

ANALYTICAL ESSAY

Transfer 2.0: Applying the Concept of Transfer from Track-Two Workshops to Inclusive Peace Negotiations

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This article argues that the scholarly study of “transfer” from track-two workshops to track-one negotiations is highly applicable to the study of transfer from other modalities of participation to track-one in inclusive peace negotiations. During the last decade, other approaches to make negotiations more inclusive have also been increasingly employed, such as national dialogue conferences, variety of consultation mechanisms, or a diverse set of peace commissions. In this paper, we aim to expand the conceptualization of transfer beyond ICR workshops and discuss how the knowledge accumulated concerning transfer in the ICR literature during the last decades can be applied to understand and evaluate transfer from other inclusion modalities used in peace negotiations today. We therefore make a distinction between the first generation of transfer (1.0) developed by the ICR workshops scholars and practitioners and the transfer process from other modalities used in inclusive negotiations (2.0). To apply the lessons learned from transfer 1.0 to 2.0, we start with an overview of the concept as developed in track-two literature. We then suggest a conceptualization of transfer 2.0, based on insights from how it has unfolded in five of the seven inclusion modalities examined in our comparative case study. We discuss the similarities and differences between transfer 1.0 and 2.0 and how transfer 2.0 can be studied, including and beyond track-two initiatives. We conclude by suggesting a number of directions for future research on transfer 2.0 that are relevant to several inclusion modalities.

Keywords: inclusive peace negotiations, track-two diplomacy, transfer

Introduction

A vibrant literature has developed in the conflict resolution field during the last couple of decades around the concept of “transfer” from track-two initiatives to

track-one negotiations and decision-making.¹ Transfer, in the context of track-two diplomacy, refers to a process in which ideas and outcomes from track-two workshops move to and influence formal, high-level, so-called track-one negotiations (upward transfer) or move public opinion and impact the conflict-at-large (downward transfer).² This process has been discussed under different terms like “transfer” (Kelman 1972; Fisher 1997, 2005; Chataway 2002; Cuhadar 2009; Mitchell 2009; Jones 2015), “dissemination” (Cuhadar and Dayton 2012), and “critical juncture” (Volkan, Montville, and Julius 1991). Overall, tracing the impact of track-two initiatives beyond the immediate workshop environment on the macro level, be it on track-one negotiations or public attitudes, has proved to be a difficult and non-straightforward task (Kelman 1996; Rouhana 2000; Fisher 2005).

Track-two diplomacy³ (also known as interactive-conflict resolution workshops [ICR]) is often used to supplement the official negotiations taking place in peace processes. The method has been systematically defined and has evolved since the 1960s, with the help of scholars and diplomats like John Burton, Leonard Doob, Herb Kelman, Ronald Fisher, and Joe Montville. It has been applied by diplomats, scholar-practitioners, and conflict resolution NGOs in various armed conflicts around the world. The ICR workshop approach has become an integral part of the conflict resolution repertoire today, as it is used extensively by NGOs, think tanks, international and regional organizations, and track-one negotiators in order to test ideas in an unofficial and flexible setting.

During the last decade, mutual acceptance and cooperation between track-two and track-one have improved tremendously, and other approaches necessitating effective connections between different and multiple levels of mediation and peacebuilding have also been increasingly employed, such as national dialogue conferences, a variety of consultation mechanisms, or a diverse set of peace commissions. These have all been added to the mediation and peacebuilding repertoire of intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN and OSCE) and nongovernmental organizations, following an increasing awareness of the need for “inclusive” or participatory peace processes.⁴

In fact, the need for a multilayered peace process connecting different levels of society—all the way from track-one to grassroots—has long been advocated by the pioneers in the field. Almost three decades ago, Harold Saunders called for “circumnegotiation” (1996) and “public peace process” (1999), in which he mapped a dialogue methodology for how to engage citizens in a peace process in addition to the elites. Fisher (1997) highlighted the need for connecting track-two dialogues with wider segments of the society to prepare them for peace. Diamond and McDonald (1996) in a similar spirit suggested a multitrack diplomacy approach aiming to integrate different societal actors into a peace process. John Paul Lederach (1997) came up with his now famous pyramid model connecting track-two dialogues with the other two levels and activities of peacebuilding at track-one and grassroots levels. Three decades since these pioneering works suggested ways to integrate the public into a peace process to increase its legitimacy, a peace process architecture

¹ These terms are used interchangeably throughout this article, even though each concept has evolved separately in the literature.

² Herbert Kelman and Ron Fisher are the first scholars who pointed to the complexity of this process and used the concept of “transfer” in their writing on problem-solving workshops.

³ In this paper, we use the term track-two diplomacy in a broader sense, referring to and interchangeable with interactive conflict-resolution workshops (Fisher 1997), interactive problem-solving workshops (Kelman 1995), or unofficial diplomacy (Volkan 1991). We also include workshops at different levels of participation, called track-one-and-a-half (high-level participation) or track three (grassroots participation), under this term. For more information, see Paffenholz (2010).

⁴ For an example of a policy document on the need for inclusion, for example, see the UN and World Bank report “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018. For an empirical analysis of civil society inclusion, see Nilsson (2012) and Paffenholz (2014).

that connects multiple levels and societal actors has become commonly accepted in principle and in practice.

This paper argues that the present-day well-accepted principle of inclusive mediation and negotiation processes also invites scholars to revisit their thinking about “transfer.” In today’s landscape of mediation and peacebuilding, the concept of transfer is not only relevant to track-two–track-one linkages but is also highly applicable to the connection between other modalities of inclusion engaging civil society, the public, and other actors with track-one. Multiple inclusion modalities exist—such as a variety of different formal or informal consultative mechanisms or peace process commissions that take place during and after negotiations (Paffenholz 2014). In this paper, we treat ICR workshops as one such modality of inclusion in a peace process, among other modalities that help include civil society and the wider public.

The focus on inclusion in the international mediation community has changed track-one actors’ perceptions of conflict resolution and management interventions.⁵ Consider the early writings of John Burton and Joe Montville, for instance, where there are numerous indications that track-two is perceived as a marginal activity by diplomats, one that often meddles with the work of official diplomats (Chataway 1998; Cuhadar Gürkaynak 2007). Diplomats no longer see civil society and citizens’ role in peace processes as marginal. On the contrary, international organizations like the UN and the OSCE frequently collaborate with conflict-resolution NGOs that are facilitating supplementary track-two workshops, or the UN and OSCE even fund and organize track-two processes.⁶ Track-two workshops have become a legitimate and widely used approach in peace processes around the world. However, despite this recognition, the question of *how* to transfer most effectively from track-two to track-one lingers. Furthermore, with increasing attention to inclusive peace processes within international policy circles, the question is equally relevant for transfer from public consultations, inclusive commissions, and parallel civil society forums to track-one as it is for transfer from ICR workshops to track-one.

In this paper, we aim to expand the conceptualization of transfer beyond ICR workshops and discuss how the knowledge accumulated concerning transfer in the ICR literature during the last decades can be applied to understand and evaluate transfer from other inclusion modalities used in peace negotiations today. When scholarship and research on transfer developed in track-two literature, the attitudes and norms toward peace processes were quite different. The pioneering work of track-two scholars promoted the need to connect track-two and track-one levels; and they did this in an environment when civil society and citizen involvement in peace processes were not necessarily welcomed or practiced within international organizations and the diplomatic community. Today, broader societal inclusion is not only accepted as a common principle, it is also practiced widely in peace processes and even promoted by track-one actors. Therefore, we need a new way of looking into the concept of transfer, taking into account the current complex, multifaceted nature of peace processes, which are designed with broader inclusion in mind and often with multiple modalities of participation in parallel.

We therefore make a distinction between the first generation of the scholarly literature around transfer (transfer 1.0) developed by the ICR workshops scholars and scholar/practitioners and the transfer process around inclusive negotiations, which we refer to as transfer 2.0. To apply the lessons learned from transfer 1.0 to

⁵ An example of this would be the UN Guidance on Effective Mediation, which can be accessed at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf. For other relevant UN documents see UN Security Council 2009.

⁶ An example is from Libya in 2018, where the UN mission to Libya commissioned the conduct of a country-wide, local-level National Dialogue Consultation Process to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (hd), a mediation NGO. Another example is the OSCE organized and funded track-two workshops between women parliamentarians from Serbia and Kosovo, known as the Budva Process. See <https://www.osce.org/serbia/159091>.

2.0, we start with an overview of the concept as developed in track-two literature. We then suggest a conceptualization of transfer 2.0, based on insights from how it has unfolded in four of the seven inclusion modalities examined in the case studies. We discuss the similarities and differences between transfer 1.0 and 2.0 and how transfer 2.0 can be studied, including and beyond track-two initiatives. We conclude by suggesting a number of directions for future research on transfer 2.0 that is relevant to several inclusion modalities.

Our propositions are based on a comparative case study project covering forty peace and transition negotiation cases from around the world. The study builds on Paffenholz's (2014) framework encompassing various modalities of broader inclusion in peace negotiations, among which high-level track-two (also known as track-one-and-a-half) workshops were one of the inclusion modalities examined. Other inclusion modalities examined were direct representation at the table (including mostly formally mandated national dialogues); observer status; formal, informal, or public consultations; inclusive commissions; referenda; and mass action. After collecting data on the aforementioned modalities of broader inclusion, the project also looked into the consequences of broader inclusion, focusing on what affects the quality and sustainability of peace agreements. A variety of themes related to the modalities were systematically examined across these cases. Among these themes were the initiation of inclusion, role of third party, selection procedures, decision-making rules, and transfer mechanisms used (between the modality and track-one negotiations). It is this comprehensive lens we have adopted in studying the transfer process that led us to realize the need for a 2.0 version of the concept.

We launch from two main premises: (a) transfer is highly relevant to other inclusion modalities as well in addition to ICR workshops; and (b) that transfer 1.0 developed in the ICR literature is a useful and relevant concept to study the link between other modalities of inclusion and track-one negotiations. Just like in ICR workshops, the objective in other modalities is the same: a microlevel intervention (i.e., bringing the representatives of either small size elite or large size societal groups together) in an interactive format with the intention of generating a variety of outcomes (e.g., recommendations, draft proposals, ideas for implementation, and positive relationships) to eventually influence the macrolevel.⁷ Macrolevel can either be the official track-one negotiations (i.e., upward transfer) or the public opinion (i.e., downward transfer). Like in ICR workshops, these modalities are interactive and often take place outside of the official realm of track-one talks, though some may be formally mandated. We are aware that using the concept of transfer limits what we can study in the context of inclusive peace negotiations. For instance, its relevance does not apply to all of Paffenholz's inclusion modalities, such as referendum (public decision-making), direct representation at the table (except national dialogues), observer status, and mass action. In the case of observer status, although transfer is theoretically relevant to this modality, our case studies engendered very limited evidence (only pertaining to women in Liberian talks) on how outcomes are transferred from observers to the macro level. Hence, we take a cautious stance on this modality, even though we still present our limited findings, especially concerning the use of media by observers later in the article. In sum, the usefulness of the transfer concept is especially limited to those inclusion modalities that take place away from the negotiation table but seeking to influence the negotiation table.

What Do We Already Know about the “Transfer” Process?

Track-two is often defined as “a variety of nongovernmental and unofficial forms of conflict resolution activities between the representatives of adversarial groups that aim at de-escalating conflict, improving communication and understanding

⁷ For more information on the micro- and macrolevel language used in a track-two context, see Rouhana 2000.

between the parties, and developing new ideas to be used in the official peace processes" (Montville 1991).

There has been an inflation of concepts in the scholarly writing about track-two workshops, including but not limited to track-one-and-a-half, track-two, track three, ICR, sustained dialogue, unofficial diplomacy, and multitrack diplomacy. There are also numerous attempts to categorize and conceptualize within these concepts. Agha et al. (2003), Chigas (2005), Jones (2015), and Cuhadar (2009) are among those who identified different levels of ICR workshops depending on the type of participants and purpose of the initiative. Agha et al. classified them as hard track-two and soft track-two, depending on the purpose and type of participants. Cuhadar (2009) categorized them according to two dimensions: the level of participants in the interactive workshop (grassroots, midlevel, and quasi-official) and during what stage of the conflict the workshop is held (preventive, prenegotiation, negotiation, postconflict). Paffenholz (2010) introduced the concepts of first- and second-generation track-two, where first generation refers to workshops with a small group of participants close to the parties to the conflict, and the objective is primarily to influence the negotiations. This type is also known as track-one-and-a-half diplomacy (Nan, Druckman, and Horr 2009). Second generation focuses more on building destroyed relationships in a society. Also known as "people-to-people" programs, these have become an essential part of peacebuilding practice, bringing together a wide range of societal actors. In a more recent attempt to classify different types of track-two initiatives, Jones placed all types of track-two workshops on a continuum, with track-one (official diplomacy) at one end, followed by track-one-and-a-half (hard track-two in Agha et al.), track-two (soft track-two in Agha et al.), and finally, at the other end of the continuum, multitrack diplomacy and track three (also referred to as people-to-people) (2015, 23).

Regardless of the type of participants attending, two underlying features of track-two cut across different subcategories, according to Cuhadar (2009). First is the underlying belief that contact and interaction between the members of adversarial groups in a small group setting, which is unofficial and friendly, and often facilitated by a third party, help improve relations and generate a joint understanding of the conflict.⁸ Second, improved relations and jointly formulated ideas are intended to be transferred to the society and/or the official policymaking processes. Peter Jones (2015, 23) mentioned several additional features common to all types of ICR: workshops are not debates but involve a problem-solving methodology where participants step back from their official positions and explore; workshop participants are encouraged to explore the underlying needs, interests, and deep-seated roots of the conflict; workshops are not one-off but sustained; and workshops are conducted in confidence, if not in secrecy.

A number of key features distinguish track-two and track-one-and-a-half from ICR workshops held with grassroots participants or people-to-people. First, their representatives are influential people who are not official but have access to official decision-makers. Second, the purpose of the problem-solving activity is to influence policy.⁹ It aims to generate new ideas and insights about conflicts that could then be helpful for policymakers conducting track-one negotiations. It also aims to contribute to change in the political culture of the conflicting parties (Kelman 1996; Chataway 1998; Fisher 2005).

⁸ One of the theories in social-psychology that influenced the development of ICR and its theory of change has been contact hypothesis. Contact theory has been extensively researched as a prejudice reduction method; some of its key learnings have been used in ICR in addition to other theories in social-psychology exploring intergroup conflicts. For more information on this theory see Pettigrew 1998; for its application to the track-two see Cuhadar and Dayton 2011 and Fisher 1997.

⁹ It is especially these last two aspects that distinguish track-two and track-one-and-a-half from grassroots level dialogue efforts or what is also called as track three (Jones 2015; Chigas 2005).

The purpose of the workshop and the theory of change adopted are highly pertinent to transfer, as the overall intended impact of the track-two initiative is closely related to *what* is going to be transferred and to *whom*. Transfer can be envisaged in different directions, which can take place simultaneously or sequentially (Fisher 1997; Cuhadar 2009). According to Cuhadar (2009), track-two effects could diffuse into the grassroots and societal level (downward), into the decision-making and negotiation level (upward), or into other track-two initiatives or civil society organizations (sideways). Even though ICR workshops take place with participants from all levels of society, research conducted on track-two diplomacy has thus far mostly focused on workshops that are conducted with high-level participants, often as part of a prenegotiation strategy (Fisher 1989, 2005; Keashly and Fisher 1996; Saunders 1996; Nan 1999; Lieberfeld 2002; Cuhadar 2009; Jones 2015). Track-two diplomacy is usually seen as preparing the groundwork for and facilitating formal negotiations, especially when they are stuck and in need of support to be resumed. Fisher (1989, 207; 2006) has argued that workshops can be used to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations and to help develop new ideas and establish a framework for negotiations by providing parties with a low-risk opportunity to evaluate the feasibility of more formal negotiations and to determine the basis of future activity. Jones has proposed a comprehensive typology with regard to transfer (2015, 153). He has suggested that the target of transfer for track-one-and-a-half and hard track-two is elite decision-makers, via specific policy proposals and the transfer of people to the track-one negotiations; whereas track-two and soft track-two would naturally target decision-makers again, but this time via civil society, adding tools such as public education and training to policy proposals and transfer of people. Finally, track three (or people-to-people) targets grassroots and civil society activists.¹⁰

In reality, transfer from track-two diplomacy to track-one has proved quite difficult to trace empirically. The optimism of initial scholar-practitioners (e.g., Burton 1969), who saw the inclusion of “influential participants” as adequate for transfer, has become unsatisfactory in attempting to understand what actually goes on concerning transfer. Burton thought that getting the key ideas and insights from the track-two workshops, which he called controlled communication, to the decision-makers would help resolve the conflict. Soon enough all scholar-practitioners realized that this was naïve and ignored the complexity of a peace process. Most of the time, decision-makers and politicians are divided over an issue: some support the new insights and ideas and are motivated to negotiate a mutually satisfying agreement; others strongly resist any attempt to resolve the conflict in order to preserve the status quo. Thus, *which* decision-maker is a key contingency in transfer success, and impact is often a result of political bargaining. Mitchell (1981, 2009) has recognized the impact of the complexity of a peace process in relation to track-two, but the literature is still thin in conceptualizing how complexity impacts transfer from track-two to track-one.

Burton’s idea of transfer was later developed by d’Estree et al., Kelman, Fisher, Rouhana, and others with empirical feedback. Kelman (1995), based on many years’ work on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, identified the following methods of transfer: developing cadres of people to take part in future track-one negotiations, providing specific substance input into a negotiation process, and developing a political environment in which negotiations may be possible. His definition of transfer clearly remains centered on decision-making and focused on the agreement-making phase of a negotiation process. It does not consider other phases, such as implementation.

¹⁰ It is important to keep in mind that these are general typologies intended to stimulate discussion in the case, and each specific case may be different.

Because of early practitioners' focus on impacting the decision-making and agreement negotiation, transfer from track-two initiatives concentrated mainly on the selection of participants and their closeness to track-one actors. The argument is that the closer the participants were to decision-makers, the greater their impact would be on the negotiations (e.g., [Mitchell 1993](#); [Kelman 1996](#); [Fisher 1997](#)). However, a growing number of empirical studies on the transfer process have shown that this relationship is not straightforward and that there are other conditions affecting the success of transfer. Kraft pointed out an autonomy dilemma that exists in track-two: while closeness to track-one grants access to privileged information and elevated levels of influence, it puts a brake on critical thinking and quality of analysis ([Kraft 2000](#), 346). [Keashly and Fisher \(1996\)](#) and [Nan \(1999\)](#) argued, respectively, that the timing of track-two, and the coordination capacity between track-one and track-two, are critical factors.

Ron Fisher, in a comparative case study of a number of well-regarded ICR workshops, identified conditions that facilitate transfer. He listed the nature of the conflict, the power balance between the adversaries, the stage of the conflict, and the culture of conflict (2005 207–8). In his study of track-two workshops in Southeast Asia, [Capie \(2010\)](#) argued that transfer is most likely during times of change when track-one is in search of new ideas that can address the needs of the moment. Cuhadar's comparative study of four Israeli–Palestinian track-two processes, where she controlled variables related to the nature of the conflict and the type of the ICR methodology, also identified conditions in which transfer is more likely ([Cuhadar 2009](#)). In addition to the willingness of the decision-makers to push for track-two insights during the negotiations, she found that asymmetrical transfer (i.e., transfer to one of the conflict parties only) is an important obstacle to an effective transfer process. When transfer is asymmetric on either side, regardless of the closeness of participants to the decision-makers, its success is hampered.

Recent research has also highlighted the range and variety of transfer mechanisms and strategies used by parties and practitioners. Other than the selection of influential participants, third-party mediators in the peace process were found to be highly effective in the transfer process. [Cuhadar \(2009\)](#) found that the role of the United States and other mediators was key in transferring some of the insights from track-two workshops to track-one negotiations in the Israeli–Palestinian case. In addition to official mediators, [Agha et al. \(2003\)](#) found that a high-level insider politician, as political mentor or chaperone of the track-two process, is “key.”

[Fisher \(2005, 225\)](#) has pointed out other key mechanisms of transfer, such as personal contacts with track-one people, private briefings and memos sent to leaders and to members of the public administration, and speeches, op-eds, and interviews to reach out to the public. [Cuhadar \(2009, 654\)](#) identified multiple transfer mechanisms in her research on Israeli–Palestinian track-two initiatives, grouping them as “insider” or “outsider” strategies, following [Fitzduff and Church's \(2004\)](#) concept of “insider” versus “outsider” strategies used for NGOs and their relation to public policy. Transfer mechanisms identified as “insider strategies” were: exporting key influential participants from track-two initiatives to negotiations and policymaking institutions (which overlaps with Kelman's idea of developing cadres); contacts and consultations with decision-makers and/or official mediators; serving as advisors to policy-makers in negotiation teams; and creating and sending artifacts comprised of ideas, maps, and policy recommendations for decision-makers' attention ([Cuhadar 2009, 654](#)). “Outsider strategies” included strategies that mainly targeted public opinion, such as using media for transfer. Recent research has also shown that there is a slight inclination toward using outsider strategies more than insider strategies for transfer. [Cuhadar and Dayton's \(2012\)](#) study with track-two practitioners in the Israeli–Palestinian context and [Cuhadar's \(2016\)](#) survey with 120 track-two practitioners around the world give an idea about not only the range of

transfer mechanisms used by practitioners but also how frequently each one is preferred. The survey lists the transfer methods from most preferred (with 5 being the highest value) to least preferred by practitioners indicated by the mean preference scores in parenthesis. There is a strong preference for involving media as an outsider strategy (4.13) as the most common way of transfer reported by practitioners. The rest, in the order of more to less frequent, are participants transferring results (4.01), publishing reports (3.98), lobbying (3.93), participants taking part in official negotiation delegations (3.52), and using third parties for transfer (i.e., mediators) (3.29).¹¹

Thanks to these studies, we have a better understanding of the variety of strategies used for transfer by practitioners and the conditions that facilitate or inhibit transfer. However, documenting the ultimate impact of track-two remains a challenging task. We still have limited understanding of which strategy works most effectively and under what conditions. On the other hand, while research conducted so far is useful and vital, it may never take us to a highly generalizable theory of transfer that allows for a parsimonious explanation.

Considering the research so far, there seems to be a difference between the impact of the first-generation and second-generation track-two initiatives. The former aims at track-one negotiations and policymaking, while the latter aims at societal change and conflict transformation writ large. The first generation tends to prefer elites, influential participants, and outcome-oriented track-two initiatives (Cuhadar and Dayton 2012; Jones 2015) as the predominant transfer strategy. Findings suggest that the impact of first-generation track-two (and track-one-and-a-half) initiatives is slightly clearer than for the second generation, as discussed in previous paragraphs. Most researchers agree that track-two initiatives with influential participants made various important contributions to track-one negotiations, in terms of positively affecting either the negotiation/policy outcome or at least the process (e.g., Keashly and Fisher 1996; Kelman 1996; Kriesberg 1996; Fisher 1997; Nan 1999; d'Estree et al. 2001; Lieberfeld 2002; Fisher 2005; Cuhadar 2009; Jones 2015).

Concerning the second generation track-two activities, where the main focus is on influencing society writ large by transforming relationships and reconciliation among stakeholders (Paffenholz 2010; Jones 2015, 153–55; Cuhadar and Dayton 2012), documenting impact is much more challenging. There are a number of studies looking into the effects of people-to-people workshops at the grassroots level, which document individual changes in the participants' beliefs or attitudes either in the short or long term (e.g., Maoz 2000; 2004; Malhotra and Liyanage 2005; Rosen 2007; Cuhadar, Kotelis, and Genc 2015). However, very few studies look at the cumulative effect of the workshops at the societal level, since this is a daunting from the point of view of methodology. An exception is the de Vries and Maoz (2013) study that looked at the overall change in the attitudes of Israelis and Palestinians in society, with the help of a nationwide survey. They concluded that years of people-to-people activity in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict had not had much impact on macrolevel indicators regarding support for peace. Bar-Tal, Rosen, and Nets-Zehngut (2009) also suggested, looking into Israeli–Palestinian peace education projects, that the approach works when the general direction is progress toward peace, and there is support at the leadership level for a peace process. Paffenholz (2010) compared the role of civil society in peacebuilding in thirteen cases and concluded that the impact of grassroots level people-to-people activities is limited. She argues that a limited number of initiatives with small numbers of participants does not neutralize years (sometimes even decades) of mass-level socialization. Most initiatives are scattered, short-term, and fragmented, with participants who are predisposed to engage with the other group. Many initiatives aim

¹¹ See Cuhadar (2016) for more information on the results. The measurement range is 1–5 (five being the highest frequency).

at changing attitudes, yet evidence from Bosnia, Cyprus, and Israel and Palestine demonstrate that attitude change might not be necessary for behavior change, and the apolitical nature of most initiatives frame a deeply political problem as a relationship problem. Paffenholz's (2010) arguments are in line with findings from an experimental study by Rosen (2007) arguing that individual gains are not sustained when the entrenched conflict narratives do not change, and the conflict continues.

In sum, for second-generation track-two, the potential for transfer and impact is more difficult to trace, while there are more examples of documented successful contributions to negotiations for first-generation track-two processes with high-level influentials. However, contrary to earlier scholar-practitioners' expectations, even for first-generation track-two, the transfer process is much more complex and political. The rest of this paper recommends a number of ways to better capture this complexity and, as a result, enhance our understanding of transfer.

Insights from the Broadening Participation Project: Transfer 2.0 in Inclusive Peace Negotiations

In this section, we suggest a number of reasons why transfer can be reconceptualized by scholars and practitioners, beyond its use in the track-two context, to address the challenges of current complex peace processes. In doing so, the next part of the article provides evidence from case studies that suggest new contexts in which this concept is highly relevant and useful. We base these suggestions concerning transfer on findings from the broadening participation in peace negotiations study,¹² which examined different inclusion modalities in forty negotiation cases.¹³ The cases examined adopted a number of inclusion modalities before, during, and/or after the negotiation process. The goal of the study was to understand how, why, and when inclusion takes place in negotiation processes and the factors that facilitate or hinder inclusion. Within this general aim, and in addition to a number of other themes, the study also examined transfer mechanisms from each inclusion modality to track-one negotiations. Thus, to begin with, we suggest that transfer is relevant not only for track-two workshops but to any negotiation process where there is a microlevel process designed away from the track-one negotiation to include civil society, women, armed groups, refugees, etc., with the goal of making a contribution to the negotiation and policymaking process.

In the overall study, high-level problem-solving workshops (track-one-and-a-half or hard track-two) were treated as one of the seven inclusion modalities that facilitate the participation of people other than the few negotiating representatives from conflict parties and integration of their ideas into the track-one negotiations. The first point we should make is that transfer to track-one is relevant to most of the other inclusion modalities (except direct representation in the delegations, observer status, public decision-making, and mass action). Our study concluded that most of the inclusion modalities identified and further examined in the project strive to link official and/or unofficial inclusion initiatives with track-one negotiations. Thus, the concept of transfer should be revisited within the context of discussions concerning inclusion in negotiation processes. First, we provide an overview of all of the modalities of inclusion from Paffenholz (2014) used in the case study research:

¹² For project's web page and summary results, see <https://www.inclusivepeace.org/content/broadening-participation>.

¹³ We use participation and inclusion interchangeably, referring to the participation and contribution of a variety of actors (e.g., civil society, women, opposition parties, armed groups, business)—in addition to the main conflict parties—to the negotiation process.

1. *Direct representation of groups other than the main track-one players at the negotiation table:* This is achieved through a variety of ways. One of the most common processes of direct representation is a “national dialogue” process, in which a new societal and political transition and its documents or institutions are discussed with broad participation of different representatives of the societal groups at the national level. The other common form is the broadening of negotiation delegations to include actors other than main interlocutors.
2. *Observer status:* Participants are granted no other official role in the negotiations but a direct observer presence.
3. *Consultations:* Consultations may take many different forms. They can be official or unofficial; they can be conducted with a specific or elite group or with the broader public. Below are some of the different forms we have identified in the cases:
 - a) *Official consultative forums:* These officially mandated forums run parallel to official negotiations or implementation processes. They are endorsed by the mediators and core decision makers.
 - b) *Informal consultations:* These are consultative mechanisms but lack official endorsement from all the stakeholders. Yet, they still take place parallel to track-one.
 - c) *Public consultations:* Different forms of *public participation*, involving the broader population via public hearings, opinion polls, and “town hall” meetings.
4. *Inclusive commissions:* These commissions involve more societal and political groups. They can be established as postagreement commissions for the implementation of peace agreements, to prepare for and conduct peace processes, or as permanent bodies with various tasks during a peace process, such as human rights, transitional justice, and inquiry.
5. *High-level track-two/track-one-and-a-half workshops:* In this project, we only considered high-level problem-solving workshops during the prenegotiation phase or parallel to official negotiations because of the focus of the project on the official negotiation process.
6. *Public decision-making:* This mechanism takes place usually as referendum and other electoral forms that put major political decisions to binding public vote (e.g., terms of peace agreements, constitutional reforms).
7. *Mass action:* Although this is not a planned inclusion mechanism unlike the previous ones, often we observed that campaigns, demonstrations, street action, protests, and petitions become very instrumental for further inclusion into track-one negotiations.

Transfer from any of the “inclusion modalities” to track-one negotiations is a challenging task for both third parties and participants in five of the seven modalities (the exceptions are public decision-making and mass action, where this is not relevant). In all of these inclusion modalities, however, the goal is the transfer of outcomes to the negotiations (rarely the other way around) and the safeguarding of implementation. Within the modalities, a great variety of options for influencing the track-one negotiations and their implementation were observed. Some overlapped with the transfer strategies used in track-two workshops, but some differed. To reflect and capture this diversity, transfer 2.0 can be defined as the transfer of

outcomes (e.g., recommendations, proposals, positive relationships, ideas, and insights) generated in *any* inclusion modality to contribute to any stage (prenegotiation, agreement phase, and implementation) of negotiations (i.e., upward transfer), as well as transfer of information from specific groups to the populace writ large (i.e., downward transfer).¹⁴ Following this definition, we can examine, for instance, how ideas and insights generated in consultative civil society forums and public consultations, which usually run parallel to track-one talks, are transferred effectively to track-one. Furthermore, in most peace processes, we see different commissions tasked with a variety of responsibilities, from designing a peace process to implementing various aspects of peace agreements. Many of these inclusive commissions are representative groups, but they also work with public hearings and other forms of public participation to incorporate public preferences and ideas into the track-one process. How are recommendations prepared by these inclusive bodies transferred back to track-one?

Transfer is clearly not a problem peculiar to high-level problem-solving workshops, and it is not only the unofficial or indirect nature of the ICR workshops that makes transfer to track-one a challenging process. Indeed, some inclusion modalities are directly (and officially) linked to track-one negotiations, such as national dialogues (e.g., Benin, Yemen) as well as official consultative forums (e.g., Afghanistan, Guatemala), but we still observe in these cases that transferring results to track-one is a challenging task. In some cases, unofficial inclusion modalities have been more effective in transfer than cases where there was a more direct and official mechanism of inclusion. An example of the former is the negotiations around post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, where the main channel of transfer for the ideas put forward by civil society and the business community was informal consultations and contact with the mediators and negotiators. Kofi Annan, the mediator, mainly used informal consultations during the negotiations (modality 3b above) because the main conflict parties were resistant to the official inclusion of civil society actors in the negotiation process. The inclusion mechanism was not officially mandated, and less direct, but the consultations were nevertheless highly effective in influencing the negotiations.

Contrary to the above example, in Nepal, representatives of various societal groups were at the negotiation table (in a national dialogue). However, they failed to reach an agreement on the new constitution (despite two extended terms) and failed to finalize the new constitution, and, later in the process, the traditional political leaders took over and pushed their own version of the constitution. Likewise, in Egypt, a national dialogue process was officially mandated, with the half-hearted blessing of track-one. Here too, the traditional power-holders were resistant to change that would come out of this process and saw it mainly as a tool to enhance their legitimacy and for short-term political gain rather than as a mechanism to genuinely create an inclusive peaceful transition in the country. This demonstration that transfer is difficult even in direct track-one mandated inclusion mechanisms challenges one of the main assumptions discussed earlier, that “the closer the participants are to the decision-makers, the more direct the transfer will be” and provides support to the autonomy dilemma voiced by Kraft. The motivation of decision-makers in endorsing or taking part in an inclusive process, which may be simply to buy time, is more important than how closely the participants are situated to the track-one process. Where the motivation is to buy time or gain legitimacy, rather than seriously consider ideas and insights from track-two, closeness to the negotiation table is not necessarily an effective strategy to maximize transfer.

We have traced some degree of successful transfer to track-one in fifteen of the forty cases and within different inclusion modalities. Many different societal actors influenced track-one negotiations, such as organized grassroots women’s groups,

¹⁴ We only focus on upward transfer in this paper.

other civil society groups, political parties, clan or religious leaders, and business people. It is important to note that transfer does not necessarily mean that the outcome from the inclusion modality *directly* affected the outcome of the negotiation or that *every* issue was transferred. Sometimes the impact was limited to a specific issue, such as including provisions on women's rights, other times it was broader, such as the acceptance of a general principle for negotiations, but there was some degree of impact on the negotiation outcome.

With this definition of transfer 2.0, we turn to a discussion of what is transferred, to whom, how, and in what sense our research findings are similar to the way these questions are tackled in track-two scholarship. We focus on transfer to track-one in this paper.

Beginning with "what," we observed a variety of outcomes that have become the subject of transfer. Outcomes transferred from other inclusion modalities to track-one are similar to those transferred from ICR workshops, as mentioned in the works of d'Estree et al., Cuhadar, Fisher, Jones, Kelman, and Mitchell. These are: insights about the perspective of the other party in the conflict, or the negotiation flexibility of conflict parties on issues; policy recommendations, proposals, and options; key participants and people; and data and evidence-based findings, such as joint analysis of the conflict on the ground.

We also observed the transfer of some novel and different outcomes not mentioned in the previous track-two literature. The first is the transfer of norm-based outcomes, such as gender quotas. These outcomes transferred by women into track-one were supported by international legal frameworks on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the inclusion of women's input into peace agreements. Such inputs transferred to track-one negotiations were shaped in and recommended as a result of women-only, problem-solving workshops (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]) or in consultations with women groups (e.g., Kenya). Enhancing women's participation in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was a concern for the international community, and thus, a "declaration and plan of action for all women," which was shaped in the ICR workshops with women participants, was one of the major outcomes targeted for transfer into track-one (Rogier 2004).

Second, most of the time, a "negotiated agreement" format is eschewed for transfer in track-two, as has also been suggested by Jones (2015), but is not always avoided in other modalities. The rationale for the avoidance has been that most of the time, political parties want to maintain their political space for maneuver. This was still the preference in some of our case studies involving ICR workshops as an inclusion modality (e.g., the high-level problem-solving workshops regarding the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict). However, in other modalities, such as consultation mechanisms, we also observed that the mediator sometimes encouraged the participants of that consultation to come up with an agreement articulating a joint position, in order to be able to forward a less fragmented input to track-one. For instance, in negotiations in Kenya and the DRC, the mediator encouraged the fragmented women's groups to come up with a joint statement in consultations reflecting their unified voice before this was transferred to track-one. Another example is, in the parallel civil society forum to the 2001 Bonn Afghanistan negotiations, the mediator pushed the civil society participants to come up with a joint statement.

The third novel outcome for transfer relates to the stage of the negotiation. Most of the literature on track-two scholarship has focused on the prenegotiation and negotiation stages, hence it finds that what is transferred mainly concerns these stages. However, we observed that some outcomes transferred are specifically about the implementation stage. For instance, in some cases, recommendations and reports transferred were specifically concerned with the monitoring and implementation of an agreement, such as breaches of an agreement.

Concerning "to whom" transfer takes place, there are again similarities and differences between the track-two workshops and our findings from a range of other

inclusion modalities. We found that transfer is generally not unidirectional. Transfer is both multidirectional and multidimensional. Often, there are simultaneously multiple targets of transfer.

Among the multiple actors that we observe as targets of transfer in our cases, the most commonly observed targets are government bodies and actors, which are often mentioned in the track-two literature. Our cases have great variety within the governmental actors targeted. Sometimes the target of transfer is the parliament or assembly (e.g., the Jirga in the case of Afghanistan or the Peace Secretariat in the case of Sri Lanka), at other times it is the office of the president (e.g., Burundi, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan) or military (e.g., Egypt). Governmental negotiation delegations, negotiation committees or teams, and national peace conferences are among the track-one bodies most commonly targeted for transfer. In addition to governmental bodies, and again similar to the track-two literature, we observed that mediators and other third-party actors in the negotiations are very common targets of transfer. In more than half of the cases (twenty-one out of forty), the third party was considered by participants as a key mechanism for transfer. Most of the time, this third party was the official mediator (UN or other), but sometimes third-party facilitators organizing the inclusion modality were targeted, such as the UNDP, or NGOs like the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Another similarity with track-two workshops concerns the media. We found that the media was the target of transfer in around half of the cases examined, and the heavy reliance on media to transfer outcomes is parallel to the findings discussed in [Cuhadar's \(2016\)](#) study. In some cases, the media was even included as a participant of an inclusion modality, such as in national dialogues (e.g., Yemen), in problem-solving workshops (e.g., Georgia-Abkhazia), or having observer status (e.g., Tajikistan). Media was used as a transfer target in our observer status inclusion modality. Observers prepared statements and presented them not only to mediators and conflict parties but also to the media. This was the case in negotiations in Liberia. In other cases, media received outcomes in order for them to be publicized and reach a wider constituency. For instance, during the civil society consultative forum held in Afghanistan during the Bonn negotiations of 2001, regular information exchange took place between the civil society forum and the media. In the beginning, it was difficult for the facilitation team of the civil society forum to control the exchange with the media, but an official procedure was eventually agreed. The communication with the media was systematically used to put pressure on the track-one negotiation parties to reach an agreement whenever the negotiations were in a critical stage. Moreover, targeted press releases or media interviews were used to put certain issues on the negotiation agenda.

We also identified a number of actors that are targeted for transfer that are not mentioned frequently in the track-two literature. For instance, in the cases of Aceh, Darfur, and Mexico (Chiapas conflict), armed opposition groups were targeted. International actors were also targeted, such as international observers of the negotiations or friends groups, like in the cases of Afghanistan, Georgia-Abkhazia, and Somalia (2001-2005).

Concerning the how of transfer, again we see a number of differences as well as similarities between the track-two literature and our findings from other inclusion modalities. First, in the context of inclusion modalities, it is necessary to specify how transfer occurs for each modality.

Transfer from consultations, either officially mandated or informal (modalities 3a and 3b) to track-one is perhaps the most similar to transfer from ICR workshops to track-one. In officially mandated consultative forums, which were most often composed of civil society actors, there was rarely a direct link between the forum and track-one negotiations. Even though they are officially mandated, the link to track-one is most often neither direct nor planned carefully (e.g., the parallel civil society forum in Afghanistan). One of the rare cases of a direct link between the two tracks

was the Civil Society Assembly (CSA) in Guatemala, where the assembly prepared documents by consensus on different themes pertaining to the negotiations and then passed them on to the track-one negotiations. The content of these consensus-based documents was to a large extent included in the peace agreement, some of which addressed the root causes of the conflict, such as human rights violations and the rights of indigenous populations, including some proposals relating to socioeconomic and agrarian reform. This impact happened at the expense of the land-owning elites in the country, who opposed these reforms, boycotted, and did not participate in the CSA. Eventually, the socioeconomic reforms were largely ignored as the government gave in to pressure from the economic elite. Therefore, even though there was direct transfer from the CSA to track-one, it was these aspects of the agreement that also happened to be most difficult to implement due to the opposition from the powerful elite.¹⁵

The Guatemala example also illustrates that there is too much focus on “transfer process” rather than “transfer quality,” that is whether what is transferred addresses the root causes of the conflict or not and thereby lays the foundation for peaceful societies. The current track-two literature puts little emphasis on the quality of transfer and the implementation rate of peace agreements but rather sees track-two as providing track-one with new ideas, insights, and improving relations that will enable or sustain track-one. When we look at the forty case studies, and the Guatemala example in particular, we observe that even if transfer to track-one is successful, it does not mean that the quality of transfer is the case, which can be essential for the sustainability of agreements done at the track-one level. Issues suggested by societal or political groups outside of the track-one negotiations are often against the interests of some of the key power-holders in the society, as exemplified in the Guatemala example.

In other cases of officially mandated consultative forums, transfer to track-one frequently involved an intermediary actor or process. This intermediary was usually the official mediator. The civil society forums passed their proposals to the mediators, and proposals found a place at the negotiation table through these mediators. This was the case in the Afghanistan Bonn negotiations, in the Doha negotiations over Darfur, and in Kyrgyzstan. Sometimes, the proposal was voted in the consultative forum and then passed on to the mediator, so that the mediator could use the vote result as leverage for both the government and the opposition group in track-one negotiations. In Kyrgyzstan and northern Mali, civil society input was realized through intermediary governmental bodies. In Kyrgyzstan, the government established eleven consulting offices across the country so that civil society could directly engage with the interethnic council founded to implement the concept note dealing with interethnic tensions in the country.

From unofficial consultations too, we see transfer processes similar to those from ICR workshops. Personal contacts with the mediators and conflict parties are common. Sometimes the mediator initiates these contacts, such as in Kenya, where mediator Kofi Annan held parallel consultations with entrepreneurs (Kenya Association of Manufacturers), women’s groups (Kenya Women’s Consultative Group), citizens (Concerned Citizens for Peace [CCP]), and Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice. In the case of the CCP, which prepared the “Citizens Agenda for Peace,” unofficial consultations with the mediator proved useful: several proposals made their way into the mediation agenda and guided the negotiations.

In some cases, civil society groups with connections to street power, in combination with international or regional support to the process, achieved as much impact as those close to decision-makers. In Kenya, human rights activists provided the

¹⁵ See the Peace Accord Matrix by Kroc Institute at University of Notre Dame, where Guatemala has 69% of implementation success. The areas of the agreement that have not yet been implemented pertain to transitional justice and indigenous people’s rights as well as socio-economic restructuring.

mediator, in unofficial consultations, with detailed evidence of gross human rights violations as well as proposals as to how justice mechanisms could look. At the same time, they lobbied the international community to put pressure on the negotiation parties for the inclusion of justice and accountability issues into the peace agreement. During the same period, different NGOs brought Kenyan women together to come up with suggestions as to how the inclusion of women could be ensured across the peace agreements (Paffenholz et al. 2016). With the help of a track-two workshop, they produced a nonpaper and then held formal meetings with the mediation team. Most of the suggestions from the human rights activists and the women were not popular with the negotiating parties. Nevertheless, they made it into the agreement because of the joint efforts on all levels, including insider and outsider strategies and especially a mediation team that was open to listening to a broader range of viewpoints.

Similar to ICR workshops sometimes being initiated by track-one, consultations too were sometimes initiated by negotiating parties. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, informal consultations with victims' families were initiated by President Atambayev. It is also common that people initiate contacts with government and mediators, especially when citizens groups get organized and prepare memorandums or nonpapers.

Often, consultations with different groups take place simultaneously, with one main actor being at the center of an information network. This can be with track-one actors or civil society actors at the center of the information network connected to these consultations. In Kenya, Kofi Annan was at the center of the information network, and the different groups listed above consulted with him separately. The mediator then also became the coordinating agent for transfer, as all the information flew toward him. The process during the Somalia negotiations of 2001–2005 is another good illustration of transfer from simultaneous and interlinked informal consultations but this time to a civil society actor rather than to the mediator. In this case, the Somali Business Council (SBC) was one actor at the center of transfer efforts. Members of the SBC initiated personal contacts and consultations with the international community of observer states (i.e., the EU, the United States, and Italy), gave public speeches at the plenary sessions of the official negotiation process, and issued their analysis and statements to the mediators, attendees of the high-level dialogue, and media. Further research is needed with regard to the effectiveness of who is at the center of information during the transfer process.

We also observed that transfer from high-level problem-solving workshops was sometimes initiated by the participants or NGOs; other times by track-one actors. The use of personal contacts with the mediators and decision-makers is another similar feature. Some of the workshop participants moved from track-two to track-one by becoming delegates in the negotiation or advisors to negotiators. Reflecting the literature on track-two, this was one of the most common forms of transfer in our case studies involving ICR workshops (e.g., Georgia-Abkhazia, Tajikistan).

However, we also observed that the transfer of people happened in the other direction. Sometimes track-one people participated in track-two workshops, such as in the Georgia-Abkhazia problem-solving workshops and in consultations. Track-one people were also temporarily invited to meetings in the case of Fiji and in the public consultation in the peace process concerning the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Thus, the movement of people between track-two workshops and consultation modalities and track-one often happened both ways.

Multidirectional transfer implies that the direction of influence is not one-way. In some of the track-two projects, there is often an underlying assumption that track-one is the “real” thing, whereas track-two has innovative ideas but not significant influence, hence its role is to support, help, complement, and recommend. Such a top-down view of a peace process ignores the much more complex process dynamics that are taking place on the ground. Power is not only concentrated in the hands

of the few in government, it is dispersed in different centers in a conflict and in society. In many peace processes, different groups from within society have forcefully put pressure on the main parties to the conflict to come to an agreement or have even pressured their way into the negotiations. In some cases, power rested in other actors, such as armed opposition groups excluded from negotiations. This meant that transfer to the armed group was as important as transfer to the government decision-makers. One example of this is negotiations in Darfur, where the actions of the armed groups represented in the negotiations blocked the transfer of recommendations coming from civil society. Although there are examples of work on track-two that specifically focus on armed groups (e.g., [Jones 2015b](#)), this is often an understudied area, not only in the context of their inclusion in track-two processes but also in other modalities as well.

In a way, treating transfer as multidimensional blurs what track-one is. For instance, looking at the Darfur example, can we consider an armed group not present at the negotiation table as track-one? And in political transition negotiations, such as in Benin, Mali, and Yemen, where the structure of track-one institutions is the subject of negotiations, what is track-one? Negotiations are often a starting-point for the renegotiation of existing power structures. When this is the case, the notion of transfer to track-one, or decision makers, is not very applicable. The situation resembles more of a multistakeholder negotiation of a new social contract for a new political regime.

Transfer from inclusive commissions to track-one is more similar to transfer in the first modality (direct representation in national dialogues). These two modalities more resemble multistakeholder negotiations, and in this sense, transfer dynamics are in some ways different from consultations and interactive problem-solving workshops. Both commissions and national dialogues are often formally mandated peace infrastructures, and transfer channels are more directly connected. At the end, the success of transfer boils down to whether the outcome of the process is binding or nonbinding for the top decision-makers. Nonbinding recommendations can be ignored, not ratified, or rejected. In most of the cases examined, reports of commissions were not treated as binding and were presented in the form of recommendations for further discussion and deliberation. Examples of this are commissions in the Solomon Islands and Fiji. A highly participatory constitution-making process in Fiji, which took much effort and time to reach an agreement, was eventually rejected by the military elite and replaced by a version imposed by the military. On the other hand, in cases where there was a rule for a binding decision, transfer happened directly, although again did not always guarantee that it was fully implemented by the elite. An example of this is from Mali (1990–1992), when the commission referred reports and opinions to the government, and the National Assembly was obliged to follow suit with the recommendations within three months.

Similarly, in the national dialogue cases examined, what was most important to transfer was how the process designed the decision-making rules adopted in the peace architecture. This, to a great extent, determined the fate of the transfer process. Whether a vote was required or not and whether an adopted document had a binding status or not were key factors in transfer. To give an example, one can contrast the design of the national dialogue processes in Yemen and in Egypt. Both countries went through a national dialogue after similar political experiences following the uprising and had the similar goal of drafting a new constitution and political reforms. Yet, the Yemeni national dialogue was crafted in a way that the outcomes obtained in the dialogue were successfully transferred to the Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC). After the CDC produced their draft, it was then transferred back to a “national body” composed of members of the national dialogue, to make sure that the national dialogue outcomes were incorporated into this draft ([Gluck and Brandt 2015](#), 8). In Egypt, on the contrary, the transfer process in the 2012 national dialogue was vague and lacked any of these mechanisms. The

committee responsible for drafting the constitution was not connected to the national dialogue process. Furthermore, the national dialogue was boycotted by most societal actors. Committee meetings with civil society were almost always closed, and there were no transfer channels for the members of civil society representatives to monitor and follow the committee (Gluck and Brandt 2015, 9).¹⁶

In sum, the transfer process to track-one is far more structured in the commissions and national dialogue modalities of inclusion, compared to the consultation and ICR workshop modalities. In terms of structure, transfer from these two modalities differs more from the dynamics mentioned in the track-two scholarship.

One can therefore conclude the following concerning transfer from various inclusion modalities into track-one: First, when transfer channels are less direct (in other words, more distant from the negotiation table), such as in consultations and ICR workshops, the transfer process focuses more on the participants, the mediator, and the decision-makers and on the quality of contact, communication, and relationship with them. However, in inclusive commissions and direct representation (i.e., national dialogues), the decision-making rules and procedures within the modality gain the upper hand as the main transfer channel. Theoretically speaking, observer status can be considered in this second category as well, since it's officially linked to the negotiation table. However, our case studies offer limited information on how transfer operates in this modality. Liberia is a rare case in our data where observers were powerful. Transfer in this case was multidimensional. Women groups who were granted observer status inside the negotiations not only advised the negotiation parties inside but also channeled information to the women activist groups outside the talks. Those inside encouraged the ones outside to put pressure on the negotiating parties through massive street action.

The quality of transfer is a common thread for both modalities directly connected to the table and to unofficial and distanced modalities. As discussed above, transfer was effective in some of the unofficial consultations and high-level ICR workshops. In fact, it was more effective than in some cases where there was an officially mandated commission or national dialogue. Transfer is not guaranteed because there is an official endorsement. Eventually, in all cases, echoing Capie and Cuhadar's arguments for track-two workshops, the political will of the negotiating parties was one condition that determined to what extent they were open to outside input. In cases where there was no political will, a determining factor was whether those on the outside and inside were able to create incentives to push for the creation of the political will to consider their input. The fact that some outcomes from commissions and dialogues were made binding, although in very few cases, is an example of creating incentive structures that we observed concerning decision-making rules. The incentive to create political will from outside also came in the form of mass action. The combined use of transfer strategies seems more successful.

Conclusions

In this article we have argued that the accumulation of knowledge on transfer from track-two workshops to track-one offers useful insights to examine transfer from other inclusion modalities to track-one as well. For this, we suggest transfer 2.0, which takes into consideration the complex environments of current inclusive peace processes, where track-two is one of the processes used. We suggest that track-two workshops constitute one of the many other inclusion modalities that facilitate the participation of civil society and the public in negotiations and bring different ideas or voices to the negotiations. Peace processes are increasingly designed with inclusivity in mind, with the purpose of involving key stakeholders other than the main negotiating representatives and integrating their ideas and interests to achieve

¹⁶ See more on national dialogues at (Paffenholz, Zachariassen, and Helfer 2017).

more sustainable outcomes. In this context, transfer to track-one is relevant to almost every inclusion modality, and the accumulated knowledge on this process in track-two literature is highly informative. Thus, the concept of transfer can be reconceptualized and analyzed in a way that encompasses other inclusion modalities and their interaction with track-one.

In this article, we suggest expanding the conceptualization of transfer with regard to what is transferred, to whom, and how, based on case study observations concerning transfer in a variety of inclusion modalities, including various types of consultations, inclusive commissions, and national dialogues, in addition to high-level ICR workshops. We identified similarities as well as differences with regard to each of these questions, between how they have been conceptualized in the existing scholarship on transfer 1.0 and what we observe in the examination of these questions within diverse inclusion modalities, leading us to transfer 2.0.

In terms of what is transferred, in addition to similarities such as transfer of insights and cadres from the inclusive body to track-one, we also identified novelties not discussed in the track-two literature under transfer 1.0, such as the transfer of normative frameworks. With regard to the question of to whom, the situation is similar in transfer 1.0 and 2.0. We identified the same actors and forums frequently mentioned in the existing track-two scholarship, such as various track-one actors and the media, also in transfer 2.0 findings. Yet, examination of transfer 2.0 also revealed new actors—not mentioned very frequently in the transfer 1.0 scholarship—to whom transfer is realized, such as armed groups and international observers.

We could easily argue that the differences between the existing scholarship and our examination of transfer in multiple modalities is most visible concerning the “how” question. Transfer from consultations (either officially mandated or informal) to track-one is the most similar one to transfer from ICR workshops to track-one; whereas how transfer takes place from inclusive commissions and national dialogues is quite different from consultation and ICR workshop modalities. The latter two modalities resemble multistakeholder negotiations because both commissions and national dialogues are often formally mandated peace infrastructures. Observer status can also be considered in this second category but requires more research. Therefore, unlike in ICR workshops and consultative bodies, transfer channels are more directly connected to track-one in the latter situation. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is an impact on track-one. Ultimately, the success of transfer in these direct mechanisms boils down to whether the outcome of the process is binding or nonbinding for the top decision-makers and how results of transfer can be secured through various means such as media and mass mobilization. As transfer channels become less direct or more distant from the negotiation table, such as in consultations and ICR workshops, transfer process focuses rather on the participants, the mediator, and key decision-makers, as well as the quality of contact, communication, and relationship with them. Successful transfer in most cases showed a variety of transfer strategies applied at the same time (e.g., talking to mediators and negotiators; writing short priority demand papers; using the media; and engaging in advocacy and lobbying strategies). We suggest that this is one area that would benefit from further research.

Finally, regardless of how direct the connection to track-one, the quality of transfer is a common concern for all relevant inclusion modalities. We suggest that further research is needed on what constitutes “quality” transfer and the conditions that render more effective interaction between different inclusion modalities and various track-one processes.

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