

IS INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT A BURDEN ON WOMEN'S
HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION?
EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

A Master's Thesis

by

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Ankara

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In loving memory of Elmar

IS INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT A BURDEN ON WOMEN'S HUMAN
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION? EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

IS INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT A BURDEN ON WOMEN'S HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION? EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

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Over the last 35 years, Turkey has been fighting with an outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in East and Southeast Anatolia. The increasingly fierce struggle from the mid-80s to the late 90s led to thousands of internally displaced people. Using Turkey Demographic Health Survey, we define displaced women as those who migrated for security reasons from conflict regions between 1984-99 to understand the long-term impact of forced migration on the educational attainment of displaced women. Our results show that internal displacement decreases years of schooling by one year, and the detrimental effect mainly stems from the reduced level of primary and secondary school completion. We also investigate the mechanisms through which internal displacement affects educational outcomes and show that internal displacement increased the probability of working before the age of 15. We also find evidence that internal displacement decreased marriage age and increased the possibility of being in a forced marriage.

Keywords: Conflict, Female Education, Forced Migration, Human Capital Accumulation, Internally Displaced People

ÖZET

ÜLKE İÇİNDE YERİNDE EDİLME KADINLARIN BEŞERİ SERMAYE BİRİKİMİ ÜZERİNDE BİR YÜK MÜDÜR? TÜRKİYE'DEN KANITLAR

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Türkiye, 35 yılı aşkın bir süredir Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu bölgesinde faaliyet gösteren PKK ile silahlı çatışma içindedir. 1980'lerin ortasından 1990'ların sonlarına kadar şiddeti giderek artan bu çatışma, ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş yüz binlerce insanı beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye Nüfus Sağlık Araştırması'nı kullanarak, zorunlu göçün yerinden edilmiş kadınların okullaşma oranları üzerindeki uzun vadeli etkisini araştırıyoruz. 1984-99 yılları arasında OHAL bölgesinden güvenlik sebebiyle göçen kadınları 'yerinden edilmiş' olarak tanımlıyoruz. Tahmin sonuçlarına göre, ülke içinde yerinden edilmenin eğitim süresini bir yıl azalttığını ve bu olumsuz etkinin temel olarak ilkökul ve ortaokul bitirme olasılığının düşmesinden kaynaklandığını tespit ettik. Ayrıca, zorunlu göçün okullaşma oranlarını hangi mekanizmalar üzerinden etkilediğini araştırdık ve 15 yaşından önce çalışma olasılığını artırdığını gösterdik. Bunun yanı sıra zorunlu göçün evlilik yaşını azalttığına ve kadınların zorla evlendirilme olasılığını artırdığına dair kanıtlar bulduk.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Çatışma, Kadın Eğitimi, Zorunlu Göç, Beşeri Sermaye Birikimi, Ülke İçinde Yerinden Edilmiş İnsanlar

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CHAPTER 1

PRELIMINARIES

1.1 Introduction

Being uprooted from their homeland is a life-changing and unpleasant experience for many people whom we call forced migrants. According to UNHCR, we can basically divide forced migrants into two sub-groups in terms of their destination places: internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.¹ Internally displaced persons are migrants who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes but have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (OCHA, 1998). Refugees, on the other hand, are migrants who have crossed national borders. By the end of 2020, 82.4 million individuals forcibly migrated worldwide because of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations, and more than half of those forced migrants were internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2020).

Forced migration and forced migrants have always been a great deal in world history, and the history of modern Turkey is not an exception. Since the country's history dating back to the Ottoman, Turkey witnessed many involuntary population movements and became both receiving and sending country. In the late 1910s, after Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922), a bilateral agreement (The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations) provided the mutual expulsion of Orthodox Christians from Turkey to Greece and of Muslims from Greece to Turkey. Another example is more recent. Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011,

¹ We use the term forced migrant and internally displaced person (IDP) interchangeably throughout the paper.

Turkey has received a mass refugee influx, hosting over 3.6 million registered people (3RP, 2020).

Besides these international population movements, Turkey has its own IDPs. Founded in 1978, an insurgent group called Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) entered the armed conflict with the Turkish security forces for the first time in 1984, and for the next fifteen years between 1984-1999, it caused many eastern provinces, especially in the Southeast Anatolia region, to become conflict zones. During this first wave of the conflict, many villages and hamlets have been evacuated. An estimated 1 million people have moved from rural to urban in the eastern regions and from the eastern regions to the western and southern regions throughout the country (HÜNEE, 2006).

However, this substantial displaced population has received little attention. While there are a couple of qualitative studies that aim to provide evidence on short-term consequences of internal displacement in Turkey (Kurban, Yüksek, Ayşe, Ünal, & Aker, 2007), there is no quantitative analysis in economics literature about the long-term effects of forced migration except Gulesci (2018). When IDPs migrated from relatively less developed regions to more developed regions, it is a valid expectation that there must be a significant change in their lives in terms of their long-term wellbeing. In this sense, education is one of the most crucial determinants of the long-term welfare of an individual. In our study, as the most fragile group of those who forcibly migrated, we ask what the long-term educational outcomes of women are after they flee from their homes.

To investigate this question, we use the last three waves of the nationwide Turkey Demography and Health Survey (TDHS) conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. They provide rich data recording many features of women, including their migration history. Since respondents have no official displacement status, we construct a dummy variable to identify the displacement status of an individual. We define a woman who migrated from conflict-intensive provinces for security reasons between 1984-1999 as a forced migrant.

Our findings suggest that internally displaced women accumulated less human capital in the long term even if they migrated from less developed regions to more developed ones. They have received about one year less schooling in total due to a

significantly lower probability of primary and secondary school completion. Their primary school completion was reduced by 10.2 percentage points (ppt) and secondary school completion was reduced by 9.8 ppt on average. Looking at the sample of women born in the eastern provinces only, we find that they obtained 0.61 years less schooling, and the probability of their primary and secondary school completion dropped by 9.8 and 6 ppt, respectively. We also investigate the mechanisms through which internal displacement affects educational outcomes and find that internal displacement increased the probability of working before the age of 15 by 4.6 ppt. We also provide evidence that internal displacement decreased marriage age and increases the possibility of being in a forced marriage.

1.2 Related Literature

In the migration literature, studies of forced migration are relatively scarce compared to voluntary/economic migration (Becker & Ferrara, 2019; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2013). However, there are papers exploring the consequences of forced migration for different populations: receiving population, sending population, and migrants themselves. In the context of receiving populations, one of the first papers about the effects of conflict-induced refugee inflow is written by Baez (2011). He finds that hosting refugees had adverse effects on local children's health in the short run, decreases schooling and literacy in the long run. Those kinds of effects are not common across the world, and they emerged through different mechanisms which are unique to the host countries. For instance, according to Tumen (2021), the articulation of Syrian refugee children into the Turkish education system made Turkish adolescents, especially on the margin of dropping out of school, perform better at the PISA exam. For the labor market side, there are a couple of papers providing some evidence on the earnings of people in host cities. These studies have found that wages, especially for the low-skilled workers, are negatively affected by the influx of displaced people creating labor supply shocks through competition over low-skilled jobs (Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez, 2016; Morales, 2018). Studies, in general, have found the detrimental effects of mass population change in the context of sending population. The expulsion of professors and high-skilled Jewish

professionals in Nazi Germany has distorted both Ph.D. students' long-term academic outcomes and decreased German children's probability of finishing school (Waldinger, 2010; Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, (2015).

Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it examines the effects of forced migration on the immigrants themselves. Articles written in this context are generally about the labor market and the educational outcomes of immigrants. Kondylis (2010) finds that after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, displaced Bosnian men experienced higher levels of unemployment, while their female counterparts were less likely to participate in the labor force. Becker, Grosfeld, Grosjean, Voigtländer, and Zhuravskaya (2020) have shown that descendants of uprooted Poles from Eastern Poland after WWII are more educated, they are more likely to complete higher education, and they give more value to intangible assets. Our paper differs from this one in terms of the main interest group. We look at the impact of displacement on first-generation displaced women. In this sense, our work is closely related to Calderón, Gafaro, and Ibáñez (2011). Their evidence suggests that displacement does not increase the bargaining power of displaced women, and significantly increases domestic violence within the household while they contribute household earnings more.

Second, it is the first paper that explores the effect of the displacement caused by the Turkey-PKK conflict in the context of female education. Prior to this study, there is a couple of papers elaborating the relation between the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and education. Berker (2012) focuses on the effect of the exposure to armed conflict in southeastern Turkey on the educational outcomes of treated cohorts. His findings suggest that while exposure to conflict is positively related to primary school completion, it is adversely related to middle and high school completion rates. Oyvatt and Tekgüç (2019) also show that armed conflict in southeastern Turkey reduces the school enrolment rates at middle and high school levels but increases the primary school enrolment. Kıbrıs (2015) investigates the connection between civil conflict and the performance in the university entrance exam and she finds a significant negative relationship for the students from the conflict zone. Our study differs in that it focuses not on the direct impact of conflict exposure, but the impact of conflict-induced displacement. As a closely related paper, Gulesci (2018) is a study conducted on displaced women affected by the conflict in the southeast of Turkey.

He studies the impact of forced migration induced by the conflict in southeastern Turkey on migrant women's attitudes toward domestic violence. His findings indicate that displaced Kurdish women are more likely to view domestic violence as acceptable, their spouses were more likely to try to control their wives by limiting mobility or social activities, and those women have been subjected to more severe and prolonged violence before opting to seek help through reduced bargaining power in the household. Another paper written by Aside from that, there are a few national and international studies that extensively investigate the sociological, psychological, health, and human rights dimensions of this issue and provide policy recommendations (HÜNEE, 2006; IDMC, 2010; KHRP, 2010; Kurban et al., 2007)

1.3 Background: Internal Displacement in Turkey

The source of internal displacement is based on the armed conflict between Turkish security forces and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The PKK is an insurgent group founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, operating in the rural parts of East and Southeast Anatolia regions in Turkey. They started fighting and launched an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984, calling for an independent Kurdish state within Turkey (Brandon, 2006). The conflict reached a peak in the mid-1990s, and an estimated 40,000 people have been killed (Mandıracı, 2016). The first period ended with the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 but it resumed in 2004, continued at a lower intensity until it heightened again in 2015.

Amid the conflict, the Turkish state declared a state of emergency (OHAL) in 11 provinces² in 1987 and recruited local people to form a paramilitary group, called 'village guards' to tackle its struggle against the PKK (Özar, Uçarlar, & Aytar, 2013). Based on the estimated official figures, about 3,500 villages and hamlets were evicted either completely or partially by security forces and PKK; between 925,000

² When we take into account the two regions that have received later the status of a province, and Agri, where the state of emergency has not been declared but there has been intense forced migration, we use the following 14 provinces as conflict provinces (OHAL provinces) in our estimates: Adiyaman, Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van.

and 1.2 million people were internally displaced during 1984-99 (HÜNEE, 2006). According to the report by the Turkish Parliament Investigation Commission (1998), there were several political and economic motives why people were obliged to migrate, but the main reasons were stated as the following: i) the collapse of animal husbandry and agriculture; ii) the eviction by the PKK of certain villages and hamlets where the local people accepted to become a village guard, and iii) the eviction by security forces of villages whose inhabitants refused to become village guards since they were considered to cooperate with PKK. As stated in the same report, most of the migrations took place suddenly, against the will of the local people, and within an average of one week; after the villages were evacuated, it is claimed that the villagers were left to their fate and that there was no re-settlement coordination. Most of the IDPs settled in the nearest city centers, usually where their relatives were, and some of them moved to western provinces such as Izmir, Istanbul, Mersin, and Adana. After displacement, IDPs have encountered different obstacles. The most crucial ones were unemployment and poverty. The social aid and some sort of compensation for IDPs' damage provided by the government were late and insufficient to meet IDPs' needs (Kurban et al., 2007). The Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project, launched in 1994 to facilitate the return of those who want to return their villages voluntarily, did not provide a sustainable environment, the return rates were far below expectations (IDMC, 2009).

CHAPTER 2

DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY

2.1 Data

We use the data from the 2008, 2013, and 2018 waves of Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. The surveys aim to provide basic demographic and health indicators, and they have both household and women questionnaires. Our sample contains 22,010 responses from individual women aged 15-49 about their background information, pregnancy, and fertility preferences; their migration, marriage, and work history. In the migration history section, respondents are asked where they have lived for at least 6 months from the age of 12. The questions include i) their province of residence, ii) place of residence (villages/districts/province center), iii) how long they lived in, iv) month and year of the migration from there, and v) the main reason for migration. The reasons for migration in the survey are divided into six subgroups: personal reasons, including marriage, education, and employment; husband-related reasons, family-related reasons, health-related reasons, security reasons, and other reasons. There is not officially reported 'displacement status' in the dataset, but we can partially identify whether a respondent is an internally displaced person by deducing from their migration reasons. Among all, we use security reasons as the most suitable indicator for forced migration. For this purpose, we create a dummy variable, forced migrant, taking 1 if a woman migrated from conflict provinces for security reasons between 1984-1999. Additionally, since migration history starts at the age of 12, to identify a forced migrant who migrated at primary school age, we

include the women born in the conflict years (1984-99) and whose birthplace belongs to any villages of conflict provinces, but her childhood place/province is different from her birthplace.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics of women born before 2000 in different samples including the region they come from and their displacement status.³ Column (1) shows the descriptive statistics of the whole sample, column (2) reports the means corresponding to the subsample which includes women whose birth region belongs to East or Southeast Anatolia (simply the whole East)⁴, column (3) and (4) differ in terms of displacement status in conflict region that consists of 14 provinces out of all eastern provinces. Particularly, column (3) includes the women defined as ‘forced migrant’ according to our definition, and column (4) includes the women whose either birth or child province belongs to conflict provinces but not migrated during the conflict years.

In Panel A of Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics for the individual characteristics and background information of respondent women, by their displacement status and origin region. In general, displaced women are younger than the average, the mean age is 27.8 for displaced women. They are mainly composed of Kurds (82 percent of the forced migrants), the largest minority group in Turkey. In terms of parents’ educational outcomes, displaced women are way below compared to both the average of Turkey and East sample. However, there is no statistical difference between displaced and not displaced women in the conflict provinces.

Panel B shows the long-term educational outcomes of the respondents. While the average woman in Turkey receives 7.1 years of schooling in total and they are literate with 88 percent probability, displaced women receive only 4.5 years of schooling and 38 percent of them are illiterate. 84% of the women in the sample have completed at least primary school, which entails five years of schooling for women born before 1986, and eight years of schooling for women born after 1986, which is the cutoff cohort exposed to 1997 education reform. The proportion is smaller for women born in eastern provinces and even smaller for the displaced population: 62%

³ Since the women born after 2000 are unlikely to be affected by the conflict, our sample includes only those who born before 2000.

⁴ The term ‘East’ used in the tables refers to East and Southeast Anatolia together, throughout the paper.

percent of the women from the East have obtained at least a primary school diploma while only 53% of displaced women have received the same degree. For the at least secondary and high school completion, this proportion drops to 45% and 28%, respectively for the women in the whole sample. However, for the displaced women, this figure falls to 31% and 14%, correspondingly. Higher education corresponds to having at least a bachelor's degree, and only 11% of women in Turkey have received at least an undergraduate diploma. This share is dramatically lower for displaced women: only 3% of them have had a bachelor's degree.

Panel C reports the long-term labor market outcomes of the respondents. 38% of women in the whole sample participate in the labor force and 30% of them report they are employed at the time of the survey. Among displaced women, 21% are in the labor force and only 11% are currently working.

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Turkey	East	Conflict Region		
			Displaced	Not Displaced	Diff.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(4)-(3)
Panel A. Background					
Age	32.68	31.49	27.77	31.27	3.50***
Kurdish	0.21	0.60	0.82	0.79	-0.04
Village (Childhood)	0.44	0.53	0.28	0.56	0.28***
Mother School Attendance	0.48	0.25	0.19	0.18	0.00
Mother Primary School	0.39	0.18	0.11	0.13	0.01
Mother Secondary School	0.07	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02***
Father Primary School	0.70	0.53	0.43	0.47	0.04
Father Secondary School	0.19	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.03
Panel B. Educational Outcomes					
Years of Schooling	7.1	5.05	4.56	4.48	-0.08
Literacy	0.88	0.71	0.62	0.63	0.01
Primary School	0.84	0.62	0.53	0.54	0.02
Secondary School	0.45	0.30	0.31	0.26	-0.05
High School	0.28	0.15	0.14	0.13	-0.01
Higher Education	0.11	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.02
Panel C. Labor Market Outcomes					
Labor Force Participation	0.38	0.26	0.21	0.24	0.03
Employed	0.30	0.19	0.11	0.17	0.06**
Ever Worked	0.55	0.39	0.39	0.37	-0.02
Observation	22,010	6,748	255	3,644	3,899

Notes: Detailed explanation of the variables can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey

2.2 Identification

We identify the effects of forced migration on women’s educational attainment by estimating the following model:

$$Education_{ir} = \alpha_0 + \beta ForcedMigrant_i + \delta X_{ir} + \gamma_i + \gamma_r + \epsilon_{ir} \quad (1)$$

where $Education_{ir}$ is educational outcomes including years of schooling, and every education level from at least primary school to at least university graduation of women i residing in region r . $ForcedMigrant_i$ is a dummy variable showing displacement status of a respondent i taking 1 for if a respondent migrated at least once during the conflict years 1984-1999, from any 14 conflict provinces for security reasons and 0 otherwise. X_{ir} are the vectors of control variables including age, age squared, being Kurdish or not, and parents’ education level and survey year fixed effects.⁵ γ_i is a vector of dummies controlling for respondent’s childhood province, childhood place, and its interaction. γ_r is a current region fixed effect at the NUTS1 level. Standard errors are clustered by childhood province to account for the fact that women from the same childhood provinces might have correlated educational outcomes.

To understand the long-term impacts of internal displacement, we focus on the period 1984-1999 and people who migrated from the conflict region for security reasons during 1984-2016 and the severity of the conflict. As it is seen from Figure 1, the percentage of people who migrated for security reasons traces the severity of the conflict proxied by the number of total casualties due to the conflict.⁶ Therefore, we argue that migration for security reasons is exogenous and the estimated coefficient of being a forced migrant with our definition gives the casual effect.

According to our definition of forced migration, we can discuss whether the variable $ForcedMigrant_i$ is exogenous or not. We argue that the parameter of interest, β shows the causal effect of forced migration on educational outcomes because of three reasons. First, in our case, conflict-induced migration has mostly taken place against

⁵ We use survey year fixed effect since 2008 wave of TDHS includes only ever-married women.

⁶ For the number of casualties, we use a novel dataset, The Turkish State-PKK Conflict Event Dataset, created by Kibris (2020). Also, we believe that the mismatch between the number of deaths in conflicts and migrations for security reasons in 2011-2013 is due to citizens fleeing their homes following the 2011 Van earthquake for safety concerns.

the migrants' will. Between 1984-99, about 87 percent of migrations for security reasons took place involuntarily, 13 percent of this occurred at the request of the migrants themselves or their families (HÜNEE, 2006). Second, the migrants had no time to choose where to live: 40 percent of the migrants had to flee within hours or a week and they have located where their relatives live (HÜNEE, 2006). Third, they were not selected in terms of their ideological views: they were forced to cooperate with either security forces or PKK and those positioned on either side eventually had to flee because of the pressure of the opposite side (Turkish Parliament Investigation Commission, 1998).




Figure 1: Migration for security reasons and number of casualties

CHAPTER 3

MAIN RESULTS

3.1 Educational Outcomes of Displaced Women

To analyze the effect of being a forced migrant, we mainly focus on two samples: women born in any province of Turkey and those born in one of the eastern provinces. Table 2 reports the effect on educational outcomes in Turkey. Column (1) shows the total years of schooling respondents have received and columns (2)-(5) show the effect of displacement on the probability of graduation from the respective level of education. In columns (2)-(5), to eliminate the possible effects of displaced women who migrated after the respective school age on educational outcomes, we separate our displaced population into groups according to their age at the time of migration. That is, for example, if a woman migrated after age 11, primary school completion age, her primary school completion is less likely to be affected by forced migration. In this case, when we investigate the effect of forced migration on primary school completion, we define forced migrant status as 0 for those who have migrated after age 11. Similarly, we define forced immigrant status as zero for those who migrated after age 14 for secondary school completion, age 17 for high school completion, and age 30 for college graduation. For the outcome of total years of schooling, we define displacement status independent of the age at the time of migration.

We divide the results into three panels in terms of displacement definition varying with the reasons for migration. Panel A reports the results of the most specific and clear definition of forced migration. It takes a respondent who migrated from one of

the 14 OHAL provinces for security reasons during 1984-99 as a forced migrant. The results suggest that being a forced migrant leads migrant women to receive 0.92 years less education, decrease the probability of being at least primary school graduate and secondary school graduate by 10.1, and 9.4 percentage points, respectively. It has no significant effect on high school and onwards.

Conflict-induced forced migration taken place in southeastern provinces of Turkey has a complex structure. First, as we mentioned in the background section, people were either obliged to leave their villages or ‘felt to be obliged’ to flee from their homes. Thus, IDPs consist of both directly and indirectly affected people. Second, there might be a misreporting about the reasons for migration. As indicated in the HÜNEE (2006), people report both primary and secondary reasons for migration and it is seen that even if a woman reports a husband-related reason as a primary reason for her mobility, her secondary reason might be security concerns.⁷ Therefore, we extend our definition of forced migration to encompass all potential IDPs. In Panel B and Panel C, we define forced migration as migration for security plus other reasons and any reason except migration for marriage, respectively. The results show that forced migration affects schooling negatively, but its effects decrease in magnitude gradually as we relax the definition of forced migration.

Table 3 reports the estimation results for the individuals whose birth region is any eastern provinces of Turkey. On average, internal displacement distorts total years of schooling of IDPs by 0.61 years, and also decreases the probability of graduating at least primary school by 9.8 percentage points; secondary school by 6 ppt. Although the coefficients are similar in Table 2 and Table 3, the net effect is higher in the East sample since the mean education level in the East is lower than the mean of Turkey. Panel B and Panel C in Table 3 gives similar results compatible with Panel A in general. However, in Panel C we see that even if it is statistically insignificant, the coefficient is positive in total years of schooling for the IDPs because the results might be driven by the voluntary/economic migrants who migrated during conflict years from the conflict region.

⁷ In our dataset, we only observe the primary reason for migration.

Table 2: Effect of forced migration on educational attainment

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Years of schooling	Primary School	Secondary School	High School	Higher Education
Panel A. Reason: Security only					
Forced migrant	-0.924*** (0.200)	-0.102*** (0.034)	-0.098*** (0.024)	-0.031 (0.024)	-0.019* (0.011)
Panel B. Reason: Security + Other					
Forced migrant	-0.788*** (0.190)	-0.102*** (0.034)	-0.094*** (0.023)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.009)
Panel C. Reason: Any (except marriage)					
Forced migrant	-0.151 (0.167)	-0.103*** (0.033)	-0.067*** (0.019)	-0.012 (0.016)	0.003 (0.010)
Mean of outcome	7.094	0.835	0.446	0.281	0.107
Observations	21,980	21,982	21,982	21,982	21,982
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration on respondents' educational outcomes. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000. Column (1) shows the effect on total years of schooling for all displaced women. Column (2) estimates the effect of being displaced under age 12 on primary school completion. Columns (3) – (5) takes displaced women under age 15, 18, and 30, respectively. Each panel differs in terms of reported migration reasons. Panel A corresponds to the individuals who migrated from one of the 14 conflict provinces during 1984-99 for security reasons only. Panel B defines individuals who migrated from one of the 14 conflict provinces during 1984-99 for security and 'other' reasons as a forced migrant and Panel C defines them migrated for any reason except marriage. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. Estimates of other parameters of the model are reported in Appendix. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the childhood province level.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey.

Table 3: Effect of forced migration on educational attainment (East)

VARIABLES	(1) Years of schooling	(2) Primary School	(3) Secondary School	(4) High School	(5) Higher Education
Panel A. Reason: Security only					
Forced migrant	-0.607*** (0.205)	-0.098*** (0.023)	-0.060* (0.029)	-0.013 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.013)
Panel B. Reason: Security + Other					
Forced migrant	-0.427** (0.184)	-0.098*** (0.023)	-0.056* (0.027)	-0.013 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.010)
Panel C. Reason: Any (except marriage)					
Forced migrant	0.230 (0.143)	-0.102*** (0.022)	-0.034 (0.021)	0.004 (0.018)	0.007 (0.012)
Mean of outcome	5.032	0.617	0.299	0.151	0.0494
Observations	6,716	6,716	6,716	6,716	6,716
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration on respondents' educational outcomes. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000 and their birth region belongs to Eastern provinces. Column (1) shows the effect on total years of schooling for all displaced women. Column (2) estimates the effect of being displaced under age 12 on primary school completion. Columns (3) – (5) takes displaced women under age 15, 18, and 30, respectively. Each panel differs in terms of reported migration reasons. Panel A corresponds to the individuals who migrated from one of the 14 conflict provinces during 1984-99 for security reasons only. Panel B defines individuals who migrated from one of the 14 conflict provinces during 1984-99 for security and 'other' reasons as a forced migrant and Panel C defines them migrated for any reason except marriage. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in paratheses are clustered at the childhood province level.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey.

Panel C in Table 2 and Table 3 provides relatively biased results than the other panels due to the broad definition of forced migration, implying that results might be driven by the outcomes of voluntary/economic migrants. However, it gives some sort of an idea about the lower bound of the effect of forced migration on education. To make more precise the lower bound of this effect, by defining a woman who migrated from conflict provinces for any reason except marriage between 1984-1999 as a forced migrant, we estimate the equation (1) varying three types of the origin places ordered by decreasing degree of severity of the conflict: villages/subdistricts, district centers, and province centers. The degree of severity of the conflict in each place is related to the density of migrations for security reasons. Figure 3 (see Appendix) shows that 75.25% of the migrations for security reasons were taken place in the villages/subdistricts and only 6.74% of them were from the province centers.

Table 4 provides more precise evidence on the effects of forced migration for our broader definition of forced migrant. Panel A shows that the women migrated from villages of the conflict provinces for any reason except marriage during conflict years 1984-99 receive 0.52 fewer years of education. The effect on the probability of primary school completion for displaced girls under age 12 is still persistent and decreased by 10.3 percentage points, probability of secondary school and high school completion for displaced women under age 15 and 18 decreased by 8.4 and 3 percentage points, respectively. When we relax our origin of the migration places step by step, we see still negative and persistent effects, especially for the primary school completion.

Table 5 focuses on the women born in the eastern provinces. The results suggest that even if the negative effect on the total years of schooling is insignificant, the effect on primary school is still significant and persistent. One possible reason why primary school completion decreased while years of schooling relatively increase is that, after education reform applied in 1997, the condition for being a primary school graduate is obtaining 8 years of education rather than 5 years. So, it is likely to happen that while women receive more years of schooling, they might not complete 8 years and get not a primary school diploma.

Table 4: Effect of forced migration on educational attainment by origin

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Years of schooling	Primary School	Secondary School	High School	Higher Education
Migrated: Any Reason (except marriage)					
Panel A. Migrated from: Village					
Forced migrant	-0.522*** (0.156)	-0.103*** (0.033)	-0.084*** (0.020)	-0.030* (0.016)	-0.008 (0.006)
Panel B. Migrated from: Village + District					
Forced migrant	-0.382** (0.153)	-0.103*** (0.033)	-0.072*** (0.019)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.008)
Panel C. Migrated from: Village + District + Province					
Forced migrant	-0.151 (0.167)	-0.103*** (0.033)	-0.067*** (0.019)	-0.012 (0.016)	0.003 (0.010)
Mean of outcome	7.094	0.835	0.446	0.281	0.107
Observations	21,980	21,982	21,982	21,982	21,982
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration taken place for any reason other than marriage on respondents' educational outcomes. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000. Column (1) shows the effect on total years of schooling for all displaced women. Column (2) estimates the effect of being displaced under age 12 on primary school completion. Columns (3) – (5) takes displaced women under age 15, 18, and 30, respectively. Each panel differs in terms of the origin of the migration places. Panel A, B, and C correspond to the individuals migrated from one of the 14 conflict provinces' villages/subdistricts; districts or villages/subdistricts; and province centers, districts, or villages/subdistricts during 1984-99. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the childhood province level.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey.

Table 5: Effect of forced migration on educational attainment by origin (East)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Years of schooling	Primary School	Secondary School	High School	Higher Education
Migrated: Any Reason (except marriage)					
Panel A. Migrated from: Village					
Forced migrant	-0.177 (0.129)	-0.102*** (0.022)	-0.049** (0.021)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.007)
Panel B. Migrated from: Village + District					
From migrant	-0.023 (0.131)	-0.102*** (0.022)	-0.038* (0.020)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.008)
Panel C. Migrated from: Village + District + Province					
From migrant	0.230 (0.143)	-0.102*** (0.022)	-0.034 (0.021)	0.004 (0.018)	0.007 (0.012)
Mean of outcome	5.032	0.617	0.299	0.151	0.0494
Observations	6,716	6,716	6,716	6,716	6,716
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration taken place for any reason other than marriage on respondents' educational outcomes. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000 and their birth region belongs to Eastern provinces. Column (1) shows the effect on total years of schooling for all displaced women. Column (2) estimates the effect of being displaced under age 12 on primary school completion. Columns (3) – (5) takes displaced women under age 15, 18, and 30, respectively. Each panel differs in terms of the origin of the migration places. Panel A, B, and C correspond to the individuals migrated from one of the 14 conflict provinces' villages/subdistricts; districts or villages/subdistricts; and province centers, districts, or villages/subdistricts during 1984-99. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in paratheses are clustered by childhood province.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey.

3.2 Potential Channels

In this section, we discuss and test the potential channels underlying our results of women's lower educational attainment hindered by internal displacement. There are many reasons for the lower rate of school attainment of children, particularly girls, who have forcibly migrated at school age.

The most crucial one is poverty and the problems it brings. In the literature, household permanent income and poverty are closely pertinent to both employment and school enrollment of children (Dayıoğlu, 2006; Tansel, 2002). Due to sudden eviction and prior destruction in the villages, peasants engaging in agriculture and animal husbandry lost their livelihoods, sold off the livestock at a low price, and needed to leave most of their belongings behind (COE, 2002). Since the migrants have generally moved from rural areas, their skills were mismatched in the urban labor market. Therefore, poverty accompanied by unemployment became a catalyst for the access to education for displaced children in three ways: i) since families cannot afford basic school expenses such as books or school clothing, children had to drop out the school (Human Rights Watch, 2002), ii) displaced families try to minimize the cost by forgoing some of their children's education, those are usually the young girls, and iii) they try to maximize their incomes by making their children work (Kurban et al., 2007).

The second channel making girls drop out of school could be early marriage. Early marriage can be a multifaceted issue as a result of conflict-induced migration. The first underpinning factor is economic. After displacement, families in acute poverty can consider their daughters as an extra burden and can force them to marry (UNICEF, 2001). In addition, as a primitive tradition, the 'bride price' paid by the groom can also be an economic incentive for families to marry their female children rather than sending them to school. The second factor can be related to morality. When the girls reached puberty, families can use early marriages as a coping mechanism for social stigma accompanied by the displacement: they are scared for girls' safety and tend to forced them to marry to protect family's 'honor'(Karasapan & Shah, 2019).

The third channel might be psychological. Displaced women do not only experience changing of the place of residence, but they might be highly exposed to violence in the conflict environment. According to research on the consequences of internal displacement in Turkey conducted by a group of psychiatrists, traumatic impacts of displacement led migrant people to have depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), panic, and somatization disorders (Aker, Ayata, Özeren, Buran, & Bay, 2002). It is likely that women and young girls had to cope with a feeling of despair, social exclusion, and alienation in their destination cities. Given this mental vulnerability, not being able to pursue their education is a predictable upshot for displaced girls.

The last reason is related to feasibility. In the early 1990s, many children were out of school since some rural schools were already closed in the region because of armed conflict (Kurban et al., 2007). When they migrated to district or province centers, especially in the eastern provinces, they encountered overcrowded urban schools and teacher shortages (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2005). This has significantly decreased the quality of education and hampered the educational attainment of children. Among those potential channels, due to lack of adequate data, we can only test the effect of forced migration on the probability of being child labor because of destitution, and early marriage outcomes.

3.2.1 Child Labor

Table 6 reports the effect of forced migration on the probability of being child labor. The results suggest that displaced girls under age 15 are more likely to start working at school age: Forced migration increases the probability of being child labor by 4.6 percentage points.

Table 6: Effect of forced migration on working before the age of 15

Dep. Var: Child Labor	Turkey	East
	(1)	(2)
Forced migrant	0.046** (0.021)	0.032 (0.021)
Mean of outcome	0.160	0.137
Observations	21,982	6,716
Controls	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration for security reasons on the probability of working before the age of 15. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taken 1 if a woman has started working before 15-year-old, 0 otherwise. Column (1) consists of all sample, and column (2) consists of women born in one of the Eastern provinces. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by childhood province. *, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey.

However, it is worth mentioning that while displaced women have started to work in early ages, forced migration have undermined their labor market outcomes in the long term: they are less likely to participate in the labor force (decreased by 10 percent), and less likely to be employed, probability of currently working decrease by 17 percent (see Table 10 in Appendix).

3.2.2 Early Marriage

Table 7 reports the effect of forced migration on first marriage outcomes, including the probability of early marriage (before the age of 15), first marriage age, whether the consent of a woman was taken at her first marriage, and whether the bride price was paid at her first marriage. Our results are statistically insignificant but economically significant. The directions and sizes of coefficients are worth discussing. We find that being a forced migrant increases the probability of marrying under age 15, decreases the age at her first marriage both in Turkey and East sample. It is also interesting that if the first marriage is arranged by families, forced migration

diminishes the probability of taking consent of the women by 3.7 ppt and 8.5 ppt in the Turkey and East sample, respectively.

Considering our results together, they are highly consistent with the findings of Gulesci (2018). He shows that one of the underlying mechanisms that drive the higher incidence of domestic violence is the decline of the bargaining power of women within the household. Given that education is one of the main drivers of the bargaining power (Chiappori, Iyigun, & Weiss, 2009; Duflo, 2012), it would be appropriate to say that the results of the two studies support each other.

Table 7: Effect of forced migration on first marriage

VARIABLES	(1) Early Marriage	(2) Marriage Age	(3) Consent	(4) Bride Price
Birth Region: All Sample				
Forced migrant	0.011 (0.018)	-0.111 (0.208)	-0.037 (0.063)	0.020 (0.028)
Mean of outcome	0.0349	20.51	0.848	0.163
Observations	18,461	18,349	9,142	18,434
Birth Region: East Sample				
Forced migrant	0.020 (0.025)	-0.305 (0.221)	-0.085 (0.074)	-0.007 (0.036)
Mean of outcome	0.0644	19.67	0.804	0.368
Observations	5,606	5,552	3,472	5,596
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration for security reasons on the outcomes of first marriage. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000 and married at least once. Column (1)-(4) shows the probability of marrying before the age of 15, first marriage age, whether the consent of a woman was taken at her first marriage, and whether the bride price was paid at her first marriage, respectively. The first panel includes all ever-married women, and the second panel corresponds to the ever-married women born in one of the Eastern provinces. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in paratheses are clustered by childhood province.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey

CHAPTER 4

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

In this section, we test the validity of our results.⁸ To identify our treatment group, we use two components: migration period and origin region that migration takes place. We run two placebo tests that correspond to placebo conflict year to abolish the likelihood of a systematic relationship between women from the conflict region and educational outcomes, and placebo conflict regions to eliminate the possibility of time trend effects.

Table 8 reports the estimation results by shifting the conflict period to 2000-2014. We exclude 2015 since it is the year the conflict upsurged again. We see that migration for any reason except marriage between 2000-2014 significantly increases the total years of schooling in general.⁹ Table 9 provides the results for three different placebo conflict regions. We exclude the women born or raised in either East or Southeast Anatolia to prevent the treated population affects our results. According to each panel, migrating from designated regions in conflict years (1984-1999) has significantly positive effects on total years of schooling, implying that our main results are not driven by the time trend effect.

⁸ We reestimate our model by using sample weight and our results are still robust.

⁹ We use broader definition of forced migration because between 2000-2014 there is not enough observation for migration for security reason.

Table 8: Placebo test for conflict years

VARIABLES	(1) Years of schooling	(2) Primary School	(3) Secondary School	(4) High School	(5) Higher Education
Conflict Years: 2000 - 2014					
Birth Region: All Sample					
Forced migrant	1.099*** (0.184)	0.056 (0.114)	0.054 (0.034)	0.038 (0.035)	0.098*** (0.022)
Observations	22,748	22,750	22,750	22,750	22,750
Birth Region: East Sample					
Forced migrant	1.065*** (0.190)	-0.094 (0.136)	0.057 (0.038)	0.027 (0.038)	0.103*** (0.023)
Observations	6,993	6,993	6,993	6,993	6,993
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration on respondents' educational outcomes for placebo conflict years. The sample consists of individuals born before 2014. Column (1) shows the effect on total years of schooling for all displaced women. Column (2) estimates the effect of being displaced under age 12 on primary school completion. Columns (3) – (5) takes displaced women under age 15, 18, and 30, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by childhood province.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey.

Table 9: Placebo tests for conflict regions

VARIABLES	(1) Years of schooling	(2) Primary School	(3) Secondary School	(4) High School	(5) Higher Education
PLACEBO CONFLICT REGIONS					
<i>Istanbul - West Marmara - Aegean</i>					
Forced migrant	0.917*** (0.230)	-0.015 (0.030)	-0.040 (0.025)	0.015 (0.038)	0.096*** (0.019)
<i>East Marmara - West Anatolia - Mediterranean</i>					
Forced migrant	1.167*** (0.216)	-0.043** (0.021)	-0.044 (0.035)	0.027 (0.037)	0.118*** (0.021)
<i>Central Anatolia - West Black Sea - East Black Sea</i>					
Forced migrant	0.874*** (0.103)	-0.047* (0.026)	0.014 (0.024)	0.041* (0.021)	0.101*** (0.013)
Observations	14,845	14,847	14,847	14,847	14,847
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each column reports the effect of forced migration on respondents' educational outcomes for placebo conflict regions. The sample consists of individuals born before 2000. Women born or raised in one of the Eastern provinces are excluded. Column (1) shows the effect on total years of schooling for all displaced women. Column (2) estimates the effect of being displaced under age 12 on primary school completion. Columns (3) – (5) takes displaced women under age 15, 18, and 30, respectively. Each panel differs in terms of placebo conflict regions. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameter of interest β is reported. All regressions control for the following covariates and fixed effects: age, age squared, a dummy for being Kurdish taken 1 if the mother tongue of either the mother or the father of the respondent was Kurdish, dummies for mother ever attend a school, mother's and father's at least primary and secondary school completion, childhood province, childhood place, and their interactions, NUTS1 level current region dummies, and dataset fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by childhood province.

*, **, *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Source: 2008, 2013, and 2018 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The decades-long battle between the Turkish state and PKK has brought about many dire consequences. As of the early 1980s, the armed conflict in the southeast of Turkey has caused the region to become an economically and socially uninhabitable place and forced migration of at least 1 million people from their villages to urban centers or western provinces due to increasing security problems and pressures by either security forces or PKK. The displaced people have been almost left to their fate. The government has been insufficient to meet their material and mental damages, and they had to struggle with many obstacles, especially chronic poverty, and unemployment. In this paper, we particularly focus on the displaced women and young girls, the most vulnerable group affected by the conflict.

We analyze the long-term effects of internal displacement on the educational attainments of migrant women. Our results suggest that being displaced at school age distorts their long-term educational outcomes. Specifically, displacement decreases total years of schooling by about 1 year and this decline mostly comes from the decrease in the probability of primary and secondary school completion.

When we asked the question of what these girls do rather than going to school, we find that one of the underlying reasons is that they work to contribute to the income of their families, who are struggling with poverty and unemployment. Being displaced before the age of 15 increases the probability of starting to work before the age of 15 by 4.6 percentage points. Alternatively, we test whether being displaced before 15-year-old affects first marriage outcomes as a reason for dropping out of

school. We find statistically insignificant but meaningful evidence: Displaced girls are more likely to become child brides, marry at a younger age, and their families are less likely to take the girls' consent in their first marriage.

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APPENDIX




Figure 2: Migration for security reasons from NUTS1 regions between 1984-99




Figure 3: Place of migration for security reasons between 1984-99 from East and Southeast Anatolia

Table 10: Effect of forced migration on labor market outcomes

VARIABLES	TURKEY			EAST		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In Labor Force	Currently Employed	Ever Worked	In Labor Force	Currently Employed	Ever Worked
Panel A. Reason: Security only						
All						
Forced migrant	-0.036* (0.021)	-0.050*** (0.019)	0.013 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.059*** (0.021)	0.042 (0.025)
Migration Age < 12						
Forced migrant	-0.018 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.024)	0.004 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.039)	-0.041 (0.030)	0.031 (0.032)
Migration Age < 15						
Forced migrant	-0.020 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.021)	0.017 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.024)	0.049* (0.024)
Migration Age < 18						
Forced migrant	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.038* (0.020)	0.023 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.035)	-0.048** (0.023)	0.056* (0.028)
Migration Age < 30						
Forced migrant	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.051*** (0.019)	0.014 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.026)	-0.061*** (0.021)	0.043* (0.024)
Panel B. Reason: Any (except marriage)						
All						
Forced migrant	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.027 (0.016)	0.011 (0.018)
Migration Age < 12						
Forced migrant	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.030 (0.023)	0.012 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.038)	-0.042 (0.029)	0.041 (0.033)
Migration Age < 15						
Forced migrant	0.013 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.019)	0.020 (0.026)	0.035 (0.026)	0.006 (0.022)	0.053* (0.030)
Migration Age < 18						
Forced migrant	0.016 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.019)	0.017 (0.024)	0.040 (0.029)	0.007 (0.021)	0.047* (0.025)
Migration Age < 30						
Forced migrant	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.034** (0.015)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.017)	0.017 (0.019)
Mean of outcome	0.379	0.299	0.549	0.257	0.192	0.392
Observations	21,982	21,980	21,980	6,716	6,716	6,716
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Current Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Place FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child. Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DHS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 11: Variable definitions

VARIABLES	DEFINITION
Age	The respondent's current age at the time of the survey
Kurdish	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's mother tongue is Kurdish; 0, otherwise
Village (Childhood)	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's childhood place is a village/subdistrict; 0, otherwise
Mother - School Attendance	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's mother has ever attended a school; 0, otherwise
Mother - Primary School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's mother completed at least primary school; 0, otherwise
Mother - Secondary School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's mother completed at least secondary school; 0, otherwise
Father - Primary School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's father completed at least primary school; 0, otherwise
Father - Secondary School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's father completed at least secondary school; 0, otherwise
Years of Schooling	Total years of schooling the respondent has received
Literacy	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has ever attended school (a proxy for being literate)
Primary School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has completed at least primary school; 0, otherwise
Secondary School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has completed at least secondary school; 0, otherwise
High School	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has completed at least high school; 0, otherwise
Higher Education	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has completed at least university; 0, otherwise

Table 11 (cont'd)

Labor Force Participation	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is either employed or looking for a job; 0, otherwise
Employed	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is employed; 0, otherwise
Ever Worked	A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent has worked at least once; 0, otherwise
