The Annexation of Galatia Reviewed

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Abstract

This article reconsiders the accepted views on the annexation and ‘provincialisation’ of Galatia by expanding on the military-related factors involved. It is argued that the annexation helped provide Rome with the necessary resources, including manpower, to maintain Augustus’ ‘New Model’ Army as established between 30 and 25 BC, as well as providing land for the future discharge of legionary veterans. The achievements of the known governors of Galatia for 25 BC-AD 14 are reviewed also, noting how their senatorial status as pro-praetor or pro-consul had no bearing on the type of garrison they commanded. The process of establishing the Augustan coloniae in Pisidia is then re-examined, as is the evidence for the character of Ancyra, Pessinus, and Tavium in the pre- and immediate post-annexation period. The data for the garrison of Augustan Galatia is then surveyed, concluding that the legiones V and VII took part in the annexation and probably remained there until AD 8, these legions being supported by auxiliary units that remained in the province after their departure. Finally, the evidence for the formation of the legio XXII Deiotariana is re-assessed, concluding it was indeed constituted under Augustus using the former Galatian Royal Army.

Keywords: Augustus; Galatia; legiones V, VII, and XXII; auxilia; Roman army; Pisidia coloniae; Ancyra, Pessinus and Tavium

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Augustus; Galatia; legiones V, VII ve XXII; auxilia; Roma ordusu; Pisidia coloniae; Ankyra, Pessinos, ve Tavion

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As so often before, I am indebted to the staff of the British Institute in Ankara for help in using their library resources; also my colleague Jacques Morin for assistance with Greek and Latin sources. The original and a corrected version of the article benefited from the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, although in this final version I have discarded the more contentious issues on which we disagree. Otherwise, it would lengthen the article
Prologue

Twenty-five years have passed since the publication in 1993 of S. Mitchell’s magisterial *Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor I: The Celts and the Impact of Roman Rule* and its companion volume, *Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor II: The Rise of the Church*. In general, the two volumes have stood the test of time remarkably well, although D. Magie’s seminal *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950) remains of great use in understanding fully the evolution of Roman Anatolia from a historical and epigraphic viewpoint. This entirely justifies the decision recently to reprint the work. Subsequent epigraphic and archaeological discoveries have of course added to the sum of knowledge on Roman Asia Minor since these quite different yet complementary syntheses first appeared, naturally prompting continuing re-analysis of several topics they each cover. This seems especially true regarding Mitchell’s assessment of the initial proceedings and the process involved in converting the territory of King Amyntas of Galatia into a functioning Roman province. A series of recent papers authored by A. Coşkun have discussed already certain aspects of the procedure: here we focus specifically on the involvement of the Roman military in this matter.

The Annexation

The Galatian king Amyntas died in 25 BC ‘when invading the country of the Homonadeis’ of Cilicia, while ‘trying to exterminate the Cilicians and the Pisidians, who from the Taurus were overrunning this country [Lycaonia], which belonged to the Phrygians and the Cilicians’. The exact circumstances of his death, in the course of what was clearly a major campaign, during which he had taken Isauria by force and captured Cremna and other places of note, are not entirely clear other than it came after capture in an ambush and resultant treachery. It occurred at the most inopportune time for Augustus, who was then directing personally a force of seven or possibly eight legions in the opening stages of his war against the Cantabrians. He certainly perceived a potential crisis of some severity in Central Anatolia, however, as despite his declaration to the Senate in 27 BC not to make any territorial additions to the Roman Empire, he took Amyntas’ kingdom under direct Roman control the very same year. Significantly, although I have responded to those points where I felt her/his comments needed correction and/or allowed for a short reply. The same reviewer also suggested I consult a lengthy list of articles by A. Coşkun that I had not originally had time to fully consider, disseminated, as they were in several disparate international journals, not all accessible immediately at Ankara. Despite their oft-repetitive nature, these were of great use in preparing the final version of this article, although they regularly neglected to discuss the military-related aspects involved in the annexation of Galatia, the particular focus here. I also thank Mark Wilson for commenting on the text and his revisions to its syntax, etc.

1 Strabo 12.6.3–5. According to Pliny, *NH* 5.94.23, the Homonadeis occupied ‘a hollow and fertile plain which is divided into several valleys … having mountains that served as walls about their country’, with a focal settlement at Omana and forty-four *castella* ‘hidden between the rugged valleys’. Identifying this area has challenged many scholars, although there is a general agreement it was to the south of the Trogitis (Suğla Gölü).

2 Strabo 12.6.3.

3 In discussing events related to the first *princeps*, for those dating before 27 BC the name Octavian is used and Augustus thereafter.

4 Dio 54.9.1. An anonymous reviewer of this article questioned Dio’s status as a reliable authority for events some 250 years before his own time. This is to ignore the wealth of scholarship confirming how Dio had access to contemporary records for the reign of Augustus, e.g., the relevant parts of Millar 1964, with Manuwald 1979, and Swan 1987. Dio did on occasion make mistakes, however, as, for example, 55.25, when he claimed that Augustus’ ‘New Army’ was initially paid from a military treasury.

5 Dio 53.26.3 is quite specific as to the date of annexation.
There has been much discussion over exactly why Augustus decided on this particular measure. In particular his surprising determination to break with the long-established convention by which after the death of a ruler of one of Rome’s ‘client kingdoms’, a son or other close relative of that ruler was approved as that ruler’s successor. If such were not possible, then a member of the relevant political elite was installed as his replacement. Amyntas had at least two sons. Yet, instead of one of these replacing their father as ruler, with or without a regent in place, Augustus chose to ignore precedent and annex Galatia. The *commnis opinio* has long been that the assumed youth of these sons, along with the lack of an appropriate member of the late king’s entourage who could be trusted to act as regent determined this action. There is, however, no clear evidence that any of Amyntas’ sons were below the age of majority at the time, in which case an alternative explanation has to be found for the failure to appoint one as ruler of Galatia. It may well have been connected to how Amyntas, presumably along with his inner circle of advisers, perhaps including one or more of his older sons, had only recently committed the major sin of backing Mark Antony against Octavian at the Battle of Actium in 31 BC. Indeed, it seems likely that Amyntas had retained his rank, title, and authority afterwards simply because of the need to maintain a strong ruler in a territory bordered by mountain ranges and harbouring brigands and the like. If we take into account Amyntas’ earlier support for Mark Antony, then a contributory factor determining annexation instead of appointing a suitable successor of some kind was a real or inferred reluctance by his sons and/or his council in wholeheartedly welcoming Augustus’ new regime, and so a basic lack of trust in the Galatian aristocracy.

Such matters aside, what we should not forget here is the potential threat that these ostensibly unorganised montagnard peoples, who had managed to trap Amyntas in an ambush, posed to the wider region, and so the need for a strong and reliable ruler of his territory. Just as war bands of Galatians had raided throughout western Anatolia during the 3rd century, so the occupation of Lycaonia by marauding Cilicians and Pisidians, now made possible by the death of Amyntas, had the potential for these groups to develop into more than the localised threat some would dismiss them as. What needs stressing at this point is the reasonable assumption that the Galatian Royal Army, founded in the 40s BC, was active and serving with Amyntas at the time of his death. Yet its apparent failure to take any form of retaliatory action against the captors of Amyntas and his subsequent death points to a distinct lack of professionalism among its officers and the absence of a reliable substitute commander. In which case, as there was no other significant military force in the region to oppose the further advance of these ‘Cilicians and Pisidians’, their occupation of Lycaonia threatened unhindered access to the main trans-Anatolian routes and along the Meander valley, although they perhaps proved

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7 Coşkun 2008a, 139–53, discusses exhaustively the various possibilities; here we assess those relevant specifically to the focal points deemed relevant here.
8 Dio 53.26.3. One of these sons was a Pylaimenes, named on the Ancyra ‘Priest List’ for 2/1 BC: Mitchell and French 2012, 140, lines 20 and 48, with Coşkun 2014, 43 and 58.
9 So, for example, Mitchell 1993, 62.
10 As Coşkun 2008a, 151–2.
11 The various and lengthy campaigns Rome initiated against the brigands of Cilicia Tracheia and the Inner Taurus during the last one hundred years of the Republic, for example, that of P. Servilius Vatia in 78–74 BC, indicate how the peoples living in this mountainous area proved tenacious warriors, not to be dismissed as a purely localised problem.
12 E.g., Coşkun 2008a, 141.
13 See further below.
less of a threat to the principal Hellenised *poleis* provided as they were with their own local militia. Such a potential threat to local stability needed dealing with, and so reason enough for Augustus to annex Amyntas' kingdom in its entirety, just as he later annexed Rhaetia to eliminate the harassing raids of its inhabitants into Gaul.  

Other alternatives to annexation were, of course possible. For example, if none of Amyntas' sons or a member of the cadre that formed his power base were acceptable as a suitable successor, the installation of a descendant of one of the other Galatian rulers. For instance, Kastor, son Brigatos, ‘probably a grandson of Tarkondarios through his mother and a grandson of Deiotaros through his father’. Another was to impose a Roman-supervised interregnum, as Octavian did with Mauretania following the death of its ruler King Bocchus in 33 BC, the territory remaining under Roman control until Augustus appointed Juba II as its ruler in 25 BC.

So what made Galatia a case apart, demanding direct rule as a *provincia* of Rome? As might be expected, there were probably several factors. To begin, as indicated already, a perceived lack of trust in the local political elite that extended to the sons of Amyntas and other members of the Galatian nobility could well have been a factor, if not the deciding one. Another was a concrete threat to the wider region from the brigands and bandits of Pisidia and Lycaonia and their allies, the Homonadeis, together with the apparent unreliability if not sheer inability of the Galatian Royal Army to deal with this. A third was the unsuitability of any potential candidates among the descendants of other Galatian tetrarchs to assume the position of Amyntas. After all, any person who stepped into Amyntas' shoes needed to be competent enough to resolve happily the practical difficulties of imposing rule over a territory with settlements that ranged from relatively sophisticated *poleis*, established and functioning on the Hellenistic model, to villages and farms. And as if that were not enough, he would need to deal also with that perennial problem of the Homonadeis and their affiliates.

A consideration of the wider context in which the annexation took place, however, does allow another possible explanation for the annexation of Galatia, namely that military-related factors may have played a part. In the first place, there was the matter of financing the new professional Roman army Augustus established sometime after 31 BC. Under the Republic, a magistrate with *imperium* raised an army as necessary on a seasonal or campaign basis, and the same applied in times of civil war. Thus, at the battle of Actium, Octavian and Mark Antony deployed between them perhaps as many as forty-six legions. At this time – as far as it can be determined – a Roman citizen’s legal obligation for military service had apparently not changed since the mid-Republican period when it was set as six years before the age of 46, although extendable to a total of sixteen years. Following on from Actium, Octavian proceeded...
to demobilise some twenty of the legions that participated in that campaign – many of them raised specifically for this – marking the first step in creating a permanent force of initially twenty-seven legions and then twenty-eight, together with an uncertain number of auxiliary units as support forces (see below). This meant finding the funds to maintain these units on a permanent basis with – it is reasonably estimated – legionary pay alone amounting to some 40-50% of the annual revenues received by the imperial treasury. In addition, there were the food and equipment needs of that army, supplied of necessity from state resources also. In which case the opportunity to expand the sources of revenue to help maintain the ‘New Army’, with pay, food, and equipment, may have just nudged Augustus to decide on taking control of Galatia at this opportune moment. True, it went against his avowal before the Senate only two years earlier in 27 BC not to make any additions to the territory then under Roman control. Galatia at this time, however, evidently presented a special case to prove the rule, for the reasons outlined above, and so his decision to make the territory a provincia could be justified by reference to these.

This, of course, begs the question: Might Galatia have been a territory which, when made subject to taxation by Rome, have produced revenue enough to justify an annexation? This meant, as we will see, maintaining at least one legion, and probably two, in the province, and the usual auxilia forces also. Sources on the ‘economy’ of pre- or even immediately post-annexation Galatia are, of course, scarce. Strabo talks of how some three hundred flocks of sheep in Lycaonia alone belonged to Amyntas but adds nothing further. On the other hand, the direct or indirect acquisition of such flocks might have seemed a possible benefit to Rome – wool for clothing, salted meat for storing for future eating – and Galatian wool was certainly valued in later times. Pliny the Elder notes that the region produced a sweet or honeyed wine, scybelites, and berries used for the coccus dye also. But it is difficult to see how accumulating stocks of a honey-like sweetened wine or a purple dye – assuming these were in production at the time – might have prompted direct Roman control. On the other hand, although not mentioned in contemporary sources, we might with reason expect that salt from Lake Tatta

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19 The earliest certain fact concerning the number of legions in the Imperial period is that in AD 23, there were exactly twenty-five (Tacitus Ann. 4.5.). As we will see, one of these, the legio XXII, was added after the annexation of Galatia, while three legions were destroyed in the Varian disaster of AD 9 and not replaced, as far as it is known. Thus, as there is no evidence that any new legions were formed or existing ones destroyed under Tiberius, then the probable total raised originally by Augustus was twenty-seven, raised to twenty-eight with the addition of the legio XXII. The original twenty-seven presumably retained a cadre of volunteers who chose to continue in military service after Actium for the benefits it offered, as well as men who had not yet completed their official term of service and were still ‘on the books’ as it were, the balance necessary to bring the new legions to full-strength after the discharge of those already time-served being raised via a dilectus.

20 Hopkins 1980, 101–25, with Campbell 2002, 85. The need to finance the Roman army probably encouraged Tiberius’ annexation of Cappadocia in AD 17. This allowed him to cut by 50% the centesima rerum venalium, the 1% sales tax, a levy which at that time was causing general unrest among the plebs. It also helps explain Claudius’ decision to take Lycia under Roman control in AD 43. On the annexation of Cappadocia, see, e.g., Bennett 2006, esp. 79–81, and of Lycia, Bennett 2011, esp. 129–31.

21 Dio 54.9.1.

22 Tacitus (Ann. 4.5) indicates that by the time of Tiberius, it was usual to match the number of legionaries in a province with a more or less equal number of auxiliaries. The origin of the practice cannot be determined, but as legions had regularly fought with auxilia in Republican times, then it would have been natural for Augustus to formalise the practice.

23 Strabo 12.6.1, with Pliny the Elder, NH 29.33.

24 Scybelites: Pliny the Elder, NH 14.11.80. Coccus dye: NH 9.140–141. Pliny adds at NH 22.3 how this dye was used for dyeing the paladumentum, the cloak worn by a triumphant general in Republican times and later by the reigning princeps.
(Tuz Gölü), a resource certainly exploited heavily in earlier (and later times and still so today), also played a part in the regional economy in the Galatian period.\(^{25}\)

What might have been a far more attractive reason for provincialising Galatia was its probable agricultural value. The mountainous parts aside, much of what was Galatian territory is today only farmable thanks to intensive irrigation systems. For it is essentially a steppe-like region, characterised by cold, wet winters and hot, arid summers with an equally short growing season that promotes the natural growth of the smaller native flora,\(^{26}\) grasses and the like, suitable as fodder for sheep/goat. Yet there is highly persuasive evidence for the existence of a well-developed agrarian economy in Galatia by the mid-Augustan period at least and so conceivably earlier. It comes in part in the form of the lists of benefactions provided by the first priests of the Imperial cult at Ancyra as listed on the ‘Priest List’, for these repeatedly stress the provision of public feasts and donations of cereal. Given the principally cellular nature of the Hellenistic and Roman economy when it came to the supply of foodstuffs and the like, then we can be certain these were obtained locally as the means of transport then available necessarily limited any long-distance supply of such items on the part of private individuals.

The point is that while at this time the Ankara Çay was quite probably navigable to some extent, most bulk supplies of food from within Galatia to Ancyra had to involve some overland transport, whether to a suitable barge-loading transit point or to Ancyra directly. An axiom holds that the longer the land journey for any commodity, the more the fodder required for feeding the animals involved and so the greater the overall expense.\(^{27}\) Thus, while we cannot be certain, these several benefactions involving food as catalogued on the ‘Priest List’ point to the private ownership of substantial ranches (to coin a term) in the vicinity that provided the necessary surplus for these donations.\(^{28}\) Indeed, a reasonably substantial and disposable surplus of some kind must have existed to allow several of the men listed there to import the significant quantities of olive oil they distributed at such ceremonies. Admittedly, the earliest records of such benefactions date to some twenty-five years after the annexation, but there is no reason to doubt that such expanses of farmland existed in earlier times. Indeed, just as with the large imperial and private land holdings attested later in west Galatia, south Phrygia and Pisidia, these assumed Augustan-period estates could best be explained as former royal or even temple land that became _ager publicus_ under Rome before being distributed among a deserving elite.\(^{29}\)

\(^{25}\) Cf. Erdoğğu et al. 2013. On the importance of salt, note Cassiodorus, _Var.Epist._ 7, who comments on the office of the _Comes Sacrarum Largitionum_. ‘The commerce of salt, that precious mineral, rightly valued and classed with silken robes and pearls, is under your superintendence’; and _Var.Epist._ 24, ‘A man might be lukewarm regarding the search for gold, but everyone desires to find a source of salt’.

\(^{26}\) Atalay and Mortan 1997.

\(^{27}\) Cf. Finlay 1973, 128, on how Diocletian’s Tax Edict indicates that a wagonload of wheat equivalent to around 600 kg doubled in price over a distance of 300 Roman miles (about 444 km).

\(^{28}\) Coşkun 2014 offers a new and greatly improved version of the Ancyra ‘Priest List’, and discusses the various benefactions. He also discusses the evidence for the foundation of the cult and the dating of the so-called ‘Temple to Roma and Augustus’ at Ankara.

\(^{29}\) Strabo 12.8.14, with Mitchell 1993, 61–2. An anonymous reviewer complained that the use of the term _ager publicus_ here was an ‘erroneous conception of _ager publicus_, which was in Italy, and owned by the Roman people and accessible (in principle) to all Roman citizens’. Moreover, s/he continued, it represents on the part of the writer a ‘failure to distinguish correctly between _ager Romanus_ and _ager publicus_ (admittedly a frequent error but quite detrimental to the description of the legal framework of Roman provincialisation’). However, the use of the term here is quite correct. See, for example the relevant entries in _New Pauly_ and other similar works, which define _ager Romanus_ as the area of the state of Rome inhabited by Romans (including the city), and _ager Publicus_ as lands confiscated from defeated or rebellious peoples inside and outside of Italy.
As it is, in a seminal paper on the environmental evidence from Gordion, R. Marston has shown how the local landscape there in the Hellenistic period was devoted to mixed agriculture at a subsistence level, suitable for a small population distributed among farmsteads, but changed in the Roman period to one in which sheep husbandry and cereal surplus cultivation, of wheat in particular, dominated. There is no way obviously of dating this change precisely, even within a few decades, nor can we entirely exclude that simple population growth might have been the reason behind it. Yet, as Marston notes, the change matches that of other ‘coercive economic systems that had the capability to demand specific agricultural practices, such as the Roman system that prioritized wheat production to pay a heavy tax burden’, resulting in ‘eventual unsustainable agricultural and land-use practices in central Anatolia’. To be sure, Columella, writing in the mid-1st century AD, confirms in a sense that the climate of Galatia was not exactly ideal for wheat cultivation, for he stresses how it produced excellent barley, known as *distichum* (‘two-rowed’) or as ‘Galatian’, which was ‘of extraordinary weight and whiteness, so much so that when mixed with wheat it makes excellent food for the household’. Barley is of course the natural choice for a cereal crop in a highland area such as Galatia, with a generally short growing season in a somewhat uncertain climate, as it takes less time to mature and is more resistant to disease than wheat. Yet, despite these positive factors and its highly nutritive value, barley in classical times – as well as earlier and later – was considered a low-class food, suitable in the main for animals only. This is why it was fed to Roman soldiers as punishment rations, since white bread was a symbol of status in the Hellenistic and Roman world. That aside, simple economic factors must surely have come into play with regard to a preference for the cultivation of wheat over barley as we see at Gordion. A given quantity of barley brought in much less in cash and exchange terms than one of wheat, which is why in the agricultural centre of Karanis in the Fayum, where taxes were paid in kind, there was a 5% surcharge if this was paid in barley instead of wheat.

What we have to remember here is, of course, that aside from the personal prestige attached to military triumph in subjecting new territories to Roman control, one of the principal benefits attached to the expansion of the Roman Empire from the Republican period onwards was to extend the taxation base. It was the only sure way of raising revenue to finance increased government spending and service, and to satisfy the demands of the wider population. This is why Pompey boasted to the Roman people at his triumph in 61 BC that his ‘conquests’ in the east increased the taxation revenues of Rome from some 50,000,000 drachmae to 85,000,000. Might the need to help pay for Augustus’ ‘New Army’ have prompted in part the annexation of Galatia? This possibility is discounted by A. Coşkun who has denied that Galatia may have become subject to taxation so soon after its annexation, owing to the lack of

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30 Marston 2012, 394.
31 Marston 2012, 395.
32 *Col. De Re Rustica*. 2.9., with 8.16.
35 The Price Edict gives 100 HS for a *modius* of wheat and 60 for one of barley.
36 Johnson 1936, 511.
37 Plutarch Pomp. 45.3–4.
38 While Augustus had become enormously wealthy personally from his ‘capture’ of Egypt, by 25 BC he had already paid out large sums of money to the plebs and others. The establishment of a military treasury to pay gratuities to veterans did not come into effect until 6 BC; cf. RG 15–7.
any evidence for a monetarised economy hereabouts until later in the 1st century AD. That is to ignore the Roman preference in some provinces – Egypt immediately springs to mind – for taxation in kind, commonly referred to in academic literature today as the *vectigalia*, a direct tax levied as a ratio of the annual crop harvest. Rome favoured this method in the less urbanised provinces where a monetarised economy did not exist or in which coin played a very small part in the local economy. Bronze and silver coins certainly existed in Galatia from the time of Deiotaros, but as far as it can be judged, their distribution seems to have been limited. The consequence of this lack of coinage was that it failed to stimulate a monetarised trade in goods in such areas and delayed the monetisation of the relevant local economy. On the other hand, such taxes in kind were perfect for the long- and short-distance supply of military garrisons in the frontier provinces.

Another motive for the annexation of Galatia related to military factors (discussed in more detail below) was obtaining the land for the re-settlement of legionary veterans. Until the establishment of the *aerarium militare* in AD 6 with its system of cash-grants to legionary veterans, the usual method of providing their ‘retirement bonus’ was through placing them in existing or newly established *coloniae* on *ager Romanus* in Italy or, more commonly in the last decades of the Republic, on *ager publicus* in the provinces. The evidence – such as it is – suggests that already by the time of Actium there was increasing difficulty in following this practice with regard to peninsular Italy and certain of the provinces also. Thus, the possibility of acquiring new land in Galatia for the purpose might well have appealed to Augustus, albeit not necessarily as a primary motive.

Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility that the long history of Galatia in supplying mercenaries to the various Hellenistic rulers played a part in the decision to annex the territory only now as a source of legionary recruits. At first sight this might seem somewhat improbable given the mass discharge of legionaries that took place after Actium. Yet what needs to be remembered is that some of the men retained in military service after Actium would eventually be due their discharge, and some of them quite soon. The fact is that as far as we can be certain, Augustus’ ‘New Army’ contained a mixture of men enlisted under quite different terms of service. Some would have been recruited shortly before and expressly for the Actium campaign, and so under the standard late Republican system were serving a minimum of six campaigning seasons and a further ten in the ‘reserves’. Others enlisted or re-enlisted for what was by 13/12 BC certainly the official term of a full sixteen years, but a term which must have been already in force from 30 BC to account for the mass settlement of veterans Augustus

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39 Coşkun 2008, 156.
40 See Günther 2008 for an exhaustive study of the *vectigalia*, a word derived from *vehere* (‘to convey or transport’), related to how it originally referred to the cartloads of crops from *ager publicus* surrendered as rent-in-kind to the state by a leaseholder, but which in later times covered various forms of (mainly) indirect taxation.
41 On Roman taxation systems in general, see especially Hopkins 1980, passim, for an overview and detailed references, if over-emphasising the belief that taxes were paid in cash. These provincial laws were often extremely comprehensive as with, for example, the so-called ‘Tax law of Ephesus’ (Cottier et al. 2008), its first iteration, as represented by lines 8–71, possibly based on the Gaius Gracchus’ law on the taxation of Asia *provincia* instituted in 123–122 BC.
42 Hopkins 1980, 103. But see now more recent work, as e.g., the historiography and critical analysis in Aarts 2005.
44 Cf. Coşkun 2008a, 148 and 152.
45 Coşkun 2008a 158, with 2008b, 35.
46 See note 18 above.
oversaw sixteen years later in 14 BC. The point is that at this time, a clear reluctance was developing among Italians to join the legions. Thus there was a need to find a source of new recruits for those men who were due discharge in the years immediately after Actium and in the future, as well as the necessary replacements occasioned on an annual basis to make up for ‘natural loss’ in battle or illness.

The Governors and Their Achievements

Having set out some of the military-influenced factors that possibly influenced Augustus’ decision to annex Galatia as a Roman provincia, it will be useful to provide an overview of those men who governed the province and some of their accomplishments between the annexation in 25 BC and Augustus’ demise in AD 14. Therefore, we begin with the person charged with the annexation itself, namely M. Lollius (Curio?), a man of uncertain origins but who, as a member of Octavian’s inner circle at the Battle of Actium, played a rather interesting role in that event. Despite his presence at Actium in a senior capacity, we know almost nothing of his career before his appointment to the command of Galatia and so what precisely qualified him for the post other than being a close confidant of Augustus. All we can say is that, assuming he followed the standard cursus honorum, he must have held a praetorship by that time. This was the prerequisite to the command of a province and/or a legion, and also for the consulship he won in 21 BC – as consul prior no less – directly after concluding his service in Galatia.

There can be no doubt that Augustus issued Lollius with mandata, a series of instructions related to his new post before taking up his duties as governor of Galatia. While there is no explicit evidence regarding the mandata for any of Augustus’ governors, we might divine their overall content from similar instructions issued to other governors in both the Republican and the later Imperial periods. A prime responsibility for all such men was to act in any matter he saw fit to protect the security of Roman interests in the region assigned to him. This would naturally involve keeping it free from internal unrest and dealing with any external aggression, even in areas technically long pacified. This is made exceptionally clear from Hadrian’s instructions to Antoninus Pius when he was appointed proconsul of Asia for 135-136. He was to interrogate captured latrones (robbers/brigands) carefully to establish their associates and – it seems – to determine their hideouts. Certainly, a governor was responsible for using his power as a Roman magistrate with full imperium to oversee all administrative and juridical matters in his territory. In Lollius’ case, we might reasonably assume this also involved

47 Fully discussed in Keppie 1983.
48 The standard work on this is Mann 1983, 50–5.
49 I follow here the listing and dating of the known governors as Coskun 2009, 162, with further details on these men as in Rémy 1989, 127–38, summarised to AD 6 by Strobel 2000, 516–20, and additional biographical notes here if thought of wider interest.
51 For those unfamiliar with the Roman consulship, as was an anonymous reviewer of this article, the consul prior was the ‘senior’ of the two consuls elected each year, being first in the annual ballot for the two consuls, the consul posterior being his ‘junior’. Neither of these positions, and especially not that of the consul posterior, is to be confused with that of a consul suffectus, a ‘replacement’ for one of the two consuls if they died in office or chose to retire before the end of the year.
52 Dio 53.15.4.
53 Cf. Cicero, Ad Fam. 3.6.6, with 15.2.6, on the duty of a governor to protect the interests of the rei publicae.
54 Dig. 48.3.6.1.
deciding on the matter of what to do with the property and land owned by Amyntas, and the revenues from these,\textsuperscript{55} and any other property that might serve the interests of Rome. It seems likely, though, that the sons of Amyntas inherited at least a part of what had belonged to him in his private capacity: hence the rise to local prominence some twenty-five years later of one of them, Pylaímenes, named on the Ancýra ‘Priest List’ for 2/1 BC.\textsuperscript{56} However, that part classed as ‘Royal’ property, such as the taxes paid in kind or in money by those poleis under Amyntas’ dominion, now went to Rome, as did the revenues and ownership of any land in this ‘private’ category. Moreover, Lollius was perhaps responsible for despatching that team of assessors which disbanded the priesthood at the major religious centre dedicated to Mên Askaios close to Antioch by Pisidia, a temple that controlled ‘many sacred slaves and estates’.\textsuperscript{57} They presumably formalised the ownership of the temple’s estates also, some of it becoming Roman property, ultimately for use by the legionary veterans settled soon after at what became Colonia Caesarea Antiœcheia.

What to do with the Galatian Royal Army was most probably another priority for Lollius and discussed in more detail below. Necessary now is to observe how Deiotaros, the first established king of all Galatia, had sometime in the early 40s BC formed ‘thirty cohortes’ of 400 men each, with a cavalry arm of 2,000, all trained expressly on the Roman system of discipline and armament.\textsuperscript{58} As such then, this army was the equivalent, more or less, of three Roman legions. Two of these ‘legions’ accompanied the Caesarean army despatched in response to the invasion of the Pontus in 48 BC by Pharnaces of the Cimmerian Bosporus, and were honoured by being made the centre of the Roman order of battle at Nicopolis.\textsuperscript{59} In the event they ‘offered scarcely any resistance to the attack’, with the result that ‘many of their men were killed’.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, presumably, the circumstance by which only a single Galatian only fought for Caesar at the Battle of Zela that followed soon after.\textsuperscript{61}

The generally accepted view is that this army survived into the reign of Amyntas and was presumably involved in his campaign against the Homonadeis. What happens next is a matter of some debate, although most scholars believe that it or a core element thereof was absorbed directly into Augustus’ new legionary army as the legio XXII. More recently this view has been challenged and it has been argued it continued in service as a legio vernacula only, that is to say, a unit of peregrini trained and armed in Roman fashion, until the Tiberian period. A detailed analysis of the debate, however, demands a slightly more detailed analysis than is appropriate at this point, and so is provided towards the end of this article.

\textsuperscript{55} For, example, the three hundred flocks of sheep in Lycaonia: Strabo 12.6.1.

\textsuperscript{56} Mitchell and French 2012, 140, lines 20 and 48, with Coşkun 2014, 45, and 58.


\textsuperscript{58} Cic., Ad Att. 6.1.14, with Keppie 1984, 141. The practice of forming a Royal army on the Roman model was not exclusive to Galatia, as is sometimes thought. Note, for example, the Royal armies of King Juba of Numidia and King Bocchus of Mauretania: B.Afr. 48, and B. Alex. 62. Also note the temporary legion ‘formed from the hastily improvised forces in Pontus’ which took part alongside Deiotaros’ army at the Battle of Nicopolis: B. Alex. 34 and 40. To these we might add the regular auxiliary cohort formed from the royal militia of Pontus Polemoniacus after its annexation to Galatia-Cappadocia in AD 63–64. Its members were given Roman citizenship at the time and issued then, if not before, with ‘arms and banners in the Roman fashion’. The royal navy was similarly formalised to what later became the Classis Pontica: Josephus BJ. 6.4; Tacitus Hist. 47, and Suetonius Nero 18.

\textsuperscript{59} B. Alex. 34.

\textsuperscript{60} B. Alex. 39–40.

\textsuperscript{61} B. Alex. 69.
More germane to Lollius’ administration of Galatia is how he was probably responsible for conducting what was in effect a census in the new province. Such would certainly be required to allow the province’s quaeestor, the official in charge of financial matters, to establish the necessary taxation regime. It need not have been a full-blown census of the type initiated by Augustus in 2 BC, as referenced in the Res Gestae. All that was required in the first instance was an assessment of property, revenues, and population statistics within Amyntas’ former kingdom using the records of the various poleis and those held by the Galatian treasury, perhaps still maintained at Peium. There should be no doubt that such records existed for, as with any polity, taxes are the machinery of government. Certainly, it is clear that throughout Asia Minor, all methodically ordered poleis had been regulated in a taxation system of some form since Achaemenid times with the proceeds going to whoever was their overlord. These systems essentially related to property and produce, although the poll tax, while uncommon in the Hellenistic world, certainly existed in some parts of Asia Minor as with Carian Kildara. How such taxation systems could be effected in the countryside though, where it would prove more difficult to register numbers of people and assess their property value, is not at all clear. Yet we can be certain that the rural population is unlikely to have escaped entirely some form of official registration for taxation purposes.

That aside, we can be sure that while governor, Lollius was responsible for a dilectus, the (usually) forced recruitment of non-Roman provincials into the Roman army. As is well known, a peregrinus granted Roman citizenship for whatever reason would take the praenomen and nomen of their patron, just as was the case with a child adopted by a Roman citizen or a slave given his freedom. Thus, we can be reasonably certain that the two legionaries sharing the name ‘Marcus Lollius’ on an inscription of probable Augustan date recording members of two legions involved in construction work in the Wadi Umm Hussain region in Egypt were drafted into military service under that governor. They were given his names along with Roman citizenship at the same time, and memberships of the Pollia tribus, commonly associated with newly-made Roman citizens, with their origin stated as Ancyra. A Lollian dilectus would explain also a funerary text from Iconium recording the veteran Marcus Lollius of the legio VII, although his origo and tribus are not stated. The memorial itself, however, was erected to his ‘dearest friend’ by one P. Mestrius P.f. Maecia tribus, another veteran of the legio VII. It allows for the possibility that both men originated from and retired there, and thus were Galatian in origin. Putting these cases indicating a Lollian dilectus to one side, an inscription from Pessinus provides us with a group of family members and their wives descended from a

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62 Cf. Kennedy, 2006, at 116–17: ‘in order to function adequately, the Roman taxation system presupposes a census’; also Brunt 1981, 163 (= Brunt 1990, 329–30), and Capponi 2005, 90, with the cautionary observations by Cotton 1997, esp. 206, that we should ‘dispel … the notion that a provincial census followed immediately upon the annexation of a territory to the Roman empire’.

63 RG 15, with Adler 1928, 293, and Blume et al. 1848, 239.

64 Strabo 12.5.2.

65 Cf. Polybius 21.46.2–3, on how after the Treaty of Apamea, ‘Those places which had paid taxes to Attalos I, were now ordered by Rome to give the same amount to Eumenes II’. There is a wealth of data on the form these taxes took and the relevant rates; see, e.g., most recently, Virgilio 2011.

66 SEG 42. 994; cf. Mackil 2015, for the unpopularity of the poll tax in Hellenistic times.


68 CIL 3.6627 = ILS 2483, col. 1. On the common use of the Pollia tribus from Republican times for those men newly-enfranchised as Roman citizens, see, e.g., Haecesser 2013, 189–91.

M. Lollius, albeit a member of the Menenia tribus, but possibly a man awarded citizenship by the same governor on entry in the legions. Like the Lollius Menogenes recorded on a funerary dedication at Dümrek (near Sivrihisar) could, at a pinch, be the descendant of another legionary recruited between 25-23 BC, especially given the proximity of the findspot to the late Augustan colonia at Germa.

We do not know the name of Lollius’ successor or, in fact, the names of those who came after that ignotus until L. Calpurnius Piso (Pontifex), consul posterior for 15 BC, is on record as governor of Galatia in 14-13 BC. This long period, however, saw an important step in the administration of the province with a division of the territory into three semi-autonomous jurisdictions (see further below). This presumably coincided with the introduction of formal civic charters at Ancyra, Pessinus, and Tavium, each modelled – so it seems – on the example introduced by Pompey the Great in Pontus-Bithynia when he constituted the two regions into a single provincia in 64/63 BC. As for L. Calpurnius Piso (Pontifex), he was evidently a man of recognised military and administrative competence, for on completion of his duty in the province he departed directly to the Balkans to deal with disturbances in Thrace and Macedonia. He won ornamenta triumphalia for his successes there, and, as we will see, arguably took with him at least one legion and other forces from Galatia for the campaign.

Then comes another gap in the sequence of known governors of Galatia until the appointment of Cornutus Aquila/us. He was a man of unknown senatorial rank who in 6 BC completed the Via Sebaste linking the outer ring of the original Pisidian coloniae to each other and to the coast at Side. The purpose of Roman roads, especially paved ones such as this, designed for wheeled transport, was specifically for the movement of Roman military forces, so we should see this road as a prelude to an intended campaign in the southern Taurus. In fact, it was Aquila’s successor, P. Sulpicius Quirinus, consul posterior in 12 BC and governor of Galatia for 5-3 BC, who completed the taming of the Homonadeis, receiving ornamenta triumphalia for this achievement. What is more, Quirinus, who later reached one of the pinnacles of Roman administration with his appointment as governor of Syria (AD 6-12), may well have overseen the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Cult at Ancyra.

There is another lacuna in the fasti for Galatia until 2 BC-AD 4 when Metilius (Rufus?), perhaps the son of the early Augustan proconsul of Achaea, was in office. He was followed as governor for AD 4–8 by a man named on the Ancyra ‘Priest List’ simply as ‘Fronto’.

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70 IK-66, 102 = AE 2005, 1475. The C. Julius C.f. Papira from Cormasa who served with the legio VII (AE 1961.15) logically belongs to an Augustan dilectus also, as he took his name from that of the first princeps, and so quite possibly under Lollius.

71 Mitchell 1982, 99, no. 101; but note how not all agree that Germa was an Augustan foundation.


74 His service there and triumph for the ‘hard-fought’ campaign is reported in Livy, Per. 140; also Velleius Paterculus 2.98; Tacitus, Ann. 6.10; and Dio 54.34.6–7. None of these sources says anything of Piso taking any part of the garrison with him for the task, but Syme 1933, 23, and 30–1, has made a convincing argument for this, which has stood the test of time.

75 Rémy 1989, 131–32.

76 Coşkun 2014, 54 with 59–63.

77 Coşkun 2014, 43.
The Annexation of Galatia Reviewed

is conceivably the same person as the Tiberian-period pro-praetor Octavius Fronto, known for his opposition to luxurious excesses among the senatorial and other classes, including the amount of silver plate, elaborate furniture, and slaves and servants a senator might own, and firmly opposed to men wearing ‘oriental silks’. More significantly, though, a successful campaign against the Isaurians took place when this Fronto was in office in Galatia, a campaign led presumably by the governor in person. ‘Fronto’ was followed in office for AD 8–12 by M. Plautius Silvanus, consul posterior with Augustus as the consul prior in 2 BC, and then de facto consul prior after Augustus resigned the office that summer. He was called up for service with Tiberius in the Pannonian War shortly after assuming his appointment to Galatia, and received ornamenta triumphalia in AD 9 for his part in the campaign there (see below) before returning to Galatia to complete his term of office. Finally, taking us to the time limit of this article, we come to T. Helvius Basila, registered in office for about AD 12–16.

Evidently on the patchy evidence we have, there was no consistent rank pattern by which the governors of Augustan Galatia were selected for the duty, except that as it was one of the so-called ‘Imperial provinces’, these men were all formally legati Augusti pro praetore. To which we need to add that, according to Dio, under the system of administration introduced by Augustus in 28/27 BC, the governors of provinces with more than one legion were generally pro-praetors or pro-quaestors. Why that observation is relevant here relates specifically to the nature of the garrison of Galatia during the Augustan period. K. Strobel believes that the actual social and political status of the person in command of Galatia until the early Tiberian period, whether as pro-praetor or pro-consul, reflects directly the prevailing diplomatic and/or military circumstances affecting the province at the relevant time, and thus the need or size of any legionary garrison. His thinking seems influenced by the fully developed cursus honorum familiar from the later Imperial period, which certainly stipulated that pro-consuls only, with the same title of legati Augusti pro praetore, commanded provinces with a legionary garrison, while pro-praetors supervised ones without. Yet as Mitchell reminds us, this rigid procedure need not automatically apply throughout the early principate when a measure of fluidity might be expected. Indeed Augustus’ possession of the repeated consulship from 28/27 BC and then from 23 BC the imperium proconsulare maius made him sole arbiter in the government of the Roman Empire, with absolute authority to appoint whosoever he wished as his ‘delegates’ to the governorship of the so-called ‘Imperial provinces’, and, by showing his preferences, the ‘Senatorial provinces’ also.

80 Cf. Tacitus, Ann. 33.1.
81 Dio 55.28.3. For Fronto as governor at this time see Coşkun 2014, 43, 57.
83 Velleius Paterculus 2.112.4, and Dio 55.28.2–3, which, as Mitchell and French 2012, 147, observe, following Coşkun 2007, 232–33, is a prolepsis – an allusion to his actual involvement in the campaign in AD 8–9.
86 Dio 53.15.1.
88 Mitchell 1993, 63.
89 Dio 53.32.
The Coloniae and the Urbanisation of Celtic Galatia

The *Res Gestae* states how Augustus settled legionary veterans in *coloniae* established in eight of Rome’s *provinciae* and ‘in Pisidia’. The majority of these colonies ‘in Pisidia’ enclose effectively the Pisidian highlands, with two (Cremna and Isauria) located more centrally in the region. Thus, given how Amyntas died while on campaign in that general area, most commentators have assumed – perhaps naturally – that the first stages at least in establishing these Pisidian *coloniae* took place under Lollius. This seems barely possible given a coin of Antioch – *Colonia Caesarea* - with the obverse showing a bareheaded Augustus and the legend ‘IMP AVGVST TR POT’. Its reverse has the representation of a togate figure ploughing to the right with a plough-team of two hump-backed oxen together with the legend ‘PARENS CAESAREA’, with ‘COL’ in the exergue. The reverse confirms the Augustan date of its foundation, as it distinguishes Augustus as its ‘parent’, and the ‘Colonus ploughing’ scene it accompanies references the defining of the *pomerium* for the new colony. What is more significant about the coin, however, is how it describes Augustus as ‘TR(ibunicia) POT(estas)’, for this title only appears on coins and inscriptions of Augustus after 23 BC. Hence, the debates over the relevance of the so-called centenary and bi-centenary coinages for Antioch along with two other Augustan *coloniae* Lystra and Cremna suggesting they were established in 25 BC become irrelevant. We should thus discard the oft-repeated view that Lollius founded the *coloniae* almost immediately after his arrival.

It is conceded that the legend on this coin of Antioch provides a *terminus post quem* for the foundation of that *colonia* only and leaves open the possibility that it at least may have been established when Lollius was still in office – but only just. That aside, the foundation date of Antioch need not necessarily have any direct bearing on the foundation date of the other Pisidian *coloniae*, except that with Antioch being the ‘parent’ colony, it was perhaps the first and so precedes the others. Certainly, as has been stressed elsewhere, we should not assume that all the other twelve or so Pisidian *coloniae* were founded simultaneously with *Colonia Caesarea*. Indeed, the limited coin evidence suggests that they were established individually, one-by-one, as circumstances demanded. To be sure, in the three or four years following the mass discharge of veterans accompanying Augustus’ army reorganisation in 30/29 BC, it is unlikely that the conditions existed – and no evidence at all – for such large numbers of men being discharged at one single time to warrant the contemporaneous foundation of as many as twelve *coloniae*. That remains the case even if only eight of the twelve (Antioch, Comama, Lystra) were founded in 25 BC.

90 It was not possible to consult Sugliano 2005 or De Giorgi 2011 for what these might have contributed to this section.

91 RG 28.

92 RPC I.3529. Cf. also ILS 5336; and Levick 1967, 196.


94 OCD s.v., ‘Colonus’.

95 Lacey 1979.

96 On which see Levick 1967, 34–7, with the note of caution introduced by Brunt 1971, 601, and Mitchell 1993, 76. What has seemingly escaped comment in many a discussion of the foundation date of the first *coloniae* is this: If 25 BC was the initial foundation date for at least one or more of them, how did the required veterans arrive there? That is to say, are we to assume – if this were the case – that Lollius brought them with him as serving soldiers or as supernumeraries? The question is discussed further below.

97 E.g., Strobel 2002, 53.

Crema, Iconium, Lystra, Nicipa, Olbassa, and Parla) were full coloniae; the remainder (Attaleia, Apollonia, Isuria, and Phrygian Neapolis) settlements of coloni within existing communities.99

There should be little doubt that the establishment of these coloniae conformed to the practice in the mid- and Late-Republican period. They were created not simply to provide army veterans with a home, but so that the original coloni could, if necessary, play their part while still able and active to help secure control of the Pisidian Taurus, presumably as men drafted into a legio facta ex colonitis as it were,100 along with – it is commonly believed - the hope their sons would also join the legions. As already observed, we can assume that some of the legions re-formed after Actium contained a mixture of those who had not yet completed their six campaigning seasons in accordance with the standard late Republican system. But they also probably included evocati – men who had completed their required military service but were obliged to serve a further ten (or sixteen?) in the ‘reserves’.101 This is implied from the way that – as already noted - when Augustus formalized finally the terms of legionary service in 13/12 BC, the terms were set at sixteen full years, suggesting that a period ‘on reserve’ of up to ten years had applied to those serving in earlier times.102 It seems possible, therefore, that some, if not necessarily the bulk of the coloni in the original Pisidian coloniae, were men who had enlisted in the legions before Actium and qualified for discharge under the earlier Republican terms of service, yet were perhaps obligated to fulfil a military role when required, if only to provide a secondary level of security to Galatia and neighbouring territories.103

Whether or not this was the case, as the original colonists were legionary ‘veterans’ in one sense or another, it behoves us to identify the legions they served with formerly, evidently, two with regard to establishing the colonia at Antioch on the basis of a coin issued there under Augustus showing two inward-facing aquilae standards with signa to the left and right of these.104 This issue is paralleled closely by another now attributed to Augustus that has an obverse legend ‘C.C.ANT(iochia)’ showing a ‘Colonus ploughing’ and a reverse with two aquilae standards flanked to the left and right by signa and in between the legend ‘C. / C’ in two lines for ‘C(olonia) C(aesaria)’.105 To these we should add a coin of Nero issued in approximately AD 65 which has an almost identical image on the reverse, but with the legend ‘CO[l] CAESAREAE.106 Best of all though is a coin of Vespasian issued in AD 76 whose obverse shows a single aquila between two standards, and ‘LEG V’ to the left and ‘LEG VII’ to the right.107 The latter number is incomplete since this part of the legend extends beyond the flan, but its

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99 Although there is still disagreement on the identities never mind the constitutions of the Pisidian coloniae, this listing follows that provided by Mitchell 1993, 77, and generally accepted.
100 Best translated as ‘a legion recruited from the colonies’.
101 Cf. Keppie 1984, 146, for the terms of legionary service in the late Republican legions up to 13 BC. For the evocati, see New Pauly s.v., ‘Evocati’.
102 Dio 54.25.6, with Keppie 1984, 147–48. The reward under the new terms of service, which remained in force until the end of the principate, was a cash-grant, although re-settlement in a colonia was possible also. In AD 5/6, the terms were re-defined as twenty year’s full-time service with perhaps five in the ‘reserves’, with the same cash grant at the end. Nevertheless, some veterans continued to be re-settled in new coloniae in newly occupied territories such as Britannia and Dacia down to the time of Trajan and Hadrian.
104 RPC I.3530
105 RPC I.3531.
106 RPC I.3532.
107 RPC 2.1603.
restoration as VII is perfectly justified as there is no evidence that a legio VI ever served and so discharged veterans anywhere in Anatolia, while there is relatively plentiful epigraphic evidence that both the legio V and VII did so at Antioch and elsewhere in Galatia.

For example, we have four veterans of the legio V Gallica (sic) recorded on inscriptions at Antioch:108 T. Campusius C.f. Sergia, L. Pomponius Nigro, M. Tiberius M.f. Sergia, and C. Carbo P.f. Sergia.109 For the legio VII, one veteran is recorded on a text from Antioch, T. Cissonius Q.f. Sergia; two at Iconium, M. Lollius M.f. and his ‘best friend’ P. Mestrius P.f. Maecia; and one from near Cormasa, the locally-born C. Julius C.f. Papiria, a former eques with the legion.110 Noteworthy is how these men generally lack cognomina, confirming their early date in the principate.111 Noteworthy also is how the nomenclature and tribus of many of these veterans and other settlers of early Augustan date in the epigraphic record for Antioch and the other Pisidian coloniae point to an Italian or similar origin, and, at that, in putative Republican-period colonial foundations. It suggests that these veterans at least, and perhaps many of the others with similar backgrounds, were recruited before or in connection with Octavian’s campaign against Mark Antony. Therefore, they probably completed their term of service after the annexation of Galatia provincia, and so perhaps arrived in the new province with their legion.112

Although the coin evidence indicates that Antioch, the first of the Pisidian coloniae, was established the same year that Lollius returned to Rome, and so was probably constituted by his unknown successor as legatus Augusti pro praetore of Galatia, Lollius was evidently responsible for identifying Ancyra and Pessinus (and possibly Tavium also) as centres of jurisdiction and administration for the Galatian people. The evidence comes principally in epigraphic form which indicates how Ancyra and Pessinus at least share a common-era dating system that commenced in the autumn of 25 BC, although that for Tavium, for some reason, starts in 21/20 BC.113 It was also presumably under Lollius, if not during Augustus’ sojourn in Anatolia in 20 BC, that a formal division of the province into the three semi-autonomous territories of the Sebasteni Tolistobogii Pessinunti, Sebasteni Tecostages Ancyrani, and Sebasteni Trocmi Tavianni occurred.114 The adoption of these titles, each emphasising their formation as somehow connected directly to the first princeps, confirms their semi-autonomous status, as does their issue of coinage in later times, although what that status was is unclear. Coşkun seems to interpret this evidence as possibly indicating that the urban centres of each one were in name, if not in full practice, civitates liberae – ‘free communities’ outside the normal jurisdiction of the provincial governor.115 However, this uncommon category of effective self-government was granted

108 Cf. Strobel 2000, 520–22, for most of what follows with updated references and commentary where appropriate.
111 Cf. Salway 1994, 127, where it is noted how the use of cognomina, which began in early Republican times among the nobility, was adopted slowly by the plebs urbana after around 125 BC, but remained rare for another one hundred years or so.
112 Strobel 2000, 523, with Levick 1967, 56–67, who cautions that not all such Italian-origin settlers at Antioch or the immediate region necessarily arrived here as army veterans. A number most likely were traders and the like. See also Btu 2009, 264–69, for the unlikely but not impossible suggestion that the formation of the legiones V and VII and the recruitment of some of its men occurred in Spain at the time of Caesar’s civil war.
113 For the provincial era of Galatia and for Tavium, see Leschhorn 1993, 398–414, with the interesting suggestion that the Tavium system related to Augustus’ eastern expedition of 20 BC.
115 Coşkun 2008a, 155–56.
usually to long-established urbanised centres that already had an existing and well-organised social and civic structure and a widely recognised degree of political independence. More probably, they identified each of the putative urban centres they were named for as the *conventus* for that territory, the judicial centre for governors rotating their assizes on a regular basis from one main centre to another within their province.\(^{116}\)

Of greater interest though, if not directly relevant to the focus of this article, is the matter of exactly what motivated the choice of these three places as the administrative centres for their named territories. In other words, what was their physical nature and local significance at the time? Here, with archaeological evidence scarce, we rely mainly on Strabo’s assessment of each one, written about the time of the annexation. It suggests that each was already a location of regional and perhaps supra-regional importance. Pessinus, for example, was already by the 3\(^{rd}\) century BC, a major sanctuary for the local goddess Kybele with porticoes of ‘white marble columns’ donated by the Attalid rulers of Pergamum.\(^{117}\) Indeed, a team of Roman commissioners journeyed there in 205/204 BC during the Second Punic War in accordance with a reading of the Sibylline Books to retrieve the cult statue of Kybele / Agdistis. Thus the cult of the *Magna Mater* was introduced in Rome itself to help her in the war against Carthage.\(^{118}\)

The place was still of major significance in the late 1\(^{st}\) century BC when it served as an *emporium* for the surrounding area, although just as in the case with the Temple of Temple of Men Askaenos at Antioch, it is possible that the temple revenues were assessed and part at least re-directed to Rome during the annexation process.\(^{119}\) However, while evidence of pre-AD 25 activity at the site is gradually emerging, the precise nature and appearance of the settlement here in Hellenistic times remains elusive. Much of what has been identified to date is of ‘Late Hellenistic’ date, whatever ‘late Hellenistic’ might mean.\(^{120}\) As for Ancyra, several pre-Roman accounts reference the place by name, indicating that some form of settlement existed here long before 25 BC. Strabo describes it as a *phrourion*, in other words a fortress of some kind, presumably in reference to a settlement on the Kale area.\(^{121}\) Physical evidence for any possible pre-25 BC activity at Ancyra though comes solely in the form of allegedly ‘Phrygian’ and ‘Hellenistic’ pottery found during excavations at the so-called Temple to Augustus and other locations on the possible höyük now covered by the modern Ulus district.\(^{122}\) Certifiably pre-Roman structural evidence in that area or elsewhere in modern Ankara is completely lacking.\(^{123}\)

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\(^{116}\) The best evidence for this system is of course the relevant letters of Cicero for the Republican period and of Pliny the Younger (Book 10) for Imperial times.

\(^{117}\) Strabo 12.5.3.

\(^{118}\) Livy 39.10.7 with 34.3.8. But note Varro, *Ling.* 6.15 who indicates the home of the image was Pergamum, while Cicero, *Har resp.* 8.28 remarks only that it came from Phrygia. According to Livy, 10.4.–11.18, the cult image was a large black stone said to have fallen from the sky.

\(^{119}\) Strabo 12.5.3. See now Coşkun 2018.

\(^{120}\) E.g., Krsmanovic 2018. It was not possible to consult Tsetskhladze 2019 during the preparation of this article.

\(^{121}\) Strabo 12.5.2 (567).

\(^{122}\) Bennett 2003, 1–3, summarises the recorded findspots of alleged ‘Hellenistic’ ceramics at Ankara. Now that we understand better the ceramic sequence of the region, as with the material from Pessinus, a fresh examination of these finds of ‘Hellenistic’ pottery is called for urgently to discover their true date. That aside, it remains scandalous that apparently none of the major building developments occurring in the Kale area since at least 1995, never mind those in Ulus, have been preceded by archaeological investigation or excavation. These are obvious places to find evidence for any pre-Roman or occupation of modern Ankara, regardless of the post-Classical history of the place.

\(^{123}\) Cf. Kadıoğlu et al., 2011, 20–1, with Mitchell and French 2012, 1–2. Best left aside here is any discussion of the continuing debate over the date and final form, never mind the exact identity, of the so-called ‘Temple of Augustus and Roma’. See Kadıoğlu et al., 2011, 90–8, for an overview of the dispute, with Coşkun 2014, 50,
although it might conceivably be the location of the new city (‘nea polis’) Deiotaros was allegedly establishing in 54 BC.²¹¹ Tavium is, if anything, an even more enigmatic site. Strabo notes its function as an emporium for the surrounding region with a ‘colossal statue of Zeus in bronze’ and an associated precinct with the privilege of asylum.²¹² The ceramic sequence there indicates continued occupation from the early Hellenistic to the early Byzantine period,²¹³ and there are indications that it was possibly the centre of production and for the trade of a distinctive class of late Hellenistic ‘Galatian Ware’, as appropriate for an emporium,²¹⁴ but it has yet to produce structural remains of a certifiably late 1st century BC date.

Thus, all three loci clearly had some form of local prominence and associated settlement at the time of the annexation, even if the evidence is in the main archaeologically invisible. Even so, we might reasonably attribute their development post-annexation as urbanised centres through the process of an enforced synoikism, precisely as Pompey did in his re-organisation of Bithynia.²¹⁵ Either way, the process of fully urbanising these places with the appropriate monumental architecture may well have taken some years. Thus, it should not be a cause for surprise that, as Coşkun observed, there is no evidence for any form of urbanisation programme at Ancyra until Neronian or Flavian times.²¹⁶ A delay of a few decades in providing the appropriate monumental infrastructure for this newly Romanised centre is, in reality, quite unremarkable: as the adage has it, ‘Rome was not built in a day’. The provision of such structures necessary to present the picture of a fully-formed Romanised civitas or a Hellenised polis could simply not have happened overnight, but took place when civic resources were available - unless a Potemkin-like approach of building a shanty town ‘stage-set’ was taken. To which we might add that at Ancyra at least, the epigraphic evidence is how many of those granted Roman citizenship took the praenomen and nomen of one of the Julio-Claudian emperors

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²¹¹ Plutarch, Crassus 17.1–2. But see Coşkun 2013b esp. 156–58, for a reasoned if not entirely convincing and self-admittedly speculative argument that this ‘nea polis’ was perhaps a re-foundation of an earlier phrourion in Lesser Armenia, that originally established by Mithridates Eupator and named Symphorion (Dio 37.7.5) or Sinhorium (Amnianus Marcellinus 16.7.10), but also referred to as Sinara (Tab. Peut. 10.1–2), Sinera/Sinibra (Ptolemy Geog. 5.6.19 and 5.7.2), and Sinervas (Ant. Itin. 208.3).

²¹² For the ‘Galatian Ware’ of Tavium, see Bittel 1974, with Özsait and Özsait 2003.

²¹³ An anonymous reviewer of this article questioned this possibility because of the ‘negative archaeological evidence’ for any ‘pre-Roman’ settlement at or in the immediate vicinity of modern Ankara. S/he seems unaware of, for example, the admittedly poorly published Hellenistic site at Yalıncak and the several Phrygian- and Galatian-type tumuli at locations such as Bestêpe, Anatkarib and Yalacık (Yağcı and Mermerci 1990 for the last). We should add also the Galatian-type tumuli burial found at Balgat. In addition, there are the several ‘Galatian’ forts in the immediate region, none unfortunately excavated but which, if occupied in 25 BC, would of necessity be depopulated soon after the annexation; cf. Vardar 2002, 2003, and 2004.

²¹⁴ A delay of a few decades in providing the appropriate monumental infrastructure for this newly Romanised centre is, in reality, quite unremarkable: as the adage has it, ‘Rome was not built in a day’. The provision of such structures necessary to present the picture of a fully-formed Romanised civitas or a Hellenised polis could simply not have happened overnight, but took place when civic resources were available - unless a Potemkin-like approach of building a shanty town ‘stage-set’ was taken. To which we might add that at Ancyra at least, the epigraphic evidence is how many of those granted Roman citizenship took the praenomen and nomen of one of the Julio-Claudian emperors
rather than the ‘C. Julius’ of Augustus, pointing to a gradual rather than overnight development in the status and wealth of the local elite.\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{The Legions of Augustan Galatia}\textsuperscript{131}

It is natural to assume that Lollius took up his post as Galatia’s first legate with some form of regular military force, this being maintained in whole or in part by his immediate successors until possibly as late as the annexation of Cappadocia by Tiberius in AD 17. After all, following Amyntas’ death and the apparent failure of his army to respond militarily to this, there was a ‘clear and present danger’ of opportunist raids by ‘Cilicians and Pisidians’ and the Homonadeis into Galatia and potentially adjacent regions, even after the successful campaign of Quirinus. Added to which Galatia was one of the largest regions annexed by Rome since the creation of Asia \textit{provincia} in 133/129 BC, and dominated by rural settlement with very few urbanised centres that of necessity had their own form of local police force. Thus, from the moment of the annexation, Lollius required some form of military element to ensure and maintain external and internal security in this vast and essentially rural landscape.

As already noted, the Galatian Royal Army was presumably still in existence after the death of Amyntas and when Lollius arrived to take control of his province, subsequently (as we will see below), being transformed into a force of Roman citizen legionaries and transferred overseas. In addition, Cappadocia, a Roman ally since the Treaty of Apamea, might have been able to supply troops to assist in maintaining internal and external security at the point of annexation.\textsuperscript{132} The necessity to supply troops to help local governors if required was a common obligation placed on all of Rome’s allies in the region, as when in earlier times the Galatian king Deiotaros supplied an armed force to Cicero when governor of Cilicia \textit{provincia}.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, it is conceivable that the Galatian Royal Army and possibly a force from Cappadocia may have satisfied Lollius’ immediate need for policing duties in the new province.\textsuperscript{134} However, there was always the possibility that the Galatian elite or others might respond with armed force to the annexation of the territory, as had happened with the annexation of the kingdom of Pergamom, and such ‘native’ forces might prove unreliable in the event of significant local resistance, never mind suitable for defence against external attack. Providing Lollius with a force of professional legionaries was the wiser course of action. And as Lollius ranked as a \textit{legatus Augusti propraetori} with \textit{imperium}, then, according to the practice at the time, he was eligible to command one or more Roman legions for the annexation process.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{130} It was not possible to consult Coşkun 2013c on this topic, but Kadioğlu et al. 2011, 35–9, provides a convenient review of this aspect of Galatia’s provincialisation. All the Julio-Claudian emperors shared the praenomen and nomen of Tiberius Claudius, and so exactly when these ‘T. Claudii’ received Roman citizenship can rarely be determined. However, it is noticeable that most inscriptions naming them are in Greek rather than Latin, hinting how the texts themselves date to later rather than earlier in the 1\textsuperscript{st} century AD.

\textsuperscript{131} A useful summary and evaluation of the sources relevant here are the pertinent parts of Strobel 2000 and 2002, the latter a somewhat unwieldy revision of the first which is difficult to comprehend fully.

\textsuperscript{132} Strobel 2000, 517, who, however, seems to connect this with possible resistance on the part of the Galatians to the annexation.

\textsuperscript{133} Cicero, \textit{Att.} 5.18.1–2, with 5.20.2–3; also Cicero, \textit{Fam.} 8.10.1–3, 15.1.2–6, 15.2, and 15.4.4–6.

\textsuperscript{134} An anonymous reviewer suggested that the Galatian Royal Army was a ‘highly efficient and professional and efficient and had also been used for occupation and conquest’, so it was capable of maintaining order within the province after Amyntas’ death and before the arrival of M. Lollius as governor. However, no support is supplied for this statement. Its known record was patchy, to say the least, having failed dismally to hold the centre at the Battle of Nicopolis in 48 BC. See B. Alex. 39–40.

\textsuperscript{135} Dio 53.15.1. As noted above, we cannot be certain of the exact total of legions in Augustus’ ‘New Army’ as originally formed. However, accepting the generally agreed number of twenty-seven or so, then aside from the seven
We have seen already that veterans of the legiones V Gallica and VII provided coloni for Colonia Caesarea at Antioch. How they arrived there or in what number is unknown. They may have marched into Galatia as a group, as the first colonists in the early Republican period were reputed to do,\textsuperscript{136} already possessed with that status. Or perhaps they came as serving soldiers with their relevant legion, and were discharged shortly after their arrival in the new province. On the whole, the latter option seems more probable and so we should assume that the legions in question – the legio V and the VII – accompanied Lollius for the annexation of Galatia, with Lollius and/or his unknown successor proceeding to discharge men from these as and when their term of service expired.\textsuperscript{137} The two legions themselves had presumably been re-deployed from the inner Balkans for the annexation, as a campaign there requiring several legions had only recently been brought to a successful conclusion by M. Licinius Crassus.\textsuperscript{138} Confirmation of a kind that legiones V and VII took part in the annexation of Galatia, though, comes not just from the circumstance they provided coloni for the Augustan foundations, but from funerary inscriptions at Antioch recording three members of the legio V and one for a member of legio VII who died there while still serving with their legions.\textsuperscript{139} To these we should add an inscription set up by the people of Lydian Nisyra in year 96 of the Sullan era, and so AD 11-12, which honours another serving member of legio VII, a centurion hastatus prior no less, for his services towards a citizen of the place.\textsuperscript{140}

Owing to the paucity of clear evidence, making sense of exactly how long these two legions remained in Galatia is problematic. However, K. Strobel, tracking the footsteps of R. Syme, H.-G. Pflaum, and S. Mitchell,\textsuperscript{141} has made a sterling attempt recently to do so for the period from the annexation to AD 17, when the apparently peaceful takeover of Cappadocia certainly ended Galatia’s status as a ‘frontier’ province.\textsuperscript{142} Yet, while Strobel has employed to the full his in-depth knowledge of the relevant historical and epigraphical sources known at present on this matter, his conclusions regarding the legionary garrison in Galatia seem overly influenced by the senatorial grade of the known governors – whether they were pro-praetorian or pro-consular. The point is that he follows the dictum of R.K. Sherk regarding the relationship between the actual political status of a specific governor and the type and size of the province’s garrison.\textsuperscript{143} This dictum holds that, while all the governors of the so-called Imperial provinces were styled as legati Augusti proprateore, some had served as praetors only before being assigned their province and so had command over a single legion while others had achieved consular status and thus could command two or more. But Sherk models this thinking on the basis of the post-Augustan system as set in stone, as it were, most probably during

\textsuperscript{136} Salmon 1969, 24.
\textsuperscript{137} Mann 1983, 59-60 calculated for the later principate, that each legion ‘retired’ an average of 100 men every year.
\textsuperscript{138} Dio 51.25.2. Crassus celebrated his triumphs ex Thracia et Geteis on 4 July 27 BC, although Augustus – in a notable change from precedence – refused him the spolia opima or the title imperator.
\textsuperscript{140} IGR 4.1375 (= Ehrenberg and Jones 1949, 131, no. 36), C. Aemilius Geminus. The use of the Sullan era dating system seems to have been preferred in Lydia; see, e.g., Leschhorn 1993, 318–21.
\textsuperscript{141} Syme 1933, passim; Pflaum 1950, 16–9; Mitchell 1976a.
\textsuperscript{143} Sherk 1980, following essentially Dio 53.15.
the Julio-Claudian period. However, while the first princeps usually appointed a governor of an imperial province with a legionary garrison from the ranks of pro-consuls, he chose the best man for the job in hand, even apparently ex-quaestors.\(^{144}\) Lollius, a close confidant of Augustus, was evidently a trusted man and considered capable enough to be assigned the annexation of Galatia. Thus, with the potential threat from the Tauric tribes in mind and possible unrest arising within Galatia itself because of its annexation,\(^{145}\) there is no reason to doubt that Lollius arrived with an army of two legions, the \(V\) and the \(VII\), not the \(legio VII\) alone as commonly held, despite his official status as a pro-praetor rather than pro-consul.\(^{146}\)

Exactly how long either legion remained in Galatia remains a matter of debate, and Strobel has stressed how the confused nature of our evidence makes this exceptionally difficult to determine. It may have been that one was detached, in part at least, to provide support for Tiberius’ expedition to the east in 20 BC, since he certainly took some kind of armed force with him. Suetonius claimed that he personally led an army from Macedonia into Syria, implying an overland march by way of Galatia, and it would have made sense to boost this by using any spare troops from the new province, if these were available.\(^{147}\) Indeed, such a redeployment of all or part of one of the Galatian legions, even if on a temporary basis, could help explain why there was no action against the Homonadeis in the first years of the province’s existence although, as we will see, other explanations are available for that delay. That aside, such a proposed re-deployment has been used to explain why veterans of a \(legio V\) were settled at a later date in the Berytos and Baalbek area. However, the one inscription referring to this Levantine-based legion by name assigns it the agnomen ‘Macedonica’, suggesting it was either formed or had served there before travelling east with Tiberius,\(^{148}\) and so is highly unlikely to be the Galatian \(legio V\), named on tombstones as the \(V\) Gallica.

To be sure, considering how a determined attempt at resolving the real or perceived threat posed by the Homonadeis and other Tauric tribes was delayed until the final years of the 1st century BC, with the paving of the \textit{Via Sebaste} in 6 BC under Cornutus Aquila, it seems more than likely that two legions were retained in Galatia until the annexation was considered ‘mission accomplished’. The road linked the outer arc of the Pisidian coloniae and enclosed the southwestern Taurus as a preparatory move towards the reduction or destruction of the peoples within this enclosed area.\(^{149}\) In a sense, then, the \textit{Via Sebaste} constituted a limes in the proper sense of the word, a road defining and marking off a specific piece of territory, and in military terms a hostile territory. The primary purpose of a Roman road was, after all, to allow a military force to move rapidly from one threatened area to another at the fastest speed

\(^{144}\) Dio 53.15.1.

\(^{145}\) We should not assume, as most commentators do, that those dwelling within a ‘client kingdom’ welcomed the transformation of this into a provincia.

\(^{146}\) E.g. Mitchell 1976, passim, albeit allowing for the possibility (307–8) that the \(legio V\) might have been involved also. Sherk 1980, 1047, however, strongly objected to this view on the grounds of Lollius’ pro-praetorian rank, arguing that a legionary province demanded a pro-consular governor. This caused Mitchell (1993, 73, n. 42) to modify his original belief, while maintaining his stance that the \(legio VII\) at least was involved in the annexation of Galatia.

\(^{147}\) Suetonius, \textit{Tib.} 14.3.

\(^{148}\) Cf. Keppie 2000, 91, with CIL 3.14165/6 = AE 1899.45. In addition, the following coin reverses for Berytos: RPC 1.4535 (Augustus), with two \textit{aquilae} between legionary \textit{signa}; BMC 58 (Augustus \textit{divus}) with two \textit{aquilae} and the legend (\textit{Colonia}) (\textit{V} \(B\)erytos) (\textit{legio} \(V\)); and RPC 1.4547 (Claudius) with two \textit{signa} each with superimposed \textit{aquilae} and the legend (\textit{legio}) \(V\) (\textit{legio} \(VII\)).

\(^{149}\) For a general introduction to the \textit{Via Sebaste}, see French 1997, 181–82, with a more detailed account and maps presented in French 2012.
possible. Thus, the paving of this highway was the prelude to the major campaign in the area that – as we have seen - was begun and completed by Aquila’s successor, Sulpicius Quirinus, governor from 6–2 BC. This was pursued on an essentially genocidal basis. According to Strabo, he ‘overthrew the inhabitants by starving them, and captured alive four thousand men and settled them in the neighbouring cities, leaving the country destitute of all its men who were in the prime of life’. For this Quirinus received the ornamenta triumphalia in around 3 BC.¹⁵⁰

Why the potential problem of the Homonadeis was not resolved at an earlier date – if they indeed posed a real threat to Galatia and neighbouring regions – needs some elucidation. It is best understood by the Roman practice during the late Republican and early Imperial periods of holding back from a punitive campaign, whether or not this became one of conquest, until the conditions were ‘just right’. This is especially true of the Augustan period, for which we have to bear in mind also that at the time of Galatia’s annexation, Augustus and Rome were heavily involved in the Bellum Asturicum which continued off-and-on until 16 BC. Moreover, the start of that Spanish campaign in 26 BC had coincided with the failed expedition of C. Petronius into Ethiopia, followed the next year by the disastrous foray led by C. Aelius Gallus into Arabia Felix. Taking into account the several campaigns that took place in Europe during the first three decades of Augustus’ principate against the far more threatening Germanic and Thracian tribes, a major operation against the Homonadeis, with its demands on manpower and logistics along with potential casualties, might have taken a back seat in Augustus’ overall assessment of how best to use his forces.

Whatever the reason for the delay, with the threat from the Homonadeis and their allies ostensibly removed, one or both of the Galatian legions was possibly redeployed to serve with the 20-year-old C. Caesar on his mission to the east in AD 1 to resolve peacefully, if feasible, a dispute with Parthia over the Armenian succession.¹⁵¹ This possibility is raised by Strobel on account of the long-held belief that the governor of Galatia at this time was M. Servilius (Nonianus). He was made consul posterior in AD 3 after leaving the province,¹⁵² which indicates he was of pro-praetorian rank when Caius Caesar was in the region. Therefore, as Servilius was technically ineligible – as Strobel believes – to command a two- legion consular army, the two Galatian legions were available for C. Caesar to use as he wished. Coşkun’s re-analysis of the Anycra ‘Priest List’, however, reveals one Metilius (Rufus?), perhaps the son of the early Augustan proconsul of Achaea, as legate in Galatia at this time, specifically 2 BC-AD 4.¹⁵³ His name is not to be found on the consular fasti and so he was of pro-praetorian rank only, in which case Strobel’s argument could still apply. Yet the fact remains that even if the threat from the Homonadeis was eliminated, other Tauric tribes still posed a menace. Indeed, sometime around AD 6, the Isaurians ‘began marauding expeditions, and were then led on into all the horrors of war, until they were utterly subdued’, presumably by Metilius’ successor, the Fronto attested in office in Galatia from AD 4–8.¹⁵⁴

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¹⁵⁰ Strabo 12.6.5, with Tacitus, Ann. 3.48. See also CIL 14. 3613 = ILS 918, usually restored as referencing this campaign. One might speculate why – if the Cilician tribes presented a major threat – Augustus did not attempt an attack on the Homonadeis when in the east in 20 BC to oversee the installation of Tigranes III as king of Armenia. The answer probably lies in his decision, after his involvement in a series of campaigns in Spain and his concurrent illness – perhaps a form of post-traumatic stress disorder? - to leave matters of this kind to trusted and skilled subordinates such as Agrippa rather than take the field of battle himself.

¹⁵¹ Strobel 2000, 519; 2003, 53.

¹⁵² Rémy 1989, 134–35.

¹⁵³ Coşkun 2014, 57.

¹⁵⁴ Dio 55.28.3. For Fronto as governor at this time, see Coşkun 2014, 58.
A major change in the garrison of Galatia did, however, come about in AD 8 when the newly-appointed governor M. Plautius Silvanus, was summoned by Augustus to help deal with the Balkan-wide revolts then handled by Tiberius. Silvanus receiving *ornamenta triumphalia* in AD 11 for his part in suppressing these. According to Velleius Paterculus, a contemporary observer and our principal source for the campaign, Silvanus and A. Caecina Severus, then governor of Moesia, brought with them for this campaign five legions *ex transmarinis provinciis*. Logically, as Syme observed almost a century ago, two of these five came from the east, and so one at least from Galatia. It may have been that Silvanus took both Galatian legions with him, but Galatia was still, nominally at least, a frontier province so in theory at least required a legionary garrison. On the other hand the available evidence could support the idea that Silvanus took both legions with him, and that neither returned to the province. All that is certain is how no concrete evidence exists for the presence of either legion in Galatia after the mid-Augustan period.

The matter demands much more discussion than possible here for no simple explanation fits all, and so we restrict ourselves to a general overview. Insofar as the *legio V Gallica* is concerned, the simplest explanation is that it is identical with the *legio V Macedonica*, found as a part of the Moesian garrison working on the road along the Iron Gates Gorge of the Danube in AD 33–34. The adoption of the *agnomen Macedonica* indicates a stay in that region which may have followed directly from its arrival there either with Silvanus in AD 8, or at a later date. It may have been re-deployed in Macedonia in connection with overseeing adjacent Thrace, a region prone to dynastic struggles and resulting civil wars. As for the Galatian *legio VII*, this is almost certainly identical with the *legio VII Macedonica* reported on an incomplete inscription from Thracian Lysimachia which names a M. Caecilius as a centurion in the *cohors X* of that legion. It is registered in Tilurium (near Trilij / Gardun) in Illyrium under Tiberius, remaining there until redeployed to eastern Anatolia in AD 58 for Corbulo’s Armenian campaign. Thus it could well have remained in the Balkan region after Silvanus returned to his Galatian command in AD 11 or so, remaining in Thrace possibly until the end of the Pannonian war in AD 9, perhaps to make up for the large legionary and other losses incurred in that campaign. It was then possibly transferred to Illyricum in connection with a fresh campaign Tiberius planned in that region, but cancelled after Augustus’ death in AD 14 and Tiberius’ elevation as *princeps*, possibly being brigaded at this time with the *legio XII* at Burnum (Kistanje) in Illyricum before establishing its base at Tilurium.

This brings us to a series of memorials to legionaries of Galatian origin found at Ljubuski a veteran’s settlement in Illyricum established at or around AD 14 near *Colonia Julia Narona* (Metković). Mitchell has persuasively argued that these men joined the *legio VII* while it was in *Galatia provincia* and on the basis of one recruit, M. Sosius M.f. *Fabia*, from Sebastopolis, a settlement founded in 3/2 BC, suggests the legion remained in the province until at least that

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155 Dio 54.34.6
156 Vel. Pat. 2.12.4; Syme 1939, 394.
157 There is no evidence to support the suggestion by Strobel 2002, 53, that there may have been as many as three regular legions in Galatia at this time.
158 ILS 2281. We should reject Strobel’s hypothesis that the *legio V Gallica* was despatched to the Balkans in 18/17 BC, and then went to Gallia Belgica being the same as the *legio V* that lost its eagle in battle there in 16 BC in the *Clades Lolliana*. Cf. Velleius Paterculus 2.97, with Strobel 2000, 522–23; 2002, 57–8. The nameless legion that suffered this disgrace was almost certainly the *legio V Alaudae*, cf. Franke 2000
159 CIL 3.7386.
date.\textsuperscript{160} This ignores the way by which throughout the early Imperial Period, men recruited from the provinces to serve as legionaries were usually sent to join a legion in another, making their home on retirement in that legions’ ‘personal’ colonia (as it were). The relevance of this point here is that two of the Galatians recorded at Ljubuski as veterans of the legio VII Macedonica do not have the honorific Claudia Pia Felix added to the legion’s name on their memorials, an agnomen it was awarded in AD 42, indicating their death before that year.\textsuperscript{161} As they had served the full 20 plus years demanded by Augustus’ second legi

yreform of 13/12 BC, they could have been recruited in Galatia and then sent to join the legion anytime between 13 BC and AD 17, and so they need not have been recruited into the legion while it was still in Galatia.\textsuperscript{162} Added to which, we do not know exactly when the legionary veteran settlement at Ljubuski was established and so when the first veterans from the legio VII may have moved there. The generally accepted year AD 14 is inferred from local circumstances, to be precise, the mass discharges that followed the legionary mutiny in Illyricum that year over their conditions of service.\textsuperscript{163} Quite simply, then, the burials of these Galatian veterans of the legio VII at Ljubuski at a date sometime before AD 42 cannot be used as evidence for the legion having remained in and recruited from Galatia as late as the last decade of the 1\textsuperscript{st} century BC.

Whichever suggestion offered above for the departure of either legion from Galatia provincia is accepted, this would mean, of course, that sometime in the late Augustan period Galatia ceased to be considered a legionary or frontier province. Indeed, this may have come about in AD 8 if both legions left with Silvanus and remained in the Balkans thereafter, or towards the end of the Augustan period if the legio V returned for a spell before departing for ‘Macedonica’. Either way, it would mean that for a time before the annexation of Cappadocia in AD 17, when for certain Galatia ceased to be a ‘frontier’ province, it no longer had a legionary garrison. Exactly when Galatia finally lost its legionary garrison though demands more discussion than can be justified here, for no simple answer is forthcoming. There again, it is noteworthy how neither Cilicia nor Pontus-Bithynia had a legionary garrison in the early principate, and it is quite possible that the situation in Central Anatolia was deemed peaceful enough to make Galatia a non-legionary province from as early as AD 8.

For this part of the article, we conclude by noting the matter of the ‘elephant in the room’, so to speak. There is a lack of evidence for where either of the legiones V or VII called ‘home’ in Galatia when not on campaign. There are, as far as it is known, no legionary-related artefacts from Pisidian Antioch. However, as the home to veterans from both legions and a place that apparently supplied them with new recruits, this does suggest that one or other or both were based in the vicinity. Yet there is no visible trace there – or anywhere in South Galatia for that matter – of a base for two legions at a time when it was usual to brigade two legions together in one location,\textsuperscript{164} never mind anything indicating a semi-permanent base for even just one of them. While it is true that Augustus intended his ‘New Army’ to be a self-sufficient force that was ever ready for movement where needed, legions did need a home for those periods when not on campaign. While permanent fortresses do not make an appearance in Europe at least until the Tiberian or even Neronian period, archaeologically visible winter

\textsuperscript{160} Mitchell 1976, 304.
\textsuperscript{161} Cf. Franke 2000.
\textsuperscript{162} Cf. CIL 3.2710 = ILS 2710, and AE 1994.1355. The legion was awarded the agnomen for its loyalty to Claudius during the rebellion that year of Furius Samillus Scribonianus, then governor of Dalmatia.
\textsuperscript{163} Wilkes 2000, 329.
\textsuperscript{164} Keppie 1984, 193.
camps, or \textit{hibernia}, had by then become permanent bases along the Rhine and elsewhere,\textsuperscript{165} such as that at Vetera, and so we should reasonably expect something similar in Augustan Galatia.

\textbf{The Auxilia}

Ever since the early Republic, units of \textit{auxilia}, supplied under their treaty obligations by the \textit{Socii et amici populi Romani}, had provided support for a Roman legionary army while on campaign. They often formed a vital component for any campaign force in that period by delivering the sizeable cavalry element the early legions lacked.\textsuperscript{166} Such units of \textit{auxilia} played an especially important part in the wars of the later Republic, beginning with the Social War of 91-88 BC right down to the Triumviral war of 31–30 BC, before appearing epigraphically as fully formed regular units of the Roman army under Claudius.\textsuperscript{167} By then they were composed of men either conscripted or volunteers for a set period of service, eventually set as twenty-five years, in return for which they received regular annual pay and, on discharge, the award of Roman citizenship for themselves and their \textit{de facto} or future legal wife and children.

What happened between the Triumviral War and the time of Claudius is quite unclear. According to Dio, in that discussion between Augustus and his advisers in 29 BC during which he was encouraged to create an army that included a permanent force of legions, he was advised also to include in this army men from ‘the subject nations, and the allies’ (i.e., the \textit{auxilia}).\textsuperscript{168} The details of the discussion as recounted by Dio are doubtless fictive. Nevertheless, there is no reason to deny that something similar to what he claims was agreed on had come into effect by the end of Augustus’ reign – certainly with regard to the legions and so the \textit{auxilia} probably also, although firm evidence is scarce. Strabo, writing – it is believed – of the army in Egypt in 26–24 BC, noted that there were nine auxiliary \textit{cohortes} and three \textit{alae} there at the time.\textsuperscript{169} Moreover, Velleius Paterculus, writing with reference to the outbreak of the Pannonian War in AD 6 and at the scene in person, records that the army assembled for the initial campaign included 10 legions supplemented by an auxiliary force of 14 \textit{alae}, more than 70 \textit{cohortes}, more than 10,000 veterans, and a cavalry contingent supplied by King Rhoemetalces of Thrace.\textsuperscript{170}

Thus two of the elements of \textit{auxilia} familiar from the Julio-Claudian period onwards – the cavalry \textit{alae} and infantry \textit{cohortes} – were clearly in existence as recognised military formations by late Augustan times if not earlier. However, we cannot know if they were of the usual 500 man strength (\textit{quingenaria}) found in later times.\textsuperscript{171} On the other hand, the 70 plus \textit{cohortes}, mentioned by Paterculus presumably included several if not all of the units of epigraphically-attested \textit{cohortes Voluntariorum} and \textit{Ingenuorum}, units of \textit{auxilia} raised among Roman

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[165]{Keppie 1984, 193.}
\footnotetext[166]{Keppie 1984, 150.}
\footnotetext[167]{Cf. Haynes 2013, 51–2.}
\footnotetext[168]{Dio 52.27.1}
\footnotetext[169]{Strabo 17.1.12 (797).}
\footnotetext[170]{Velleius Paterculus 2.113.1.}
\footnotetext[171]{It is very likely that partly mounted units of cavalry and infantry, the \textit{cohortes equitata} of the later imperial period, existed about now also, just as they probably did in the earlier Republican period. However, our earliest evidence is an inscription of Augustan or early Julio-Claudian date referencing a \textit{cohors Ubiorum peditum et equitum}: CIL 10.4862 = ILS 2690.}
\end{footnotes}
citizens for the Pannonian campaign, and in addition those named simply as *cobortes Italica* or for the region of Italy they came from, as with the *cobors Apula*.

That these were regularly constituted military units rather than ad-hoc formations raised on a ‘needs must’ basis is implicit in the way they were beneficiaries along with the legions in Augustus’ will, which refers to the sums of money left to his ‘*legionariis aut cohortibus civium Romanorum*’ and their continued existence as regular auxiliary units long into the post-Augustan period. The remainder of the auxiliary troops brigaded for the Pannonian campaign, especially the cavalry *alae*, were drawn evidently as in earlier times from the *Socii* and so were perhaps not yet on the formal payroll of the Roman army. Either way, our first hint at what we can recognise as regular *auxilia* units drawn from the empire’s non-Roman peoples comes at the very end of the Augustan period, when we are told how he kept records of the numbers of citizens and non-citizens under arms.

We do not know if the legionary force that annexed and then occupied Galatia until the late Augustan period was accompanied by an auxiliary contingent or not. Nonetheless, even though the routine of brigading auxiliary units with legions was not yet apparently common practice, it certainly seems likely the case with the annexation of Galatia. After all, it would surely have seemed impractical for any of Augustus’ governors to distribute members of the legions throughout the vast extent of territory they controlled for little more than policing purposes. A far more likely never mind effective solution would be to use regiments of *auxilia* for the purpose, which could then be marshalled in their entirety alongside the legion(s) when required for active campaign in, for example, the Taurus. As such, then we might envisage Galatia as a potential origin for the procedure observed certainly by AD 23 by when it was usual to provide the legionary provinces with sufficient auxiliary units virtually equal in their manpower to the legions they contained.

In which case it is only natural to attempt at identifying what auxiliary units may have taken part in the annexation and subsequent transformation of Galatia into a *provincia*. At first sight, such an undertaking might seem doomed to immediate failure. After all, there is a complete lack of any securely dated evidence for any units of *auxilia* in Galatia before the Trajanic period, for which there are four *diplomata* listing the *auxilia* in what was then the joint province of Galatia-Cappadocia, a combined command constituted originally in the late Neronian-early Flavian period. What is remarkable about these *diplomata*, though, is how several of the auxiliary units they record incorporate in their titles one or more elements indicating they were Augustan foundations. During the Augustan period, the legions he established or reconstituted added his name to their title,

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172 Kraft 1951, 82–105, remains the seminal account on these ‘citizen’ cohorts. While some consider it ‘dated’ in the sense of being published more than half a century ago, it provides the most insightful account of these units. For later works, see Spaul 2000, 19–48.


174 Spaul 2000, 19–48, provides a convenient summary account of the evidence relating to these units.


all of which are attested in inscriptions also as serving in Galatia, were all quite possibly part of the province’s initial auxiliary garrison. Indeed, if the Galatian garrison did supply a task force for the review of the eastern frontier by Germanicus in AD 18–19, then the *ala I Augusta Germaniciana* may well have taken its name from service with him on that occasion.\(^{178}\) To these five, though, we might add another two listed on the Trajanic *diplomata*, namely the *cohortes I Italica* and *I Italica Voluntariorum civium Romanorum*. Both were probably among the citizen cohorts raised by Augustus in connection with his Pannonian campaign, and were later enlarged – most probably in the Flavian period – to *milliaria* or ‘double-sized’ status.\(^{179}\) As Augustan creations, they may well have been ‘spare’ after the ‘pacification’ of the Balkans and so available for service in Galatia.

To conclude this section on the seven auxiliary units likely transferred from other provinces for the initial annexation of Galatia, we should note also the possible presence in the province in the early Imperial period of two cavalry units popularly thought to have been recruited there in the late Augustan or early Tiberian period from among the descendants of the original Augustan-period colonists. That is to say the *ala Antiochensium* and *ala I Augusta Gemina Colonorum*. To be sure, there is scant evidence for this belief with regard to the first of the two, the *ala Antiochensium*, first securely reported as part of the Syrian garrison in the Flavian period,\(^{180}\) and not attested on any of the ‘Trajanic *diplomata* or any other epigraphic record for Galatia–Cappadocia. The conventional opinion it was formed from settlers at Pisidian Antioch is based essentially on the discovery of an inscription there of late Augustan or early Tiberian date,\(^{181}\) but which – if correctly read – simply honours a citizen of the place who was a commander of the unit, apart from which we might add that an *ala Antiochensium* could have been formed from any of the other twelve or so like-named *poleis* in the wider region. On the other hand, there is somewhat better evidence that the second unit, the *ala I Augusta Gemina Colonorum*, which is listed on the Trajanic *diplomata* and features in other epigraphic records for the region does have a close connection with Galatia, and was indeed perhaps recruited from the descendants of Roman colonists, specifically those settled at Iconium where it seems to have been based.\(^{182}\) Having said that we should note how the inclusion of the ‘Gemina’ element in its title, as first attested for certain in the Trajanic *diplomata*, would indicate a unit formed by joining two earlier units of the same name, as was the case when two legions were amalgamated.\(^{183}\) In other words, it seems probable that two earlier units, perhaps named along the

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\(^{179}\) We might perhaps include the *cohors I Hispanorum* also named on these four *diplomata* in the list of *auxilia* for Augustan Galatia, despite the lack of any precise evidence it was an Augustan foundation, as it would appear to have been active in the province during the Claudian period and so possibly earlier: AE 1961.17, with Mitchell 1993, 74.

\(^{180}\) AE 1983.927.

\(^{181}\) AE 1926.82; cf. Mitchell 1993, 74.

\(^{182}\) IGR 3. 797; cf. Mitchell 1993, 74.

\(^{183}\) In criticising this interpretation of the unit’s title, an anonymous reviewer asserted that units named *Gemina* represent a second and independent unit sharing the same name. This is not so, for they carried a sequential number to signify this was the case, while those single units formed by combining two others into one were regarded as ‘twinned’. Caesar (BC 3.4.1.), for example, states quite clearly that a single legion formed from two others took the cognomen ‘Gemella’, or ‘twin-born’, while Cassius Dio (55.23.7) adds that when Augustus and later emperors combined men from disbanded legions into a single body, the new legion took the name ‘Gemina’. As Birley 1928, 56–7, observed, the same procedure logically applies to auxiliary units. It certainly does in the case of the *cohors Gemina Sardorum et Corsorum* and the *cohors II Gemina Ligurum et Corsorum*, which preserve the names of the original formations from which they were constituted, i.e., Sardinia, Corsica, and Ligurium. For the sake of completeness, other examples of ‘twinned’ auxiliary units are the *Ala Gemina Sebastena / Sebastenorum*, the *Ala...
lines of the *ala I* and *II Augusta Colonorum*, provided the necessary cadre for what later became the *ala I Augusta Gemina Colonorum*.\(^{184}\)

Be that as it may, Trajan was the first to raise an auxiliary unit from and named for Galatia in the form of the *cohors I* and *II Ulpia Galatorum*. If Galatia did indeed serve as a source of needed manpower for Rome, then it seems that until the early 2nd century, space was clearly found for such men in the Egyptian (and other?) legions and/or the auxiliary units stationed in Galatia itself or other *provinciae*. The matter will be discussed further elsewhere. However, it is certainly a sobering thought that the first named Galatian known to serve in a military unit other than a legion is L. Valerius Pudens, who joined the *auxilia* around AD 57 ending his service with the *Cohors I Aquitania* in AD 82.\(^{185}\)

**And What of the Galatian Royal Army?**

We leave almost to the last the fate of the Galatian Royal Army, briefly discussed above, and assumed to have been in existence at the time Galatia was annexed as a *provincia*. According to the long-held conventional opinion, it was subsequently incorporated in whole or part into Augustus’ legionary army as the *legio XXII Deiotariana*. More recently, though, A. Coşkun, following a hypothesis originally developed by R. Syme,\(^{186}\) has argued that after 25 BC it continued in service in Galatia as a *legio vernacula*, before being absorbed in Tiberian times into a pre-existing *legio XXII* (*Cyrenaica*), at which time it took the agnomen *Deiotariana*.\(^{187}\) Space does not allow a full critique of the proposition, but it would be invidious not to observe here a few significant counterpoints.

To begin with, we need not doubt the possibility that at the time of Galatia’s annexation, Rome accepted the continuance of the Royal Army as a *legio vernacula*. Several non-citizen units of legionary type existed and campaigned alongside regular Roman legions in Republican times. Yet those we know of were short-lived formations, established for specific campaigns, although one, the *legio V Alaudae*, was later elevated to the status of a regular citizen legion, or *legio iusta*.\(^{188}\) There would be little need to maintain the Galatian Royal Army as a *legio vernacula* for any length of time after the annexation though, because, as we have seen, it seems likely that two regular legions were involved in taking control of the territory. Of these two, one at least and possibly both remained there into the late Augustan period, along with an uncertain number of auxiliary forces. It is not clear why Galatia might require an extra ‘legion’ in the form of the Galatian Royal Army along with the two regular legions in the province, while an over-abundance of men under arms would certainly have placed overly onerous demands on the military supply system. On balance, therefore, it seems unlikely that the Galatian Royal

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1. *Flavia Gemina,* and the *cohors VIII Gemina Voluntariorum*; also the *cohors V Gemella civittas Romanorum*, first attested in Syria in 139 (CIL.16.87), suggesting it was formed from two earlier units that suffered heavy losses in the Second Jewish Rebellion.
5. E.g., Coşkun 2008a, 148, and in detail, Coşkun 2008b.
6. E.g., during Pompey’s campaign against Caesar in Spain: *B.Hisp.* 7: ‘Pompeius ... Aquilas et signa habuit XIII legionem; sed ex quibus aliquid firmamenti se existimabat habere duae fuerunt vernaculae, quae a Trebonio transfugerant; una facta ex coloniis quae fuerunt in his regionibus’. Thus a clear distinction is made between the two *legio vernaculae* formed of non-citizens and the one raised from Roman citizens in the colonies, the *legio facta ex coloniis*. For a comprehensive account of the *legio V Alaudae* and its history, see Franke 2000.
Army remained in service in Galatia for any length of time as a *legio vernacula*, and certainly not for the next forty years or so.

Thus, we follow here the usual view that it was absorbed in whole or in part into Augustus’ professional army, bringing the overall total of these units to twenty-eight. However, as the enumeration of the legions in Augustus’ ‘New Army’ does not run sequentially, the Galatian ‘legion’ became the *legio XXII*. 189 We do not know when the act of absorbing the Galatian Royal Army into the regular scheme of legions happened nor can we divine what prompted the transformation. It was, though, more probably early rather than late in the Augustan period, Augustus taking the opportunity to draft men serving in an army armed and trained already to Roman standards at a time when there was a growing reluctance for Italian-born citizens to serve in the legions. Moreover, there was also the possible need to strengthen the garrison of Egypt after the disastrous expeditions of 26 and 25 BC. To be sure, the several texts on papyrus and on stone from Egypt recording relatively large numbers of Galatians serving there in the Augustan-early Tiberian period in either the *legiones III* and especially the *XXII*, point to a pattern of block recruitment in the time period we are concerned with.

The best known of these documents is the oft-cited Koptos inscription set up in the eastern Egyptian desert by members of a building party detached from two unnamed legions for road building and other associated construction works. Unfortunately, it cannot be precisely dated, except that it belongs to the period when Egypt was presumably garrisoned by just two legions. 190 Its importance is how it provides *inter alia* a listing of legionaries in parallel columns employed on the project subtracted for the task from the 4th to the 6th cohorts of the two legions, and that each man is named not simply according to his *cohort* and *centuria* but by his *praenomen*, *nomen*, patronymic, *tribus* and *origo*, but none of them with a *cognomen*. Many of them are of Galatian origin, each evidently made a Roman citizen by adopting or being assigned what is clearly fictive nomenclature and membership in one of the Roman tribes to satisfy legal requirements that legions must be composed of Roman citizens only, while the lack of *cognomina* indicates a date for the text in the early Imperial period. Most accept that since column 1 of the inscription names a C. Sossius C.f. Pollia from Pompeiopolis, attested elsewhere as a member of *legio III*, 191 then this column contained the names of members of that legion, while the other column lists men in the *legio XXII*, these being the two legions that formed the garrison of Egypt in the early Imperial period.

None of the available literary sources points directly to the existence of an accepted procedure whereby the grant of citizenship and fictive nomenclature to a freeborn *peregrinus* was a means of maintaining one or more legions at full strength, never mind establishing an entirely new one. When put into context though, the absence of such documentary evidence for the Roman principate is easy to explain. Roman citizenship remained a prized asset until the *constitutio Antoniniana* of AD 212, and no contemporary or later commentator on the reign of Augustus or even his successors as *principes* were likely to reflect too deeply, never mind

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190 CIL 3.6627 = ILS 2483. Much hinges on the statement of Strabo that there were three legions in the province when he wrote his *Geographia* 17.1.12. However, apart from noting where they were stationed, he adds no further detail. Hence the passage cannot be dated to any particular point in the reign of Augustus or Tiberius (many think it belongs earlier rather than later). Tacitus (*Ann.* 4.5.2) states that only two were present in AD 23. Hence, debate continues over the date of the text. Many favour the Augustan period and perhaps early Augustan at that (e.g., Holder 1980, 6, and Saddington 1982, 61); others argue for an early Tiberian date (Coşkun 2008b, 38–42) or even later, in the mid- or late- 1st century date (Alston 1995, 29–31).

191 CIL III.6591.
advertise, on such a revolutionary step as the enfranchisement of a large number of non-citizens at a single time. Indeed we might cite Caesar’s circumlocutions over the origin of his legio V Alaudae, a legion raised from non-Roman citizens, as a precedent, and with that precedent in mind, perhaps the same procedure was applied to the Galatian Royal Army after the annexation of Galatia, and so the formation of the legio XXII Deiotariana. We have already mentioned legionaries with Lollius’ nomen and praenomen who were assigned membership in the Pollia tribus, one often chosen for new citizens. These Galatians aside though, the new legio XXII presumably received a cadre of men transferred from other legions to bring it up to the required standards before deployment, initially, it seems to, Cyrenaica. Hence the legio XXII makes its first appearance in the epigraphic record as the legio XXII Cyrenaica. By the Flavian period, however, this legio XXII had adopted the agnomen Deiotariana, presumably in honour of its ultimate origin, just as legions named Augusta did so to signify their formation under the first princeps. Or perhaps the legio XXII took the epithet because of the many numbers of Galatians among its ranks, presumably recruited as a block into a pre-existing legio XXII (Cyrenaica), with any ‘extras’ assigned to the existing legio III? One wonders if we will ever know the answer to that question.

Envoi

All-in-all, it has to be said that, despite the well-deserved status of S. Mitchell’s Anatolia I as a vade mecum for understanding the formation of Galatia provincia and its later history, several aspects regarding the Augustan phase of the process remain to be resolved. The sequence of

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192 Cf. Suetonius, Caes. 24.2. We have no record of how or when Caesar arranged the grant of citizenship to the entire legio V Alaudae raised in Transalpine Gaul nor the reaction this may have caused at Rome. Keppie 1984, 140–41 notes how the unit is referred to simply as a series of cohorts in the B. Hisp., suggesting that Caesar was well aware of the possible discontent it might cause if it became widely known the legion was recruited from peregrini who were subsequently granted full citizenship.

193 Coşkun 2008b, 24, believes Augustus’ ‘well-known cautious practice of granting citizenship’ would preclude the application of such a measure to transform the Galatian Royal Army into a legion. However, we might speculate if the increase in the number of Roman citizens from the 4,063,000 recorded in 28 BC to the 4,937,000 of AD 14 (RG 8) might have resulted, in part at least, from the extension of citizenship to peregrini to provide urgently needed recruits for the legions.

194 See note 68 above.

195 CIL 10, 4862 = ILS 2690, of Tiberian date. At this stage in the development of the legionary army, a geographical title indicates service in the named location, and so the legio XXII Cyrenaica may well have served there before arriving at its later ‘home’ at Nicopolis in Egypt, where a Legio XXII is first registered in 8 BC (BGU 4.1104).

196 Coşkun 2008b, 24, wrongly claims BGU I.140 of AD 119, as the earliest documented use of the agnomen Deiotariana. It appears for the first time on CIL 03, 6023 = CIL 03, 6606 from Alexandria, which on analogy with CIL 3.30, is dated precisely to AD 65, so should belong to the years around that date. Note also a cursus honorum at Paestum, internally dated to the Vespasianic period: AE 1975.251. A similar date seems applicable to CIL 6.5583, recording a T. Claudius T.f. Quirina Telesino, who transferred to the legio XI Claudia Pia Fidelis from the legio XXII Deiotariana. His name is possibly fictive, indicating recruitment by one of the Julio-Claudian emperors, while the agnomen Claudia Pia Felix on the text for the legio XI dates it to after AD 42. Indeed Telesino at a pinch might have been of Ancyran origin, given the relatively large numbers of T. Claudii attested there, although not as members of the Quirina tribus. As for BGU I.140 of AD 119, this certainly confirms the epithet was in common use by the early 2nd century.

197 Cf. Coşkun 2008b, 27. BGU 4.1083 reveals how the two legions in Egypt in AD 32–38 (the III and the XXII) received Galatian recruits at that time. Some of these men were perhaps recruited or despatched there in response to losses incurred dealing with the riots at Alexandria in AD 37/38. Given how Galatians predominate on the Koptos list among the ranks of those men listed in the 4th to 6th cohorts of both the III and XXII, if the members of the working party were chosen on a random basis, this could indicate a bulk transfer of Galatians recently registered in these legions; cf. Coşkun 2008b, 29. Note also the already cited CIL 03, 6023 = CIL 05, 6606 from Alexandria, naming two signifert from Ancyra serving with the legio XXII Deiotariana. This suggests the continued recruitment of Galatians into these legions from AD 40–5, if not later.
The Annexation of Galatia Reviewed

The governors for one, for which we sorely need more epigraphic evidence, and the foundation dates of the Pisidian coloniae. There is also the matter of the legionary garrison of the province, from its annexation in 25 BC to the formalisation of Cappadocia provincia. This subject Strobel in particular has attempted to address with – in this writer’s opinion – somewhat mixed results.

But there are other topics that certainly need further investigation and which in the discussion above have not been touched upon or considered in any detail. For example, where were the legiones V and VII based while in Galatia? What was the economic impact of the legionary and auxiliary garrison (even if from a late Augustan date) on the economy of Galatia provincia in the Augustan period? Where is the archaeological evidence for the influx of coinage for everyday life of some five thousand men represented by a single legion, never mind two legions plus an additional auxiliary garrison? These men received their pay on a regular basis in hard Roman cash three times a year. These stipendia, each equivalent to 900 sestercii but probably issued in denarii, were due on the 1 January, 1 May, and 1 September. Yet there is nothing in the available coin lists for the region to indicate either a significant increase in Roman denarii or the official locally issued ‘small change’ needed by these men. Such is certainly the pattern from other provinces in the years following their annexation, as with Britannia. The explanation might simply be that no one has yet attempted a comprehensive survey of the coin finds made in Galatia. Or it could be that not enough field surveys in the rural areas of Galatia or the excavation of rural sites and poleis have yet been carried out to provide us with such raw data. Alternatively, it might be that while Galatia paid its way in taxation terms chiefly via the vectigalia, it could be that coin was also required and so in a sense, what the soldier received from the office of the procurator of Galatia responsible for financial matters went back to the same place via local taxation.

More pressing is the issue of the impact of a large garrison and the needs of taxation on local food resources. A discussion presented elsewhere has looked at the potential impact of the Neronian-Flavian and later garrison of Galatia and Cappadocia on their home provinces in terms of its regular food requirements. The figures are astounding. Such demands may well have justified the appropriation under Augustus of royal and temple lands in Galatia in about 25 BC for the use of the provincial fiscus and the formation of those areas of land that were originally imperially owned but then privatised, as it were, to become the estates of the local nobility. Be that as it may, the absence (as of yet) of any areas of land identifiable as marked by the regular centuriation method used to apportion land for the colonists at the twelve coloniae is remarkable. Such is conspicuous by its absence, yet surely it must have existed in some form or another.

It would be possible to list several other more matters regarding the annexation of Galatia on which we are ill-informed or for which there is no relevant evidence. But with this article already long enough, many would feel, it is with the above matters alone in mind that it finds a somewhat uneasy and admittedly unsatisfactory finale.

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198 Cf. Speidel 2009, for a general discussion of Roman Army pay scales
199 It is certainly difficult to find published comprehensive coin lists for most of the settlements within Galatia.
200 Bennett 2013, 324–27.
201 Cf. Palet and Orengo 2011, passim. The name colonus for a colonist does, after all, indicate a gift of farmland was integral to their new status.
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