

A STUDY OF BELIEF CHANGE AND STABILITY WITH OPERATIONAL
CODE ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF ERDOGAN

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

Ihsan Dođramacı Bilkent University

by

İZEL EKİN ALPAY

In partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER of
ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĐRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

July 2021

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

--

Assoc. Prof. Özgür Özdamar

Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Assist. Prof. Fe Tokdemir

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Assoc. Prof. Nihat Ali Özcan
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Refet Gürkaynak

Director

ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF BELIEF CHANGE AND STABILITY WITH OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF ERDOGAN

Alpay, Ekin
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgür Özdamar
July 2021

Objectives. As the significance of a leader's beliefs in decision-making processes is widely acknowledged, how and when those beliefs change became important aspects in comprehending the foreign policy of a given country. I investigated whether Erdogan's beliefs changed in his 19 years of power over exogenous shocks. Informed by the Role Theory, I controlled for the impacts of Arab Spring and US-PYD Alliance as two time intervals. Method. I utilized Operational Code Analysis as an at-a-distance content analysis method. I examined Erdogan's foreign policy speeches between 2003-2021 and generated his operational code construct. Results. Findings suggest that Erdogan's beliefs somewhat changed over these two external events, although not in the way that theoretical framework of this study predicted. This limited change is measured as statistically significant change after US-PYD Alliance and tools of OCA supported this, demonstrating a leadership typology change. Conclusion. Events of Arab Spring and US-PYD Alliance had an impact on Erdogan's OCA belief system and the unfold of Turkish Foreign Policy in an altering manner. Role Theory applications are informative in pursuit of belief change.

Key Words: Operational Code Analysis, cognitive consistency, belief change, Turkish Foreign Policy, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

ÖZET

İNANÇLARDA DEĞİŞİM VE İSTİKRAR ÜZERİNE BİR OPERASYONEL KOD ANALİZİ ÇALIŞMASI: ERDOĞAN ÖRNEĞİ

Alpay, Ekin
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Danışmanı: Doçent Dr. Özgür Özdamar
Temmuz, 2021

Amaçlar. Dış Politika Analizi çalışmalarında liderlerin inançlarının karar verme süreçlerindeki önemi kabul edildikçe bu inançlar nasıl ve ne zaman değişir noktaları bir ülkenin dış politikasını anlamada mühim noktalar haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma 19 yıllık iktidarı süresinde Erdogan'ın inançlarının değişip değişmediğini araştırmıştır. Rol Teorisi yönlendirmesiyle Arap Baharı ve ABD-PYD ittifakı etkileri kontrol edilmiş iki dışsal şok olarak belirlenmiştir. *Metodoloji.* Uzaktan söylem analizi yöntemi olarak Operasyonel Kod Analizi kullanılmıştır. Erdogan'ın operasyonel kod yapısını oluşturmak için 2003-2021 yılları arası dış politika konuşmaları kullanılmıştır. *Sonuçlar.* Bu çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre, kullanılan teorik çerçevenin öngördüğü şekilde olmasa da Erdogan'ın dış politika inançları bir seviyede değişmiştir. Bu sınırlı değişim istatistiksel önem olarak ABD_PYD ittifakının ardından gerçekleşmiştir ve Operasyonel Kod Analizi araçları da liderlik tipi değişimi şeklinde bu sonucu desteklemektedir. *Netice.* Arap Baharı ve ABD-PYD ittifakı Erdogan'ın Operasyonel Kod inanç sistemi üzerinde ve Türk Dış Politikasının gelişiminde değiştirici bir etki göstermiştir. Rol Teorisi uygulamaları inanç değişikliği arayışında yönlendirici olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Operasyonel Kod Analizi, bilişsel istikrar, inanç değişikliği, Türk Dış Politikası, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my advisor Assoc. Prof. Özgür Özdamar for his endless encouragements, best guidance and tremendous patience with my anxiety levels similar to a sinus graph, every stage of my graduate studies at Bilkent University. With his humorous approaches to the problems and great support throughout the whole process, I have been able to write this thesis. From him, I learned how to keep my calm in the face of limitations and how to maintain my motivation and curiosity despite them. I believe what he taught me would always guide me throughout my graduate studies.

I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee Assoc. Prof. Nihat Ali Özcan and Assist. Prof. Efe Tokdemir for their constructive feedbacks and perspectives on my thesis. Also, I have learned many invaluable points from Efe Hoca throughout my time as his research assistance and I feel lucky to be able to work with him.

I am forever grateful for my parents Yasemin Yavuz, Kubilay Yavuz and Mustafa Alpay for their love, trust, encouragement and understanding throughout my whole life. I would like to thank them as they never stopped dreaming with me, never limited my ideals and always supported me in my endeavors. Their cheerful, and optimistic take on life is a muse and motivation for me. None of these would be possible without their love.

Last but not the least, there are two special people I am forever indebted. I would like to thank Işık Aksoy, my life support unit, for always being there for me through all the ups and downs, for believing in me in times even I did not, and for

never sparing her unmatched humor. She has not been only a friend, but a sister and she never ceased to support me. My gratitude also extends to Ekin Cengiz as he has been there with me from the day zero when all was a cloud of gas and dust. I am forever grateful for his never-ending challenging ideas, thought-provoking deep questions and most importantly his love and support throughout everything.

So long and thanks for all the fish.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
ÖZET.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	6
Importance of Beliefs	7
Cognitive Consistency and Belief Stability.....	8
Role Theory.....	13
Roles in Turkish Foreign Policy.....	20
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN..	26
Operational Code Analysis.....	27
Research Design.....	32
Hypotheses	36
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.....	43
Results	43
Discussion	59
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	64
REFERENCES.....	69
APPENDIX.....	78

LIST OF TABLES

1. Table 1. Holsti' Revised Typology	30
2. Table 2. Verbs in Context Belief Indices.	31
3. Table 3. Phases and Time Intervals.....	33
4. Table 4. Operational Code Indices of Norming Group and Erdogan	46
5. Table 5. Master Scores of Norming Group and Erdogan in Phases and General	48
6. Table 6. Norming Group and Erdogan According to Leadership Types	53
7. Table 7. Significance test results of Erdogan's belief scores.....	58

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Figure 1. Breuning's (2011) Role Theory as a Cognitive Model of the Agent– Structure Relationship	17
2. Figure 2. Neural Network Triology Model of Role Theory	19
3. Figure 3. Leadership Types of Norming Group and Erdogan's Phases and General	49
4. Figure 4. Erdogan's Self Typologies According to the Origin of Norming Group's P4a and I-1 values	54
5. Figure 5. Erdogan's Other Typologies According to the Origin of Norming Group's P-4b and P-1 values	55
6. Figure 6. Trendlines of Annual Master Belief Scores of Erdogan.....	52

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Do beliefs of a leader change? A question that has been under focus yet still remain relatively underexplored in the effort to understand foreign policy actions of states. Ever since actor-specific models proposed to put the individual to the center of bureaucratic decision making rather than systemic dynamics and calculations in an effort to abolish black-boxing of the state, comprehending decision-making mechanisms of a given leader has become of utmost significance. In this line of thinking, this question aims to un-black-box the individual as their motivations, perceptions are the main driving force behind a foreign policy decision. Beliefs are a large component in these cognitive explanans of foreign policies as the primary filters in the mind of a leader against the vast and highly complex reality they confront. Therefore, comprehension of beliefs is a helpful method of unpacking the foreign policy actions. Relatedly, whether these beliefs change and when they change are also informative points to make sense of the policy outcomes. As an extension of this approach, this thesis aims to answer the question that “*did Erdogan’s foreign policy beliefs change over his 19 years of power?*” over instrumentalizing his Operational Code indices.

The main approach to the belief change topic is dominated by the cognitive consistency theory which argues that beliefs of an individual are internally consistent. Since priorly existing beliefs of an individual are primary filters *visa vis* the reality, any incoming information or a novel situation cannot infiltrate through the belief system without passing by these lenses. When they pass through, they must be in conformity with the existing elements of the belief system because otherwise they would create a cognitive dissonance which is to be settled somehow by the individual since it would create a deep disturbance to the mind (Festinger, 1957). Furthermore, since beliefs are main determinants of incoming elements, they cannot be easily changed (Jervis, 1976) therefore, beliefs tend to maintain their temporal stability and internal coherence.

Very much structured on these premises, Operational Code Analysis argues that beliefs are hierarchically ordered as core and peripheral beliefs (George, 1969; Holsti, 1970). While peripheral beliefs are more prone to change, core beliefs tend to be stagnant as whole belief system depends on them in an deterministic manner. However, Renshon (2008) points out to a great portion of operational code studies in the literature provides findings of belief changes, mostly in core beliefs of philosophical beliefs. Although these prepare a foundation for studies on belief change, most of these works do not precisely focus on the theoretical framework of belief stability or cognitive consistency. While Renshon (2008) address this theoretical approach in his study of George W. Bush, there is still a vast gap in the literature on whether beliefs change and when they change. Therefore, it is important to search for these answers across different case applications and herein, this study examines the case of Erdogan in this line. Moreover, since Erdogan has been a leader who hold different offices as a central decision-making figure for a long period of

time now, the recent foreign policy events have been influenced by his preferences so have his mark over them. Hence, analyzing his operational code beliefs as well as when they changed is an important step to make sense of different periods of Turkish Foreign Policy after AKP and in general.

On the point of when beliefs change, there is again mixed argumentation. On the one hand, belief stability theories argues that “spectacular events” might trigger a belief change reaction (Jervis, 1976; Deutsch and Merritt, 1965). However, on the other hand, Tetlock (2005) argues that traumatic events or exogenous shocks justifies the existing beliefs of individual as the event was not predicted, individual is not responsible for integrating into their belief systems. In the face of these divergent results in the literature, this study predicts belief changes in Erdogan’s VICS indices over exogenous shocks, building upon the belief change finding in the OCA. Where to look for these path-changing exogenous shocks, Role Theory is an informative tool of this thesis.

According to role theory analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy, there are changes in traditionally attributed roles in TFP as they became more pro-active in essence around years of 2009-2010 when Arap Spring protests suddenly outset to change power dynamics in the region. Similarly, around October 2015 when the USA-PYD alliance came into being formally, these rather novel roles left their places to a precious loneliness in foreign policy orientations (Akbaba and Özdamar, 2019). Therefore, these events are taken to be the exogenous shocks, impacts of which to be examined and addressed in this study.

The tool to measure the belief change is Operational Code Analysis in this thesis which is an automated at-a-distance context analysis method operated through VICS (VerbsInContext System), formulated by Leites (1951) and refined by George

(1969). The software analyzes the speeches of leaders in terms of 10 VICS indices corresponding to 10 questions each representing a belief. Therefore, the unit of analysis of this study is foreign policy speeches of Erdogan ever since his election to Prime Ministry in 2002 to this day. One novelty this study offers is that for the first time Operational code Analysis is conducted in Turkish and Erdogan is studied through his speeches in his native language over OCA, for the first time. For the research design of this study, I formed three phases with two exogenous shocks separating them. The first phase is between 2003- December 2010; the second phase is between December 2010-October 2015 and the last phase is between October 2015-until present. However, I had to follow a different coding procedure than conventional one since there is a lack of available speech transcripts after 2014. In a standard procedure of coding each speech is analyzed in the software individually and the scores are aggregated. However, since the limited number of speeches I was able to gather did not produce meaningful results, I aggregated them on annual basis and obtained belief scores per year. Although aggregated data point does not facilitate conducting significance tests such as t-test or ANOVA my research design allowed me to apply t-test as a result of which I found statistically significant changes in two core beliefs (P-3 and P-4) of Erdogan in the shift to Phase-2 to Phase-3. Moreover, standard operational code analysis examinations also supported that there has been a belief change in Erdogan's operational code indices throughout all phases. Therefore, the results of this study supports that exogenous shocks can change beliefs of an individual without echoing impacts throughout the whole system.

In the overall, I deliver findings of this thesis in five chapters. Apart from this very chapter, in the Chapter 2, I provided the literature on cognitive consistency,

belief change and stability, also introducing the informative frameworks of role theory. In the Chapter 3, I explain the methodology of Operational Code with its development, various tools it offers such as typologies and its explanatory tools. Furthermore, in the light of the literature and OCA' theoretical approaches I present my hypothesis and describe their rationales as well as I elucidate the research design of this study in detail in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I delivered my results elaborating them in graphs and tables. Also, I provided the illustrated my findings in the Discussion subheading, in terms of what they could mean on themselves, how we could make sense of them in terms of Turkish Foreign Policy as well as testing my hypotheses. Lastly, in the Chapter 5, I summarize the literature and structure of this thesis along with the discussions on findings to conclude.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Accounting for most of the studies in International Relations, the scope of the discipline had been examined on the systemic level, taking the states as the unitary rational actors, which make their decisions and order their preferences in accordance with their utility maximization. As an alternative approach to rational actor models, cognitive approaches started to compliment the systemic picture that the grand theories of IR have drawn. These alternative approaches cross beyond the black boxing of the state and turn to decision-makers as the unit of analysis. What was once a novelty for the discipline, became an integrated part of it and recently as Kaarbo (2021) argues, research agenda of the scholars in this field shifted towards comprehending how perceptions, personality and cognition of leaders formulate the foreign policies of states, from justifying why leaders matter. The scope of my thesis instrumentalizes these cognitive approaches in an effort to understand belief change of a leader in foreign policy. In this chapter I will introduce the conceptualization of what a belief is, how and when it changes or if it ever does. Additionally, I will provide the literature on cognitive consistency theory that looks at belief stability and change, operational code analysis literature that provides several research outputs on the matter, role theory and Turkish foreign policy studies.

Importance of Beliefs

According to Rosati (2000), we humans are habitual creatures, looking for patterns in our cognition processes. In our pursuit of regularities throughout everyday life, we generate several beliefs and constructs (for instance images and schemas that are different than beliefs) regarding our physical and social environment. These beliefs and constructs assist us to understand the complex signals we receive from our outside world in a more structured and simplified manner (George, 1980). In this sense, as Lane and Knutson (as cited in Renshon, 2008) argue separately in their books, our beliefs function as the primary filters of our mind through which our perception processes function. Additionally, Renshon (2008) defines a belief, in the most basic way, as what we regard true, be it an assumption about how the world works or a proposition of causal relationships. Putting them all together, in this thesis I will take the conceptualization of belief as a primary filter that helps us make sense of the complex world around and as what we take to be true about the world.

While this definition indicates the fundamental function of beliefs assisting our mind to comprehend the chaotic reality in our surrounding, it also points out to that if the beliefs are primary filters of our perception processes, then any new input that goes through these filters must be in accordance with them. As Jervis (1976) puts it, the filters of pre-existing beliefs in human mind allow new information in a way that preserve the consistency of these beliefs. He argues that while confirming input is easily and correctly taken in and integrated into pre-existing beliefs, the contradicting information is simply dismissed. There are two outcomes from this vein of argument. First, people are necessarily theory driven, although varying in the extent, because the human information processing capacity is very much limited in

the face of the complexities of the outside world (Jervis, 2006). Therefore, people see in the outer world what they expect to see (Jervis, 2006).

All these points so far render study of beliefs very much significant for political decision-making since they all apply for the decision makers as well. In arguing so, leaders, or decision-makers employ their pre-existing beliefs in order to make sense of the ambiguities, lack of information or contradicting information, shocks or complexities of dynamics in political life. In this sense, similar to any human being, decision-makers also respond to their own subjective reality shaped by their beliefs and images of the situation rather than an objective one (Holsti, 1962, 1976; Tetlock 1998). However, linking beliefs of a leader to foreign policy actions in a simplistic manner is problematic as beliefs do not translate into actions and in turn are not executed right away mechanically (Holsti, 1976). Although a researcher has to be cautious building the relation between beliefs and foreign policy actions, it is still an effective way to understand what orients a decisionmaker in the face of an ever-changing complex reality, to make sense of the foreign policy of a state.

Second point that this line of thinking holds is that our belief systems tend to maintain temporal stability, since the incoming information is absorbed in a consistent manner with the pre-existing ones. This approach is formulated in the literature as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and it dominated the cognitive studies field for quite a long time in a paradigmatic way as well as study of beliefs in particular. In the next part I will illustrate into the premises of this theory.

Cognitive Consistency and Belief Stability

Before delving into the question of belief change, we must understand the concept of belief stability as it became a paradigm in the social psychology and

spilled into many subfields of psychology discipline as well as disciplines such as political science, economics, sociology and so on (Kruglanski, Jasko, Milyavsky, Chernikova, Weber, Pierro and di Santo, 2018). Changing the term inconsistency with dissonance, Festinger (1957) defines it as mismatching relations between cognitions, or if one cognitive element follows from the opposite of another (Gawronski, 2012). Furthermore, for inconsistency to exist between to these two elements, individual has to believe they both are true when one follows from the opposite of the other (Gawronski 2012; Gawronski and Strack, 2004).

However, Festinger (1957) suggests that maintaining this internal coherence of beliefs or cognitions is as vital as eating or breathing for humans because existence of dissonance in the human mind creates psychological disturbance. Hence, this discomfort motivates individual to reduce the dissonance. An instance of dissonance can be that a person under the pouring rain without any kind of a tent or umbrella would expect to get wet. If they happen to be in such situation and realize that they did not get wet, this creates a dissonance in the mind (Festinger, 1962). As a more politically contextualized example, people expect the countries they like to take actions they like, pursue same interests and adverse the same opponents, while they expect enemy countries to bring harm, cooperate with their opponents and challenge their interests (Jervis, 1976). While there are many studies in the literature focusing on strategies that human beings follow in order to keep the internal coherence intact (Festinger, 1957, 1962), it is also possible that individuals may not succeed in reducing the dissonance and the discomfort continues along with attempts to reduce it. In the face of all these, referring back to Jervis (1976, 2006), human mind, as theory driven as it is, allows new information into the belief system in a

consistent manner with the filters of pre-existing beliefs then alteration of these filters themselves do not seem to be an easy task in the cognitive processes.

According to Renshon (2008) along with internal coherence and therefore stability of beliefs, one of the main premises is that beliefs are interdependent in a hierarchical ordering. He suggests that beliefs are ordered in a continuum between core beliefs that are fundamentals of a belief systems and peripheral or auxiliary beliefs that are less important and fundamental. While periphery beliefs are more open to change, core ones are more resistant to it. Relatedly, due to the interdependence across belief system, once a core belief changes, peripherals have to follow suit to restore the internal consistency.

Based upon these premises of cognitive consistency approach Leites (1951) established Operational Code Analysis as a new method intended to study political beliefs of decisionmakers in Soviets and Politburo. Later on, George (1969) refined the method and formulated ten questions each targeting a belief. It is worth noting here that these beliefs do not aim to address all beliefs that impacts behavior of an individual, rather these beliefs are related to political decision-making processes. These questions asked to public speeches of leaders in the form of content analysis are divided as 'philosophical' and 'instrumental' questions. These two sets are regarded to be internally consistent, arguing that peripheral beliefs change along with core beliefs (George, 1969; Holsti, 1970). Recently, OCA studies are conducted through automated system of Verbs in Context System (VICS) (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998) as quantitative research. The details of this method will be elaborated in the following sections, at this point we must focus on how the output of these studies are related to belief change or stability. However, first we must clarify what change refers to. In my thesis, I will operationalize change in the way Renshon

(2008) does. According to him, we can capitulate on belief change in two veins, first any given belief can be reversed, or it can be reinforced, both of which are equally of importance to understand. For instance, the belief of ‘political world is friendly’ can be reinforced and become ‘political world is very friendly’ or it can be reversed and become ‘political world is conflictual or hostile’ (Ibid). While in the studies of the past change has been regarded as the magnitude of change calculated over statistical significance tests, this dimension introduced into change concept has been rather new (Ibid).

Despite its initial roots in the cognitive consistency theory, OCA studies produced rather odd results in the sense that while they do not dispose a generalizable pattern of change or stability in the belief scores, they also contradict the premises of cognitive consistency theory. The studies of OCA basically controlled the impact for two major elements: the impact of specific events as in foreign policy shocks or changes in the international structures such as end of the cold war or they controlled for longitudinal changes (Renshon, 2008). Before examining this literature, it is beneficial to note that only a small portion of these studies controlled for other potential causes of belief change. Furthermore, these works approach the belief change from a variety of theoretical frameworks, testing hypothesis of mostly IR theories. In this sense, this thesis borrows much from Renshon (2008) in bringing together this theoretical framework, although all other studies that indicates a belief change in the operational code system of leaders are worth mentioning as they create the empirical background on the matter.

According to Crichlow (1998), philosophical beliefs of Yitzhak and Rabin significantly changed between 1970s and 1990s as they both became more optimistic leaders from pessimistic ones. Malici and Malici (2005) controlled for the impact of

end of the cold war on Kim Il Sung and Fidel Castro and did not find any observable effect on the former while only a small effect on the latter (in terms of P-4 and I-5 scores). In terms of impacts of the events, President Jimmy Carter's operational code scores demonstrated a statistically significant decline after 1980 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in terms of his P1 and P2 scores indicating that he became a remarkably pessimistic and conflictual leader from 1977-1979 period to post-1980 (Walker, Schafer, Young, 1998). Similarly, President Lyndon Johnson showed decrease in P-4 score feeling less in control of historical discourse of events, increase in P-5 score giving more proportion to role of chance and an increase in I-3 becoming more risk avoidant (Walker and Schafer, 2000a). In the case of Mao Zedong, he displayed an even more hostile and confrontational disposition in terms of all philosophical indices after the Korean War (Feng, 2005a), exhibiting the reinforcement of prior beliefs. Similarly, Feng (2005b) studied four Chinese leaders (Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) in the crisis and non-crisis situations in their incumbent terms. According to the findings of this study, during a crisis Mao and Jiang's perception of political universe (P-1) became more hostile while Deng and Hu's did not. Mao and Deng attributed more control over historical events (P-4) to themselves while Jiang and Hu's self-attributions weakened.

In the light of all these studies, Renshon (2008) suggested that a belief change broadly happens on the philosophical beliefs, rather than instrumental beliefs. If the latter changes, it is of smaller magnitudes. However, it is contradictory to social psychology literature on belief change which argues that change hardly takes place in the central beliefs since any alteration here would result in a total change in the belief system, therefore, change mostly happens in the peripheries of the construct (Larson,

1994). Relatedly, Tetlock (as cited in Renshon, 2008) suggested that beliefs are ordered in a hierarchy of fundamental assumptions at the top, ‘strategic policy beliefs’ and tactical beliefs following respectively. He put forward that learning takes place at the bottom and beliefs of the higher level are relatively more resistant change. In this line of argument, we should have seen changes the most and the highest of magnitude in the instrumental beliefs level rather than philosophical beliefs.

In summary, there are two varying perspectives on belief change. On the one hand, cognitive dissonance approach argues that beliefs are internally consistent and novelties to belief systems are absorbed in a consonance with the pre-existing beliefs. On the other hand, operational code analysis literature, rooted in the very same cognitive literature, argues that beliefs are hierarchical and periphery beliefs change easier than the core ones. However, latter’ research output points out to a rather different results observing a change of magnitude in the core beliefs mostly. At this point, it is beneficial to clarify where to look for possible belief changes or belief stability in the case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. I will examine his incumbency in an eighteen-year continuum and where to put the reference points for belief change is informed by the role theory literature.

Role Theory

Role theory was originally recruited into the field of International Relations by Holsti (1970) in the form of national role conceptions (NRC). Fundamentally, they refer to a policymaker’ own conception and understanding of rules, decisions, actions that are most proper for their state and functions that their state should execute on a regular basis in the international or subregional systems (Holsti,1970).

Holsti (1970) defines these roles as the 'images' of proper orientation and behavior in the mind of the decisionmaker towards or in the external world and he originated seventeen roles and a role typology. These initially formulated roles are bastion of revolution- liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti- imperialist agent, defender of the faith, mediator- integrator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate, and protectee (Holsti, 1970). While a leader could have more than one role conception on his mind regarding the identity and stance of the state, these roles or conceptions turns into a state' foreign policy, in the simplest expression (Thies, 2009). For instance, Wish (1980) put forward a strongly correlated relationship between a leader's national role conception and their foreign policy behavior, forming long standing guidelines of behavior.

Regarding the variety of these roles, on the one hand, Sarbin and Allen (1968) suggests that the more roles a state have in its tool-set the better for its preparedness in international environment and state's capacity to tap on them to respond to novel conditions increase. However, role demands constrain choices of roles (Sarbin and Allen, 1968), they manage which role to tap onto in a specific situation (Thies, 2009). While on the other hand, enacting multiple roles are thought to cause the cognitive situation of *role strain*, as demand of different roles excess the resources of an individual (Goode,1960). According to Rosenau (1987), policymakers confront many types of strains from institutions, society, or role expectations from them. In these situations, they form role scenarios as action scripts assisting them which role to enact and these scripts can adapt and change overtime (Rosenau, 1987).

One advantage point of role theory application is that it can be implemented across levels of analysis (Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1979), in an interlinking manner between the most debated agent and structure. In this sense, role theory can be applied to both individuals as in leaders, group of decisionmakers and top officials or corporate entities (Walker, 1979; Thies, 2009). Barnett (1993) introduces three approaches to give ground for implementing theories for individual level to the state level analyses. Firstly, top officials of a state could be taken as the equivalent of the state. Second, the state could be taken as an institutional entity where the top officials convey the persistence of it. Third, state could be taken as a corporate being with a stable identity affiliation, which constructivist accounts of IR informed by Wendt (1999) touches upon, while the former two are widely instrumentalized by role theory literature. At this point, Thies (2009) suggests that as the research in role theory literature began with coding speeches of leaders for their NRCs, and these conceptions came to be regarded as role conceptions of the state, normally the level of analysis appears as the individual since individual beliefs come under examination. However, if the researcher includes variety of historical sources rather than coding speeches, then level of analysis can be smoothly taken as the state. In the light of all these, role theory draws our attention to cognitive backgrounds of it when it takes the individual as the decisionmaker to the connection point between the structure and the agent or the individual and state level analysis. Breuning (2011) explains one of the strengths of role theory as that it exhibits structure' delimiting effect on perception and behavior while in return agency has the vision and interpretation along with behavior to potentially transform the structure. However, he suggests that neither only structuralist explanations nor only agent-based approaches could comprehensively grasp the interaction between the decision makers and the

environment in which they try to operate (Breuning, 2011). In this sense, while the decisionmakers cannot be thought of as independent from the structure therefore their conceptions must resonate with the obligations of the international systems and structures, they also have roots in the national and domestic cultures and identities of their own societies (Hudson, 1999). Relatedly, Breuning (2011) suggests that role theory scholars agree with Wendt's (1987;1999) argument that agent and structure constitute each other although the mechanisms of this constitution are yet to be elaborated. However, role theory would display reservations against the structure-oriented explanations of constructivist accounts. Instead of placing the focus on the structuralist approaches only, Breuning (2011) posits that:

The national role conception framework places its emphasis there: it seeks to understand how actors' fashion their role in the international system, navigating between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as possible the obstacles imposed by their position in the international structure.

In this sense, a decisionmaker' national role conceptions draw on ideational factors of identity, cultural heritage and audience; and material factors of capabilities in terms of resources and opportunities in the international system. Between these two aspects, Breuning (2011) positions national role conceptions as a device as depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Breuning's (2011) Role Theory as a Cognitive Model of the Agent-Structure Relationship (retrieved from: Akbaba and Özdamar, 2019)

Before shifting our focus to the relationship between beliefs and role theory and how role theory is informing the belief change control points in this thesis, we must consider change and adaptation in role theory. Grossman (2005) pointed out to role theory as a convenient device to predict changes in state behavior. Relatedly, Gustavsson (1999) develops a model in order to understand behavior change in foreign policy and regards three factors as necessary: a change in the essential structure as the conditions, a crisis or strategic political leadership referring to decisionmakers reviewing national role conceptions in existence of the former two factors. While literature focuses on several possible causal factors of role change such as a change in the international system (Holsti, 1991), visa vis domestic factors (Rosenau, 1981). A branch in the literature focused on decision-makers (Gustavsson, 1999) and Grossman

(2005) analyzed directly national role conceptions while according to Breuning (2011) these conceptions of decisionmakers are only interpretations which do not have a direct impact on foreign policy behavior change.

Since individual' conceptions and related mental processes repeatedly appear to be at the crossroads in the role theory, it is very much in place to examine the relations between roles and beliefs, also connecting the two pillars of theoretical framework in this thesis. According to Walker (2021), instrumental and philosophical beliefs together form the operational code construct of an individual portraying exercise of social power between Self and Other; similarly, very same beliefs can also formulate the operational code of states as agents who convey their roles in international affairs in terms of exercise of social power between Ego (Role Conceptions-RX) and Alter (Role Expectations-RE). In this sense, RX and RE operate as the instrumental and philosophical beliefs in terms of prescriptive and diagnostic functions (Walker, 2021). However, in both levels, beliefs follow the same logic that they accumulate and come to exhibit the diagnostic and choice propensities of individual's relationship with the external world with other agents (Walker, 2021). Following the interactions between the individual and the world, social patterns of behavior occur and they are hypothesized to be coherent with cognitive belief patterns (Ibid). In addition to this point, logical structures in role theory can empirically go across different level of analysis from system-oriented, actor-oriented or action-oriented models. Because of this ability it provides, Walker (2021; 2016) places role theory between Ego and Alter as a theory to examine and understand foreign policy decisions of Ego and Alter.

According to Walker (2013), cognitions, emotions and motivations of an individual constitute the mechanisms of psychology employed to receive and process

the incoming information. Therefore, they are the internal boundaries of individual' responses to the environment, operating within the external boundaries that determine the possibilities for actions. This elaborates into the bounded rationality (Simon,1985) as the gap between individual cognitions from the studies of mind and collective decision making from political science. Operational code schemes utilize variety of mechanisms to illustrate this bounded rationality model (Walker, 2021). Figure 2 exhibits this bounded rationality model depicting the three networks that affects the decisions of an individual.




Figure 2. Neural Network Trilogy Model of Role Theory (retrieved from: Walker, 2021)

After reviewing stability and change in beliefs, the conceptualizations of interaction between the beliefs or operational code analysis in specific and role theory, we must turn to the literature of Turkish foreign policy in order to be able to understand the empirical background of my control points. In this context, I will bring together a literature that sets the theoretical framework for role theory and Turkish foreign policy applications, then its implications for my thesis will be elaborated.

Roles in Turkish Foreign Policy

As the observers highlights, Turkish foreign policy has never been out of exceptional situations or ups and downs, considering the conflict-bound nature of the regions across which she is situated. In the face of this rather turbulent discourse of events, historically Turkish state-elite or foreign policy decision-makers followed passivist isolationist and strongly pro-Western blueprints in foreign affairs, which have historical roots that can be traced back to the foundation of the republic. However, according to scholars, this traditional stance of Turkey began to change with the start of AKP (Justice and Development Party) coming to power in 2002.

Setting aside the exceptional cases, in fact Özal tenure in presidential office starting in 1983 after the coup demonstrated the signs of bifurcating from traditional roles in foreign policy (Aras and Görener, 2010). Although Özal period falls out of scope of my thesis, some of the roles enacted in the AKP era have their roots from this term (Ibid). For instance, Özal visibly diverged from highly heeded Western orientation followed by republican elite and laid the foundations of economic and political foundations of cooperation with the neighboring regions tapping into a dynamism rhetoric that is in contrary to the passivist approach of conventional understanding of former state elite. Relatedly, two most enacted roles of Özal period that outstand is *regional leader* and *bridge* (Aras and Görener, 2010).

To grasp a better understanding of what has changed with the AKP period towards MENA, we must examine the traditional roles that were employed in the region up until 2002. During Cold War years in general, Turkey, as a NATO ally, was mostly referred as a bastion or a buffer state that finds the balance between the West and the Soviets due to her hostility avoidant stance in a variety of regional turmoil (Akbaba and Özdamar, 2019). According to Özdamar (2016), until 2002 MENA policies of Turkey were traditionally marked by three main roles: “defender

of peace and stability,” “regional system collaborator,” and “global system collaborator”. Firstly, defender of peace and stability role applies when a country takes the responsibility of protecting universally intact peace and stability. This has been the Turkish policy makers’ self-perception of Turkey in the MENA and for instance Turkey was referred as an “island of stability” by Turkish policy makers since 1997 (Özdamar, Halistoprak and Sula 2014). Global system collaborator role applies when a state adheres to international agreements, norms and rules actively and Turkey’s continuous engagement with the UN, related bodies and other entities exhibits an indication for this role (Akbaba and Özdamar, 2019). Lastly, regional subsystem collaborator role applies when a country undertakes efforts to establish regional cooperation mechanism (Holsti, 1970) and Turkey’s historical endeavors in regional foundations such as Balkan Pact or Black Economic Cooperation indicates this role (Özdamar, 2016). In addition, “mediator” and “facilitator” are also two rather recent roles that emerged in Turkey’s engagement fashion with the MENA, although the former must be personally adopted by the leader of the country. Mediator role applies when a country continually adopts the duty of accommodating the differences between opposing sides.

In 2002, the AKP government won the power with the rhetoric of being conservative democrats locating the party in the center of the political pendulum. After AKP came to power, moderate modifications of pre-existing roles started in repeatedly enacted and mentioned “bridge” role. While it used to refer to the country as being at the crossroads of different regions as a key meeting point, AKP decision-makers attributed a new dimension to it referring to a metaphorical bridge in the midst of civilizations, namely as in West and Islam, as well as assuming the task of representation of the latter (Yanık, 2009). Apart from these alterations in already

existing roles, according to Özdamar (2016), the AKP governments until 2008-9 under differing state elites generally displayed and adhered to the traditional three roles in the MENA region, namely “defender of peace and stability,” “regional system collaborator,” and “global system collaborator”.

In the period after 2009, particularly with the eruption of Gaza War in December 2008 and Ahmet Davutoglu acquiring the office of Foreign Affairs Minister, Turkish foreign policy started shift in the region. However, what immensely impacted the role conceptions of the Turkish policymakers and triggered a visible behavior change towards the region was Arab uprisings that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia and influenced the whole region ever since. In this fluctuating context, Turkish authorities had to revise the existing roles of the state and diversified the toolkit in this sense. Some of the newly added roles are “regional leader,” protector of the oppressed,” “leader of the Muslim world,” “rule maker,” and “central country” (Ozdamar, 2016). These new roles diverged from the traditionally ascribed conceptions in their assertive and hard power-oriented nature (Akbaba and Ozdamar, 2019).

As the power vacuum started to spill over the region, Turkish policymakers contemplated a Muslim Brotherhood influenced reconstruction of order in the region, which would support Turkish leadership. This vision depicted the policymakers’ assumption of a regional leadership role (Akbaba and Ozdamar, 2019). In addition, Turkey tried to ascribe the role of “protector of the oppressed” as she accepted approximately 4 million Syrian refugees ever since the start of the Syrian civil war (<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/unhcr-turkey-stats>), and legitimize involvement in the Syrian civil war on this role (Akbaba, and Ozdamar, 2019). Building on these two roles, the government established a new role of “leader of the Muslim world” (Ibid).

Certainly, we have to acknowledge the role of the elite change in these shifts in the national role conceptions. Since Davutoğlu became the minister of foreign affairs and then prime minister, enactment of his Strategic Depth doctrine in which he envisioned Turkey to be a central actor in the world tapping into the Ottoman legacy of historical and geographical depth (Davutoğlu, 2000; see also Murinson, 2006). In the light of all these, I place a time interval in the eighteen years of AKP rule time continuum to control for a belief change in December 2010 when Arab uprisings began for two reasons. First, as it broke out as a crisis and its spillover effects were of high magnitude in an unexpected fashion, I consider this as a foreign policy shock in the discourse of events. In a combination with this, considering that the cognitive consistency and operational code literatures also highlight the possible impacts of shocks, I believe this date constitutes an empirically and theoretically informed checkpoint. Second, since role theory literature clearly argues that there had been a change in the national role conceptions of policymakers as a shock starting at this point, and as the cognitive consistency and operational code literatures also highlight the possible impacts of shocks, I will trace these role changes in the form of a belief change in the operational code construct of the central decision-maker Erdogan.

For the second time interval, I will turn to Turkish foreign policy literature, although the role theory applications have not covered this part yet, my starting point is still informed by the very same line of thinking. After Turkey got heavily engaged in the civil war enacted several of the aforementioned new national role conceptions, the rift between the US and Turkey deepened over the Kurdish question. With the emergence of PYD as de facto authority in the Northern Syria, historical security concerns of Turkey rooted in the ongoing clash with the PKK in the eastern regions.

In addition, Obama administration decided not to get heavily involved in the civil war with bitter memories of implications of Iraq war but rather operate with proxy forces on the ground, which turned out to be PYD/YPG forces. Particularly after 2014 Kobane attacks and subsequent response of the US-led coalition in the fight against ISIS proved influential both for the defeat of ISIS and for the US-PYD alliance under the name of Syrian Democratic Forces, with inclusion of several other forces. However, this cooperation between the two actors seriously threatened Turkish security interests and intended goals in the region, as well as drifting the two historical allies apart. At this point, according to Hale (2019), in autumn 2015 with the defeat of ISIS, Turkey had to confront with the fact that her closest ally in the NATO is cooperating with an organization that is a threat to her territorial integrity. Combining these material developments on the ground with a more cognitive perspective, a debate regarding Turkey becoming a lonely country in the region due to its support for Muslim Brotherhood was entertained in the media. In the face of this debate, Ibrahim Kalin, chief advisor to the prime minister back then, stated in August 2013 that Turkey is not alone in the MENA region, but even if so, then it is a precious loneliness (<https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/10/turkey-perilous-loneliness-turkey-middle-east.html>). Although it is yet to be comprehensively explored with role theory tools, it is still important examined in the scope of this thesis because this precious loneliness rhetoric could be argued to be put into action when Turkey began to unilaterally operate on her Syrian border in 2016 with Operation Euphrates Shield and continued in this manner henceforth. Relatedly, this quarrel between the US and Turkey could be considered as a shock in the Turkish foreign policy under the AKP as its ramifications have been of huge magnitude and it is followed by a visibly change of course in the policies towards the region. Thus, I

put the second time interval in October 2015 when Syrian Democratic Forces were found and funded by the US officially.

Having set the theoretical framework of my thesis within cognitive consistency, operational code analysis, role and theory and Turkish foreign policy literatures, in the next chapter I will illustrate into my methodology and research design.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Do the foreign policy beliefs of leaders change? Did Erdogan's beliefs change during his term in power? The answers to these central questions I ask in my thesis requires application of a classical method that is Operational Code Analysis in order to depict foreign policy belief system of a given leader. In this chapter, I will elaborate into the development, theory and fundamental elements of this method. Additionally, I will explain the research design of this study explaining the case selection, speech collection and resources, coding and generating the operational code construct along with how to observe possible changes in components as belief scores. Lastly, I will formulate hypothesis to be tested in this thesis according to the belief scores I acquire.

Operational Code Analysis

Operational Code Analysis employs an at-a-distance method as it depends on coding of leaders' public speeches into belief scores through content analysis. Therefore, this establishes a causal link between the leaders' foreign policy beliefs expressed in the speeches and the foreign policy decisions (George 1969, Walker 1983). It is very much in place to examine this approach in the psychological paradigm as the main concern is leaders' diagnosis of political world and tendencies

towards choosing conflict or cooperation in this very universe. (Walker, Schafer, Young 1998)

Studies of operational code analysis began with Nathan Leites' two pioneering work on Politburo in order to understand the decision-making style of Soviets, namely Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and A Study of Bolshevism (1953). Coining the term operational code, he employed social psychological approaches to depict the worldview, decision-making templates and unusual bargaining behavior of Soviets. However, this line of research was not drawn upon for nearly a decade due to variety of other thriving content analysis methods until Alexander L. George (1969) embarked on it. In his examination of these early works, George (1969) refined the approach of Leites as it was very much complex. In this respect, George removed the operational code construct from Leites's rather psychoanalytic account specified to the study of Bolshevism so that political scientist could also explore and contribute to the method with the data and methods they have at their disposal (George, 1969). As a result, George (1969) formulated the works of Leites into ten questions and generated scores for each of these questions stand for a certain belief in the construct. This formulation only includes beliefs that are taken to be effective in political decision making, rather than all beliefs that possibly affect the behavior of an individual. The series of questions that were generated by George (1969) are as follows:

Philosophical Questions

P-1. What is the 'essential' nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4. How much 'control' or 'mastery' can one have over historical development?

What is one's role in 'moving' and 'shaping' history in the desired direction?

P-5. What is the role of 'chance' in human affairs and historical development?

Instrumental Questions

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4. What is the best 'timing' of action to advance one's interests?

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?

The question set comes in two categories of philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Answers to philosophical questions express the beliefs towards the perception of the political Other along with the essential nature of the political universe. Answers to instrumental questions, on the other hand, depict the perception of the Self in the political universe, and the best strategic orientations to employ (as in cooperative or conflictual tactics to obtain desired outcomes). Furthermore, the construction of the question set follows the very same line of thinking in the cognitive consistency theory in the sense that a given belief system is consistent in itself and the components are logically consistent with each other. Therefore, P-1 (the essential nature of the political universe and the fundamental characteristic of the political opponents), P-4 (attribution of control over historical events to Self or

Other) and I-1 (Self's own orientation towards strategies) are taken to be the master beliefs of the system. Relatedly, other indices of the rest of the beliefs in the operational code construct are derived from these master beliefs.

Drawing upon these three master beliefs, Holsti (1977) formulated a leadership typology over the George' (1969) question set. The initial typology employed six different leadership types, A, B, C, D, E, F. Later on, Walker (1983) refined this original work and proposed a typology with four types A, B, C, DEF. In this typology, the optimists A, B and C, who see the conflict as temporary, differ in their perception of the source of the conflict. A Type sees the source as the incorrect interpretations of the individuals, B Type sees the source as societal institutions, while the C Type argues that the anarchic nature of the political universe. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998). In contrast, pessimist types of DEF, who see the conflict as permanent, are not necessarily diversified because the rest of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of these leaders do not differ in a meaningful way (Walker, 1983). The details of the revised typology are introduced in the Table 1.

TYPE A	TYPE C
<p><i>Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit</i> Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A 'conflict spiral,' based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that</p>	<p><i>Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit</i> Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical the state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed because predictability and control over historical development are low under anarchy. Instrumental: Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever</p>

<p>establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.</p> <p>TYPE D-E-F Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Instrumental: Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.</p>	<p>possible. Resources other than military capabilities are useful.</p> <p>TYPE B Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding the realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.</p>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 1. Holsti' revised typology (Walker 1983).

Initially researchers conducted their studies in Operational Code Analysis with a hand-coding method for each public speech of each leader, making the studies more qualitative. However, recently the research in this branch became much more quantitative with the introduction of VICS, Verbs in Context System (Walker et. al. 1998). As the method became automated over the ProfilerPlus software, now we are able to produce more replicable and systematic results at-a-distance by analyzing the speeches of leaders. Moreover, we can now make cross-comparisons among different subjects and because of the standardized statistical analysis we can make probabilistic generalizations (Schafer and Walker 2006b). As this methodological tool provided a more standardized procedure for the research, we can now determine patterns and regularities in the foreign policy beliefs of the leaders. Furthermore, we are able to draw inferences from leaders' operational code typology about their Self and Other preferences towards settlement, deadlock, domination and submission (Walker et al, 1998). Relatedly, we are able to compare the master beliefs of leaders to the scores of a norming group of world leaders' speeches composed of 164 coded

speeches (Malici and Buckner, 2008). This enables us to make predictions on the tendency of a given leader towards conflictual or cooperative strategies (Walker, Malici and Schafer, 2011).

P-1	Essential Nature of the Political Universe (harmonious or conflictual)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2	Realization of Political Values	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4	Control over Historical Developments	Self (P-4a) or Other (P-4b) Attributions divided by [Self plus Other Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low self-control
P-5	Role of Chance	1 minus [Political Future×Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role
I-1	Strategic Orientations	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2	Methods of Pursuing Goals	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3	Risk Orientation	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self-Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4	Timing of Action a. Cooperative or Conflictual b. Word or Deeds	1 minus Absolute Value [%X Minus %Y Self Attributions] a. Where X = Coop and Y = Conf Where X = Word and Y = Deed	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity

I-5	Utility of Other Means	Percentages for exercise of power; Categories a to f	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward	a's frequency divided by total	
	b. Promise	b's frequency divided by total	
	c. Appeal/Support	c's frequency divided by total	
	d. Oppose/Resist	d's frequency divided by total	
	e. Threaten	e's frequency divided by total	
	f. Punish	f's frequency divided by total	

Table 2. Verbs in Context Belief Indices. (Walker et al., 1998)

Research Design

In this thesis, I utilize the ProfilerPlus software to analyze the selected speeches of Erdogan. This is an automated content analysis software accessed through VICS (Verbs in Context System) that generates the belief constructs by coding the verbs used in the selected speeches. These resulting constructs are composed of indices each responding to ten questions of George's operational code construct. This way researchers can assess a given leader's beliefs in the foreign policy in terms of control attributions to Self or Other and approaches to political universe. Additionally, since all the selected speeches are coded through VICS, this automated system enables us to attain a greater reliability compared to hand-coding along with enabling the researcher to compare the scores of any given leader to those of a norming group since both sets of beliefs are generated through the same system (Schafer and Walker, 2006a).

In this study, the unit of analysis is the public speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The reason why he is the case of this study is that Erdogan has been one of the main political figures in the last eighteen years of Turkish politics. Although his initial struggle with the institutional forces continues in a rather lighter manner since such forces are systematically weakened lately, he has been a central decision-making figure in the foreign policy of Turkey. In this sense, making sense of recent Turkish foreign policy cannot be whole without making sense of Erdogan and his belief systems. Herein, this study is an endeavor to make sense of the Turkish foreign policy of last almost two decades over understanding one of the main policymakers in it.

Time span of the selected speeches cover his tenures as Prime Minister (2003-2014) and President (2014 to present) therefore the temporal limits of this study are 2003-2021. Furthermore, I placed two time intervals to certain foreign policy shocks that occurred during this whole period where Erdogan has been in power. First time interval is on December 2010, the beginning of the Arab Spring and the second one is on the US' official financial support for the Syrian Democratic Forces. Thus, I divided this duration into three phases. As depicted in the Table 3 below, first phase (2003-December 2010) starts with his election to Prime Ministry and ends with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in December 2010. Phase 2 (December 2010 to October 2015) is between the outbreak of Arab Spring and the US officially funding the Syrian Democratic Forces. Phase 3 (October 2015 until 2021) starts with the conflict with the US over SDF forces in 2015 and comes until now.

Phases	Time Intervals
1. From election to Prime Ministry to the Outbreak of Arab Spring	2003 to December 2010
2. Beginning of the Arab Spring to official funding of SDF by the US	December 2010 to October 2015
3. Start of the clash of interest with the US over Kurdish forces until now	October 2015 to 2021

Table 3. Phases and Time Intervals

I gathered the transcript of speeches between 2014-2021 from the official website of Presidency of Turkish Republic (<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/konusmalar/>). Those speeches between 2003 to 2011 are collected from the library of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) by getting a special permission as an outside researcher. The latter were gathered as books and they were only offered in the form of scanned copies, therefore I typed each speech one by one in required format of ProfilerPlus software (UTF-8). At this point, this study offers a novelty in terms of language preferences. The speeches utilized in this study are deliberately selected from Turkish transcripts in order to run the analysis in Turkish via VICS. While the previous operational code studies on Erdogan were conducted over English transcripts, this one provides his foreign policy belief score over his native language for the first time.

In terms of speech selection, I followed four criteria: “(1) the subject and the object are international in scope; (2) the focus of the interaction is a political issue; (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflictual” (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998); and (4) the minimum number of words in a text to be coded must be at least

fifteen (Schafer and Walker, 2006a). In the light of these frameworks, I coded 118 speeches for a total of 19 years of Erdogan in power (2003-2021). Breakdown of these speeches into phases are as follows: 32 speeches for Phase-1, 17 speeches for Phase-2 and 85 speeches for Phase-3. As seen, number of speeches coded for each year and each phase is not equal or close due to data availability problems.

Moreover, due to the requirement of meeting these four criteria, I had to eliminate some of the available speeches as for instance a speech about domestic elections would serve no use for the scope of this study. Therefore, along with availability, propriety factor also resulted in the uneven number of coded speeches and they set the limitations of this study.

Due to the very much same reason, I had to follow a different procedure while coding the speeches. Ordinary procedure is coding speeches one by one and obtaining mean scores of each speech while generating score tables. However, since available and suitable speeches for each year differs, available resources for some of the years were either too short or very few. Thus, short speeches do not provide enough transitive verbs for the software to generate a meaningful score, rather creating undefined scores. In this context, I applied the method suggest by Schafer and Walker (2006b, p.44) that is creating data points by aggregating data. In this procedure, I gathered all the speeches on annual basis and received annually aggregated scores from the software. I followed the norm of annual aggregation because the conventional method of coding speeches one by one delivered undefined scores in an irregular manner. While I received undefined scores for each year, some of them were in philosophical beliefs only and some were in instrumental, while some speech scores were undefined in total. Because of this irregularity, the most convenient method to aggregate the speech score was the annual basis. Hence, in

order to set a standard summing rule, I gathered the speeches on annual basis. However, since I achieved one score for one year, summed scores as Schafer and Walker (2006b) refers, rather than several scores coming from the speeches individually, calculating variance through t-test or ANOVA are not suitable (Schafer and Walker, 2006b). However, although my research design allows to conduct a t-test among the annually aggregated scores as I have several annual observations per each indice, these are not enough to solely rely on to generate meaningful results. Since the data set at my disposal would be a narrow one, variance among indices cannot be reasonably high. However, it is still possible to conduct t-test and even find significant changes between Phase-2 and Phase-3 to be illustrated in the next chapter. Therefore, I will analyze my results in the framework of belief change and stability over standard Operational Code Analysis tools for instance quadrant predictions in the Holsti (1977) typology, examining the raw scores directly in a complimentary manner and comparing the Self and Other scores of Erdogan with those of the norming group.

Hypotheses

The theoretical framework summarized in the previous chapter does not assist a researcher to form hypotheses in a certain direction because of the disagreements on stability and change along with mixed results provided by existent studies. Hence, I will seek assistance from political psychology, Role Theory, Turkish Foreign Policy and Operational Code Analysis theory and practices altogether in formulating the hypotheses. Furthermore, research design and resource availabilities also inform formulation of my hypotheses since the extent of available observations at my disposal was not enough to run certain tests, I deliver my analyses more in the

framework of standard Operational Code Analysis. In this context my hypotheses are as follow:

Hypothesis 1a. There will be a shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase 1 to Phase 2 to be observed in the leadership type (Holsti, 1977) and related quadrant change.

Hypothesis 1b. There will be a shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase 2 to Phase 3 to be observed in the leadership type (Holsti,1977) and related quadrant change.

Rationale: These two hypotheses mainly address the impacts of designated exogenous shocks as in unexpected events with high magnitude effects. Political and social psychology literature is divided on this topic. On the one hand, one group of social psychologists suggest that beliefs can change as a result of exceptional occurings (Jervis, 1976; Deutsch and Merritt 1965). While they abide by the belief stability argument, they propose that once the change happens, it happens in a comprehensive extent throughout several elements of a belief system. While another group suggests that exogenous shocks motivate an individual to defend the existing belief systems and intensify the already existent beliefs (Tetlock, 2005).

In the face of these mixed argumentation, Role Theory, in a modest way, reinforce both these lines of thoughts suggesting that a new situation can strengthen an existing role or the actor can learn a new one. However, Role Theory studies focusing on Turkey particularly found that Turkey adopted a new set of roles after Gaza War in 2009 and Arab Spring in 2010. (Ozdamar, 2016; Akbaba and Ozdamar 2019). Therefore, if these time interval events changed roles, we can expect to see changes in the master belief scores of Erdogan thereafter in terms of Hypothesis 1a.

For Hypothesis 1b, although the second time interval to and the following period remains understudied so far, previous findings can inform our predictions for this period as well. Therefore, we can expect a belief change after another exogenous shock in the foreign policy. Furthermore, according to Turkish foreign policy literature, an observable loneliness in consciously increased unilateral cross-border operations expressed as “precious loneliness” by İbrahim Kalin, support this argumentation. Overall, a shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan can be expected at both of these time intervals. These shifts are to be observed in the leadership types of Erdogan in Holsti (1977)’s typology and their related demonstration in the quadrants.

Hypothesis 2. The directionality of the shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase-1 to Phase-2 will be

- a. in a friendlier and more optimistic way in his P-1 belief.
- b. in a more hostile way in his I-1 belief.
- c. in a direction that attains less control of historical developments to Self in his P-4 belief.

Rationale: Regarding the directionality of this predicted shifts in the master beliefs of Erdogan, the literature of Turkish Foreign Policy will be the informing factor. Prior to the start of the Arab Spring, Turkish Foreign Policy was marked by an increasing engagement and dialogue with the MENA region. This observably increasing activism was performed through soft power instruments. Therefore, when the protests erupted, policymakers of TFP oscillated between an ethical stand to support the democratic demands of the masses and the self-interested motives (Öniş, 2012). Nevertheless, Erdogan and the front-runner policymakers of the time vocally

welcomed and supported the democratic demands of the masses, calling all the authoritarian regime leaders to step down (Başkan, 2018). As a consequence of this welcoming and positive rhetoric towards the newly developing crisis, in Hypothesis 2a, I expect the P-1 score of Erdogan to shift in a more friendly direction, indicating that he saw a more harmonious political universe out there.

On the other hand, the nature of these engagement tools of zero problem with neighbors rhetoric have been argued to be mostly in the form of economic and trade relations, which led to the categorization of Turkey as a trading state (Kirişçi, 2009). In a complementary manner, many studies showed how the economic relations were a defining dimension in Turkey's relations with the region (Tür, 2011; Müftüler-Baç 2014). However, after the outbreak of the crisis, especially the spread of protests to Syria a short while after the eruption, Özpek and Demirağ (2014), suggests a switch back to hard power instruments in Turkish Foreign Policy in the form of multilateral military interventions. Similarly, Ayata, (2015) makes the similar observation that Turkey appealed to more interventionist and confrontational reactions after protests turned into civil war in Syria, in direct opposition to the approach to Libya, Egypt or Yemen. Furthermore, according to Aydın-Çakır and Akdağ (2016), while the relations with the MENA peaked in the year of 2010 in the form of bilateral relations, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring they started to drastically decrease. Alongside those, Oğuzlu (2016) argues that Turkey started to combine soft power tools with hard power ones when engaging with the regional conflicts in an effort to create a more Turkey-friendly region. In account of these studies of Turkish Foreign Policy orientations, in the Hypothesis 2b, I expect to see a shift in the I-1 belief of Erdogan in a more hostile way as the strategic propensities demonstrate a more conflictual tendency.

Hypothesis 3 The directionality of the shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase-2 to Phase-3 will be

- a. in a more conflictual and hostile way in P-1 and I-1 belief.
- b. in a direction that attains less control of historical developments to Self in his P-4 belief.

Rationale: With the withdrawal of the US from active intervention after the defeat of ISIS, avoiding boots on the ground policies and allocating fighting capacity to proxies namely Kurdish SDF, the structure of the conflict changed for Turkey. Since Kurdish forces gaining power and autonomy in the region was the traditional concern of Turkish Foreign Policy, a traditional ally announcing open support for such groups rather than a NATO ally posed a serious problem for Turkish perceptions. While political relations strained with the US in the aftermath, Turkey's response to the civil war in Syria became more unilaterally interventionist with cross-border operations. In this sense, this was a deeply powerful shock since it did not only change the power structure in the region but also the directionality in the Turkish Foreign Policy, as well. Therefore, in explanation of Hypothesis 3a, I expect to see a shift in the strategic propensities reflected in the I-1 belief to shift in a more hostile manner since Turkish Foreign Policy becomes more hard-power oriented. Similarly, I expect to see the impacts of this exogenous shock on P-1 belief of Erdogan in terms of a more conflictual outlook towards the political Other.

Regarding Hypothesis 2c and 3b, Ozdamar (2017) examines the operational codes of three original Islamist and three Neo-Islamist leaders, and he categorizes Erdogan in the latter. One of his main findings suggest that while all 5 leaders have a very low attribution of sense of control to the Self, while Erdogan has a relatively

higher sense of mastery with a medium level of attribution to the Self. However, he argues that because of the political penetration of Western powers into the region historically, Islamist leaders have a lower sense of control over events compared to other world leaders. Therefore, in the face of these exogenous shocks which invited a remarkable extent of Western power intervention to the region, I expect Erdogan to display a decreasing attribution of historical control to the Self between phases.

Hypothesis 4. Any statistical change between the Phases, if at all, would occur mostly in the philosophical beliefs rather than instrumental beliefs.

Rationale: As explained in the Research Design subchapter above, because of the insufficient data, I aggregated the data at my disposal. While this design allows for conducting t-test as a significance test, because of the limited observations I do not expect a meaningful result. However, if I happen to observe a statistical significance as a result of t-test, I expect to see it in the philosophical beliefs of Erdogan. In fact, a disagreement in the literature is again valid at this point. While the social psychology literature tends to suggest that belief systems are mostly stable and when change occurs, it occurs in the peripheral beliefs rather than the cores. However, on the other hand, Renshon (2008) observes that Operational Code Analysis studies found belief change in the philosophical beliefs (regarded as the core beliefs) mostly rather than instrumental beliefs (regarded as the peripheral beliefs). On the same terrain of thought, as the same method is applied herein, I expect to see a statistically significant change in the philosophical beliefs.

In the next chapter, I deliver the operational code construct of Erdogan and address the results of my research in the framework of belief change, belief stability and role theory. Additionally, I assess the hypotheses of my research in the light of the results of ProfilerPlus.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I present the results of my study in detail and explain what they could mean in terms of belief change, belief stability and role theory in the case of Erdogan under the impact of exogenous shocks and accompanying role changes. Additionally, I will address what these results indicate about Erdogan in general when juxtaposed with the scores of norming group of world leaders. In the Discussion Section, I will discuss the validity of my hypotheses within the framework of my results.

Results

After coding 118 speeches in total, the results I obtained suggests intriguing and counterintuitive perspectives at several points. Table 4 Below represents the operational code constructs of norming group, Erdogan's general scores and scores of three phases I highlighted in the previous chapters. Before introducing the significance test scores and testing the hypotheses, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from the raw data itself.

In illustrations of the data below in Table 4 and Table 5, VICS scores of three masters beliefs vary between +1.0 and -1.0. While as the scores get closer to +1, P-1 scores get more friendlier, P-4 scores yield perception of higher control over historical events and I-1 scores indicate a more cooperative orientation in strategies.

Consequently, as the scores get closer to -1.0, what the scores suggest turns more negative in meaning. One point in this regard is that there is an observable trend in the master scores (P-1, P-4 and I-1) of Erdogan in all of the phases and in general scores. In terms of his P-1 scores indicating his perception of essential nature of the political universe, all his scores have negative values. This draws a conflictual profile for him in the sense that his understanding of the political nature is hostile in general and in all the designated periods of his terms in power. An interesting result here is that the most conflictual P-1 score comes from the Phase-1, his earlier terms in office. This coincides with the inception of AKP governments' endeavors to be accepted to the European Union when Turkey strived to demonstrate a more cooperative profile and took many initiatives in the accession process. In the following phases, his scores become less conflictual and relatively more optimistic but remain under zero, maintaining his hostile position.

Similarly, P-4 values suggest a general trend in the sense that all values are always above zero indicating a generally higher sense of historical control over events. As his highest P-4 score is attained in the Phase-3, after a slight decrease from Phase-1 to Phase-2, might indicate that his confidence in Self's control capacity increased in his later years in office because of learning he experienced throughout the years. However, in general it can be argued that he has been a leader who attributed a middle level of control to Self. This trend continued in regard with the I-1 scores as well. While his I-1 scores remained in positive values, indicating a relatively more cooperative approach to best strategies to attaining goals, these scores followed a declining fashion. His most cooperative orientation was performed in the Phase-1 and this approach gradually turned more hostile as his lowest score is

in the last phase and Erdogan becomes a less cooperative leader with his coercive methods throughout his terms.

This steady fall in the I-1 indices is in fact an important result of this study since the impact of this decrease can be argued to be observed in the Turkish foreign policy in recent years. As the strategic orientations of Erdogan became hostile, unilateral operations of Turkey increased, especially in the MENA region, compared to the dialogue-oriented approaches in the earlier terms. Very much on the same line of argumentation, one component of the increase in Self's control over historical events from Phase-2 to Phase-3 can be argued to be these proactive approach in the immediate region. These results could point out to those implications of changes in the master belief indices of Erdogan can be traced in the Turkish foreign policy in synchronicity. Building on this, strained ties with the US can also be a contributing factor to the decrease in the P-1 indices from Phase 2 to Phase 3 as the state of affairs challenged Erdogan to his roots. Consequently, this structural challenge might have affected his perception of political universe in a more pessimistic manner.

	Norming Group	Phase-1	Phase-2	Phase-3	General
P-1 Nature of Political Universe (conflict/cooperation)	0,301	-0,5108	-0,2171	-0,2551	-0,3752
P-2 Realization of Political Values	0,147	-0,5644	-0,3655	-0,3593	-0,4572
P-3 Predictability of Political Future	0,134	0,3867	0,2347	0,1745	0,2815

P-4 Historical Development (low control/high control)	0,224	0,5142	0,4091	0,5636	0,5141
P-5 Role of Chance	0,968	0,7797	0,9052	0,9019	0,8471
I-1 Strategic Approach to Goals (conflict/cooperation)	0,401	0,1968	0,1143	0,0203	0,1198
I-2 Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0,178	-0,1709	-0,2005	-0,2660	-0,2077
I-3 Risk Orientation	0,332	0,5146	0,2941	0,2823	0,3889
I-4 Timing of Action	0,503	0,6492	0,8857	0,9433	0,7914
a. Coop. /Conflict					
b. Words/Deeds	0,464	0,8609	0,7242	0,8692	0,8336
I-5 Utility of Means	0,157	0,0089	0	0,0211	0,0131
a. Reward					
b. Promise	0,075	0	0,0476	0,04692	0,0294
c. Appeal/Support	0,468	0,58951	0,5095	0,4742	0,5294
d. Oppose/Resist	0,154	0,0318	0,0185	0,0235	0,0258
e. Threaten	0,034	0,0119	0,0852	0,089114286	0,0560
f. Punish	0,112	0,3578	0,3391	0,4093	0,3732

Table 4. Operational Code Indices of Norming Group and Erdogan *Notes: Norming group means are retrieved from Özdamar an Ceydilek (2020)*

As the Table 5 below depicts in a more concise fashion, similar comparisons can be made with the scores of Erdogan and the master scores of the norming group using the raw scores. However, before starting with the norming group, one has to be careful to bear in mind that these mean scores are mostly from world leaders of earlier periods of history and the coding procedure likely endured lingual differences of coded speeches, coding procedures and speech selections. Although this is not a sole barrier to make meaningful comparison, it is beneficial to acknowledge these divergent points.

Having set this possible limitation, one trend that is very much guiding in understanding Erdogan's belief system is that all his P-1 indices in each and every term have been more hostile than the average world leader. Particularly, his P-1 score in Phase-1 (-0,501) draws a pessimistic leader in his perception of essential nature of the political universe compared to the norming group score. Although his indices in Phase-2 and Phase-3 become relatively more optimistic, his general score is still more conflictual than the world leader average. Overall, this means that Erdogan sees conflict in the political world rather than harmony in all his terms, while the norming group of leaders can be more in the optimistic side of the pendulum. On the same line of thinking, I-1 indices of Erdogan demonstrates a leader who is hostile in his strategic choice propensities compared to the norming group which depicts a more cooperative leaning outlook. Furthermore, his I-1 scores declines gradually making him even more hostile compared to the norming group, while his general score of I-1 does not suggest any alteration to this conclusion.

In account of P-4 indices, one general conclusion can be that Erdogan have always felt more in control of the historical events than the average world leader since all his indices are significantly higher throughout his terms than the norming group. While in the Phase-2 his score declines, in the Phase-3 it yields the highest value. Relatedly, in his general score he is depicted as a leader who attributed the control of the political events to the Self. The norming group, on the other hand, can be addressed as yielding a lower attribution of control of events to the Self, despite the above zero value.

	Norming Group	Phase-1	Phase-2	Phase-3	General
	n= 164	n=32	n=17	n=85	n=118
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0,301	-0,510	-0,2171	-0,2551	-0,3752
P-4 Historical development (low control/high control)	0,224	0,514	0,4091	0,5636	0,5141
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0,401	0,196	0,1143	0,02038	0,1198

Table 5. Master Scores of Norming Group and Erdogan in Phases and General
Notes: Norming group means are retrieved from Özdamar an Ceydilek (2020).

Depiction of belief scores in Table 5 also illustrates into the hypothesis testing. According to the data, Hypothesis 2a is supported as his P-1 score shifts into a remarkably friendly direction from -0,510 to -0,217 between Phase-1 and Phase-2. According to the Renshon's (2008) categorization of change, this is a reversal in the belief as it changes direction and quality when shifting, however still maintaining his position as a leader with conflictual outlook at the political universe. Similarly, Hypothesis 2b. is confirmed as his P-4 score slightly decreases from 0,514 to 0,409

however still keeping him in the same medium range of sense of historical control. Hypothesis 2c is also confirmed that his I-1 score moves into a more hostile direction from 0,196 to 0,0203 between the first two phases, pointing out to a strategic tendency towards more conflictual tactics when pursuing goals. In this sense, it can be argued that this is a reinforcement of the previous belief since he became more conflictual in his strategic propensities, maintaining the category of his previous outlook.

Additionally, the data in the Table 5 supports the Hypothesis 3a. Between Phase 2 and Phase 3 his P-1 score decreases from -0,217 to -0,255. While he slightly becomes more antagonistic in his perception of the political universe and this can be categorized as a reversal of belief, he remains as a pessimistic leader as far as his P-1 score goes. Furthermore, his I-1 score demonstrates a slight decline from 0,114 to 0,020 becoming even more adversary in his strategic choices. In this sense, his I-1 belief is reinforced even more to a more belligerent direction. In contrast to these, Hypothesis 3b fails according to these scores since his P-4 belief dramatically increased from 0,409 to 0,563 depicting his increasing attribution of historical control to Self. However, Hypothesis 3b predicted a decline in his sense of mastery as a result of the shock between Phase-2 and Phase-3.

In the light of these master scores, Figure 3 below represents what these master scores of Erdogan (General, Phase-1/2/3 indices) and Norming Group corresponds to in terms of their leadership types. The graphic depicts the locations of both Self and Other indices. While Self indices are I-1 and P-4a which is the P-4 score that is directly calculated by the VICS, Other indices are P-1 and P-4b (calculated with the formula of $1-P4a$). Each quadrant in this graph matches a leadership type developed by Holsti (1977) and refined by Walker (1983) as

addressed in detail in the Chapter 2.

In account of Self's leadership type, Norming Group and Phase-2 scores of Erdogan corresponds to Type A, while his general scores, Phase-1 and Phase-3 are in the quadrant of Type-C. At this point both his Self-scores and those of the norming group produce cooperative leadership types. Whereas, in terms of Other's scores, Erdogan's Phase-1, Phase-3 and General scores fall under the Type DEF and his Phase-2 score fall to type B, while the norming group is located in Type C. In this context, Erdogan shows a conflictual leadership type in Other's score as opposed to Self-scores, while the norming group is always in the cooperative typology. Overall, Erdogan demonstrates a leadership type where he perceives himself as a cooperative leader, while his perception of the outside world and strategies to follow there are conflictual.




Figure 3. Leadership Types of Norming Group and Erdogan's Phases and General

Table 6 exhibits the breakdown of norming group scores, Phase scores and general scores of Erdogan into Holsti (1977)'s leadership typologies. Moving from these typologies it is possible to draw several conclusions in terms of the changes between phases, although the general qualities did not change. Holsti (1977) suggests that in terms of Self's typologies, a Type-C leader sees the source of the conflict in the anarchical system with a mindset that sees possibilities of changing the system in line with the common interests. Because of the anarchy, the control and predictability of the events are limited therefore unless the system changes, one should be pessimistic about their goals. Relatedly, they set strong goals and they can follow shared aims. Escalation is mostly delayed, and conciliatory exercises are primarily preferred, in accordance, non-military resources are welcome. Erdogan displays this

kind of leadership in his Phase-1, Phase-3 and in general scores. In Phase-2, this type switches to Type A, which is still a cooperative type with alterations in explanation. In this case, a Type-A leader sees the source of the conflict in miscommunication and misunderstanding. They perceive the future as more predictable and controllable therefore they tend to be more optimistic as attaining goals mostly depend on one's willingness and ability. Related to this they form international goals paying attention to common interests with flexible strategies. They control risks by avoiding escalation in total and quickly respond to conciliation opportunities. Resources that establish a negotiation environment are given priority and they do not use force at an early stage. Norming group on the other hand, fall under these two cooperative typologies in both Self's and Other's scores.

As opposed to these qualities, in Other's typologies Erdogan displays a very much conflictual outlook. Similar to the Self, he is the Type DEF in Phase-1, Phase-3 and in General. Type DEF leaders perceive the conflict as permanent, with several reasons for it such as human nature (D), nationalism (E), international anarchy (F). They are not very optimistic in the long run and in the short run it is determined by the leadership quality along with power distribution in the system. Accordingly, they pursue limited goals with moderate capabilities. They can turn to use of force as a last resort when required. Likewise, Erdogan's typology in Phase-2 as Type B suggests similar characteristics. A Type-B leader sees the conflict as temporary, reason of which is states with war-tendency. Their perception of opponent is deterrable and rational and they are more optimistic in attaining goals. They see political predictable and historical control is possible. Building on these, they try to control the risks by limiting their means rather than ends. Hence, any strategy is

preferable under the conditions where risk is limited and benefits are larger in return.

	Type for Self (I-1, P4-a)	General Quality	Type Other (P-1, P4-b)	General Quality
Norm.Group	Type A	Cooperative	Type C	Cooperative
Phase-1	Type C	Cooperative	Type DEF	Conflictual
Phase-2	Type A	Cooperative	Type B	Conflictual
Phase-3	Type C	Cooperative	Type DEF	Conflictual
General	Type C	Cooperative	Type DEF	Conflictual

Table 6. Norming Group and Erdogan According to Leadership Types

Notes: Norming group means are retrieved from Özdamar an Ceydilek (2020)

In this line, Figure 3 and Table 6 are illustrative on the Hypothesis 1a and 1b in a verifying manner. According to the graphic that demonstrates the leadership typologies of Erdogan in quadrants, the Self and Other points of all phases shift and change quadrants and consequently change the leadership type of Erdogan in between these phases. These shifts are indicators of belief change as a result of exogenous shocks therefore the proposal of Hypothesis 1a and 1b suggesting a typology and quadrant change as a result of shifts in the master beliefs of Erdogan are confirmed.




Figure 4. Erdogan's Self Typologies According to the Origin of Norming Group's P4a and I-1 values.

In terms of typology changes, Figure 4 illustrates an interesting change in the quadrants and typologies in terms of Self scores of Erdogan. In the traditional depiction of typologies in the cartesian plane with O (0.5, 0) Erdogan is located in the quadrants of Type A and Type C demonstrating cooperative perception of the Self. However, when I take the norming group's Self values to the origin coordinates, in order to find Erdogan's location scattered around the norming group of world leaders, he turns out to be a Type B leader in all of his Self scores becoming a leader with a rather conflictual perception of the Self as well. This is an intriguing result because although the general locations of his master scores could depict him as a cooperative leader on the Self, compared to the average world leader's Self perception in terms of typologies, Erdogan becomes a more conflictual leader in all phases of his incumbency as well as his general score. It is important to note here

that this comparison is a complementary tool to understand the operational code of Erdogan in general rather than measuring for the impacts of interval events. Nevertheless, this is a significant shift because P-1 and I-1 scores individually portray him as a conflictual and hostile leader when compared to the norming group but his P-4 score is relatively higher. However, when these scores projected into typologies around norming group, Erdogan becomes a merely hostile leader on his perception of the Self.




Figure 5. Erdogan's Other Typologies According to the Origin of Norming Group's P-4b and P-1 values.

When I plotted the graph for Erdogan's Other beliefs of P-1 and P-4b around the scores of norming group, he maintains his conflictual outlook towards the political Other. However, this time only the scores of Phase-2 exhibits a shift from quadrant of Type B to Type DEF only becoming more conflictual in general quality. Hence,

Erdogan demonstrates a leadership typology that is more conflictual towards the Other and in the perception of the Self throughout his term in power as well as in all these phases when norming group averages are taken to the center. This supports his very much conflictual outlook and hostile tendencies in strategic propensities depicted as belief scores.




Figure 6. Trendlines of Annual Master Belief Scores of Erdogan

In regard with the Hypothesis 4, while the Figure 6 illustrates the fluctuations of annual master belief scores of Erdogan, Table 7 is informative about statistical change in these annual belief scores between phases. As explained in the previous chapter, because I had to group the yearly speeches together in order to obtain meaningful belief scores, the number of observations decreased. Therefore, the variance calculation through t-test remained still possible although chances of

finding possible statistically significant changes in terms of belief indices became weak. Nevertheless, results of t-test in this study are worth sharing since I found 2 statistically significant shifts in annual P-3 and P-4 values from Phase 2 to Phase 3, which denoted in bold in the Table 7. This outcome is very much in conformity with the suggestion of Hypothesis 4 predicting that any statistical significance would take place mostly in the philosophical beliefs, which is informed by Renshon (2008)' argumentation. Indeed, the limited number of statistical changes is observable only in philosophical beliefs of Erdogan as a result of an exogenous shock. Although what this significance could suggest in terms of reasons for belief change due to the lack of data availabilities, this still contributes to Renshon (2008)'s general observation which is partially in disagreement with political psychology literature expecting belief change in peripheral beliefs, particularly considering this change took place in one of the master beliefs as in P-4.

Situa1	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5-Reward	I5-Promise	I5-Support	I5-Oppose	I5-Threaten	I5-Punish
2003	-1	-0,9167	0,55	0,4286	0,76427	1	0,3333	1	0	0,8571	0	0	1	0	0	0
2004	-1	-1	1	0,7273	0,2727	0,25	-0,1667	0,4375	0,75	0,9091	0	0	0,625	0	0	0,375
2005	-0,4	-0,5	0,208	0,375	0,922	0	-0,3333	0,3999998	1	0,875	0	0	0,5	0	0	0,5
2006	-0,5	-0,4167	0,18330002	0,5	0,90835	0,6667	0,1944	0,6498996	0,3333	0,6667	0	0	0,8333	0,0833	0,0833	0
2007	-0,3333	-0,5	0,4001	0,5714	0,77138287	0	-0,3333	0,3999998	1	0,8571	0	0	0,5	0	0	0,5
2008	-0,1429	-0,2619	0,15509999	0,5333	0,9172852	0	-0,25	0,26880002	1	0,9333	0,0625	0	0,4375	0,0625	0	0,4375
2009	-0,2	-0,3556	0,21069998	0,4643	0,90217197	-0,5385	-0,641	0,4462	0,4615	0,9286	0	0	0,2308	0,0769	0	0,6923
Test (Phase1)	0,21	0,28	0,43	0,19	0,39	0,79	0,88	0,16	0,35	0,26	0,54	0,13	0,62	0,62	0,1	0,91
2011	-0,2	-0,3333	0,232	0,5	0,884	0,2	-0,1333	0,3280007	0,8	0,3999998	0	0	0,6	0	0,2	0,2
2014	-0,0667	-0,2889	0,2747	0,3182	0,91259045	0,1429	-0,1905	0,2654	0,8571	0,8182	0	0,1429	0,4286	0	0	0,4286
2015,1	-0,3846	-0,4744	0,1976	0,4091	0,91916186	0	-0,2778	0,28890002	1	0,9545	0	0	0,5	0,0556	0,0556	0,3889
Test (Phase2)	0,84	0,94	**0,02	**0,04	0,82	0,12	0,11	0,68	0,2	0,2	0,22	0,99	0,38	0,8	0,94	0,16
2015,2	0	-0,2292	0,21249998	0,6522	0,8614075	0,0667	-0,2667	0,33859998	0,9333	0,8261	0	0	0,5333	0	0,0667	0,4
2016	-0,2821	-0,3761	0,16210002	0,5063	0,91792876	-0,05	-0,2833	0,24849999	0,95	0,9367	0	0,25	0,45	0,1	0,25	0,4
2017	-0,5714	-0,5	0,13990003	0,4815	0,93263817	-0,0769	-0,3333	0,27569997	0,9231	0,8519	0	0,0385	0,4231	0,0385	0,0385	0,4615
2018	-0,1	-0,2667	0,16600001	0,5556	0,9077704	0,12	-0,1867	0,2435	0,88	0,8889	0,04	0,04	0,48	0	0,08	0,36
2019	-0,1364	-0,3333	0,21780002	0,4634	0,89907146	0,0526	-0,2719	0,34680003	0,9474	0,9024	0	0	0,5263	0,0263	0,0263	0,4211
2020	0,037	-0,2099	0,17690003	0,55	0,90270496	0,0303	-0,2424	0,24839998	0,9697	0,7667	0,0606	0	0,4545	0	0,0909	0,3939
2021	-0,7333	-0,6	0,14670003	0,7368	0,8919114	0	-0,2778	0,27490002	1	0,9123	0,0476	0	0,4524	0	0,0714	0,4286

Table 7. Significance test results of Erdogan's belief scores. (* $p < .10$; ** $p < 0,05$;

** $p < 0,01$ data in the bold shows the significant results.)

Discussion

Having the belief scores and hypotheses testing results explained, it is in place to address what these results mean for different dimensions introduced in this study. In the overall look, I observed a belief change in the light of different indicators, one of them is leadership typology change directly linked to fluctuations in the master belief scores, and the other is statistically significant change between the phases. Certainly, these outcomes do contribute to the findings of previous studies in both social psychology and Turkish Foreign Policy; therefore, contextualizing them in these literatures can further elaborate the results.

Within the framework of social psychology, it is difficult to argue that the findings of this study certainly support or refute their theories of temporal belief stability. While Renshon (2008) suggest that this is mostly due to the ambiguity of the predictions of these theories, I must acknowledge that due to the limited data at my disposal and testing techniques applied in this study are not supportive of drawing a certain conclusion. However, it is still possible to make several comments informed by the results. In the face of this limited data, only two statistically significant changes can be observed in the P-3 and P-4 beliefs of Erdogan from Phase 2 to Phase 3. Moreover, no such statistically significant change can be detected from Phase 1 to Phase 2. This can be interpreted as that Erdogan's belief system remained mostly stable over a fairly long period of time. Relatedly, this does not assist the debate whether exogenous shocks or traumatic events cause a significant change in the belief systems because while the second time interval event led to a change, the first one did not generate similar results with the observations at hand.

The statistically significant shifts in P-3 and P-4 beliefs of Erdogan also allows us to make few comments on the internal consistency argument explained in the Chapter 2 of this study. The gist of this argument follows as beliefs are hierarchically ordered between core and peripheral beliefs, the former ordering the latter. Since beliefs are regarded as the main filters while consuming new information, the core beliefs cannot be changed easily while peripheral beliefs are more open to alteration. Therefore, beliefs are internally consistent as they are structured on each other and any change in the core beliefs must start a reaction throughout the whole system in order to reduce the dissonance in between.

As an extension of this line of thinking, Operational Code Analysis is structured as philosophical beliefs being the core beliefs along with three master beliefs (P-1, P-4 and I-1), instrumental beliefs are peripheries of a belief system. However, Renshon (2008) observes a contrasting pattern in Operational Code Analysis findings, including his very own study, that philosophical beliefs are more prone to change. This study also follows suit of Renshon (2008)'s observation and demonstrates a statistically significant change in philosophical beliefs, one of them being a master belief. Relatedly, a notion of internal consistency cannot be observed under these conditions as no such shift can be determined in the instrumental beliefs of Erdogan in accordance with the impact of second time interval event. This also creates a contradiction with what the social psychology theories suggest in terms of internal consistency.

While the results of this study cannot assist us in a comprehensive way in the framework of social psychology, within the tool that Operational Code Analysis offers, a several points can be mentioned in terms of the effects of these traumatic events following the standard procedures of the method. Firstly, as a result of both

events, all master beliefs of Erdogan change direction and quality. As result of the Arab Spring, first time interval, we observe a leader who is more less conflictual or pessimistic in his perception of the political universe with less sense of control over events and more hostile in tactics. In this line we observe a reversal in P-1 as he becomes less conflictual than very conflictual, and reinforcement of I-1 belief because he becomes more hostile in tactics, while already hostile. Subsequently, as a result of the USA's support for PYD and the resulting rift with Turkey, Erdogan becomes a leader who is more pessimistic in his understanding of the political universe with more sense of control over events but with even more hostile strategic propensities in Phase-3. In terms of belief scores, I-1 belief shows a reinforcement whereas other two master scores does not properly inform us, however it can still be argued that P-1 and P-4 scores showed reversal to a limited extent as decrease and increases were relatively slight.

Relatedly, these changes manifested themselves in the form of quadrant change in the Figure 3 and leadership typology (Holsti, 1977) changes. In this sense, as a result of both events, Erdogan's leadership typology as Self and Other both change. While he becomes a Type A leader in terms of Self after first time interval, he switches back to Type C after the second one. Similarly, his Other typology becomes type B after the Arab Spring and switches back to Type DEF. These shifts point out to a meaningful change in beliefs because as the leadership type changes, conflict solution tactics and perceptions of the leader change as well. Moreover, when scattered around the norming group values, Erdogan's both Self and Other points shift to the conflictual quadrants of Type B and Type DEF respectively. This points out to when norming is taken to be the origin, Erdogan becomes a leader with both conflictual Self perception and a conflictual outlook towards the Other.

In this sense, apart from the belief stability arguments of social psychology, standard tools of Operational Code Analysis indicate a change in the master beliefs of Erdogan within its own framework. At this point, it is also possible to answer the empirical question asked in this study. Did Erdogan's beliefs change throughout his incumbency? The answer to this question is somewhat yes, his beliefs demonstrated a statistically significant change, although limited, and they showed a shift in terms of his perception of Self and Other. Admittedly, these changes did not unfold or observed exactly the way social psychology or Operational Code Analysis literatures informed in terms of statistical tools; however, dismissing the changes and shifts determined in his scores and linked results would not deliver a proper argument.

Lastly, these outputs also contribute to the understandings in the Turkish Foreign Policy literature as an assisting dimension in this study. One of the main conclusions to be derived from this study is that Erdogan conception of the Self is mainly cooperative and harmonious while he sees the Other and the political universe mostly conflictual and hostile. This outlook that he displays does not change in quality but only in extent as a result of the two exogenous shocks. However, the observation that his conception of Self and Other does not show a reversal as he stays cooperative in the Self and conflictual in the Other does not mean that impacts of the traumatic events that I controlled for in this study can or should be dismissed. In contrast, there are some alignments between the roles adopted in the Turkish Foreign Policy rhetoric and Erdogan's shifts in typology. After 2009-2010, Turkish statesmen refers to the country as "leader of the Muslim world", "regional leader", "protector of the oppressed", "rule maker" or "central country" (Ozdamar, 2016; Akbaba and Ozdamar, 2019). Combining these roles with Turkey's welcoming attitude towards Arab uprisings with a supportive rhetoric,

Erdogan's location in Type A quadrant in the Self and Type B in the Other draws a relatively cooperative and confident outlook for Erdogan. Both of these typologies refer to leaders who are optimistic rooted in different sources, see the future as predictable and controllable with a temporary conception towards conflict. While Type A leaders could choose to negotiation and compromise avoiding early use of force, and Type B leaders could opt out for coercive tactics when the benefits are larger than the damage, both of these strategic propensities were displayed in the Turkish Foreign Policy. In the case of latter, strategic orientations switch to more forceful methods as the Syrian civil war erupts and up until that point responding to Type B tendencies of Erdogan in the Other and Erdogan's strong resistance against NATO intervention in Libya could be argued as an instance of realization of the Type A propensities.

Likewise, these types of alignments can be monitored in the Phase 3 after the US and PYD alliance became certain and open as with Erdogan's Self typology shifting back to Type C and Other typology shifting back to Type DEF. In the latter case where military force is taken to be a final resort but definitely useable when required, Turkey's unilateral military actions in along the Syrian border are a quite an indicator of this tendency of Erdogan. These also point out that these two events are important for the unfold of TFP as they led the pathway to both strategic changes and belief changes in the central decisionmaker and policymaker of the country. Overall, we can argue that it is possible to trace the role changes and attitude changes of Turkish Foreign Policy in the operational code belief system of Erdogan along the lines of traumatic events. In the next and last chapter of conclusion, I will deliver a summary of the literature, method, results and discussions of this study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Apart from systemic level analysis instrumentalizing rational actor models in the discipline, alternative cognitive approaches started to inform the researchers in their effort to understand nations' foreign policy formation. Beliefs in this sense provides a vast, mixed and relatively underexplored research avenue to the scholars. While understanding how and in what ways beliefs and belief systems of leaders, policymakers and decisionmakers influence the foreign policy directions of countries have been under focus for a while, aspects such as how and when these beliefs change, what could be the impact of a change throughout the belief system of a given leader remain to be understood. Herein, this thesis is an effort to understand these aspects of cognitive studies focusing on beliefs and belief stability in the case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan over Operational Code Analysis. Therefore, this thesis asks, *“did Erdogan’s foreign policy beliefs change in his 18 years of incumbency?”*

As our primary filters of understanding the world around us and making sense of the new information, the literature on belief change and stability is rather diverged. The main argumentation is that beliefs of a given individual are internally coherent because as the new information infiltrates through these primary lenses of beliefs, they must be in conformity with each other (Jervis, 1976). Otherwise case creates cognitive dissonance and an individual’s mind has to look for ways to settle

this condition (Festinger, 1957). Structured around this very argument of cognitive consistency, Operational Code Analysis is a particular method to generate belief constructs of leaders and is an instrumental tool to examine a possible belief change within its own framework. Developing the argument of belief stability, OCA regards that since beliefs are hierarchically ordered between core beliefs in a belief system and peripheral beliefs, when one belief changes, the whole system is expected to follow suit (George, 1969; Holsti, 1970). At this point, core beliefs are taken to be resistant to change since they are the filters against the incoming information, auxiliary beliefs are more open to change. In contrast to this theoretically informed argumentation, the findings of OCA studies point out to those core beliefs change more in frequency than the peripheral beliefs (Renshon, 2008). Moving from whether beliefs change when beliefs change is also another point of exploration. Again the arguments are diverse as one side proposed that exogenous shocks justify the prior belief system and reinforce their validity (Tetlock, 2005). Another side suggest that great events might trigger a change (Jervis, 1976, Deutsch and Merritt, 1965; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992)

At this point, Role Theory assist this study in terms of where to look for a belief change in Erdogan's operational code construct. According to Holsti (1970), roles are a policymaker's understanding of proper norms, rules, decisions, and actions for their own country's conduct in the political systems. In this sense they are the 'images' of suitable actions towards the outside world in the mind of a decisionmaker. According to Wish (1980), there is a strong correlation between these roles in the mind of a leader and the foreign policy orientations of a state. Therefore, a change in the communicated role attributions of Turkey could indicate a possible belief change checkpoint. In this line of thinking, Role Theory analyses of Turkish

Foreign Policy suggests that starting with Gaza War in 2009 and Arab Spring in 2010, roles adopted in the Turkish Foreign Policy started to change. While Turkish position in the politics was perceived as “defender of peace and stability”, “regional system collaborator”, “global system collaborator” or “bridge” between Eastern and Western subsystems, after 2010 “leader of the Muslim world”, “regional leader”, “protector of the oppressed”, “rule-maker” and “central country” roles were enacted by the policymakers. Additionally, as of 2015 October when the US support for Kurdish forces of PYD became certain Turkey realized that a traditional and NATO ally crossed the lines of clash of interests (Hale, 2019). Since then, a “precious loneliness” rhetoric has been tapped into by the most central figure in the foreign policy making. Therefore, December 2010 and October 2015 are two time intervals to look for belief changes in Erdogan’s the 18 years in power. Furthermore, these time interval points contribute to the debate on whether exogenous shocks, or traumatic foreign policy events can result in a belief change as both of these events occurred unexpectedly and struck the policymakers definitely out of calculation. In the light of these arguments, this study examines four hypotheses in analysis of Erdogan’s case: *Hypothesis 1a. There will be a shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase 1 to Phase 2 to be observed in the leadership type (Holsti, 1977) and related quadrant change. Hypothesis 1b. There will be a shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase 2 to Phase 3 to be observed in the leadership type (Holsti,1977) and related quadrant change. Hypothesis 2: The directionality of the shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan from Phase-1 to Phase-2 will be (a.) in a friendlier and more optimistic way in his P-1 belief, (b.) in a more hostile way in his I-1 belief, (c.) in a direction that attains less control of historical developments to Self in his P-4 belief. Hypothesis 3: The directionality of the shift in the master beliefs of Erdogan*

from Phase-2 to Phase-3 will be (a) in a more conflictual and hostile way in P-1 and I-1 belief, (b) in a direction that attains less control of historical developments to Self in his P-4 belief. Hypothesis 4: Any statistical change between the Phases, if at all, would occur mostly in the philosophical beliefs rather than instrumental beliefs. All these hypotheses are contextualized and justified on the social psychology, OCA, or Turkish Foreign Policy literature accounts since all these different fields generated rather mixed results so far.

To address these hypotheses, I instrumentalized Operational Code Analysis to observe possible changes in the VICS indices produced by the ProfilerPlus software. As this is a content analysis program to analyze the speeches of leaders, I analyzed Erdogan's Turkish speech transcripts, which is a novelty since Turkish version of the software has not been used so far and existing account of studies on Erdogan are conducted over English version. However, due to lack of available speeches from the early periods of his Prime Ministry years, I was not able to attain meaningful results for some of the years. Therefore, as explained earlier in Chapter 3 of Research Design, I had to aggregate speeches on an annual basis to retrieve plausible scores. In this context, as far as the empirical question concerned my results suggest that Erdogan's beliefs changed over these two traumatic events. Findings of this thesis confirmed all of the hypotheses suggested, except for the Hypothesis 3b. There are two measures of this change in this thesis. First is statistical significance test conducted in the form of a t-test. Second is the observations of change within the boundaries of the tools OCA provide, which is a typology change and quadrant shifts in the graphical demonstration of such typology. However, while the latter confirm the belief change between both phases in terms of typology change, the former validates the change between Phase-2 to Phase-3. This is mostly because of the

particular research design I had to apply in this study due to the lack of available resources.

All in all, the case of Erdogan indicates several points. Firstly, it confirms that foreign policy beliefs can change over the exogenous and traumatic events. Second, while the tools of Operational Code Analysis are able to detect changes in all indices, statistically significant changes occurred in the philosophical belief, which are the core beliefs in the OCA design. Third, as far as the general comments on Erdogan's Operational Code scores informs us, he has always been a leader with a conflictual outlook towards the political Other and a cooperative perception of the Self. Fourth, accounts of role theory studies in the Turkish Foreign Policy plays an informative and leading role in finding reference points of belief changes.

Finally, the results of this analysis of Erdogan over the speeches in his native language can open new research avenues in terms of comprehending approaches and behavior in other issue areas of Turkish Foreign Policy. Relatedly, these results under different theoretical framework such as authoritarianism, populism and democracy studies can give meaningful conclusions in this case itself as well as in comparison with other long-term world leaders. Moreover, integrated with role theory studies, beliefs changes and directions in them can be studied during terms of different governments earlier than AKP as well as the future ones. As the lack of available resources was a limitation of this thesis, once more resources are made publicly available, empirical part of this study can be enhanced and developed in the light of new data.

REFERENCES

- Akbaba, Y., & Özdamar, Ö. (2019). *Role Theory in the Middle East and North Africa: Politics, Economics and Identity* (1st ed.). Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315160160>
- Aras, B., & Görener, A. (2010). National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 12(1), 73-92. doi:10.1080/19448950903507453
- Ayata, B. (2015). Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of a Regional Actor? *Journal of European Integration*, 37(1), 95-112.
doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.975991
- Aydın Çakır, A., & Arıkan Akdağ, G. (2017). An empirical analysis of the change in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. *Turkish Studies*, 18(2), 334-357. doi:10.1080/14683849.2016.1261021
- Barnett, R. C. (1993). Multiple roles, gender, and psychological distress. In L. Goldberger & S. Breznitz (Eds.), *Handbook of stress: Theoretical and clinical aspects* (pp. 427–445). Free Press.
- Başkan, B. (2018). Islamism and Turkey's foreign policy during the Arab Spring. *Turkish Studies*, 19(2), 264-288. doi:10.1080/14683849.2017.1405346
- Breuning, M. (2011) *Role Theory Research in International Relations: State of the Art and Blind Spots*. In *Role Theory in International Relations*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull. London: Routledge.
- Crichlow, S. (1998). Idealism or pragmatism? An operational code analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. *Political Psychology* 19 (4): 683-706.

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Konuşmalar. (n.d). retrieved from:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/konusmalar/?&page=12>

Davutoglu, A. (2000). *The Strategic Depth: The Turkish International Location*. Istanbul: Kiire Yayinlari

Deutsch, W. K., and Merritt, L. R. (1965). The effects of events on national and international images. In *International behavior: A social-psychological analysis*, ed. Herbert C. Kelman, 132-87.

Feng, H. (2005a). The operational code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or offensive realist? *Security Studies* 14 (4): 637-62.

Feng, H. (2005b). The operational codes of four generations of Chinese leaders: Is China a revisionist power? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Washington, DC.

Festinger, L. (1957). *Theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson & Co.

Festinger, L. (1962). Cognitive dissonance. *Scientific American*, 207(4), 93–107. <https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1062-93>

Gawronski, B. (2012). Back to the future of dissonance theory: Cognitive consistency as a core motive. *Social Cognition*, 30(6), 652–668. <https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652>

Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2004). On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency: Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 40(4), 535–542. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2003.10.005>

George, A. L. (1969). The “operational code”: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making. *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (2): 190-222.

George, A. L. (1980). *Presidential decision making in foreign policy: The effective use of information and advice*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Goode, W. (1960). A Theory of Role Strain. *American Sociological Review*, 25(4), 483-496. doi:10.2307/2092933

Grossman, M. (2005). Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change: The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s. *International Politics*, 42(3), 334-351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800115

Gustavsson, J. (1999). How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34(1), 73–95.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00108369921961780>

Hale, W. (2019). Turkey, the U.S., Russia, and the Syrian Civil War. *Insight Turkey*, 21(4), 25-40. Retrieved July 17, 2021, from
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26842776>.

Holsti O. (1991), *International Systems, System Change, and Foreign Policy: Commentary on “Changing International Systems”*. *Diplomatic History*, 15: 83-89.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1991.tb00120.x>

Holsti, K. J. (1970). “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (3): 233–309.

Holsti, O. (1962). The belief system and national images: A case study. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 (3): 244-52.

Holsti, O. (1970). The 'operational code' approach to the study of political leaders: John Foster Dulles' philosophical and instrumental beliefs. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 3 (1): 123-57.

Holsti, O. (1976). Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively. In *The Structure of Decision*. Ed. Robert Axelrod. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 18–54.

Holsti, O. 1977. A typology of 'operational code' belief systems. In *Decision-making research: Some recent developments*, ed. Daniel Heradstveit, 31-131. Oslo, Norway: National Institute of International Affairs.

Hudson, V. M. (1999) Cultural Expectations of One's Own and Other Nations' Foreign Policy Action Templates. *Political Psychology* 20:767-802.

Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton, NJ:

Jervis, R. (2006). Understanding beliefs. *Political Psychology* 27 (5): 641-63.

Kaarbo, J. (2021). New directions for leader personality research: breaking bad in foreign policy. *International Affairs*, 97(2), 423-441. doi:10.1093/ia/iiaa221

Kirişçi, K. (2009). The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40, 29-56.

doi:10.1017/S0896634600005203

Kruglanski, A. W., Jasko, K., Milyavsky, M., Chernikova, M., Webber, D., Pierro, A., & di Santo, D. (2018). Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social

Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered. *Psychological Inquiry*, 29(2), 45-59.

doi:10.1080/1047840X.2018.1480619

Larson, W. D. (1994). The role of belief systems and schemas in foreign policy decision making. *Political Psychology* 15 (1): 17-33.

- Leites, N. (1951). *The operational code of the politburo*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Leites, N. 1953. *A study of Bolshevism*. New York: Free Press.
- Malici A and Buckner AL (2008) Empathizing with rogue leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(6): 783–800.
- Malici, A. & Malici, J. (2005). The operational codes of Fidel Castro and Kim II Sung: The last cold warriors? *Political Psychology* 26:387-412.
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (2014). Changing Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27(3), 538-552.
doi:10.1080/09557571.2013.840560
- Murinson, A. (2006). The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(6), 945-964. Retrieved July 17, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284512>
- Oğuzlu, H. T. (2016). Turkish foreign policy at the nexus of changing international and regional dynamics. *Turkish Studies*, 17(1), 58-67.
doi:10.1080/14683849.2015.1136088
- Öniş, Z. (2012). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest. *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, pp. 45-63.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2017639>
- Özdamar, Ö, Halistoprak, B, Sula, İ. (2014). From Good Neighbor to Model: Turkey's Changing Roles in the Middle East in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* , International Relations | Volume: 11 | No: 42 , 93-113
. DOI: 10.33458/uidergisi.553302

Özdamar, Ö. (2016). Domestic sources of changing Turkish foreign policy toward the MENA during the 2010s: A role theoretic approach. In *Domestic role contestation, foreign policy, and international relations* (pp. 105-120). Routledge.

Özdamar, Ö. (2017). Leadership Analysis at a “Great Distance”: Using the Operational Code Construct to Analyse Islamist Leaders. *Global Society*, 31(2), 167-198. doi:10.1080/13600826.2016.1269056

Özdamar, Ö., & Ceydilek, E. (2020). European populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: An operational code analysis. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26(1), 137–162. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119850254>

Özpek, B. B., & Demirağ, Y. (2014). Turkish foreign policy after the ‘Arab Spring’: from agenda-setter state to agenda-entrepreneur state. *Israel Affairs*, 20(3), 328-346. doi:10.1080/13537121.2014.922806

Peffley, M., & Hurwitz, J. (1992). International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Public Response to Changing Soviet-U.S. Relations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(2), 431-461. doi:10.2307/2111485

Renshon, J. (2008). Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(6), 820–849. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708323669>

Rosati, J. A. (2000). The power of human cognition in the study of world politics. *International Studies Review* 2 (3): 45-75.

Rosenau, J. N. (1981). *The Study of Political Adaptation*: Pinter. Princeton University Press.

Rosenau, J. N. (1987). Roles and role summaries in foreign policy. In S. G. Walker (Ed.), *Role theory and foreign policy analysis* (pp. 44–65). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Sarbin, R. T. and Allen, V. L. (1968). Role Theory. In Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed., edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, pp. 488-567. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Schafer M and Walker SG (2006b) Operational code analysis at a distance. In: Schafer M and Walker SG (eds) Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25–51.

Schafer, M., & Walker, S. (2006a). Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(3), 561-583.

Simon, H. 1985. Human nature in politics. *American Political Science Review* 79(2): 293–304.

Tetlock, P. (2005). *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. Retrieved July 17, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7spbt>

Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Social psychology in world politics. In Handbook of social psychology, 4th ed., eds. S. Fiske, D. Gilbert, and G. Lindzey, 868-914. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Thies, C. (2009). Role theory and foreign policy. In International studies association compendium project, foreign policy analysis section (pp. 1–44). Retrieved from <http://myweb.uiowa.edu/bhlai/workshop/role.Pdf>

Tür, Ö. (2011). Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP—Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones. *Turkish Studies*, 12(4), 589-602. doi:10.1080/14683849.2011.622515

UNHCR Turkey STATS. (n.d.). Retrieved July 27, 2021, from <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/unhcr-turkey-stats>

Walker S. G (2021). Development of Foreign Policy Roles in Schafer, M., & Walker, S.G. (Eds.). (2021). Operational Code Analysis and Foreign Policy Roles: Crossing Simon's Bridge (1st ed.).Routledge.<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003131021>

Walker, S. 2013. Role theory and the cognitive architecture of British appeasement decisions. New York, NY: Routledge.

Walker, S. 2016. Role theory as an empirical theory of international relations. In The Oxford research encyclopedia of empirical international relations theory, ed. W. Thompson. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Walker, S. G. (1979). National role conceptions and systemic outcomes. Psychological models in international politics, 169-210.

Walker, S. G. (1983). The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis of the Operational Code Construct. *International Studies Quarterly*, 27(2), 179-202. doi:10.2307/2600545

Walker, S. G., Schafer, M. (2000a). The political universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisors: Diagnostic and strategic propensities in their operational codes. *Political Psychology* 21 (3): 529-43.

Walker, S. G., Schafer, M. and Young, M. D. (1998). Systematic procedures for operational code analysis: Measuring and modeling Jimmy Carter's operational code. *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1): 175-89.

Walker, S.G., Malici A. and Schafer M. (2011). Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis. New York, NY: Routledge.

Wendt, A. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*, 41(3), 335-370. Retrieved July 17, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706749>

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511612183

Wish, N. B. (1980). Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 24(4), 532-554. doi:10.2307/2600291

Yanık, L. K. (2009). The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: “Bridging” Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War. *Geopolitics*, 14(3), 531-549. doi:10.1080/14650040802693515

APPENDIX

2003:

Türkiye-İngiltere E-Devlet Semineri Açılış Konuşması (9 Eylül 2003) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

IIF Yıllık toplantısı-Dubai (20 Eylül 2003) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d).

Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Sayın R. Tayyip Erdoğan'ın, Güneydoğu Avrupa Ülkeleri Devlet/Hükümet Başkanları Zirvesindeki Konuşması (9 Nisan 2003) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

2004:

AB Uyum Sürecinde Ulusal Sosyal Politika Sempozyumu'ndaki Konuşma (21 Haziran 2004) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Transatlantik İttifakı Yeni Bir Kavşakta Konulu Konferansın Açılış Yemeği (25 Haziran 2004) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

31. IDBK toplantısına Katılan bakanlar Onuruna Verdiđi Akşam Yemeđindeki Konuşma (14 Haziran 2004) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Dünya Gazeteler Birliđi'nin 57. Genel Kurulu Konuşması (31 Mayıs 2004) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Dünya Türk İş Adamları 5. Kurultay Açılış Konuşması (30 Eylül 2004) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Dünya Türk İş Adamları 5. Kurultayı Akşam Yemeđi Konuşması (30 Eylül 2004) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

2005:

AB Yolunda Türkiye-Economist Konferansı (26 Nisan 2005) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Bloomberg Konuşması (27 Temmuz 2005) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d).

Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Dış İlişkiler Konseyi Toplantısındaki Konuşma: 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası

Küresel Katkı Amaçlayan İstikrar Yaratıcı Güç (13 Eylül 2005) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Avrupalı Türk Demokratlar Birliđi (6 Kasım 2005) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

51. NATO Parlamenter Asamblesi Genel Kurul Toplantısı (15 Kasım 2005) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

2006:

Davos, “Yeni Mukayeseli Üstünlükler” Konuşması (27 Ocak 2006) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Arap Ligi Zirve Toplantısı Açılış Töreni-Hartum (28 Mart 2006) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Güneydoğu Avrupa Ülkeleri Devlet Başkanları Zirvesi Konuşması (4 Mayıs 2006) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Wharton School Küresel Mezuniyet Forumu (8 Haziran 2006) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

NATO Riga Zirvesi-Kuzey Atlantik Konseyi Toplantısı (29 Kasım 2006) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2003, 2004, 2005. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

2007:

Arap Ligi Zirve Toplantısı (28 Mart 2007) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2007, 2008. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

56. IPI Genel Kurul Toplantısı Kapanış Konuşması (15 Mayıs 2007) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2007, 2008. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

ABD Ulusal Basın Kulübünde Yaptığı Konuşma (5 Kasım 2007) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2007, 2008. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

Dış İlişkiler Konseyi- 2010'a Doğru Türk Dış Politikası: Yönelimler ve Öncelikler (27 Eylül 2007) from Erdoğan, R. T. (n.d). Uluslararası Konuşmalar : Uluslararası Konferans ve Katılım Konuşmaları : 2007, 2008. Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları.

2008:

Medeniyetler İttifakı 1. Forumu Açılış Oturumu (15 Ocak 2008) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2008). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

Nueva Economia Forumu (16 Ocak 2008) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2008). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

Uluslararası Gençlik Forumu-Kuveyt Heyetini Kabul (29 Ocak 2008) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2008). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

44. Mnh Gvenlik Politikası Konferansı (9 Őubat 2008) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2008). BaŐbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Őubat Programı: AılıŐlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup KonuŐmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Bykharf Yayınları.

AB Bykelileri ile Yemek (28 Őubat 2008) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2008). BaŐbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Őubat Programı: AılıŐlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup KonuŐmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Bykharf Yayınları.

2009:

Avrupa Politika Merkezi Toplantısı (19 Ocak 2009) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2009). BaŐbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: AılıŐlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup KonuŐmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Bykharf Yayınları.

Avrupa'nın Dostları Konferansı (19 Ocak 2009)) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2009). BaŐbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: AılıŐlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup KonuŐmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Bykharf Yayınları.

Dnya Ekonomik Forumu "Gazze: Orta DoĒu'da BarıŐ Modeli Oturumu" (29 Ocak 2009)) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2009). BaŐbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: AılıŐlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup KonuŐmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Bykharf Yayınları.

2011:

İslam Dünyası Mümtaz Şahsiyet Ödülleri (10 Ocak 2011) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2011). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

Türkiye Katar İş Forumu (12 Ocak 2011) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2011). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

GIF Açılış Yemeği (16 Ocak 2011) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2011). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Ocak Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

Değişim Liderleri Zirvesi (14 Mart 2011) from Erdoğan, R. T. (2011). Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Mart Programı: Açılışlar, Kabul ve Ziyaretler, Grup Konuşmaları, Kongreler. Ankara: Büyükharf Yayınları.

2014:

Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu'nda (DEİK) Yaptıkları Konuşma (20 Aralık 2014) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2969/dis-ekonomik-iliskiler-kurulunda-deik-yaptiklari-konusma>

Uluslararası Petrol ve Doğalgaz Stratejileri Sempozyumu Galası'nda
Yaptıkları Konuşma (10 Aralık 2014) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2962/uluslararasi-petrol-ve-dogalgaz-stratejileri-sempozyumu-galasinda-yaptiklari-konusma.html>

2. Türkiye-Afrika Ortaklık Zirvesi Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma
(21 Kasım 2014) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2958/2-turkiye-afrika-ortaklik-zirvesi-acilis-oturumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

BM Güvenlik Konseyi "Yabancı Savaşçılar" Özel Oturumunda Yaptıkları
Konuşma (24 Eylül 2014) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2937/bm-guvenlik-konseyi-yabanci-savascilar-ozel-oturumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Dünya Ekonomik Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (28 Eylül 2014) Available
at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2938/dunya-ekonomik-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Birleşmiş Milletler 69'uncu Genel Kurulu Genel Görüşmelerinde Yaptıkları
Konuşma (24 Eylül 2014) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2936/birlesmis-milletler-69uncu-genel-kurulu-genel-gorusmelerinde-yaptiklari-konusma.html>

2015:

İslam İş Birliđi Teşkilatı 5. Sağlık Bakanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları
Konuşma (19 Kasım 2015) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/36065/islam-isbirligi-teskilati-5-saglik-bakanlari-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

G-20 Antalya Liderler Zirvesi Sonunda Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları
Konuşma (16 Kasım 2015) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/36000/g-20-antalya-liderler-zirvesi-sonunda-basin-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

7. Atlantik Konseyi Enerji ve Ekonomi Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (19
Kasım 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/36063/7-atlantik-konseyi-enerji-ve-ekonomi-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

BM Çölleşme İle Mücadele 12. Taraflar Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
(20 Ekim 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35718/bm-collesme-ile-mucadele-12-taraflar-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Belçika Egmont Uluslararası İlişkiler Kraliyet Enstitüsü'nde Yaptıkları
Konuşma (5 Ekim 2015) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35549/belcika-egmont-uluslararasi-iliskiler-kraliyet-enstitusunde-yaptiklari-konusma>

G-20 Enerji Bakanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (2 Ekim 2015)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35537/g-20-enerji-bakanlari-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

31. İSEDAK Açılış Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma (25 Kasım 2015)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/36092/31-isedak-acilis-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

3. Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (16

Eylül 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/35475/3-uluslararasi-ombudsmanlik-sempozyumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Irak Cumhurbaşkanı Fuad Masum ile Birlikte Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma

(22 Nisan 2015) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32663/irak-cumhurbaskani-fuad-masum-ile-birlikte-ortak-basin-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Romanya-Türkiye İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (1 Nisan 2015)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30060/romanya-turkiye-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Romanya Cumhurbaşkanı Iohannis ile Düzenledikleri Ortak Basın

Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma (1 Nisan 2015) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30059/romanya-cumhurbaskani-iohannis-ile-duzenledikleri-ortak-basin-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

4. Uluslararası Öğrenciler Mezuniyet Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma (11 Haziran 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32673/4-uluslararasi-ogrenciler-mezuniyet-torende-yaptiklari-konusma>

Dünya Enerji Düzenleme Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (25 Nisan 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32657/dunya-enerji-duzenleme-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

12. IDEF Uluslararası Savunma Sanayi Fuarı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (5 Mayıs 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32126/12-idef-uluslararasi-savunma-sanayi-fuarinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Uluslararası Türk-Kazak Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Profesörlük Tevdii Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (17 Nisan 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31950/hoca-ahmet-yesevi-uluslararasi-turk-kazak-universitesi-tarafindan-fahri-profesorkluk-tevdii-torende-yaptiklari-konusma>

Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nazarbayev ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma (16 Nisan 2015) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32666/kazakistan-cumhurbaskani-nazarbayev-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisinda-yaptigi-konusma>

Türkiye-Kazakistan İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (16 Nisan 2015)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32665/turkiye-kazakistan-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Slovakya İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (31 Mart 2015)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30058/turkiye-slovakya-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Slovenya-Türkiye İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (30 Mart 2015)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30055/slovenya-turkiye-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

2016:

Parlamentolar Arası Kudüs Platformu 'Kudüs ve Sürecin Problemleri'

Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (29 Kasım 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61174/parlamentolararasi-kudus-platformu-kudus-ve-surecin-problemleri-sempozyumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

NATO Parlamenter Asamblesi Sonbahar Genel Kurul Toplantısında

Yaptıkları Konuşma (21 Kasım 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61069/nato-parlamenter-asamblesi-sonbahar-genel-kurul-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

TRT World Tanıtım Gecesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma (15 Kasım 2016)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61157/trt-world-tanitim-gecesinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

MÜSİAD 16. EXPO Fuarı ve 20. Uluslararası İş Forumu Kongresi'nde

Yaptıkları Konuşma (9 Kasım 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/58925/musiad-16-expo-fuari-ve-20-uluslararasi-is-forumu-kongresinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

ABD'deki Türk STK'larla Bir Araya Geldiği Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma

(22 Eylül 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52398/abddeki-turk-stklarla-bir-araya-geldigi-toplantida-yaptiklari-konusma>

Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (20 Eylül

2016) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52365/birlesmis-milletler-multeciler-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Birleşmiş Milletler 71. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (20 Eylül

2016) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52364/birlesmis-milletler-71-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

İslam Dünyası Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Birliği Heyetini Kabulünde

Yaptıkları Konuşma (18 Ağustos 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/51004/islam-dunyasi-sivil-toplum-kuruluslari-birligi-heyetini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Kenya İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (2 Haziran 2016)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/45476/turkiye-kenya-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Uganda İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (1 Haziran 2016)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/44414/turkiye-uganda-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Uganda Makerere Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Doktora Tevdii Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (1 Haziran 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/44374/uganda-makerere-universitesi-tarafindan-fahri-doktora-tevdii-torende-yaptiklari-konusma>

BM Medeniyetler İttifakı 7. Küresel Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (26 Nisan 2016) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/43875/bm-medeniyetler-ittifaki-7-kuresel-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı 13'üncü İslam Zirvesi'nin Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma (14 Nisan 2016) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/42573/islam-isbirligi-teskilati-13uncu-islam-zirvesinin-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Dünya Türk Girişimciler Kurultayı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (26 Mart 2016)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/41325/dunya-turk-girisimciler-kurultayinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

2017:

D-8 Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma (20 Ekim 2017) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87239/d-8-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma (25 Eylül

2017) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87274/uluslararasi-ombudsmanlik-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türk-Amerikan ve Amerikalı Müslüman Toplumuyla Buluşma Programında

Yaptıkları Konuşma (21 Eylül 2017) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87275/turk-amerikan-ve-amerikalimusluman-toplumuyla-bulusma-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Birleşmiş Milletler 72. Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (19 Eylül 2017)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87252/birlesmis-milletler-72-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Hindistan-Türkiye İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (1 Mayıs 2017)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/75072/hindistan-turkiye-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

4. Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (2 Mart 2017) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/72347/4-uluslararasi-ombudsmanlik-sempozyumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Bahreyn’de “Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu’da Barışa Yönelik Girişimci Vizyonu” Konulu Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma (13 Şubat 2017) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/71040/bahreynde-turkiyenin-ortadoguda-barisa-yonelik-girisimci-vizyonu-konulu-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

13. EİT Liderler Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma (1 Mart 2017) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/72349/13-eit-liderler-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma.html>

9. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma (9 Ocak 2017) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/70692/9-buyukelciler-konferansi-vesilesiyle-duzenlenen-yemekte-yaptiklari-konusma.html>

Aliya İzzetbegoviç’i Anma ve Aliya Dizisinin Tanıtımı Toplantısı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (23 Ekim 2017) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/86064/aliya-izzetbegovici-anma-ve-aliya-dizisinin-tanitimi-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

2018:

Türk-İngiliz Tatlı Dil Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (13 Mayıs 2018)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94017/turk-ingiliz-tatlidil-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Londra'da, Chatham House'da Yaptıkları Konuşma (14 Mayıs 2018)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94018/londra-da-chatham-house-da-yaptiklari-konusma>

SOCAR Star Rafinerisi'nin Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma (19 Ekim

2018) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/99344/socar-star-rafinerisi-nin-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Afrika Ekonomi ve İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (10 Ekim

2018) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/99372/turkiye-afrika-ekonomi-ve-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

73. Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (25 Eylül 2018)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/98783/73-birlesmis-milletler-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

ABD'de Türk Ve Müslüman Toplumuyla Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları

Konuşma (24 Eylül 2018) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/98789/abd-de-turk-ve-musliman-toplumuyla-bulusma-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

TİKA Koordinatörlerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma (10 Nisan 2018)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92347/tika-koordinatörlerini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Kırgızistan İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (2 Eylül 2018)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96516/turkiye-kirgizistan-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Moldova - Gökoğuz Yeri Ziyaretinde Komrat Halkına Hitaben Yaptıkları

Konuşma (18 Ekim 2018) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/99343/moldova-gokoguz-yeri-ziyaretinde-komrat-halkina-hitaben-yaptiklari-konusma>

İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Birinci Yargı Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma (14

Aralık 2018) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/100110/islam-isbirligi-teskilati-birinci-yargi-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

2019:

Kuala Lumpur Zirvesi'nin Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma (19 Aralık 2019)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/114037/kuala-lumpur-zirvesi-nin-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Küresel Mülteci Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (17 Aralık 2019) Available

at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113993/kuresel-multeci-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

İslam İşbirliđi Teşkilatı Sosyal İşler Bakanları Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları

Konuşma (9 Aralık 2019) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113857/islam-isbirligi-teskilati-sosyal-isler-bakanlari-zirvesi-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

İslam İşbirliđi Teşkilatı Üst Düzey Kamu ve Özel Sektör Yatırım

Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (8 Aralık 2019) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113844/islam-isbirligi-teskilati-ust-duzey-kamu-ve-ozel-sektor-yatirim-konferansi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

İngiltere Cambridge Camii Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma (5 Aralık 2019)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113849/ingiltere-cambridge-camii-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

ABD Diyanet Merkezi'nde Vatandaşlarımızla Buluşma Programında

Yaptıkları Konuşma (14 Kasım 2019) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/112543/abd-diyanet-merkezi-nde-vatandaslarimizla-bulusma-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Yabancı Medya Temsilcilerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma (18 Kasım

2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/111183/yabanci-medya-temsilcilerini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Azerbaycan’da Gerçekleştirilen Dünya Türk İş Konseyi Toplantısı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (14 Ekim 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/111104/azerbaycan-da-gerceklestirilen-dunya-turk-is-konseyi-toplantisi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Barış Pınarı Harekâtına İlişkin Genel Yayın Yönetmenleri ile Yaptıkları Toplantıdaki Konuşmaları (13 Ekim 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/111075/baris-pinari-harek-tina-iliskin-genel-yayin-yonetmenleri-ile-yaptiklari-toplantidaki-konusmalari>

Birleşmiş Milletler 74. Genel Kurulu’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (24 Eylül 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/109804/birlesmis-milletler-74-genel-kurulu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

G-20 Zirvesi Nedeniyle Bulunduğu Osaka’da Düzenlediği Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma (29 Haziran 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/106887/g-20-zirvesi-nedeniyle-bulundugu-osaka-da-duzenledigi-basin-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Asya’nın Kalbi İstanbul Süreci Bakanlar Konferansı’nda Yaptığı Konuşma (9 Aralık 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113898/asya-nin-kalbi-istanbul-sureci-bakanlar-konferansi-nda-yaptigi-konusma>

35. İSEDAK Toplantısı Açılış Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (27 Kasım 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113683/35-isedak-toplantisi-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

2. İstanbul Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma
(18 Kasım 2019) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113561/2-istanbul-uluslararası-ombudsmanlık-konferansı-nda-yaptıkları-konusma>

TRT World Forum'da Yaptıkları Konuşma (21 Ekim 2019) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/112223/trt-world-forum-da-yaptıkları-konusma>

Türk-Amerikan Ulusal Yönlendirme Komitesi (TASC) Tarafından
Düzenlenen Etkinlikte Yaptıkları Konuşma (23 Eylül 2019) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/109735/turk-amerikan-ulusal-yönlendirme-komitesi-tasc-tarafından-duzenlenen-etkinlikte-yaptıkları-konusma>

2020:

Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu Covid-19'la Mücadele Özel Oturumunda
Yaptıkları Konuşma (3 Aralık 2020) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/123037/birlesmis-milletler-genel-kurulu-covid-19-la-mucadele-ozel-oturumunda-yaptıkları-konusma>

G-20 Liderler Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (22 Kasım 2020) Available at:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/118061/g-20-zirvesi-nde-yaptıkları-konusma>

4. Uluslararası Kadın ve Adalet Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (26 Kasım 2020) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/122969/4-uluslararasi-kadin-ve-adalet-zirvesi-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Halifax Uluslararası Güvenlik Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (21 Kasım 2020) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/122922/halifax-uluslararasi-guvenlik-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

BM Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (22 Eylül 2020) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/122156/bm-genel-kurulu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

12. Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (9 Kasım 2020) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/122735/12-buyukelciler-konferansi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Pakistan İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (14 Şubat 2020) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/116684/turkiye-pakistan-is-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

TürkAkım Projesi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (8 Ocak 2020) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/115235/turkakim-projesi-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Ukrayna İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (3 Şubat 2020)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/116527/turkiye-ukrayna-is-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Senegal İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (28 Ocak 2020)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/116459/turkiye-senegal-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türkiye-Cezayir İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (26 Ocak 2020)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/116422/turkiye-cezayir-is-forumunda-yaptiklari-konusma>

2021:

Güneydoğu Avrupa İşbirliği Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (17 Haziran

2021) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/128379/guneydogu-avrupa-isbirligi-zirvesi-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Azerbaycan Millî Meclisi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (16 Haziran 2021)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/128350/azerbaycan-mill-meclisi-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

1. Uluslararası Medya ve İslamofobi Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma

(8 Nisan 2021) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/128006/1-uluslararasi-medya-ve-islamofobi-sempozyumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

D-8 Teşkilatı 10. Zirve Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (8 Nisan 2014)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/126505/d-8-teskilati-10-zirve-toplantisi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Türk Konseyi Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma (31 Mart 2021) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/126451/turk-konseyi-zirvesi-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>

İnsan Hakları Eylem Planı Tanıtım Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (2

Mart 2021) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/125097/insan-haklari-eylem-plani-tanitim-toplantisi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Uluslararası Konferansı Göç: Önümüzdeki Yirmi

Yılın Projeksiyonu ve Ötesi Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (22 Şubat 2021)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/125024/dokuz-eyul-universitesi-uluslararasi-konferansi-goc-onumuzdeki-yirmi-yilin-projeksiyonu-ve-otesi-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Uluslararası Demokratlar Birliği Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (6 Şubat

2021) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/124835/uluslararasi-demokratlar-birligi-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

Avrupa Birliği Ülkeleri Büyükelçileri ile Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma (12

Ocak 2021) Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/123549/avrupa-birligi-ulkeleri-buyukelcileri-ile-toplantida-yaptiklari-konusma>

Antalya Diplomasi Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (18 Haziran 2021)

Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/128427/antalya-diplomasi-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

ABD Merkezli Şirketlerin Üst Düzey Yöneticileri ile Toplantıda Yaptıkları

Konuşma (26 Mayıs 2021) Available at:

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/128018/abd-merkezli-sirketlerin-ust-duzey-yoneticileri-ile-toplantida-yaptiklari-konusma>

Katar Ekonomi Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma (22 Mayıs 2016) Available

at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/128459/katar-ekonomi-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma>

*For the years of 2010, 2012 and 2013 no speech transcripts were available therefore no data was coded for these years.