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CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

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Introduction

Until recent decades, the military, on the whole, played a special role both in the Ottoman and Republican polities. In circa 1299, a military force, at the time consisting of warlords, formed the Ottoman principality. Later, in the Empire, as in the Turkish Republic, the centre/state had a more elevated status vis-à-vis the community/civil society and, until recently, the military remained the backbone of that state. By the end of the nineteenth century, the military, along with the civil bureaucracy, became first the *object* and then the *subject* of modernisation. A large number of Westernising leaders came from the military ranks. In 1909, they helped depose Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) to bring about a more consultative regime and do away with the Sultan’s personal rule. During the next decade, the military involved itself in the day-to-day politics of the empire. The Ottoman staff officer, Adjutant-Major Atatürk¹ disapprovingly depicted those later years as follows: ‘As long as members of the military remain in the [governing] Committee [of Union of Progress], neither shall we [be able to] set up an [effective political] party nor shall we [be able to] have a [subservient] military’ (Turfan 2000, 15).

Secondary role

Following the transition from the Empire to the Republic (1923), Atatürk, now the President of the Republic, rendered the military subservient to the civil government. For a time, some generals, Atatürk’s close colleagues during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), retained their commands in the military while also serving in the National Assembly. Some among them did not support Atatürk’s wish to proclaim a republic and carry out some crucial reforms. Thereupon, Atatürk asked the pashas to make a choice between their commands and their seats in the Assembly. Many preferred their commands. However, to be on the safe side, Atatürk also saw that Law 385, enacted in 1924, stated that ‘a person is not permitted to be a Deputy and hold another post at the same time’. Later, Atatürk was to

1 In 1934, the Turks began to take secondary names, too. Atatürk was conferred the secondary name of ‘Atatürk’, by the Grand National Assembly.

keep the military out of politics altogether. Article 148 of the Military Penal Code enacted in 1930, forbade military personnel to ‘assemble together for political objectives, join political parties, participate in political demonstrations, meetings, or elections, or in some other manner make statements with these objections in mind’ (Hale 2011, 195).

Once officers ceased to pose a danger to the Republic, Atatürk perceived the military as the most reliable and effective guarantor of the new Republic. In 1931, he declared:

the Turkish nation-state always perceived the officers ... as the leaders of the movements to achieve lofty national ideals ... When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country.

(Harris 1965, 56)

Now the military had a leading role to play in the modernisation of the country.

Thus, the military were partly turned into an instrument of education, nation-building, and social mobilisation. Young men, during their compulsory service in the army, began to learn reading and writing, discipline, cleanliness, a sense of time, improved methods for cultivating the land, and a feeling of responsibility for their countrymen. In later years, particularly in the relatively underdeveloped regions of the country, officers even prepared students for the entrance examinations of the institutions of higher learning.

In the process, the military itself chose to act as the guardian of the Republic in general and that of laicism (separation of the state from religion) in particular.² From the 1960s onwards, in their interventions in politics officers always made reference to the Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law (1935, 1961): ‘The duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, as determined in the Constitution’.

Activist posture

In line with idealistic notions of democracy, and influenced by some French revolutionary thinkers, the military successfully intervened in politics five times, in 1960–1961, 1971–1973, 1980–1983, and 1997. More recently in 2016, a failed attempt was made. In the first five interventions, the military concluded that the government had drifted away from responsible governance and, consequently, the Westernising reforms the Republic had adopted faced grave threats. In 2016, a group of officers were tempted to bring to power a religiously oriented movement led by Fethullah Gülen.³

Having had an idealistic notion of democracy, the Turkish military took democracy as an *end*, not a *means*. They had been of the opinion that their version of democracy, namely *rationalistic* democracy, was indispensable for intelligent policy-making. When things ‘went wrong’ the guilty party was perceived to be politicians, not democracy itself.⁴ It was for this reason that the military in Turkey never toyed with the idea of staying in power indefinitely. After each intervention they returned to their barracks in a reasonable period of time and, more significantly, by their own volition.

2 In the literature, there is a tendency to use ‘laicism’ and ‘secularism’ interchangeably. I take ‘laicism’ as the separation of state from religion and ‘secularism’ as thinking and acting by not taking religion as one’s single guide.

3 At the present writing, January 2018, the trials of the officers involved are continuing.

4 See Heper (1992).

Interventions

27 May 1960 intervention

In 1950, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), which had been set up by Atatürk and his colleagues and had ruled the country from 1923 to 1950, lost the general elections and the Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti*, DP) came to power. It was following this momentous political transition that officers, not trusting the country's new set of politicians who had seemed close to religious groups, began to perceive themselves as the guardians of laicism. Indeed, the 1960 military intervention was undertaken because the military came to the conclusion that the DP governments had made undue concessions from laicism. The leading plotters of the coup comprised a few officers of the ranks from captain to colonel.

Those officers had agreed on the intervention itself, but they had agreed about nothing else. This became apparent when, right after the intervention, all of the DP members of the Assembly were taken into custody but shortly afterwards some of those members were released, only to find themselves taken into custody once again before long. The second set of detentions came after a group of professors of law from Ankara and Istanbul Universities, summoned hastily to justify the intervention, reported that the coup had been carried out against a government that had lost all of its legitimacy (Ahmad 1977, 163).

In order to legitimate their intervention further, the plotters brought a former general of the army to the head of their junta. However, they still did not enjoy the support of the rest of the military. That was because the junta had acted against the military's most sacred norm – that of 'hierarchy'. The plotters reciprocated by purging 90 per cent of the generals and close to 40 per cent of the colonels. Once it had solidified its position in the polity, the junta was divided on what to do next. A minority was, for the junta's staying in power, long enough to make major reforms in the economy and politics. The majority did not agree, and successfully removed the minority from the junta.

On the whole, the junta came to the conclusion that the reason for the ills of Turkish politics had been the fact that all powers were concentrated in one body, the Assembly. The 1960 junta set up a constituent assembly that prepared the 1961 Constitution. It created a Senate with powers to delay laws, a Constitutional Court to test the constitutionality of the laws, and proportional representation to assure the representation of the Atatürk's principles. The Constitution also formed a National Security Committee (MGK). The latter comprised the president, prime minister, minister of defence, chief of the General Staff, army, navy, air force commanders, and the general commander of the gendarmerie. The MGK provided senior military commanders with an institutionalised channel to government and it was to provide 'information' to the government.

The junta had all the DP members of the banned Assembly tried at court and given various prison sentences and, furthermore, it signed the commuted-for-age death sentence of former President Celal Bayar as well as the not-commuted death sentences of former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatih Rüstü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan.⁵ Those sentences were carried out.

5 On 22 February 1962 and 21 May 1963, too, Colonel Talat Aydemir and few other officers made coup attempts. Those were easily put down.

12 March 1971 intervention

The so-called 1971 ‘military intervention by communique’ was the end result of a deteriorating political situation due to continued armed conflict between leftist and rightist groups, to which weak and ineffective governments could not put an end. This second intervention started by the military penning a Memorandum to the effect that the country had been drawn into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest and that a strong and credible government that would neutralise the current anarchical situation needed to be formed (Ahmad 1977, 205). The day the Memorandum became known, the government resigned. In contrast to the 1960 intervention, the 1971 coup was preceded by several meetings among a circle of top generals. Those meetings sought to develop a consensus within the military regarding the necessity and modality of intervention.

Following the coup, the military increasingly chose to act alone. In their opinion, as far as the guardianship of the Republic was concerned, they did not have any allies among the political parties and the intelligentsia. Thus, they had to maintain their autonomy from civilian groups while maintaining their professionalism within the ranks.

The National Security Council (MGK) could now present to the cabinet not only ‘information’ but, also make ‘recommendations’. The military hoped that through this legal and professional channel they would be able to keep recurring disturbances in society under control and prevent the strained relations between political parties from getting out of hand. The military also wished to see a cabinet of professionals, led by a technocratic prime minister, for effectively coping with the left-right terrorism. The Parliament readily passed a law along those lines.

12 September 1980 intervention

In the late 1970s, the top brass once again came to the conclusion that the laicist state was under threat. In 1972, the religiously oriented National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP) formed a coalition government with the CHP. In 1975 and 1977, the MSP became a member of the so-called ‘Nationalist Front’ governments. Thereupon, the MSP’s impact on shaping educational and foreign policies was unacceptable to the military. This was exacerbated by the government’s failure to deal effectively with the long-ongoing Kurdish separatist agitation and violence in the south-east.

Prior to the intervention in September 1980, the top echelons of the military took a long time to appraise the wisdom of yet another military intervention. When the coup was finally undertaken, the military did not want to ban the major political parties, but instead sought to cooperate with them to maintain national unity, public order, and the secular democratic order. However, when the political parties refused to cooperate, the military abolished them.

The main aim of the generals was to reshape Turkey’s political dynamics by making a brand-new constitution as well as new election and political party laws. Thus, they wished to have a political system with effective governance while at the same time not restricting the electorate’s ability to express its opinions too freely. However, on the whole, the new political system turned out to be more authoritarian than the one enacted in 1961.

The military was of the opinion that this time around the politicians were not to be left to their own devices. Consequently, the 1982 Constitution accorded the military establishment

significant new powers. The new arrangements gave the president the authority to represent ‘the office of the commander-in-chief’ and the right to decide on the use of Turkey’s armed forces. S/he was accorded the prerogative to appoint the Chief of the General Staff on the proposal of the Council of Ministers and convene the MGK, as well as to proclaim martial law. Now, when the MGK submitted to the Council of Ministers its recommendations, that Council had to give priority to the recommendations that the MGK deemed necessary for the preservation of ‘the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and the indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of the country’ (Heper and Güney 2000, 637).

Not unlike the earlier interventions, this time, too, the military itself brought the intervention to an end. However, before the 1983 elections, after which the military returned to their barracks, in accordance with the new Constitution, General Kenan Evren, head of the 1980 coup and then Head of State, became the seventh president of Turkey. The military also kept the authority to play an effective role regarding candidates and political parties in the forthcoming 1983 elections. They did not want to take any chance of seeing a revanchist party come to power and challenge the handpicked candidates and the political party sponsored by the generals. Yet, in the elections, the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*, MDP) openly favoured by Evren, ran a poor last, among the three political parties that had been allowed by the military. Instead, the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) led by Turgut Özal won. Initially Özal, as Prime Minister, shared with Evren responsibility only for law and order that ‘could not be handled without military participation’. However, as time passed, Özal took these powers into his own hands.

The 28 February 1997 coup

Seventeen years after the 1980 military intervention, the military intervened once more. This time the so-called ‘post-modern’ intervention comprised two phases, 28 February 1997 and 13 September 1997, showing that the years of the military intervention had not come to a definitive end. An escalation in April of the long-continuing Kurdish Worker’s Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK) terrorist campaign once again led to concerns for national unity. Furthermore, both the military and the secular middle strata had begun to feel anxious about political Islam being a risk for Turkey. Yet, Tansu Çiller (chairperson of the centre-right secularist True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) formed a coalition government with Necmettin Erbakan’s religiously oriented Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), overlooking the strong civil–military discordance at the time. Sure enough, the said tension ended up in the soft-coup on 28 February 1997 with the National Security Council issuing 18 measures against ‘the Islamic threat’ and, in the process, obliging the government to resign. The latter did so in June 1997.⁶

6 It should also be noted here that on 13 September 1997, Mesut Yılmaz, who had formed another coalition government when the Çiller–Erbakan coalition came to an end, asked the military twice to restrain its continuing ‘anti Islamist campaign’. First, the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, General Erol Özkasnak, responded to Yılmaz by saying, ‘from now on, do not intervene in our affairs’, and, secondly, the Chief of the General Staff, General İsmail Karadayı, indicated in a press statement that Islamism ... would remain the primary concern of the military...’ (Narlı 2011).

The 2007–2013 failed Ergenekon coup plot

The ‘terrorist’ organisation *Ergenekon*, known as the ‘deep state’ since 1997, was alleged to be a clandestine secularist ultra-nationalist organisation, with ties to the military and security forces, that made plans to overthrow the government through illegal and violent means. The organisation was revealed in 2007 as a result of the detection of 27 hand grenades in a shanty house in the Ümraniye district of Istanbul, which were claimed to belong to a retired non-commissioned officer. The investigations were broadened in a way that implicated many public figures including academics, deputies, journalists, lawyers, officers, and retired officers, including İlker Başbuğ, Chief of General Staff. These people were indicted for provoking the public to revolt against the government of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP). In 2013, the case was concluded, various punishments, including aggravated life imprisonment in the case of General Başbuğ, were handed out. However, the AKP government later declared that *Ergenekon* had been the handiwork of the Fethullah Gülen movement and everyone, including Başbuğ in March 2014, who had been handed various prison sentences, was acquitted.⁷

The 2016 failed coup

Still another, but this time unsuccessful, coup was attempted on 15 July 2016. This failed coup differed significantly from the previous military interventions. The coup attempt was organised by the members of Fethullah Gülen’s terrorist organisation (*Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü*, FETÖ) and carried out by some middle-ranking officers (major to colonel) and a few generals, primarily against the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and secondarily against the AKP government. It was the worst terrorist attack against citizens (leaving behind 240 killed, 1,440 wounded, 104 coup forces killed) and entailed a disproportionate use of military power (the use of heavy armour, tanks, assault helicopters, and war planes) against public institutions, and extrajudicial execution attempts on elected civilian elites (Gürcan 2016).

The attempt failed for two reasons: (1) the bulk of the upper command and other officers did not support it; (2) more significantly, while the rebel airplanes were flying above and bombing some strategic buildings such as Parliament, the President’s residence complex and the offices of Chief of the Staff, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called on the people directly and asked them to physically oppose the plotters! The latter did not hesitate in taking to the streets, facing rebels’ tanks, and preventing them from moving to their next targets. The failure of this coup attempt constituted a milestone in Turkish politics: whether they were aware of it or not, people themselves defended their laicist Republic and liberal democracy against a military coup basically organised by a religiously oriented movement.

Following the failed coup, those military officers who were assumed to have taken part or actively supported the coup attempt were dismissed from the military. On 28 July 2016, under a state of emergency decree law, 1,684 ranking officers in total and 44 per cent of Land Force generals, 58 per cent of Naval Force admirals, and 42 per cent of Air Force generals were formally discharged (Gürcan and Gisclon 2016, 1).

Initially, Gülen had given the impression that he was an adherent of pantheistic (mystic) Islam, that is having a moderate perspective on Islam, so much so that he was open to even ‘inter-faith and inter-civilizational dialogue’ (Sevindi 2008). After all, for some time Gülen had been considered to be an adherent of the Islamic practice Said Nursi (1876–1960) had advocated – shunning political ambition and focusing instead on a revival of personal faith

7 On Ergenekon, see (Aydınlı 2011; Bardakçı 2013).

through study, self-reform, and service for others (Turner and Horkuc 2009). Consequently, for some time, there had developed smooth relations between the Gülen movement and the AKP government and even the military in general had not been seriously disturbed by the movement.⁸ However, at some point, Gülen's communal mystic Islam seemed to be transformed into political Islam;⁹ and the movement successfully infiltrated the ranks of the military.¹⁰ In the process, some officers were persuaded to make a military intervention.

In the week following the coup, several names on a government list of suspected members of the movement turned out to be none other than the names of officers circulated during the 15 July coup among the plotters. Later, several testimonies on the coup attempt have implicated the Gülenists, as well as Gülen himself, and brought into the open at least part of the mystery surrounding their secret network within Turkey (Gürcan and Gisclon 2016). As time passed by, more telling evidence kept coming out. For instance, on 16 December 2017, one of the two major Istanbul newspapers, *Hürriyet*, published the copy of a letter dated 19 April 2015, from Gülen to a judge of the criminal court of the first instance in Istanbul, in which Gülen asks the judge to let free two members of 'their [FETÖ] organisation'.

Civil-military relations and the military itself has not been adversely affected by the failed coup. The president and prime minister, on the one hand, and chief of the General Staff on the other, continue to have harmonious relations. In its turn, in early February 2018, the Turkish military started a major and effective cross-border operation against some terrorist groups in Syria.

Normalisation

The military

Despite the fact that successful or failed military interventions have a long history in Turkey, all along the military has not taken a stance against democracy. The very first communique issued on the morning of the 1980 coup stated:

The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for the national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.

(Tachau and Heper 1983, 26)

Following the coup, Evren and his co-intervenors perceived the founding a political party as necessary because of their concern that if the pre-intervention style of politics remerged, 'Turkey could again drift into an authoritarian regime and it is possible that this time those who take power into their hands may not have faith in democracy' (Evren 1990, 68).

8 It should be noted here that, on the whole, the military in Turkey seem to be religious at the level of the individual and/or communal Islam (piety), not at the level of political Islam (Islamism).

9 I take 'political Islam' here as Islam at the level of the government/state, not Islam at the level of community and/or individual.

10 One of the rebel officers was none other than the aide-de-camp of the then chief of the General Staff, İlker Başbuğ,

By the 2000s, three successive chiefs of the General Staff have agreed with Evren's emphasis on the need for a democratic system of government in Turkey. General Hilmi Özkök (2002–2006) stated:

[In Turkey], the duties and functions of the military have been designated by law and the Turkish Armed Forces are expected to conform to that legislation. Since those laws were enacted by the representatives of the people, the situation in Turkey does not deviate from the universally valid principle of “civilian control over military.”

General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2006–2008) in turn remarked: ‘Nobody [including the military] is and may be against democratic values and the use of democratic values [by the people or their representatives]’. Along the same lines, General İlker Başbuğ remarked: ‘Democracy is the most important characteristic of the Republic. The Turkish Armed Forces has respect for democracy’ (Heper 2011, 242–244).¹¹

One of the first things the 15 July 2016 coup plotters did was take hostage the then chief of the Staff, General Hulusi Akar, as well as several other top generals in the early hours of the coup. Holding General Akar at gunpoint, the plotters insisted that he read aloud the coup declaration on TV. Despite the threats to his life, Akar refused. Since then, Akar–government relations have taken a form not unlike the civil–military relations in advanced democracies. Presently, neither oversteps its area of responsibility. Akar himself later became Minister of Defence in 2018.

Although since the early 1980s the top brass has come to have serious doubts about the wisdom of military interventions, might Turkey come face to face with another military intervention in the years to come? Compared to earlier times, the military once more taking power into its hands does not seem probable. This is because for a long time now the military in Turkey has been a professional organisation. It joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as early as 1952. Among other things, Turkish officers attended various military schools in other NATO countries and participated in several military exercises. The officers have gone through a university level of education. Furthermore, in the navy, in 2017, 5.1 per cent of naval officers have Ph.D. degrees and 23.9 per cent Masters degrees (Gürcan 2015, 7). It is no wonder that the military in Turkey is considered highly effective and efficient and thus is viewed as the most prestigious and respectable institution in the country.¹²

For a long time, the military considered itself as the guardian of laicism. In a 2017 poll, 49.1 per cent of the officers thought laicism was not under threat, while 11.2 per cent did not respond to that question. On the other hand, in the same poll, 30.7 per cent of officers reported that during the holy month of Ramadan, they ‘partially’ fast, and 22.0 per cent indicated that they try to do so during the entire month of Ramadan (Müftüler-Baç 2005, 12–13). Under the circumstances the military would not be bothered by the fact that since 2002 Turkey has been governed by a religiously oriented political party. In any case, the party in question is led by politicians who are pious, not Islamic.

While it is true that the 70.9 per cent of officers are not satisfied with the way democracy functions in Turkey (the same poll), the vast majority of officers (95 per cent) nevertheless think that democracy is the *only* legitimate system of government.

11 All three statements cited in Heper (2011).

12 See Müftüler-Baç (2005).

During recent decades, while successive governments were clipping their wings in several ways in the hope that this would facilitate Turkey's becoming a full member of the EU, the military brass did not oppose this because 'doing so would have adversely affected their credibility and legitimacy in the polity' (Sarıgil 2017, 51). Finally, although it would have its impact only in the years to come, it is apt to indicate here that according to the above poll, the elitist view is decreasing among officers as the rank decreases, and the egalitarian view that society and the officer corps should be more equal is, in turn, increasing (Gürcan 2017, 51).

It should also be noted here that the 2010 EU progress report with regard to Turkey becoming a full member mentioned positive developments in Turkish civil–military relations. Indeed, the Turkish military seems to have left behind the times of being frequently outspoken on issues it considered critical for the country. Retired General Halit Edip Başer, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, stated:

Top generals within Turkish Armed Forces ... had expressed their concerns ... about the National Security Committee several times. Despite this, government pushed for reform. The military had two options: to comply with the reform or ... do what is necessary [intervention]. The second option would damage the EU accession and the military would be blamed as an obstacle to further integration with the EU. The military felt itself obliged to choose the first option.

(Gürcan 2017, 51)

As noted earlier, for civil–military relations in Turkey, laicism has always been a critical issue. Taking this state of affairs into account, the AKP attempted to render laicism a non-issue. For this very purpose, from the very beginning, the party inserted into its party programme the following:

Freedom of conscience is utmost importance ... The state should not be able to impose its own dogma upon society. [Yet], religion is a common value system; nobody has a right to use it for partisan purposes and thus give rise to divisions in society and politics.

(Heper 2006, 349)

Since then, the AKP acted accordingly, trying to eradicate the possibility of using the pretext that laicism in Turkey is under threat as an excuse for another military intervention.

For the same purpose, several reforms were made to enable civilians to exercise further supervision over the military. Those reforms included, among others, providing greater transparency in defence and policy-making, rendering parliamentary oversight over the military more effective, and bringing to an end the presence of military representatives in civilian institutions. More significantly, as part of these reform projects, the MGK, that earlier had been the main tool for shaping military policies, was, for all practical purposes, rendered functionless. The MGK became unable to play a role in the making of national security policy. It could no longer devise psychological operation plans and prepare plans concerning military mobilisation and war. Today, the MGK can undertake only those tasks that the Presidency has assigned it (Sarıgil 2017, 45–47).

Also, from 28 July 2016 onwards, several rather significant reorganisations were decided upon in order to transfer the administration of some military-related institutions to civilian institutions. In this context, the Supreme Military Council was going to have deputy prime

ministers and foreign, interior, and justice ministers as its members, while a number of military officers would be dismissed. The Land, Navy and Air Force commands were to be affiliated with the Defence Ministry and the Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard Command were to be brought under the control of the Interior Ministry. Other such reforms with the same purpose included: (1) shutting down all the military schools and founding in their place a new National Defence University; (2) transferring the Ministry of Defence's task of disciplining military judges in the military courts to civilian judges in civilian courts and soon doing away with the military justice system altogether; finally, (3) placing all military hospitals under the Ministry of Health, and bringing all shipyards, factories, and industrial establishments under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence (Sarıgil 2017, 2–3).

Conclusion

Republican Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire a community culturally divided into centre and periphery (Mardin 1974). That cultural division between the elite and the people continued in different ways and means until the 1980s. In the 1980s, Turgut Özal played an important role in bringing the people from the periphery to the centre, and during the first decade of the 2000s, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan helped those people to transform into an economic middle class, politically effective and laicist-pious (Heper 2013). Indeed, in recent years, the above-mentioned middle class has become the guardian of democracy as a reaction to the military frequently poking its nose into civilian issues (Şatana 2011, 288). In a 2009 public opinion survey, 65 per cent of the respondents hoped that the military would no longer express its views on civilian matters (Sarıgil 2011, 176). For some time now, the military has, in fact, been withdrawing from the civilian sphere, albeit cautiously (Şatana 2011, 288).

One may suggest that, concerning their preferences on lifestyles and religion, the members of the middle classes also resemble respondents to a 2006 nationwide survey; 75.2 per cent of the latter stated that in leading a modern lifestyle the president of the republic should be a role-model for the people, while they were also of the opinion that the same president should be a practicing Muslim (Heper 2009, 416). There *is* a social-political propinquity between the members of this class and the members of the officer class. As noted above, more than 50 per cent of officers fast during the holy month of Ramadan. Indeed, the military in Turkey is defined as a 'Prophet's hearth' (Narlı 2000, 118). It has been hinted that the increased propinquity between civilians and officers could facilitate the military's adaptation to the changing social environment (Karaosmanoğlu 2011, 261).

On the question of how the military can be rendered subordinate to civilians, Samuel P. Huntington has advised to keep the military away from civilians and render them professionals preoccupied with the military issues, while Morris Janowitz has placed emphasis on the internalisation by the military of civilian cultural norms and values (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971). In regard to the history of civil–military relations in Turkey, Gürcan and Gisclon (2016, 6–9) have arrived at a new paradigm: 'Less Huntington, more Janowitz'. It makes sense.

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