich in Syria, they lost their economic resources:

> I had soda factories in Syria. We distributed our products to three different cities. They were sold in more than one hundred markets. We had twenty-three trucks. Now, they all went. They stole the factory, the machines in it. I had a quadplex villa. I had a private chauffeur, I had domestic workers… Now, I have only one wish that is to have a house, having a contract on my name or my wife's name. (IM15- 76- M- B).

Social houses are also highly preferred by young immigrants to have some privacy and more importantly, dealing with overcrowded houses. Education is an important gateway to have an apartment for many young refugees. Those who start a university education immediately hire a room from SSSB (Stockholms Studentbostäder) that is public housing provision for undergrad and graduated students in Stockholm. You can hire a flat according to your days in the queue. It is

not difficult to find a room through this system, but they must use a shared kitchen with others. However, they do love their rooms because they have more privacy in this system. For instance, one of the forced migrants had just moved to a dormitory since he started at university in one of the best prestigious universities in Sweden. His family was living in Stockholm's suburb located in northern Stockholm. Even though he could commute to university, he preferred to live by himself to experience university life. He also found a part-time job as a waitress for the weekend.

> Life in Stockholm has lots of opportunities. I know a Turkish idiom "The streets of Istanbul are paved with gold". It is also true for Stockholm. I have recently moved here but I found a job, I made a friend from the university. (IM8- 22- M- S- HS)

This quotation proves that how hard to have interactions with locals in small villages and find a job in those areas. Therefore, big cities in Sweden are pretty popular among all forced-migrants.

6.4 The Relationship in the Neighbourhood Level Segregation Problem

The Refugees choose EBO system are living with mostly their families, acquaintances and so on. Therefore, they have very close relations in their neighbourhood. Moreover, this situation is criticized by public authorities a lot with spending their time with their own ethnic communities. Yet, thanks to their ethnicity or previous connections, those people could have more lively area. Due to this tendency, segregation is discussed a lot in the Swedish public. The segregation is one of the most important urban problems in Sweden. Segregation stems from not only economic differences but also racial differences. The latter is more important for this research because ethnic clusters in the cities are visible in Stockholm. Dispersal

strategy is adopted to prevent and reverse this segregation. Also, the regulation about cutting financial aid if the applicant live in the socio-economically disadvantageous areas is an attempt to reduce segregation. For instance, the residential segregation is sharply seen in Rinkeby where Somalis have the majority. Residents point out the reason for the residential segregation in their neighbourhood due to not implementing dispersal policy. The quotation from local interviewee clearly describes the intent of public authorities:

> We were living here, Greeks and Turks before. Then, Somalis came to here because the rents are cheaper. I grew up here. We had Turkish neighbours, Greek neighbours. Then, Somalis came here suddenly. The population of the neighbourhood is Somalis now, 60%, 70% Somalis. All Greeks moved; all Turks are currently moving from here. Then, the state got regretful about this choice when they saw Rinkeby because the state lost Rinkeby. Now, they cannot control it here. Therefore, they try to disperse new immigrants not to create new Rinkebies. (IL6).

Forced migrants are also aware of this issue but they do not have any better alternative so they express that they cannot change the situation: "I feel like living in Syria with other Assyrian. I do not feel like this is Sweden so I can understand Swedish people concern but outside of Södertälje, I cannot find a house." (IM14, 43, F, PS).

The main problem of forced migrants in neighbourhood level is not to interact with locals both in segregated areas and mixed areas even though they appreciate the housing aid or the system in general. Economical problems are not as big as in Sweden for many forced migrants compared to the countries they lived before, but they have some social problem because of feeling isolated. One interviewee compares Turkey and Sweden in terms of interaction with locals:

Before Sweden, we lived in Turkey. I love living there but the condition in Sweden is better, so we moved here. We had problems with Turkish neighbours, we sometimes argued. We argued because we saw each other, we chatted each other. Here in Sweden, I do not have any Swedish friend or acquittance. I cannot say that I do not have any problem with Swedish because I do not know. May be if I saw them, we would also argue them like we did with Turks. (IM9, 47, M, SR, HS).

Language class is used for making friends especially for elderly people. Since these classes organized by municipalities generally classmates are living in the same district. In addition to municipality's language class, there are lots of different initiatives to help foreigners to learn Swedish. Language cafes are the most popular in these initiatives. Some of forced migrants meet their neighbours in these classes. An Assyrian female interviewee found her job and her friends through Swedish class. "I have too many Swedish friends from language café. I met in contact with Swedish there, I communicated with the priest. Then, I started to work in the church. I broke my leg, my friends from language café took care of me." (IM14- 64- F- S- B).

6.5 Conclusion

Swedish housing policies have many tools to integrate forced migrants into the housing market, which is highly appreciated by the forced migrants themselves. However, during this process, the legal status or their nationalities create dissatisfaction, especially for those in more difficult situations. Although they prefer EBO and ABO systems, after a while, due to better job opportunities and a more vibrant social life, many of them want to settle in big cities like Stockholm. As a result, they have to deal with more challenging housing conditions.

Due to the intertwining of job opportunities and rental housing options, during the introduction period, which covers the first years after arriving in Sweden,

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the help of local volunteers is crucial for overcoming these challenging conditions for forced migrants. Additionally, some neighborhoods stand out for these individuals because they can benefit from informal solidarity networks among their own ethnic or national groups, and these areas offer more affordable rental properties compared to the rest of Sweden. However, this situation is heavily criticized by the local population for causing segregation. Although public authorities have devised policies to prevent segregation, this issue remains a current phenomenon.

In summary, in the implementation of the right to housing in Sweden, the problems related to affordability and access to houses are somewhat alleviated due to housing assistance and social housing. However, the main issue stems from segregation, resulting in problems at the neighbourhood level. This segregation leads to divisions between ethnic groups and socioeconomic levels, causing integration challenges between communities.

Lastly, while the mobilization of forced migrants in Stockholm in the housing market are significantly influenced by their ethnic and social networks, they also maintain constant communication with institutions thanks to Sweden's housing policies. In necessary situations, they establish contact with institutions and sometimes strive to find solutions at the institutional level through negotiation methods. As a result, experiences in the housing sector in Sweden are progressing on an institutional basis in a way that I haven't seen in Turkey.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I focused on the housing experience of forced migrants by referring to different housing policies. I examined the housing market structure and agency of forced migrants to reveal their tactics. While focusing on the housing policies to understand their impact on individuals' experience, I used case comparison by conducting the fieldwork in Gaziantep, Turkey and Stockholm, Sweden.

In order to make this debate, the right to housing, the state of art in the housing studies focusing on the migration issues, and the super-diversity approach was investigated. Then, thanks to regulations and policy documents, Turkey and Sweden's position towards asylum management and accommodation was discussed to provide the structure of which all forced migrants have to be a part. Then, empirical findings from two fieldworks were summarized to show the agency of forced migrants while describing their tactics in the housing market.

7.1 Theoretical Contributions

This dissertation contributes to the fields of forced migration studies and housing policy studies by presenting very novel empirical data. Firstly, the forced migrant concept is used to overcome the problem of having different legal statuses of displaced people. It enabled me to investigate people experiencing similar housing

problems despite having other legal status. It is an essential contribution because many research migration studies focus on refugees, asylum-seekers, or immigrants but people under temporary or international protection or those having different legal status are growing significantly in Africa and MENA countries. Therefore, it provides a new approach to match those people with the existing literature.

Secondly, the three-dimension classification of the housing studies focusing on international migration in the second Chapter may open a new discussion on how to handle housing studies by focusing on different scales. It puts a novel classification based on the scales which are individual, neighbourhood, and household scales. It is claimed that these classes are related to different components of the right to housing. Housing is a multi-dimensional area which has various aspects so it could be hard to understand which angle of the topic should take the unit of analysis. Thanks to this classification summarized in the dissertation, a broad review of the literature on housing areas and its relations to the right to housing got clearer and a new classification in migration studies was performed.

Third, the comparison between Global North and Global South on forced migrants' settlement relation to formal and informal housing is crucial to understand the countries in between like Turkey. Sweden and Turkey implement pretty different housing policies in a way that Sweden has a very regulated housing area whereas Turkey has not a comprehensive housing policy. While forced migrants' individual decisions are to be settled under Migration Agency or municipalities in Sweden, the forced migrants in Turkey have to deal with every aspect of housing by themselves. However, Turkey is different from other Global South countries, as well since its housing market is much more formalized than other Southern countries and has very

limited tools to access to houses. Initially, the differences in forced migrants'

housing experiences between Global North and Global South in terms of housing

policies for them were discussed because this differentiation is quite important to

understand under what conditions forced migrants to survive in the housing market.

Even though they face discrimination in the housing market in many countries, their

reactions are different from each other which shows that the political and

sociological conditions of the country are highly affecting their reactions because

even people who migrated from the same countries adopt different strategies

according to where they settle down. For instance, unlike the global north, these

strategies entail survival attitudes in the global south. Despite the huge population of

forced migrants in the Global South, their accommodation in this region is studied

limited to informal settlement. The dissertation enlarges the current literature towards

the formal housing market which also works in the Global South countries thanks to

the Turkey case. Thus, it contributes to formal and informal housing market debate

while suggesting that these intertwined with each other in many regions.

Fourth, the dissertation contributes to the super-diversity approach, especially

in terms of showing the diversity in inter-ethnic relations. In the literature, people

having the same ethnicity are perceived as having homogenous experiences,

problems, and solutions but thanks to the super-diversity approach, the difference

between these groups could be investigated. Alongside nationality and ethnicity, the

effects of forced migrants' social networks and interactions with the local people on

their housing experiences have been highlighted in their preference for different

housing pathways. Thus, rather than focusing on disparities within the first layer,

distinctions within the second layer have been discussed. A significant contribution

of this dissertation is the recognition that these differences stem from experiences in the host country, where their choices within the housing market or methods of integration into society shape their urban experiences. Particularly, in the more institutional framework of Sweden, the first accommodation preferences of forced migrants have been shown to play a crucial role in subsequent processes after the introduction period. In Turkey, on the other hand, interactions at the local level and the social networks they establish in the country have been empirically demonstrated to guide them even in matters of purchasing an apartment or selecting buildings for rental apartments. Understanding the formation of these disparities or comprehending their impacts in specific domains is crucial for grasping urban complexity. This approach allowed me to investigate the complexity of the urban context and the empirical data of the dissertation could contribute to putting different factors into the table in the approach like forced migrants' previous connections, access to local volunteers, or language barrier.

Thanks to Chapters Three and Five, Turkey and Sweden's migration and accommodation policies via regulations are investigated. These chapters could be a good reference for future researchers who would like to have a whole picture of the legal perspective of the issue. The historical evolution of the laws and regulations provides to perceive under what conditions the amendments were made. In the third Chapter, in addition to the legal and policy framework of migration and accommodation policies in Turkey, I also classified the term after Syrian migration to Turkey in terms of accommodation options they have. This division contributes to the understanding of the rise of forced migrants in an urban context by referring to the decision taken by public authorities. Even though Turkey has not a housing

policy, the sheltering approaches to forced migrants and TACs policies especially for Syrians now have a retrospective perception which could be used in future scholarly articles and policy documents. Moreover, Chapter Five provides how Sweden changed its refugee-welcoming policy by referring to this shift as a U-turn policy.

As discussed in those Chapters, both countries have changed their migration policies after Syrian forced migrants' migration. Even though the process had started before this Migration, Turkey organized a nation-wide migration organization in the short term. This situation has facilitated the comprehensive handling of migration management in a complex structure. In comparison with other country examples, Turkey's Migration Management has reached a successful point in terms of organization. However, it predominantly applies this success to issues related to migrant acceptance or their legal statuses. It does not intervene in aspects such as the housing area or in other ways that would impact the urban experiences of forced migrants. In Sweden, with the arrival of Syrians, it can be observed that migration management has gradually become more restrictive, leading to what is referred to as a "U-turn policy," indicating a definite shift. While this shift results in significant changes in legislation and institutional functioning, the ethos of the welfare state still prevails, as evidenced by the effective involvement of the Migration Authority and other public organizations in the housing area.

This difference in approach is evident in legal texts as well, as it arises from the predicament of forced migrants in Turkey being caught between sheltering and settlement. While Sweden offers a path to citizenship for accepted migrants with the condition of adhering to distinct rules, Turkey still keeps these individuals in temporary status despite a decade having passed. Due to the temporary nature of

their residence, even individuals who have lived here for many years experience uncertainty, which is also observed in the housing area. Sweden follows a settlement policy for forced migrants whereas forced migrants in Turkey are still between settlement and sheltering. Therefore, this debate contributes to housing studies by opening a new question through new 'in between' inhabitants in the cities. These new actors bring a new perspective to almost all topics in urban studies.

7.2 Empirical Contribution

This dissertation provided a comparison between Gaziantep, Turkey and Stockholm, Sweden based on semi-structured interviews with forced migrants, local people, and local experts. This comparison allowed me to reveal the impact of housing policies on forced migrants. If I need the summarize the findings in a sentence, I would say that: In areas with comprehensive housing policies, forced migrants navigate their experiences primarily through institutional structures and forms of housing assistance, while in places lacking comprehensive housing policies, forced migrants gain their housing experiences through social-level interactions or solutions.

The main finding from the fieldwork in Gaziantep is to present a dual housing system, which are Syrian-only buildings, Turkish-only buildings, and mixed buildings, and the importance of the studio apartments in the settlement of forced migrants. Syrian forced migrants are self-segregated in buildings which only accept Syrians. This system is a result and indicator of a lack of social cohesion in the city. Since there was not any institutional support for forced migrants, they had to find their own accommodation solutions in the urban areas. Their agency could be

observed through their creation of a parallel life in the same area like Syrian-only building. Their mass migration flow to urban areas caused high and sudden rent increases stemming from both the gap between supply and demand equilibrium and the self-seeking attitudes of landlords. To overcome these two problems, forced migrants -who lack economic networks and social resources initially- tend to live in overcrowded houses. This household composition generated noise in the buildings and preferences of men to go out to mostly parks to make women and children in the house comfortable. These two issues are the reasons for local people to be improved negative attitudes towards only Syrian forced migrants whereas other forced migrant groups did not define hospitability in the city. Even though, when it was seen that Syrian forced migrants would stay in Gaziantep more than they considered, they moved to smaller apartments with their nuclear families. However, the social cohesion in the city could not be supplied again.

The findings from Gaziantep field demonstrate that Syrians in Turkey are deprived of housing aid or occupation movements like in the Global North due to the high level of rentier in the housing market nor take advantage of the flexibility of informality like in the Global South due to the formalization of the Turkish housing market. Therefore, forced migrants have different pathways to access affordable houses in Turkey based on either their socio-economical conditions or networks with other residents. These ways are mainly stemming from their informal relations like having Turkish acquaintances or networks in the market such as their own communication channels or Syrian mediators.

The research on Turkey mainly contributes to the literature on forced migrants' settlement in the urban areas beyond the formal and informal dichotomy

by delineating how informal relations are used in the formal sector in Global South. Another important contribution is to show that the housing market composition in Global South and forced migrants' housing experience is also changing. Third, the case of Syrians provides another example of how exclusion in the market and discrimination in the law increase the vulnerability of forced migrants in the case of a lack of national and local housing policy because landlords take advantage of their vulnerability. Moreover, it is the first research focusing on forced migrants' housing conditions deeply after Syrians' move to urban areas. Therefore, this dissertation is the first step that puts all housing debates in migration studies in the Turkish context. Turkey's importance in forced migration and its housing market conditions were analysed because Turkey, hosting the largest number of forced migrants in the world, could be a perfect example of how forced migrants affect the cities and have been affected by the housing markets of the host cities.

Physical, spatial, and socio-psychological dimensions correspond to household, neighbourhood, and individual levels, respectively. These dimensions are revealed in the findings. The many problems of forced migrants are related to physical dimensions, especially access to the house. Access to the house is one of the biggest problems for them and they mostly depend on their informal network. Moreover, Syrians are exposed to a legal limitation to buy a house in Turkey. Alongside this legal limitation, they have faced discriminatory attitudes in the housing market. Also, the size of the houses does not fit their daily needs. Interestingly, they do not have almost any problem about the neighbourhood. Their sense of belonging is generally towards the city, Gaziantep but the dwellings affect their sense of belonging negatively. These three dimensions are interrelated to each

other. For instance, when an interviewee faced a negative attitude while finding a house in the housing market, her/ his family experienced the same thing at the household level, it affected their settlement choice at the neighbourhood level and lastly, this eased or hardened the establishment of the sense of belonging in the individual level.

The fieldwork in Stockholm, firstly, one of the first empirical research to understand forced migrants' housing condition after their introduction period. This case showed that the housing policies and Migration Agency or municipality's housing supply was used by forced migrants or provided a safe space for them by knowing that they could apply for public institutions to access houses if they could not find a house even though the quality of accommodation is low. The main problem for forced migrants was to find a decent house if they preferred to settle by themselves. They faced discrimination while they were looking for a rental house. Even though they could find it, it was mostly through subletting, which was perceived as unacceptable by many local people. Another finding from the fieldwork is that the interaction between forced migrants and local people was pretty low. Forced migrants communicated only with local volunteers or workers in NGOs or INGOs.

Due to the organized and distinct institutional regulations in Sweden, many forced migrants knew what to expect when they arrived, and for many, the combination of Sweden's welfare state services has made it a preferred destination. Moreover, since 2015, Syrians have been more visible to the public, and they have information about the processes they need to go through, from obtaining legal status to finding housing. However, other forced migrant groups, especially Afghans, stated

that they had been completely pushed to the background and forgotten. On the other hand, Syrians' visibility in Gaziantep made Syrians more vulnerable position due to their high population in the city.

Unlike Gaziantep, the Stockholm case proved segregation at the neighbourhood scale was still an important topic in Sweden which could not be solved by ABO system or municipal houses. Forced migrants preferred to live with those who came from similar regions because of having more interaction with other residents in the neighbourhood. Public authorities took measures to prevent segregation, but all the results of the measures did not work as they wished. Even though forced migrants had the risk of losing financial aid if they resided in certain areas determined by Migration Agency, they still preferred to live in those areas to access their informal network. In addition to segregation, stigmatization on the neighbourhood level was seen in Stockholm. The magnitude of the segregation problem in Stockholm and the policies implemented to address it demonstrate the significance of this issue. However, the fact that this situation was not as prominent in Gaziantep should not lead to the conclusion that there was no segregation there. Particularly, as observed in the dual housing system, discrimination at the neighbourhood scale in Stockholm is replaced by discrimination at the building scale in Gaziantep.

In general, while Sweden adopts a settlement policy for forced migrants, Turkey still puts those people between sheltering and settlement positions despite living more than a decade in Turkey. Comprehensive policies towards the housing area cannot be formulated in Turkey without resolving the situation of Syrians, particularly their legal statuses, and in which direction they will evolve. Therefore,

due to this unresolved matter, the debate surrounding this increasingly pressing issue in the future, along with its overall impact, is highly relevant and this thesis presents very current and new findings from housing area to assess the potential direction of this evolving topic.

7.3 Further Research Topics

This dissertation investigates the housing experience of forced migrants in different housing contexts by conducting fieldwork research in Gaziantep and Stockholm. It is an attempt to provide a relationship between the structural conditions of the housing market and the actions of forced migrants to survive in the market. Within the scope of the dissertation, its limitation and some other issues that may be subject to future research can be mentioned.

The first limitation is that longitudinal research should be done to observe how the housing experience has changed in time in those cities. In this dissertation, I tried to deeply understand the housing experience in a certain period of time but the cities are alive entity which changes a lot. For instance, there is no study on the housing career of forced migrants in Turkey so this dissertation could be used as the ground for the topic to investigate their career, whose findings can be used for both measuring the integration of forced migrants and identifying the structural opportunities and limitation for improvement of the housing conditions.

Secondly, having two cases for comparison can be mentioned as another limitation of the dissertation. Two cases provided enough information to reach the aim of the dissertation. However, future research focusing on different cases could

both test the findings of this dissertation and expand the similarities and differences between different regions.

Third, the housing problem is getting a bigger problem even for local people, as well. Residents cannot find affordable housing in the cities. The conflict between tenants and landlords is a very hot topic in Turkey. The state has started to use some intervention tools but its consequences are not observed yet. Therefore, more new research focusing on local people should be done in the future. There might be a comparison of the agency between local people and forced migrants.

Finally, on February 6, 2023, a massive earthquake struck, affecting numerous cities and resulting in a significant loss of life. Thousands of residences were either destroyed or rendered uninhabitable due to the earthquake. In addition to the sociological, psychological, economic, and ecological ramifications of this earthquake, the aftermath of such a catastrophic event that directly impacts the housing stock necessitates urgent investigation into the state of the housing market, the housing rights and experiences of the thousands left homeless. This study on the effect of international migration, as a disaster, on the housing market in cities can subsequently be compared with other disaster types such as earthquakes or floods that also influence housing markets. The importance of exploring these issues, to ensure everyone's ability to live in a humane and deserving manner, is evident. Moreover, these studies might serve as guiding principles for policymakers to undertake the necessary and appropriate interventions.

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